In the years following FDA approval of direct-to-consumer, genetic-health-risk/DTCGHR testing, millions of people in the US have sent their DNA to companies to receive personal genome health risk information without physician or other learned medical professional involvement. In Personal Genome Medicine, Michael J. Malinowski examines the ethical, legal, and social implications of this development. Drawing from the past and present of medicine in the US, Malinowski applies law, policy, public and private sector practices, and governing norms to analyze the commercial personal genome sequencing and testing sectors and to assess their impact on the future of US medicine. Written in relatable and accessible language, the book also proposes regulatory reforms for government and medical professionals that will enable technological advancements while maintaining personal and public health standards.

After the establishment of the state of Israel, the Truman and the Eisenhower administrations tried to apply an even-handed policy towards Israel. Both administrations acted under the assumption that favouring Israel over its Arab neighbours would alienate the latter and would push them into Soviet arms. Washington was concerned that the Soviets would gain a foothold in the Middle East, which was under sway of the West. The very strong attachment of the United States towards Israel would preclude a truly even-handed policy. Israel needed urgent economic aid during its first years of existence, and while both administrations attempted to provide such assistance as a part of universal programmes of aid, they also helped Israel significantly more than what they were gave to other nations. Militarily, both administrations managed to thwart pressures to supply arms to Israel, but in the process, the set two principles ramifications lasting for years to come. The administrations argued that Israel was militarily stronger than its neighbours, and that if it was need, it could purchase arms from other suppliers. This meant that when the two provisions were no longer valid, the administration would supply arms to Israel. The establishment of the state of Israel also thrilled Americans from various walks of life, including Evangelicals and American Jews. The press delivered to the American people a message of a new, pioneering Israeli, justifying the American support for Israel and setting conditions for its continuation.

The 1958 Middle East crisis led to a change in the relations between the United States and Israel. The Eisenhower administration looked at Israel as a strategic ally in a region that fell under the sway of the Soviet Union. Hesitantly, the seeds for strategic cooperation between the two nations were being sown. The deepening strategic ties between the two nations led the American recognition that the Arab–Israeli conflict was conflated with the Cold War. Consequently, the United States recognized that Israel needed arms in order to maintain its strength whilst facing an Arab military challenge due to the Soviet military support for the Arab states. In a gradual process that began with President Eisenhower and culminated with President Lyndon Johnson, the United States became Israel’s main arm supplier. The 1967 June War further deepened the attachment between the two nations. Evangelicals cherished what they saw as the fulfilment of the prophecies about the restoration of the Jewish state, and the American people and politicians viewed the Israeli victory as additional proof of the Israelis’ high spirit and capabilities, especially when compared to the failing war in Vietnam. For Israel, which came to control more territories, the war provided an additional opportunity to deliver its messages to the United States through tourism diplomacy. The war also forced Israel to contemplate its place in the Middle East, with peace becoming a more plausible option.

When Robert McNamara accepted President Kennedy’s offer to serve as the United States’ eighth Secretary of Defense, the role was still new, a barely decade-old innovation emanating from World War II. As a young agency, the OSD was still defining its place in the national security decision-making landscape and, in so doing, trying to find the appropriate balance of power between civilian and military authorities. President Eisenhower had left the new administration with the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, a congressionally mandated program for change at the Department of Defense. McNamara recognized its sweeping potential to pave the way for his bureaucratic revolutions as the longest-serving Secretary of Defense.