Free choice sequences play a key role in the intuitionistic theory of the continuum and especially in the theorems of intuitionistic analysis that conflict with classical analysis, leading many classical mathematicians to reject the concept of a free choice sequence. By treating free choice sequences as potentially infinite objects, however, they can be comfortably situated alongside classical analysis, allowing a rapprochement of these two mathematical traditions. Building on recent work on the modal analysis of potential infinity, I formulate a modal theory of the free choice sequences known as lawless sequences. Intrinsically well-motivated axioms for lawless sequences are added to a background theory of classical second-order arithmetic, leading to a theory I call $MC_{LS}$. This theory interprets the standard intuitionistic theory of lawless sequences and is conservative over the classical background theory.

Elementary first-order theories of trees allowing at most, exactly $\mathrm{m}$, and any finite number of immediate descendants are introduced and proved mutually interpretable among themselves and with Robinson arithmetic, Adjunctive Set Theory with Extensionality and other well-known weak theories of numbers, sets, and strings.

We employ the lens provided by formal truth theory to study axiomatizations of Peano Arithmetic ${\textsf {(PA)}}$. More specifically, let Elementary Arithmetic ${\textsf {(EA)}}$ be the fragment $\mathsf {I}\Delta _0 + \mathsf {Exp}$ of ${\textsf {PA}}$, and let ${\textsf {CT}}^-[{\textsf {EA}}]$ be the extension of ${\textsf {EA}}$ by the commonly studied axioms of compositional truth ${\textsf {CT}}^-$. We investigate both local and global properties of the family of first order theories of the form ${\textsf {CT}}^-[{\textsf {EA}}] +\alpha $, where $\alpha $ is a particular way of expressing “${\textsf {PA}}$ is true” (using the truth predicate). Our focus is dominantly on two types of axiomatizations, namely: (1) schematic axiomatizations that are deductively equivalent to ${\textsf {PA}}$ and (2) axiomatizations that are proof-theoretically equivalent to the canonical axiomatization of ${\textsf {PA}}$.

Following the finitist’s rejection of the complete totality of the natural numbers, a finitist language allows only propositional connectives and bounded quantifiers in the formula-construction but not unbounded quantifiers. This is opposed to the currently standard framework, a first-order language. We conduct axiomatic studies on the notion of truth in the framework of finitist arithmetic in which at least smash function $\#$ is available. We propose finitist variants of Tarski ramified truth theories up to rank $\omega $, of Kripke–Feferman truth theory and of Friedman–Sheard truth theory, and show that all of these have the same strength as the finitist arithmetic of one higher level along Grzegorczyk hierarchy. On the other hand, we also show that adding Burgess-style groundedness schema, adjusted to the finitist setting, makes Kripke–Feferman truth theory as strong as primitive recursive arithmetic. Meanwhile, we obtain some basic results on finitist theories of (full and hat) inductive definitions and on the second order axiom of hat inductive definitions for positive operators.

In [17], we introduced an extensional variant of generic realizability [22], where realizers act extensionally on realizers, and showed that this form of realizability provides inner models of $\mathsf {CZF}$ (constructive Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory) and $\mathsf {IZF}$ (intuitionistic Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory), that further validate $\mathsf {AC}_{\mathsf {FT}}$ (the axiom of choice in all finite types). In this paper, we show that extensional generic realizability validates several choice principles for dependent types, all exceeding $\mathsf {AC}_{\mathsf {FT}}$. We then show that adding such choice principles does not change the arithmetic part of either $\mathsf {CZF}$ or $\mathsf {IZF}$.

Kristiansen and Murwanashyaka recently proved that Robinson arithmetic, Q, is interpretable in an elementary theory of full binary trees, T. We prove that, conversely, T is interpretable in Q by producing a formal interpretation of T in an elementary concatenation theory QT+, thereby also establishing mutual interpretability of T with several well-known weak essentially undecidable theories of numbers, strings, and sets. We also introduce a “hybrid” elementary theory of strings and trees, WQT*, and establish its mutual interpretability with Robinson’s weak arithmetic R, the weak theory of trees WT of Kristiansen and Murwanashyaka, and the weak concatenation theory WTCε of Higuchi and Horihata.

There has been a recent interest in hierarchical generalizations of classic incompleteness results. This paper provides evidence that such generalizations are readily obtainable from suitably formulated hierarchical versions of the principles used in the original proofs. By collecting such principles, we prove hierarchical versions of Mostowski’s theorem on independent formulae, Kripke’s theorem on flexible formulae, Woodin’s theorem on the universal algorithm, and a few related results. As a corollary, we obtain the expected result that the formula expressing “ $\mathrm {T}$ is $\Sigma _n$ -ill” is a canonical example of a $\Sigma _{n+1}$ formula that is $\Pi _{n+1}$ -conservative over $\mathrm {T}$ .

