Close to twenty years have passed since South Vietnam was liberated in 1975. The economy of a re-unified Vietnam, however, is still poverty-ridden. One of the reasons for this is the lack of effectiveness in the use of private domestic resources, particularly that of the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam. Before 1975, Chinese capital, entrepreneurship, and skilled manpower in South Vietnam played an important role in the development of domestic markets and international trade. After 1975, however, Chinese participation in the Vietnamese economy underwent a decline brought about by the socialist transformation of the South and an exodus of capital. However, the residual economic potential of the Chinese who have remained in Vietnam is still considerable.

Under doi moi, which is the programme of economic and political reforms in Vietnam, there is evidence that the Chinese are once again contributing significantly to the expansion of internal markets and capital accumulation for small-scale industrial development. Accordingly, the role which die Chinese have played in the past and are beginning to play again seems eminently worthy of study. From a more pragmatic point of view, it is also possible that a better appreciation of the role of the Chinese in the Vietnamese economy both historically and in the immediate future may well be of some value, if not indeed essential, to economic development. In addition to this, there are other related issues which continue to be of academic interest, for example, the study of ethnic relations and the interaction of the Chinese and Vietnamese in more recent times.

The role of the Chinese in Vietnam's economy has been the subject of study by many Vietnamese and non-Vietnamese scholars, and it would be impossible to review all the relevant literature here. However, a brief summary will provide an understanding of the subject and issues that require further investigation.

Vietnamese audiors began writing on the Overseas Chinese in the 1920s. Prominent among them at the time was Dao Trinh Nhat.

I am in basic agreement with most of Sree Kumar's analysis and conclusions. I would like to make the following points of relevance to his paper.

First, ASEAN has taken a very bold step at the Fourth ASEAN Summit in January this year. The AFTA agreement is a milestone. However, the objective of AFTA should not be just to promote intra-ASEAN trade but, and more importantly, to improve ASEAN countries' export competitiveness and investment attractiveness vis-à-vis the rest of the world. ASEAN cannot afford to be inward looking. In other words, the emphasis should be on enlarging the economic pie rather than equitable sharing of the pie, for AFTA is relatively small in terms of market size when compared with the trading blocs of EC and NAFTA. AFTA is also very small when compared to the emerging natural economic zone of South China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea. At last year's ASEAN Roundtable, Seiji Naya and Pearl Imada had shown in their paper that the static gains from trade creation in AFTA are very small. A recent World Bank conference on regional integration (April 1992) also showed that the trade creation effect of trading blocs among developing countries is very small. So we have to focus on the dynamic gains of increased export competitiveness arising from economies of scale, increased competitiveness and innovation, and increased attractiveness for foreign investors.

Second, I would like to briefly discuss the issue of ASEAN's investment attractiveness or competitiveness. Investment co-operation is necessary to ensure the investment attractiveness and competitiveness of ASEAN countries in the context of the global competition for foreign direct investment (FDI). In that regard, Sree argues that intra-regional investments may offset some of the FDI the ASEAN countries need to attract. But ASEAN would need to attract FDI from extra-ASEAN sources for a long time to come, and thus the regional investment climate becomes critical.

The first problem Chuan encountered when he tried to form his government was the selection of a fifth party, since his four-party alliance had only a slim majority of 185 in the 360-seat Lower House. The Democrat Party wanted to include the Chart Pattana Party (CPP) of former Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan, which had 60 seats. But that attempt was resisted by other partners. This was because if the CPP was brought in it would be the second largest in the government, which, under the system of four MPs to one ministerial post (both ministerial and deputy ministerial posts) (see Appendix Table 5), would upset the ministerial quotas of the other three parties — the NAP, PDP, and Solidarity. Another choice was the Seritham Party led by former House Speaker, Arthit Urairat. But Arthit's party commanded only eight seats, which was thought to be too small to stabilize the government majority in the House. Under such circumstances the other three partners were in favour of the Social Action Party (SAP).

There was a considerable reluctance to include the SAP in the first place because of its affiliation with the previous Suchinda government, but its number of seats, 22, were just right. The partners worked out the conditions that should the SAP agree to join the government, two of its key members — party leader Montri Pongpanich and another senior member Piyanat Watcharaporn — had to be excluded from ministerial posts. Montri was barred mainly because he was still facing an allegation for corruption lodged by the military. Piyanat was disliked for having blatantly supported Suchinda when he was a minister in Suchinda's government. Piyanat was seen by pro-democracy forces as having sold himself short just to get the ministerial post. With the SAP joining the government, the Chuan administration has a comfortable majority of 207 in the House of Representatives (see Appendix Table 4).

It is to be noted here that, unlike in the past, the military completely restrained itself from interfering in the formation of the Chuan government.

