The purpose of the present study was to investigate the effect of perceived time pressure on a learning-based task called the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). One hundred and sixty-three participants were randomly assigned to one of two groups. The experimental group was informed that the time allotted was typically insufficient to learn and successfully complete the task. The control group was informed that the time allotted was typically sufficient to learn and successfully complete the task. Both groups completed the IGT and performance was recorded. The major finding was that participants who were advised that the amount of time allotted was typically insufficient to complete the task performed significantly worse than those who were advised that time was typically sufficient to complete the task.

Some studies have found that choices become more risk averse after gains and more risk seeking after losses, although other studies have found the opposite. The latter tend to use hypothetical cases that encourage deliberation. In the current study, we examined the effects of prior gains and losses on a task designed to encourage less reflective decision making, the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). Fifty participants conducted a manipulated decision-making task in which one group gained money, whereas the other group lost money, followed by the IGT. Participants who experienced a prior monetary loss displayed more risky choice behavior on the IGT than subjects who experienced a prior gain. These effects were not mediated by a positive or negative affect, although the sample size may have been too small to detect a small effect.

Researchers in the decision making tradition usually analyze multiple decisions within experiments by aggregating choices across individuals and using the individual subject as the unit of analysis. This approach can mask important variations and patterns within the data. Specifically, it ignores variations in decisions across a task or game and possible influences of characteristics of the subject or the experiment on these variations. We demonstrate, by reanalyzing data from two previously published articles, how a mixed model analysis addresses these limitations. Our results, with a modified Iowa gambling task and a prisoner's dilemma game, illustrate the ways in which such an analysis can test hypotheses not possible with other techniques, is more parsimonious, and is more likely to be faithful to theoretical models.

Prospect Theory predicts that people tend to be more risk seeking if their reference point is perceived as a loss and more risk averse when the reference point is perceived as a gain. In line with this prediction, Franken, Georgieva, Muris and Dijksterhuis (2006) showed that young adults who had a prior experience of monetary gains make more safe choices on subsequent decisions than subjects who had an early experience of losses. There are no experimental studies on how experiencing prior gains and losses differently influences young and older adults on a subsequent decision-making task (the Iowa Gambling Task). Hence, in the current paper, adapting the methodology employed by Franken et al.’s (2006), we intended to test the generality of their effect across the life span. Overall, we found that subjects who experienced prior monetary gains or prior monetary losses did not display significant differences in safe/risky choices on subsequent performance in the Iowa Gambling task. Furthermore, the impact of prior gains and losses on risky/safe card selection did not significantly differ between young and older adults. These results showed that the effect found in the Franken et al.’s study (2006) is limited in its generality.

The present research aimed to test the role of mood in the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara et al., 1994). In the IGT, participants can win or lose money by picking cards from four different decks. They have to learn by experience that two decks are overall advantageous and two decks are overall disadvantageous. Previous studies have shown that at an early stage in this card-game, players begin to display a tendency towards the advantageous decks. Subsequent research suggested that at this stage, people base their decisions on conscious gut feelings (Wagar & Dixon, 2006). Based on empirical evidence for the relation between mood and cognitive processing-styles, we expected and consistently found that, compared to a negative mood state, reported and induced positive mood states increased this early tendency towards advantageous decks. Our results provide support for the idea that a positive mood causes stronger reliance on affective signals in decision-making than a negative mood.

We investigated how frequency and amount of punishment affect the decision making of Iranian subjects. In our first experiment, performing a computer-based Persian version of the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), our subjects scored remarkably lower than their Western counterparts. Moreover, our subjects chose more frequently and more rapidly from decks that had less frequent but larger amounts of punishments in comparison to decks that had more frequent punishments with smaller amounts. In our second experiment, subjects did not differentiate between decks with the same frequency of punishment but with different punishment amounts. However, among decks with the same amount but different frequency of punishment, a significant preference was apparent towards decks with less frequency of punishment. Our results differ from previous studies, indicating a different strategy in risky decision making among healthy adult Iranian subjects, as they show low attention to the amount of punishment and are more concerned with the frequency of punishment.

