It is pertinent at this stage to recapitulate on the strengths and weaknesses of distance tertiary education institutions.

Distance education is flexible and accessible. Its courses do not impose rigidities. It reaches people in their homes and provides large numbers of people with access to education.

Several institutions produce very high quality teaching materials. What is unique in the system is that all students benefit from the same material unlike in conventional university teaching, where quality varies from lecturer to lecturer, and from university to university.

The rapid developments in technology have strengthened the potential of distance education. The electronic and technology developments lend greater flexibility and innovation. As the cost of these technologies is decreasing and electronic media are improving and growing, they will be used extensively in the near future for the support of distance education.

Distance education has its weaknesses. A major weakness is the isolation and loneliness of the learner. The home-based student, deprived of peer group interaction, is also deprived of learning from others. It is therefore worthy to note that in countries where there are well-developed regional study centres and good support systems for students, the success rate for undergraduate studies is correspondingly high. It is herefore necessary to develop and strengthen study centres to support distance learning in Asia.

Another important problem is that in the eyes of the conventional academic, and many political leaders, who were trained in conventional universities, distance education does not have parity of esteem with formal systems. It is sometimes viewed as a fringe form of tertiary education.

Media broadcast material and actual broadcast time costs are high for distance education. Compounded to the economic cost is the difference in the philosophies between education and broadcasting. In the former, repetition and getting the lesson across is important, whereas broadcast producers are on the lookout for novelty.

Agriculture

1. • Cultivating, producing, processing, and marketing of seasonal agricultural crops (including tapioca and tobacco)

2. • Establishing plantations (including medicinal plants, coffee, tea, palm oil, horticulture, etc.) and producing, processing, and marketing of their produce

Livestock and Fishery

1. • Livestock breeding, processing, canning, and marketing of livestock and its products (including pig breeding and pork processing, etc.)

2. • Production and marketing of animal feeds, additives, supplements, and veterinary medicines

3. • Breeding, fishing, processing, and marketing of fresh-water and marine fish, prawns, and other aquatic organisms including fish fry, fingerlings, post larvae of shrimp, but not including breeding and production of fish and prawns in fisheries which have been reserved for research by the government

4. • Production, processing, marketing of all kinds of fish feeds

Forestry

1. • Production and marketing of basic construction materials, furniture, parquet, etc., using teak extracted and sold by state-owned economic organizations (to be carried out jointly with state-owned economic organizations)

2. • Production and marketing of carvings and handicrafts made of teak that has been extracted and sold by state-owned economic organizations engaged in the extraction and marketing of the same

3. • Production, processing, and marketing of hardwoods (other than teak), bamboo, cane/rattan, and other forest produce

4. • Production and marketing of construction material, furniture, and other products using hardwoods (other than teak), bamboo, cane/rattan, and other forest produce

Mining

1. • Exploration, exploitation, production, and marketing of non-metallic industrial minerals, such as coal, limestone, gypsum, etc.

2. • Marble quarrying and production and marketing of marble blocks and slabs

3. • Carrying out other quarrying industries and marketing of products thereof

Industry

Foodstuff

1. • Manufacturing and marketing of bakery products, including biscuits, wafers, noodles, macaroni, spaghetti, etc.

I suppose I am not revealing any state secrets when I say President Bush has never allowed burdens of state or the baitings of his political opponents either to deter him from his mission or to cloy his feelings for his fellow citizens. Moreover, as more than amply demonstrated today, his perceptions include a vision that is not only far-sighted and reassuring, but one that sees America's domestic imperatives and its global responsibilities as but two mutually compatible and profitable sides of the same coin.

In short, to him the future of a great America and that of a stable and prosperous world are inseparable twins.

We are, therefore, Mr President, all the more inspired and beholden and may I on behalf of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and all present thank you for the unique opportunity and honour of listening to you in person.

We also have the added distinction of having the other half of the illustrious Bush partnership with us, and needless to say, Mrs Bush, we are delighted that you could grace the occasion as well. May I wish you and the other distinguished members of the presidential delegation a pleasant visit and a Happy New Year.

It is fitting too that this first Lecture by a President of the United States of America has taken place under the chairmanship of Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew, and before the largest audience ever to attend the series. We deeply value this support and participation, and especially the encouragement and the privilege of the presence amongst us of Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong and his Cabinet colleagues.