Conventional universities are expensive institutions to create and maintain, and as the number of younger Asians increases, there is a need to provide alternative routes to higher education. It is at this higher education level that many countries have introduced open universities to provide for those who were unable, for a variety of reasons, to have their opportunity for higher education earlier in life. Open universities, especially in developed countries, have also been found to satisfy the educational needs of disadvantaged people. They are particularly suited for those who find it difficult to leave the home environment, for example, handicapped people; those in prison; and women who work in the home. In many countries, such as in Australia, Canada, and Thailand, where there are interested people living in remote and sparsely populated areas OUs provide the only opportunity for higher education.

While the British Open University has set the pattern for open universities, there are other patterns of open learning establishments which have emerged in the last two decades. The different types can be grouped into the following categories:

1. (a) “stand alone” universities;

2. (b) dual mode models;

3. (c) “stand together” universities;

4. (d) “parasitic” institutions/agencies.

“Stand Alone” Universities

The British Open University (or UKOU) is the prime example of this category. Since its inception in 1969, this OU has been instrumental, by assistance and example, for the birth of similar “stand alone” open universities in Europe, the Middle East and Asian countries. They are independent academic institutions with formal structures. They establish the curricula, create the courses, provide the materials for students, the support services for student learning, conduct the monitoring and assessments of student performance and award the qualifications. Academic staff teach, develop, and write curricula and have research responsibilities. Non-academic staff administer, provide human support programmes, run assessments and examinations, run publishing services including fully independent printing operations.

In the introduction to this book, it was argued that the period 1975–80 formed a particularly significant phase in Japan–Southeast Asia relations. It was during this period that Japan underwent a shift from economic to political diplomacy towards the region, exemplified by the Fukuda Doctrine. Theoretically we have attempted to explain causal relations between four independent factors and the policy shift. Having analysed the process of forging the Doctrine and the Japanese Government's implementation of it, let us recount how and why Japan's active foreign policy has been put into motion. In so doing, the two periods of Japan–Southeast Asia relations and the implications of this study will be summarized. Based on the conclusions derived from this case study we will then discuss briefly the future prospects of Japan–Southeast Asia relations.

THE PRE-DOCTRINE PERIOD

During the first period, 1951–4, Japan's so-called “economic” foreign policy had been vigorously carried out by relying upon the U.S. security networks in Asia. The triangular relationship among the United States, Japan, and the countries of Southeast Asia was the key to Japan's encroachment on the Southeast Asian economies. The process of decision-making; although slightly different in the case of the Asian Development Bank, was characterized by the pattern of a tripartite alliance between the ruling party the business community and the concerned bureaucracies. More important was the fact that Japan was designated as the superdomino, or workshop, of Asia in U.S. cold war strategy which was basically retained until 1974.

Secondly the pursuit of Japan's economic diplomacy had a direct bearing on the three assumptions discussed earlier: American military protection and its reliable commitments in Asia; free access to raw materials and export markets in order to accelerate the Japanese economy; and a stable political framework in which a dominant LDP can pursue a consistent foreign policy There was little doubt that the ruling party that is, the LDP, took every effort throughout the first period to preserve the three assumptions as the philosophy of main-stream conservatism (Hoshu Honryu).

This chapter brings into view important political actors, particularly political parties, in the Thai political scene since the 22 March election. Between the March and September elections, there were some significant changes with regard to major political parties. First, a general picture of the political parties in Thailand is presented, followed by a discussion of a number of political parties that played major roles in the two elections.

If the political development of a country can be judged by the maturity of political parties of that country, Thailand would rank relatively low. The Thai party system has not been able to serve as a strong base on which a democratic system can develop. Nevertheless, considerable development has already taken place in the party system since the 1970s. Weaknesses in the Thai political party system can be seen in at least two areas. First, in terms of their organization, political parties in Thailand are peer-based rather than people-based. That is, parties are not so much a mass party based on certain shared political beliefs as a forum where political friends gather for specific, short-term interests. Because of this characteristic, the party base is narrow and shallow. Also, this makes party- switching a common thing. Causes of splits can be personal rather than ideological, or a change of party may take place when a switchover brings about better political opportunities. A politician who has switched party would generally not feel guilty about it, and some have switched to more than three parties over the course of two general elections; yet they continue to get elected and can hold up their heads. This situation is not alarming especially when party-switching is done on the basis of loyalty to friends. But it damages the political system when politicians can be literally “bought off by a wealthier party, which shows that politicians are after money rather than political programmes.

Secondly, in terms of political programmes. Thai parties are interest-based rather than policy-based.

Comparisons of foreign direct investment (FDI) should be regarded with great caution. Some argue that they should not be used at all due to significantly differing methodologies. An analysis of methodological problems suggests that overall comparisons are, at a minimum, less useful than measurements of the trends — which in most data sources show recent Japanese investment increasing at a rapid rate while U.S. investment in the Asia-Pacific region has been relatively stagnant during the past decade, especially as measured in constant dollars.

