U.S. states are sovereign entities and can’t declare bankruptcy as cities and municipalities. This paper examines the impact of a switch in sovereign bankruptcy rules that allows declaring bankruptcy from an economics model perspective. Allowing bankruptcy increases ex-ante risks for the government to refuse repayment, but provides ex-post benefits of reducing default costs and saving federal bailouts. This paper provides a simple framework to analyze this tradeoff. Event analysis shows that an unexpected switch in bankruptcy rules that allows for bankruptcy would decrease government debt-to-GDP ratio by 9.2 percentage points, increase consumption by 0.69 percent, but increase spread by 1.1 percentage points.

The Latin American debt crisis consumed the 1980s and was not restricted to Latin America. Starting from the August 1982 Mexican weekend, the crisis had three phases: Concerted Lending (1982-5), Baker Plan (1985-9) and Brady Plan (1989 to mid 1990s). This article describes the evolution of the debt strategy and the road to embracing debt write-downs at the end of the decade. In the absence of an external coordinating mechanism, four groups of parties had to reach agreement on any change in the strategy: the borrowing countries, their commercial bank lenders, the home-country authorities of those lenders, and the International Monetary Fund as the principal international institution. Each group could effectively veto any change in the strategy. This need for consensus is lesson number one from the 1980s for today. Lesson number two is that political economy aspects dictated that the strategy be implemented on a case-by-case basis. The article concludes with an application of these lessons to a similar, but even more global, potential debt crisis in the wake of the COVID pandemic.

The deleterious effect of debt restructuring on banks’ balance sheets and, consequently, on the economy as a whole has been a key policy issue. This paper studies how post-default fiscal policy interacts with this sovereign-bank loop and shape the response of a model economy. Calibration of the model matches characteristics of the Greek economy at the time of the bond exchange. Debt restructuring in place of higher lump-sum taxation or lower nonproductive government spending harms the economy even if no other cost of default is considered. However, the sovereign-debt loop is less costly to the economy than increases in labor or capital taxes to service debt. Even so, if fiscal policy is too responsive, a crowding-out effect inhibits the recovery of capital markets, hence a more conservative fiscal stance is desirable. Thus, how diabolic the post-default sovereign-bank loop is depends to a large extent on the way fiscal policy responds.

Between June 1959 and March 1964, the democratic governments of Brazilian presidents Juscelino Kubitschek (January 1956 – January 1961), Janio Quadros (January–August 1961), Ranieri Mazzilli (August–September 1961) and João ‘Jango’ Goulart (September 1961 – April 1964) received no support from the World Bank (WB), which refused to fund even a single new project during this period. During this same period, and, more specifically, between July 1958 and January 1965, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the WB's twin institution, granted financial assistance to Brazil only twice: a controversial and highly conditional Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) signed in May 1961; and a non-conditional and automatically approved Compensatory Financial Facility (CFF), granted in May 1963 to compensate Brazil for the decrease in coffee prices on the international market.

This attitude towards Brazil changed significantly following the military coup of March 1964. Money flowed into the country and by 1970 Brazil had become the largest receiver of WB funds and a chronic borrower from the IMF, signing two SBAs in 1965, and one per year between 1966 and 1972. We use recently disclosed material from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank archives to analyse the relationship of these two institutions with Brazil and to foster the debate on their political neutrality, arguing that the difference in the IMF's and especially the WB's relations with the military regime reflected, more than anything else, the existence of an ideological affinity between the parties with regards to the ‘right’ economic policy.

This article analyses the reasons why most Latin American governments frequently defaulted on their debts during the nineteenth century. Contrary to previous works, which focused on domestic factors, I argue that supply-side factors were equally important. The regulatory framework at the London Stock Exchange prevented defaulting governments from having access to the capital market. Therefore, the implicit incentive for underwriting banks and governments was to accelerate negotiations with bondholders, particularly during periods of high liquidity. Frequently, however, settlements were short-lived. In contrast, certain merchant banks opted to delay or refuse a settlement if they judged that the risk of a renewed default was too high. In such cases, even if negotiations were extended, the final agreements were more often respected, allowing governments to improve their repayment record.

This special issue celebrates the career of Youssef Cassis. The introduction will outline his major contributions from his initial work on social characteristics of the financiers of the City of London, and their relationship with landed aristocrats and industry, through his analysis of a succession of financial centres, the comparative study of big business, the relationship between finance and politics, to his new project on the memory of financial crises. Then, we will draw on Youssef's mode of analysis to consider some of the more pressing issues in the era since the global financial crisis and the impact of Covid-19. We will consider the role of central banks, the challenge of fintech, the impact of low interest rates on inequality, savings and debt, and the potential shift in financial centres and reserve currencies with the rise of China. We will conclude by arguing that the mode of analysis developed by Cassis over his long and productive career has never been more pertinent.