On that note, Ladies and Gentlemen, may I conclude by saying once again what a pleasure it has been to welcome our special guest, President George Bush, and each and everyone of you.

Thank you all and good day.

The declaration of the Fukuda Doctrine on 18 August 1977 was timely and significant given the changing situation in Southeast Asia as that region entered a new phase of regional politics. The United States came to play a less and less visible role in the region while the five countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations – Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand – embarked on their search for a new framework for conducting regional policies. After the Bali Summit of 1976, ASEAN's search for a new partner and Japan's quest for a new regional policy resulted in a top-level meeting between ASEAN heads of government and Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda in August 1977. At the Summit, Japan played a central role in effecting the advent of a new era in Southeast Asian regionalism. Although there existed some differences between ASEAN's expectations for Japan and Tokyo's intentions, their co-optation constituted a major turning point in the history of Japan-Southeast Asia relations. By announcing the Doctrine in 1977, the Japanese Government expressed its readiness to play a positive role in promoting politico-economic and cultural relations between Japan and Southeast Asia. It is against this general background that external factors will be examined in this chapter.

Based upon the framework constructed in Chapter I, we will delve into the process of decision-making in the case of the Fukuda Doctrine. In articulating the causes of policy shift, we will examine four perspectives, external as well as internal. In particular, their causal relationships will be explicated so as to assess which perspective best accounts for the adoption of the Doctrine. The case study will be divided into three parts. This chapter will deal with the external factors, that is, the international system and the regional subsystem while the internal factors, that is, domestic politics and ideas, will be examined in the following two chapters.

Introduction

What does the end of the Cold War signify for Southeast Asia? How far has the Cold War been a cause of security problems in Southeast Asia? Obviously it played a major role, in at least six principal ways.

First, in a more general sense, it reduced the United Nations to relative impotence as the basic guarantor of international security.

Second, in a regional sense, it transformed the nature of the Malayan Emergency and the French campaign against the Viet Minh, most of all in the sight of the United States Administration, the Congress and people. What was seen as legitimate nationalism initially was viewed after 1950 as totalitarian in aim, and had therefore to be opposed, in this region as in Europe and Korea. The Cold War changed U.S. policies towards Southeast Asia from stand off and avoidance of commitments to the provision of support and ultimately to the acceptance of leadership in a long and frustrating struggle to stem the flow of Communism into Indochina. Given America's economic and military strength, this was a change of fundamental importance to the region. It was a change whose consequences are still strongly felt in the 1990s.

Third, the Cold War led both Communist China and the Soviet Union to support the Viet Minh. China's military assistance and political involvement in Indochina in the 1950s encouraged Beijing leaders over the following forty years to think of Indochina as a sphere of influence. This has a continuing legacy today. Soviet military and economic power also became significant factors on the Southeast Asian scene over the past thirty years, culminating in the use of Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang by Soviet naval and air forces. The legacy of this Soviet involvement will be much less durable than that of the Chinese.

Fourth, the United States became steadily more formally and widely committed to the Southeast Asian and Southwest Pacific regions via its bilateral treaty with the Philippines, the trilateral ANZUS Pact, the informal trilateral consultational arrangements made with the British and French in 1952-53, and the eight-sided Manila Treaty, which we came to know best through its planning agency, SEATO, after 1954.

For more than a quarter of a century, Australian social scientists have lamented the deficiencies of country of birth as an index of ethnic origin. National boundaries do not always coincide with the historical, geographical, and cultural bonds that unite groups with a common ancestry. Even if they once did, wars and political realignments can sever the nexus. Partly in response to these concerns, and partly to the growing importance of multiculturalism, the 1986 census of Australia broke new ground by including a question on ancestry. Together with information on birthplace, birthplace of parents, religion, and language spoken at home, these ancestry data throw new light on the ethnic composition of the Australian population.

For some immigrant groups, such as the Italians, ancestry data provide little additional information beyond conventional birthplace data. Most immigrant Australians of Italian ancestry were born in Italy, although some came from Egypt and Malta as well. However, other groups like the Chinese cannot be easily identified from birthplace figures, because they originate from different overseas countries, in many of which they were an ethnic minority. To identify such groups, ancestry data are needed. Ancestry data also permit the identification of third-generation members of different immigrant stock, that is to say, the ethnic origins of persons born in Australia of Australian-born parents. This chapter discusses an analytic strategy for comparing labour market outcomes among different immigrant generations, focusing on persons of Chinese ancestry.