Following our [6], though with somewhat different methods here, further variants of Goodstein sequences are introduced in terms of parameterized Ackermann–Péter functions. Each of the sequences is shown to terminate, and the proof-theoretic strengths of these facts are calibrated by means of ordinal assignments, yielding independence results for a range of theories: PRA, PA, $\Sigma ^1_1$ -DC $_0$ , ATR $_0$ , up to ID $_1$ . The key is the so-called “Hardy hierarchy” of proof-theoretic bounding finctions, providing a uniform method for associating Goodstein-type sequences with parameterized normal form representations of positive integers.

Questions concerning the proof-theoretic strength of classical versus nonclassical theories of truth have received some attention recently. A particularly convenient case study concerns classical and nonclassical axiomatizations of fixed-point semantics. It is known that nonclassical axiomatizations in four- or three-valued logics are substantially weaker than their classical counterparts. In this paper we consider the addition of a suitable conditional to First-Degree Entailment—a logic recently studied by Hannes Leitgeb under the label HYPE. We show in particular that, by formulating the theory PKF over HYPE, one obtains a theory that is sound with respect to fixed-point models, while being proof-theoretically on a par with its classical counterpart KF. Moreover, we establish that also its schematic extension—in the sense of Feferman—is as strong as the schematic extension of KF, thus matching the strength of predicative analysis.

We investigate which part of Brouwer’s Intuitionistic Mathematics is finitistically justifiable or guaranteed in Hilbert’s Finitism, in the same way as similar investigations on Classical Mathematics (i.e., which part is equiconsistent with $\textbf {PRA}$ or consistent provably in $\textbf {PRA}$ ) already done quite extensively in proof theory and reverse mathematics. While we already knew a contrast from the classical situation concerning the continuity principle, more contrasts turn out: we show that several principles are finitistically justifiable or guaranteed which are classically not. Among them are: (i) fan theorem for decidable fans but arbitrary bars; (ii) continuity principle and the axiom of choice both for arbitrary formulae; and (iii) $\Sigma _2$ induction and dependent choice. We also show that Markov’s principle MP does not change this situation; that neither does lesser limited principle of omniscience LLPO (except the choice along functions); but that limited principle of omniscience LPO makes the situation completely classical.

In a recent article, Barrett & Halvorson (2016) define a notion of equivalence for first-order theories, which they call “Morita equivalence.” To argue that Morita equivalence is a reasonable measure of “theoretical equivalence,” they make use of the claim that Morita extensions “say no more” than the theories they are extending. The goal of this article is to challenge this central claim by raising objections to their argument for it and by showing why there is good reason to think that the claim itself is false. In light of these criticisms, this article develops a natural way for the advocate of Morita equivalence to respond. I prove that this response makes her criterion a special case of bi-interpretability, an already well-established barometer of theoretical equivalence. I conclude by providing reasons why the advocate of Morita equivalence should opt for a notion of theoretical equivalence that is defined in terms of interpretability rather than Morita extensions.

In this article we study proofs of some general forms of the Second Incompleteness Theorem. These forms conform to the Feferman format, where the proof predicate is fixed and the representation of the set of axioms varies. We extend the Feferman framework in one important point: we allow the interpretation of number theory to vary.

In this paper, we study finitely axiomatizable conservative extensions of a theory U in the case where U is recursively enumerable and not finitely axiomatizable. Stanisław Krajewski posed the question whether there are minimal conservative extensions of this sort. We answer this question negatively.

Consider a finite expansion of the signature of U that contains at least one predicate symbol of arity ≥ 2. We show that, for any finite extension α of U in the expanded language that is conservative over U, there is a conservative extension β of U in the expanded language, such that $\alpha \vdash \beta$ and $\beta \not \vdash \alpha$. The result is preserved when we consider either extensions or model-conservative extensions of U instead of conservative extensions. Moreover, the result is preserved when we replace $\dashv$ as ordering on the finitely axiomatized extensions in the expanded language by a relevant kind of interpretability, to wit interpretability that identically translates the symbols of the U-language.

We show that the result fails when we consider an expansion with only unary predicate symbols for conservative extensions of U ordered by interpretability that preserves the symbols of U.

We determine the proof-theoretic ordinals (i) of ${\cal C} - {\bf{TI}}[\alpha ]$, the transfinite induction along α, for any hyperarithmetical level ${\cal C}$, in the first order setting and (ii) of any combination of iterated arithmetical comprehension and ${\cal C} - {\bf{TI}}[\alpha ]$ for ${\cal C}\, \equiv \,{\rm{\Pi }}_k^i ,{\rm{\Sigma }}_k^i$ ($i\, = \,0,1$) in the second order setting.