To identify factors which may help or hinder decision-making ability in people with psychosis, we did a systematic review and meta-analysis of their performance on the Iowa and Cambridge Gambling Tasks. Analysis of 47 samples found they had moderately poorer performance than healthy individuals (N = 4264, g = −0.57, 95% confidence interval (CI) −0.66 to −0.48). Few studies (k = 8) used non-psychotic clinical comparator groups, although very low-quality evidence (k = 3) found people with bipolar disorder may perform better. Negative symptoms (k = 13, N = 648, r = −0.17, 95% CI −0.26 to −0.07) and lower IQ (k = 11, N = 525, r = 0.20, 95% CI 0.29–0.10), but not positive symptoms (k = 10, N = 512, r = −0.01, 95% CI −0.11 to 0.08), each had small-moderate associations with poorer decision-making. Lower quality evidence suggested general symptoms, working memory, social functioning, awareness of emotional responses to information, and attentional bias towards gain are associated with decision-making, but not education, executive functioning or overall symptoms. Meta-regression suggested an inverse association between decision-making and depression severity (k = 6, Q = 6.41, R2 100%, p = 0.01). Those taking first-generation (k = 6, N = 305, g = −0.17, 95% CI −0.40 to 0.06, p = 0.147) or low-dose antipsychotics (k = 5, N = 442, g = −0.19, 95% CI −0.44 to 0.06, p = 0.139) had unimpaired decision-making. Although meta-regression found no linear association between dose and performance, non-reporting of the dose was common and associated with larger impairments (k = 46, Q = 4.71, R2 14%, p = 0.03). Those supporting people with psychosis to make decisions, including treatment decisions, should consider the potential effect of these factors. Interventionist-causal trials are required to test whether reducing antipsychotic dose and treating anxiety and depression can improve decision-making in this group.

Objectives: Good glycemic control is an important goal of diabetes management. Late adolescents with type 1 diabetes (T1D) are at risk for poor glycemic control as they move into young adulthood. For a subset of these patients, this dysregulation is extreme, placing them at risk for life-threatening health complications and permanent cognitive declines. The present study examined whether deficiency in emotional decision making (as measured by the Iowa Gambling Task; IGT) among teens with T1D may represent a neurocognitive risk factor for subsequent glycemic dysregulation. Methods: As part of a larger longitudinal study, a total of 241 high-school seniors (147 females, 94 males) diagnosed with T1D underwent baseline assessment that included the IGT. Glycated hemoglobin (HbA1c), which reflects glycemic control over the course of the past 2 to 3 months, was also assessed at baseline. Of the 241,189 (127 females, 62 males, mean age=17.76, mean HbA1c=8.11) completed HbA1c measurement 1 year later. Results: Baseline IGT performance in the impaired range (per norms) was associated with greater dysregulation in glycemic control 1 year later, as evidenced by an average increase in HbA1c of 2%. Those with normal IGT scores (per norms) exhibited a more moderate increase in glycemic control, with an HbA1c increase of 0.7%. Several IGT scoring approaches were compared, showing that the total scores collapsed across all trials was most sensitive to change in glycemic control. Conclusions: IGT assessment offers promise as a tool for identifying late adolescents at increased risk for glycemic dysregulation. (JINS, 2017, 23, 204–213)

Aging has been associated with several brain changes that often affect the cognitive functioning of adults, but changes in executive functions, particularly in the field of decision making, have not been fully investigated. The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) is a widely used tool to evaluate decision making, but little is known about the effect of age on its results. This study used the IGT and compared healthy young (n= 40) and elderly (n = 40) adults to evaluate their decision making processes. There were significant differences in the learning curve of the two age groups, but no difference in overall IGT performance. The results for the first IGT block were different from those of the rest of the task, and the group of elderly adults had a better performance in this block. Elderly adults also showed a preference for deck A, the one that resulted in greater losses. Findings confirmed the results of other studies, which reported that the IGT block score is the variable with the greatest sensitivity to age in this instrument.