Theory and Analytic Approach

Economists and sociologists have advanced two types of theories for understanding how immigrants (and women) fare in labour markets. The first type stems from neo-classical theories of human capital and examines the international transferability of training and experience. The second derives from status attainment models that explore how social background and early socialization affects achievement. Both theories usually consider the issue of how far discrimination affects socio-economic outcomes.

My journey through Southeast Asia, which began in Kuala Lumpur with my meetings with the leaders of ASEAN, is now approaching its end. I am delighted, as a kind of finishing touch to this journey, to be able to share my ideas with you, here in the Republic of the Philippines, our nearest neighbour in the distinguished presence of one of Asia's most eminent leaders, and my close friend, President Marcos.

Let me begin with one strong impression I gained from my tour. It was the spectacular and rich diversity of the area I have just visited, the diversity in ethnic composition, language and religion, in the cultural impact of distinct histories, and in economic structures. Southeast Asia is by no means a homogeneous or uniform part of the world. It is no wonder that some have been sceptical of the prospects for intraregional co-operation in this area. Yet, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, which has just celebrated its tenth anniversary, is now in the process of firmly establishing itself as a self-reliant organization for regional co-operation in the area. The first Summit conference in Bali was a milestone in progress toward solidarity, and the success of the Summit conference which has just ended confirms the belief that the determination of the ASEAN members to strengthen their solidarity is now irreversible.

ASEAN is, indeed, a historic and successful attempt to seek and create a regional identity of this area through the strengthening of solidarity while affirming the rich diversity of its membership, and respecting the proud nationalism of each member country. I saw, and was impressed by one expression of these creative efforts, the ardent dedication to solidarity of the ASEAN leaders whom I had the pleasure of meeting in Kuala Lumpur. The solidarity of ASEAN, strengthened by the success of co-operative undertakings, in turn opens up new opportunities for useful collaboration, thus further strengthening solidarity. This dynamic and self-reinforcing process will, I believe, characterize the future course of ASEAN.

The modern history of migration is in part a demonstration of power. Many might migrate, the powerful to exercise permanent sway over virgin, rich land; the powerless as near-slaves, on a temporary contract on a plantation. And power, more often than not, had a racial basis. White settlers claimed new lands, displaced aborigines, and restricted, and increasingly excluded, Asians from their territory. From 1870–1914 mankind had moved in two massive streams: 36 million Europeans sought permanent residence in largely temperate lands; a slightly larger number of Asians moved, often on contract, as temporary labourers. The streams were almost equal, the rewards were not. Europeans peopled the Americas and Australasia, and excluded Asians from their midst and many of their possessions. Even in Africa the restrictions on Asiatic migration increased with time. White supremacy reached its zenith before World War II. Japanese migration, however, challenged the White-ordained division of the world. It did not overcome it, but Japan alone of the Asian nations modified White power. As Elizabeth Schumpeter succinctly writes: “The net emigration of Japanese has been surprisingly small in view of the extent of the popular agitation against it and the number of diplomatic crises il has precipitated” (Schumpeter 1940, p. 70).

The initial focus of this chapter is upon a brief but crucial period. In 1890, Japan could hope to foster economic growth by giving labour, capital and trade free play. The only obstacles were the unequal treaties, which permitted the great powers considerable, but unreciprocated, access to Japan. Until the treaties were revised in the mid-1890s, Japan had not encouraged migration lest its nationals be treated with the indignity of Chinese coolies. Once the treaties were revised, the Japanese entertained high hopes of migration, only to find that White-settler societies in Australasia and North America imposed sharp restrictions on Japanese nationals. Between 1906 and 1908, the migrant issue seemed likely to precipitate a war.

Introduction

In January 1992, at the Fourth ASEAN Summit in Singapore, a framework agreement for the formation of an ASEAN Free Trade Area was signed. This called for the ASEAN countries to reduce tariffs on all manufactured items over a 15-year period. In order to have accelerated tariff reductions, items were to be brought onto a Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) scheme and enjoy significant margins of preference over five to eight years. Fifteen product groups were identified for accelerated reductions in the CEPT Scheme. The scheme excludes agricultural products and services. Agriculture is expected to continue on the existing Preferential Trading Arrangements (PTA) scheme.