A formula φ is called n-provable in a formal arithmetical theory S if φ is provable in S together with all true arithmetical ${{\rm{\Pi }}_n}$-sentences taken as additional axioms. While in general the set of all n-provable formulas, for a fixed $n > 0$, is not recursively enumerable, the set of formulas φ whose n-provability is provable in a given r.e. metatheory T is r.e. This set is deductively closed and will be, in general, an extension of S. We prove that these theories can be naturally axiomatized in terms of progressions of iterated local reflection principles. In particular, the set of provably 1-provable sentences of Peano arithmetic $PA$ can be axiomatized by ${\varepsilon _0}$ times iterated local reflection schema over $PA$. Our characterizations yield additional information on the proof-theoretic strength of these theories (w.r.t. various measures of it) and on their axiomatizability. We also study the question of speed-up of proofs and show that in some cases a proof of n-provability of a sentence can be much shorter than its proof from iterated reflection principles.

We investigate two weak fragments of the double negation shift schema, which are motivated, respectively, from Spector’s consistency proof of ACA0 and from the negative translation of RCA0, as well as double negated variants of logical principles. Their interrelations over both intuitionistic arithmetic and analysis are completely solved.

We extend the usual language of second order arithmetic to one in which we can discuss an ultrafilter over of the sets of a given model. The semantics are based on fixing a subclass of the sets in a structure for the basic language that corresponds to the intended ultrafilter. In this language we state axioms that express the notion that the subclass is an ultrafilter and additional ones that say it is idempotent or Ramsey. The axioms for idempotent ultrafilters prove, for example, Hindman’s theorem and its generalizations such as the Galvin--Glazer theorem and iterated versions of these theorems (IHT and IGG). We prove that adding these axioms to IHT produce conservative extensions of ACA0 +IHT, ${\rm{ACA}}_{\rm{0}}^ +$, ATR0, ${\rm{\Pi }}_2^1$-CA0, and ${\rm{\Pi }}_2^1$-CA0 for all sentences of second order arithmetic and for full Z2 for the class of ${\rm{\Pi }}_4^1$ sentences. We also generalize and strengthen a metamathematical result of Wang (1984) to show, for example, that any ${\rm{\Pi }}_2^1$ theorem ∀X∃YΘ(X,Y) provable in ACA0 or ${\rm{ACA}}_{\rm{0}}^ +$ there are e,k ∈ ℕ such that ACA0 or ${\rm{ACA}}_{\rm{0}}^ +$ proves that ∀X(Θ(X, Φe(J(k)(X))) where Φe is the eth Turing reduction and J(k) is the kth iterate of the Turing or Arithmetic jump, respectively. (A similar result is derived for ${\rm{\Pi }}_3^1$ theorems of ${\rm{\Pi }}_1^1$-CA0 and the hyperjump.)

Starting points of this article are fixed point axioms for set-bounded monotone Σ1 definable operators in the context of Kripke–Platek set theory $KP$. We analyze their relationship to other principles such as maximal iterations, bounded proper injections, and Σ1 subset-bounded separation. One of our main results states that in $KP + (V\, = \,L)$ all these principles are equivalent to Σ1 separation.

Kripke recently suggested viewing the intuitionistic continuum as an expansion in time of a definite classical continuum. We prove the classical consistency of a three-sorted intuitionistic formal system IC, simultaneously extending Kleene’s intuitionistic analysis I and a negative copy C° of the classically correct part of I, with an “end of time” axiom ET asserting that no choice sequence can be guaranteed not to be pointwise equal to a definite (classical or lawlike) sequence. “Not every sequence is pointwise equal to a definite sequence” is independent of IC. The proofs are by Crealizability interpretations based on classical ω-models ${\cal M}$ = $\left( {\omega ,{\cal C}} \right)$ of C°.

Let $\left\langle {{W_n}:n \in \omega } \right\rangle$ be a canonical enumeration of recursively enumerable sets, and suppose T is a recursively enumerable extension of PA (Peano Arithmetic) in the same language. Woodin (2011) showed that there exists an index $e \in \omega$ (that depends on T) with the property that if${\cal M}$ is a countable model of T and for some${\cal M}$-finite set s, ${\cal M}$ satisfies ${W_e} \subseteq s$, then${\cal M}$ has an end extension${\cal N}$ that satisfies T + We = s.

Here we generalize Woodin’s theorem to all recursively enumerable extensions T of the fragment ${{\rm{I}\rm{\Sigma }}_1}$ of PA, and remove the countability restriction on ${\cal M}$ when T extends PA. We also derive model-theoretic consequences of a classic fixed-point construction of Kripke (1962) and compare them with Woodin’s theorem.