The final two Metaphysical Expositions argue that our original representation of space must be intuitive. I draw some surprising connections between Kant’s discussion and Leibniz’s account of the continuum. These connections indicate that the point of Kant’s analysis of <space> is to show that our original representation of space is infinitely complex in content. Since no discursive representation can be infinitely complex, our concept <space> cannot derive its content from discursive spontaneity. Its content must rather be given to the mind in order to be thought at all and thus originates in receptive intuition. Kant’s argument does not hinge on the singularity or holistic structure of space, as many hold, but on its infinite complexity and consequent givenness. I develop a novel account of the discursivity of conceptual representation that preserves the validity of Kant’s argument, defend Kant’s account of the infinity of space against prominent objections, and finally indicate how Kant’s argument entails the singularity of intuition (rather than presupposing it).

This chapter explores Wagner’s rhetorical elisions across three substantives essential to eighteenth- and nineteenth-century conceptual history: nature, culture, and humanity. It begins by explicating Wagner’s engagement with contemporary philosophies of language, cognition, and climate in developing the racialised identities and implications of these interlocked categories. Disclosing Wagner’s participation in what philosopher Stephen Haymes describes as an ‘axiological preference for Western “holism” regarding what is valued’, this chapter suggests that his nature-thinking enforced an exclusionary humanism by elevating a Germanic subset of nature, culture, and humanity as solely deserving these monolithic titles.

The chapter concludes by exploring Wagner’s treatment of these categories in his libretti, particularly in Siegfried’s ‘forest murmurs’. Where some stage directors have sought to resuscitate Wagner by suggesting that his environmental imagery is separable from his infamous racism, this chapter ultimately argues that these conceptual paradigms were inextricably entwined, and were part of a synthetic regime of knowledge.

Authors are commonly thought to have a privileged position when it comes to the interpretation of their texts. Since treaties are consensual instruments, it is not surprising that the parties have a say in the interpretation of their treaties. At the same time, treaties cannot escape what is the fate of every text: the possibility to read a text in the absence of its author is structurally inscribed in it. This chapter examines the ways in which the parties can influence treaty interpretation in various phases of the life of the treaties. It also accounts for the diminishing state authority in the modern practice of treaty interpretation.

This chapter explores theories of revolution that propose psychological factors as the main driving force for intergroup change. These theories include social identity theory, psychodynamic theory, justice theories, equity theory, and relative deprivation theory. A number of the theories that also give importance to material conditions, such as system justification theory, also give importance to psychological factors through concepts such as false consciousness. The irrationalist perspective of psychodynamic theory is also integral to a number of the other theories discussed in this chapter because of the pervasive assumption that often people are unaware of what is influencing their participation in collective action and displacement of aggression. The most influential contemporary theory is social identity theory, and the key experiment associated with this theory, the minimal group paradigm, is critically discussed. The complex role of relative deprivation and perceived justice is discussed, with reference to fraternal deprivation and equity theory.

Among the diversity of perspectives for studying the nexus of evolution and human behavior, human behavioral ecology (HBE) emerged as the study of the adaptive nature of behavior as a function of socioecological context. This volume explores the history and diversification of HBE, a field which has grown considerably in the decades since its emergence in the 1970s. At its core, the principles of HBE have remained a clear and cogent way to derive predictions about the adaptive function of behavior, even as the questions and methods of the discipline have evolved to be more interdisciplinary and more synergistic with other fields in the evolutionary social sciences. This introductory chapter covers core concepts, including methodological individualism, conditional strategies, and optimization. The chapter then provides an overview of the state of the field, including a summary of current research topics, areas, and methods. The chapter concludes by emphasizing the integral role that human behavioral ecology continues to play in deepening scholarly understandings of human behavior.

This chapter examines mind uploading, in which one allegedly thwarts death by “uploading” oneself to a computer. This chapter examines various possible ontologies which might be associated with “uploaded” persons: the non-self view; the view that they would be immaterial souls; the view that they would be computers, or particular physical parts of computers; the view that they would be patterns; the view that they would be simulated objects. Various problems with each proposal are identified. An additional problem is discussed: regardless of which personal ontology is true with respect to us now (pre-upload), it seems doubtful that one could be moved into a computer by way of the processes which would be involved in mind uploading (e.g., copying one’s mental states to a computer). Finally, practical matters are considered, chief among them being the question of whether one should attempt to “upload” oneself if given the opportunity.

Why educate? This question has been considered throughout history and around the world. Many reasons and rationales have been proposed. Some are overlapping, while others are competing. Considering why to educate is important for considering how to educate: that is, what policies, curriculum, and pedagogy to use, in relation to purposes. This chapter discusses some of the major frameworks underpinning various educational practices that have taken place historically and today. The aim is to elaborate ethical frameworks as they relate to justifications for educational practices, before giving some examples to clarify and demonstrate how choices among frameworks make a difference in relation to practice. Additionally, the chapter considers some of the noteworthy limitations of each.

This chapter begins by addressing settler colonialism and how it has affected and influenced educational practices in the United States. The authors discuss how they define decolonization and ask themselves and their readers if it is truly possible to decolonize schooling in the United States. They offer the concept of a critical settler consciousness to push back against settler colonization, and give multiple examples of communities and schools that are decolonizing their curriculums. The authors emphasize that decolonizing the curriculum is not easy; it is complicated, convoluted, and often unclear. They conclude that there is hope in the communities, parents, and students employing decolonizing practices to educate their young people.

The Afterword summarises the previous seven chapters, arguing that theosis is not a gnostic type of spiritualisation that de-creates us but the bringing of creation as a whole to its ultimate fulfilment.

The sixth chapter examines the patristic revivals of theosis in the early twentieth century by the Russian émigré theologians of the ’Paris School’, principally through the work of Myrrha Lot-Borodine, Vladimir Lossky, and the later Bulgakov. The first two of these writers engage with modern theologians partly to differentiate Orthodoxy from its new Catholic environment and partly (especially in Lossky’s case) to enable Western theology to enrich itself through interacting with Orthodox thinking.

This chapter explores some central features of morality in terms of what are commonly regarded as virtues. A virtue is a disposition that is an important feature of one’s character. As such, a virtue endures over an extended period of time, not just for a brief moment. Still, a virtue such as honesty implies its regular exercise. However, one can occasionally behave dishonestly without this undermining its standing as one’s virtue. The notion that some emphasis on basic moral virtues should be included in K-12 and college education has long received strong public support. However, there has also been widespread disagreement about just how this should be done and with what ends in mind. Presumably, some general uncertainty, if not disagreement, about the nature and foundation of morality accounts for much of this. This uncertainty is discussed in terms of reasonableness.

The aim of this chapter is to explore how social choice theory and the capability approach can help in clarifying important ethical dilemmas and issues of injustice that need to be addressed for cities to become sustainable cities. Six types of important injustices are identified, covering both intra- and intergenerational fairness. Some important criticisms of smart cities are considered and important safeguards and policy priorities for smart cities from the social choice and capability approach framings are identified. The main message of this chapter is that the sustainability of cities is an ethical issue and not one of technology or measurement, and it is all about the six types of injustices, with cities needing to tackle all six of them in their quest to become sustainable. Nudging and smart cities can help, but these must be contextualized to prioritize participation and equality. Social choice theory as formulated by Amartya Sen provides important insights to understand and deal with conflicts between the different demands on the freedoms of different individuals.