We examined decision-making in young adulthood in a follow-up study of females diagnosed with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) between 6 and 12 years. Participants with childhood ADHD (n = 114) and matched comparison females (n = 77), followed prospectively for 10 years, performed the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) at ages 17–25 years. This task assesses preference for high-reward/high-risk chances that result in lower overall gains (disadvantageous decks of cards) compared to low-reward/low-risk chances that result in higher overall gains (advantageous decks of cards). Relative to comparison participants, young adult females with a history of ADHD did not increase their preference for advantageous decks across time blocks, suggesting difficulties in learning to change behavior over the course of the IGT. Overall, childhood diagnoses of ADHD were associated with disadvantageous decision-making in young adulthood. These results extend findings on decision-making in males with ADHD by demonstrating comparable levels of impairment in an all-female sample. (JINS, 2013, 19, 1–5)

The detection of executive deficits in early behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD) is crucial, as impairments in the executive domain constitute an important diagnostic feature of the newly proposed diagnostic criteria for bvFTD. Our group has recently demonstrated that classical executive tests fail to detect the executive deficits of a subgroup of early bvFTD patients. When administered an executive and social cognition battery (ESCB) that includes tasks that mimic everyday scenarios (e.g., affective decision-making, planning and organization, theory of mind), however, the performance of those bvFTD patients differed significantly from that of controls. One limitation of the ESCB is its lengthy nature (approximately 90 min). For this reason, the present study analyzes the usefulness of alternative shorter versions of this battery. We propose one particular two-task combination that demands approximately 30 min for its administration and scoring, and which presents similar discriminatory accuracy as that of the complete ESCB, while maintaining its significantly superior capacity to detect subtle executive deficits in bvFTD patients relative to classical executive tests. We suggest that, in clinical settings where tools, time, or human resources are scarce, this abbreviated ESCB may be useful in the detection of subtle yet impairing executive impairments of patients with bvFTD. (JINS, 2010, 16, 687–694.)

The goal of the current investigation was to address whether affective decision making would serve as a unique neuropsychological marker to predict drinking behaviors among adolescents. We conducted a longitudinal study of 181 Chinese adolescents in Chengdu city, China. In their 10th grade (ages 15–16), these adolescents were tested for their affective decision-making ability using the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) and working memory capacity using the Self-Ordered Pointing Test. Self-report questionnaires were used to assess academic performance and drinking behaviors. At 1-year follow-up, questionnaires were completed to assess drinking behaviors, and the UPPS Impulsive Behavior Scale was used to examine four dimensions of impulsivity: urgency, lack of premeditation, lack of perseverance, and sensation seeking. Results indicated that those adolescents who progressed to binge drinking or exhibited consistent binge drinking not only performed poorly on the IGT but also scored significantly higher in urgency compared to those who never or occasionally drank. Moreover, better IGT scores predicted fewer drinking problems and fewer drinks 1 year later after controlling for demographic variables, the previous drinking behaviors, working memory, and impulsivity. These findings suggest that deficits in affective decision making may be important independent determinants of compulsive drinking and potentially addictive behavior in adolescents. (JINS, 2009, 15, 547–557.)

The purpose of this study was to evaluate longitudinally, using the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), the dynamics of decision-making capacity at a two-year interval (median: 2.1 years) in a group of patients with multiple sclerosis (MS) (n = 70) and minor neurological disability [Expanded Disability Status Scale (EDSS) ≤ 2.5 at baseline]. Cognition (memory, executive functions, attention), behavior, handicap, and perceived health status were also investigated. Standardized change scores [(score at retest-score at baseline)/standard deviation of baseline score] were computed. Results showed that IGT performances decreased from baseline to retest (from 0.3, SD = 0.4 to 0.1, SD = 0.3, p = .005). MS patients who worsened in the IGT were more likely to show a decreased perceived health status and emotional well-being (SEP-59; p = .05 for both). Relapsing rate, disability progression, cognitive, and behavioral changes were not associated with decreased IGT performances. In conclusion, decline in decision making can appear as an isolated deficit in MS. (JINS, 2009, 15, 291–295.)