Japanese FDI data is based on notifications to the Japanese Government of intent to carry out investment approved by the host government, whereas U.S. data from the Department of Commerce's Survey of Current Business is based on estimated capital flows and equity positions of U.S. firms and foreign affiliates. Thus Japanese data tends to be anticipatory and the methodology tends to overstate Japanese investment when compared to U.S. investment as measured by the more conservative U.S. method. Host government estimates, which often are based on approvals of proposed investment, tend to overstate both Japanese and U.S. investment.

In what is probably an extreme case of understating U.S. investment compared with Japanese FDI, the U.S. Commerce Department valued U.S. investment in the People's Republic of China (PRC) as of 1988 at only US$310 million, versus US$2.6 billion in approved investment estimated by the Chinese Government. (Recent disinvestment in China has brought U.S. equity down to under US$300 million.) On the other hand, the Japanese Ministry of Finance estimate of US$2 billion in cumulative notified Japanese FDI as of 31 March 1989 is nearly the same as the Chinese estimate of US$2.1 billion.

Recipient countries vary widely in how they track foreign investment. Hong Kong doesn't keep overall data on foreign investment but conducts an annual voluntary survey on manufacturing investment — by admission an incomplete and imprecise process. The U.S. Survey of Current Business shows US$594 million invested in manufacturing in Hong Kong as of 1988, versus an original cost estimate of US$1.1 billion shown by the Hong Kong Government's annual report.

Today, it is recognized the world over and especially in Asia with its growing population that education has not only a social and moral function but is also an economic necessity. The education system generally provides limited access to the rural poor and other disadvantaged groups and to a certain extent, contributes to the inequalities in society. How does one provide wider access to education to the rural poor, to working adults, to women at home and to disadvantaged groups?

There is a growing perception that the schools and conventional universities cannot be the sole purveyors of knowledge and shapers of social attitudes and that mass communciations media such as radio and TV can play major roles in transmission of knowledge to large numbers of people. There are many reasons for looking into alternatives in education delivery especially for Asian countries. Good quality educational materials are not widely available. Human and financial resources are limited in many countries. There is not only increasing demand for education for city youths and working adults, but also a need to provide practical knowledge to rural youths and farmers for the development of related skills. Furthermore, among educational leaders and social and policy planners, there is a growing belief that despite quantitative gains in education in Asia, there has been a decline in its quality.

The Concept of Distance Education

The terms “distance education” and “open learning” have been used with a variety of different meanings. “Distance education” is best referred to as the educational process where a significant proportion of the teaching is conducted by someone, removed in space or time from the learner; and where programmes use a combination of educational media varying from print to audio to TV broadcasts, video recordings and computers and microprocessors. Opportunities for face-to-face study as well as learning from recorded materials are included. There is a rich and oft changing mix of media and meeting — this is what has been the strength of distance education programmes.

BROAD RESULTS OF THE MNC SURVEY

Methodology

In order to study the investment patterns of the MNCs and the impact they have had on the ASEAN-3, the authors felt that one way was to focus on MNCs with operations in at least two of the three countries and compare their operations in each location. These were identified from a questionnaire survey of 570 MNCs operating in Singapore. The companies were all in the manufacturing sector and from a cross-section of industries — food, chemicals, electronics, fabricated metal products, precision engineering, and so forth. The MNCs, the majority of whom were from the United States, Japan and Europe, were asked if they had manufacturing operations in Malaysia and Thailand, and if so, to provide details on: the date they established operations in the ASEAN-3; the products they made; the number of staff they employed in each location; and the linkages between their operations. From the responses, thirty MNCs were selected for a more detailed study, based on a further questionnaire survey and interviews with key personnel in the three countries.

Initial Questionnaire Survey Findings

From the initial survey of 570 MNCs, a total of 510 (89-5 per cent) responded to the questionnaire. Of these, 128 companies (25 per cent) indicated that in addition to their Singapore operation they also had operations in Malaysia and/or Thailand. An analysis of the sequence of their investments yielded the following result:

1. • 91 of the 128 (or 71 per cent) started production in Singapore before establishing operations in Malaysia and/or Thailand;

2. • 30 companies (23 per cent) started operations in the other two countries before coming to Singapore;

3. • the remaining 7 companies (6 per cent) started operations in the ASEAN-3 at about the same time.

The ninety-one MNCs which started operations in Singapore before moving to Malaysia and/or Thailand formed a large enough group from which a sample could be drawn for further detailed study. They also formed a broad spread in terms of origin — mainly Japanese, American and European companies and 100 per cent foreign-owned in almost all cases.