While the International Debt Crisis of the early 1980s was the most severe financial crisis since World War II and while national and international banking supervision was developing at that time, little is known about the response of supervisors to the deteriorating financial environment in the years preceding the crisis. Complementing the political and business history of the international debt situation, this article aims to unravel the international banking supervision side of the question. Based on archival material from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and various central banks, the article examines how the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), then emerging as the leading forum on international banking supervision, anticipated the International Debt Crisis through the prism of ‘country risk’. The article shows that the Committee refused to recommend strict regulations in this area. It argues that members adopted this position because of the lack of good information and the difficult position of banking supervision between macroeconomic issues and individual banks’ own responsibilities, but also because of somewhat excessive faith in market mechanisms. Their discussions on country risk shed light on critical challenges of banking supervision and, thereby, on the history of banking regulation and prudential thinking.

The economic advisers of the 1924 Dawes Committee enacted currency and banking reforms as a means of resolving financial and geopolitical problems. Although the committee members stated that they had no plans to resolve the Ruhr occupation, evidence from the technical advisers demonstrated the opposite. Economists Edwin Kemmerer, Joseph Davis and Arthur Young sought to appease Franco-Belgian demands for a resolution to the reparations debate by balancing the German budget and reorganising the banking system, thereby also addressing the question of military occupation. This research delves into the advisers’ reports on public finance, currency stabilisation and the gold standard, arguing that their attempts to assuage reparation-related concerns rested on major reforms to German central banking.

Through the analysis of Argentina-World Bank (WB) relations between 1971 and 1976, this article examines how democracies and dictatorships, as well as political and economic constraints did (or did not) impact WB lending to Latin America. This period is especially revealing. Between May 1971 and September 1976, the WB did not grant any new loans to Argentina, thereby generating an exceptional and unusually long break in WB lending to the country. Drawing on previously undisclosed files from the WB Archives and additional primary sources from Argentina and the United States, this article unveils the actual mechanisms, criteria and justification that stood behind the decision to lend or not to lend to Argentina. It maintains that the WB’s self-imposed principle of «neutrality» played a crucial role in facilitating the WB’s relations with Argentina during the politically and economically unstable early 1970s.

Geneva is host to the most ancient and venerable private banks of Switzerland, but not much is known about the circumstances in which the city allegedly developed an early competitive advantage in wealth management. Using an extraordinary qualitative source (Jacques Mirabaud's papers, and especially his memoirs), this article outlines the microstructure of Genevan private banking at the time of its emergence in the early nineteenth century. It finds that in those years, wealth managers’ ‘raw material’ did not consist of foreign capital, but of a remarkably abundant stock of domestic capital. Financial and social factors were intertwined in producing a very hierarchical division of labour in the origination and distribution of international sovereign loans.

This article examines Argentine relations with multilateral agencies and bankers during the first years of the last military dictatorship. It begins with an overview of relations and the external situation before the rise of the military and why a new economic team sought and restored Argentine credit standing. There follows a review of how links with the U.S. Treasury and international institutions lost significance and how cross-country financial intermediation, carried out mainly by leading state banks, gave foreign bankers a key role in the financing of Argentina’s foreign exchange needs. It also emphasises explicit and underlying motivations in the behaviour and policies of all actors involved and offers an evaluation of former Minister Martínez de Hoz’s efforts to justify these policies in the early 1980s.

Numerous archival documents show how the suspension of payments by Philip II, in September 1575, on the contracts with Genoese bankers (asientos) induced a freeze of the domestic credit market in Castile through the bankers’ intermediation for asientos and the credit interconnections. Commercial fairs stopped, banks failed and trade suffered while the king granted legal protection to the Genoese bankers. The evidence strikingly confirms that by his strategy, Philip II was able to remove the de facto ceiling on the domestic debt (juros) imposed by the fixed revenue commitment of the Castilian cities in the Cortes. The agreement with the bankers was signed in December 1577 immediately after the cities had agreed to the doubling of their commitment.

After the 2001 crisis, Turkey continued to pursue the radical market-oriented reform strategy that had started in the early 1980s and followed the philosophy of the Washington Consensus. Gross domestic product (GDP) growth in the post-2001 period was relatively high, but it was a “jobless” growth caused by substantial productivity increases generated largely by intensifying the work process rather than by technological advancements. Economic growth in the post-2001 period benefited society very unequally. The growth regime of Turkey is vulnerable owing to high current account deficit; high currency mismatch, particularly in the corporate sector; high income inequality; high unemployment; and an unsatisfactory development of the industrial sector, despite some successes. We recommend a new development regime with selective capital controls, a balanced current account, an active industrial policy by the government, stronger trade unions and employers’ associations engaged in social dialogue combined with coordinated wage bargaining on the sectoral level, and last but not least, redistributive policies aiming to achieve a more equal income distribution.