The agreement to create AFTA must be seen as one of considerable political will in the wake of less successful ASEAN economic ventures in the past. The initial euphoria over the agreement, however, has become less so in the months following as industries in Thailand and, more recently, in Malaysia have called for greater protection at least in the short term. This has brought into sharp relief the question whether AFTA will actually take shape in the years to come or whether it will falter as the other ASEAN economic efforts have in the past.

The recent initial agreement to create a North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) has been a cause for concern in ASEAN. The possibility of trade diversion resulting from closure of the North American market has made ASEAN more cognizant of the need for a ballast to overcome the loss of some of the trade with North America. Similarly, growing fears about the creation of a European Economic Area (EEA) have been voiced within ASEAN. These developments in ASEAN's traditional markets must now be analysed and understood. More importantly, ASEAN has to seek alternative markets for many of its products. Market diversification has to take place in the short term to prevent significant revenue losses as the EEA and NAFTA roll out.

One of the key factors for understanding the foreign policy of Japan lies in the dynamics of domestic politics. An examination of the decision-making process regarding major foreign policy issues provides an excellent perspective for assessing the workings of the Japanese political system. In addition to the external factors, the Fukuda Doctrine was also influenced by the effect of changing domestic politics on the process of policy-making. Of the internal factors, the ruling party the bureaucracy and the business community each with their own interests and positions, participated in the policy-making process which shaped the direction and substance of the Doctrine. In order to articulate the intentions and motivations of the Japanese Government in proclaiming the Doctrine; therefore, we will examine closely the changes in domestic politics, the Liberal Democratic Party the business community and the concerned bureaucracies in this chapter. In the following chapter, we will analyse the nature of the participants as a prerequisite for examining the process of policy-making.

THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (LDP)

Since the inception of the party in 1955, the LDP's vote percentage had declined with each subsequent election (see Table 4). The party's most serious loss was in December 1976, which may be attributed to the Lockheed scandal occurring in that year. In the 1976 elections, the LDP for the first time failed to retain a majority and was able to maintain a bare majority only with the entry into the party of several independents. Facing these irreversible trends until 1980, the LDP undertook a general reconstruction of the party at least on the attitudinal base.

According to a survey compiled by the LDP in 1979, the party entered into the second phase, called “Dainiki Jiminto”, in 1976 because the 1955 system had collapsed. There were two major reasons for this collapse: the national goal of the Meiji period; that is, “catching up” modernization had been attained and a new middle class had emerged; and the international environment had improved, that is; the cold war had ended.

Since the mid-1980s, the economic strategies of Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand (or the ASEAN-3 in short) have shown a remarkable degree of convergence in one important respect: all three have adopted export-led, foreign investment-driven growth strategies. They rely chiefly on multinational corporations (MNCs) to develop export-oriented industries in the non-resource-based sector. Although Singapore is often grouped with the “little dragons” of East Asia — the newly-industrialized economies (NIEs) of Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea — it differs from the NIEs in that its export orientation does not depend on local entrepreneurs or local capital inputs but on MNC investments. In this respect, Singapore now has more in common with Malaysia and Thailand.

This convergence of economic strategies among the ASEAN-3 raises a number of interesting questions. The first is: what factors brought about this convergence? The answer is by no means clear, especially since the convergence was a recent phenomenon. Singapore was the first among the ASEAN-3 to welcome MNCs in large numbers in the early 1960s. This was at a time when the wisdom of such a strategy was often questioned. In fact, much of the literature on development economics at the time was distinctly anti-MNCs and full of foreboding about the dangers of dependency on MNCs and of neo-colonialist exploitation. While Singapore, with its tiny domestic market, adopted the strategy out of necessity, Malaysia and Thailand had larger domestic markets and initially took the more prevalent route of import-substituting industrialization. It was only in the mid-1980s that the latter made decisive policy shifts away from import substitution. This raises a further question: what part did the MNCs themselves play in bringing about these policy shifts? Put another way, did MNC investment patterns in Southeast Asia, and in particular the benefits they brought Singapore, influence the governments of Malaysia and Thailand to reshape their policies?

The reliance on MNCs also raises another set of questions. In the past, each country focused on activities that made best use of its natural resources.