This paper examines sovereign lending to Latin America and the Caribbean from 1820 to 1913. We examine four waves of capital flows where defaults were followed by a return to market access. In spite of extended default, countries kept promising high returns that attracted international investors again and again: financial autarky thus gave way to eras of high integration to global markets as measured by sovereign risk pricing. We discuss imperfections of the sovereign debt institutional context in the region and discuss a menu of options that some countries used to seek funds in the global financial markets after defaults. The parallel with the modern Latin American and Caribbean sovereign bond market experience is striking.

This article provides a historical overview of the factors leading up to debt crises and the default mechanisms used by governments to solve them, ranging from repudiation and restructuring to inflation tax and financial repression. The paper also analyses the Spanish governments’ graduation to responsible public debt management under democracy and the last debt crisis starting in 2010. After analysing the evolution of the outstanding public debt, budget deficits, the Spanish economy's ability to borrow, the central government's debt affordability and the profile of public debt, the article concludes that the Spanish case confirms the main hypotheses of concerning international debt crises: short-term borrowing enhanced the risk of a debt crisis; insolvency problems arose when governments were unwilling or unable to repay debt; debt crises took place after large capital inflows; most outright defaults ended up being partial defaults; public debt level became unsustainable when it rose above 60-90 per cent of GDP; default trough inflation became commonplace when fiat money displaced coinage; financial repression was used as a subtle type of debt restructuring; and defaults endangered the creditworthiness of the Spanish Finance Ministry and forced disciplined fiscal policies.

Sovereign debts differ from other financial instruments because repayment ultimately depends on the issuers' willingness to pay. In turn, willingness to pay may be influenced by political, diplomatic or economic considerations. Based on an original database of Romanian bonds traded in Paris, this article shows that international diplomacy played an important role in the Romanian debt valuation.

Cet article développe un modèle intégrant le role de la monnaie et des flux de capitaux internationaux afin d'examiner la fragilité du système bancaire d'une petite économie ouverte dans un contexte de crise financière internationale. Le modèle met l'accent sur les décalages de maturité et de devises au niveau du bilan des banques et illustre comment la contraction du crédit sur le marché financier international, via les banques commerciales, impacte la monnaie et l'activité d'une petite économie. Les effets stabilisants du capital bancaire et du ratio minimal de capital sur le système bancaire sont également examinés. Par ailleurs, le modèle souligne qu'un secteur informel de dimension importante est un facteur défavorable àla stabilisation de la valeur de la monnaie et du système financier.

This article examines the potential conflict of interest of underwriters in London's foreign sovereign debt markets prior to the Baring crisis of 1890. We describe the main sources of information for investors concerning Argentina, whose government debt default contributed to Baring's collapse, and compare them with those of the underwriters, particularly Baring's. We then present some empirical evidence using data on bond prices and underwriting fees that demonstrate that Baring did not exploit its information lead to the detriment of investors. Finally, we present historical evidence that shows that Baring foresaw default before markets did and consequently planned a bailout loan that could not be issued due to political instability in Buenos Aires.

This article attempts to analyse the role that the Rothschild House played in the evolution of Spanish Public Finances along the 19th Century. Therefore, it endeavours to describe an elementary chronology of the relationships between the Spanish Government and the Rothschild House during the whole Century, analysing the main financial operations they underwrote, quantifying their annual aggregate figures and, finally, trying to comment upon the different consequences of the process above mentioned. To cover these aims, we have deployed original records from the Rothschild Archives in London and Paris, their contents having been supplemented with information from National Public Records in Spain and France, and other financial institutions, namely the Bank of Spain.

Dans un modèle à deux pays et à horizon infini, dans lequel la mobilité ducapital est imparfaite, on présente une analyse dynamique de la transmissioninternationale des chocs qui affectent les dépenses publiques. Trois typesde financements d’une augmentation des dépenses publiques sont comparés:l’imposition des salaires, l’imposition des revenus du capital à la sourceet l’imposition des revenus du capital selon le principe de taxation à larésidence. L’imposition des salaires ou des revenus du capital à la sourcecrée une réduction du produit dans le pays qui mène cette politique et uneaugmentation du produit à court terme à l’étranger. L’imposition des revenusdu capital de tous les résidents conduit, en introduisant un canalsupplémentaire de transmission internationale, à une baisse de la productionmondiale. Malgré cette baisse, le bien-être progresse dans le pays quiaugmente ses dépenses publiques.