The implications of rising parliamentary representation of populist parties have been thoroughly studied but little is known about the impact of populist state leaders on party positions. In this article, we study mainstream parties' strategic responses when a populist takes over as the leader of a nation. We use content-analytical data and large language modelling to measure positions expressed in manifestos from parties from 51 democracies between 1989 and 2018. Employing methods for causal inference from observational data, we find that right-wing populist state leaders induce mainstream parties to differentiate their positions on multiculturalism, possibly leading to polarization of the party system. Under left-wing populist leaders, mainstream parties adopt more homogenous or differentiated positions, depending on the policy category and other contextual factors. Parties are generally more responsive in emerging than advanced countries and in presidential than parliamentary systems.

Since the 1950s, the history of European integration unfolds as a unique social experiment, witnessing the transformation of a non-existent entity into an increasingly institutionalized force. This article delves into the consequences of this ongoing institutionalization on public attitudes towards the institution itself: the European Union (EU). We argue that as European institutional integration advanced, a divide in EU support between more and less educated individuals emerged, with the latter becoming progressively less supportive. Drawing on data from eighty-five waves of the Eurobarometer survey across fifteen countries and over 820,000 individuals from 1976 to 2014, a Bayesian mixed-effects analysis reveals that the gap in support between the more and less educated significantly widened with a country's level of institutional integration. This study emphasizes the necessity of distinguishing institutional effects from temporal patterns in order to enhance our understanding of EU-related public opinion dynamics.

Scholars have studied the carceral state extensively. However, little is known about the ‘shadow’ carceral state, coercive institutions lacking even the limited safeguards of the carceral state. Pretrial incarceration is one such institution. It often lasts months and causes large resource losses. Yet it is imposed in rushed hearings, with wide discretion for bail judges. These circumstances facilitate quick, heuristic judgments relying on racial stereotypes of marginalized populations. We merge court records from Miami-Dade with voter records to estimate the effect of this ‘shadow’ institution on turnout. We find that quasi-randomly assigned harsher bail judges depress voting by Black and Hispanic defendants. Consistent with heuristic processing, these racial disparities result only from inexperienced judges. Unlike judge experience, judge race does not matter; minority judges are as likely to impose detention and reduce turnout. The ‘shadow’ carceral state undermines democratic participation, exacerbating racial inequality.

Many efforts to persuade others politically employ interpersonal conversations. A recurring question is whether the participants in such conversations are more readily persuaded by others who share their demographic characteristics. Echoing concerns that individuals have difficulties communicating across differences, research finds that individuals perceive demographically similar people as more trustworthy, suggesting shared demographics could facilitate persuasion. In a survey of practitioners and scholars, we find many share these expectations. However, dual-process theories suggest that messenger attributes are typically peripheral cues that should not influence persuasion when individuals are effortfully thinking, such as during interpersonal conversations. Supporting this view, we analyze data from eight experiments on interpersonal conversations across four topics (total N = 6, 139) and find that shared demographics (age, gender, or race) do not meaningfully increase their effects. These results are encouraging for the scalability of conversation interventions, and suggest voters can persuade each other across differences.

Studies have widely documented that women's descriptive representation in parliaments enhances their substantive representation. We probe this relationship under varying levels of women's collective and individual marginality based on an original dataset documenting the parliamentary behaviour of Israeli legislators over eleven parliamentary terms (1977–2015). Using several measures of individual-level marginality we show that marginalized female legislators are more prone to engage in gender-related parliamentary activity than their less marginal counterparts, albeit only under a certain threshold of women's marginality as a group. The article elucidates the dynamic nature of the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation of disadvantaged groups by demonstrating that it is contingent on their collective standing in parliament and on the marginality of individual legislators as manifested in their strategic choices.

A startling feature of the countless recent sex scandals involving politicians has been the almost complete lack of public apologies. This note explores the electoral incentives politicians face when crafting communication strategies in the aftermath of sex scandals. We focus on two communication strategies – denials and apologies – and assess their impact on incumbent support across a wide range of scandals that vary in terms of the seriousness of the charges as well as the availability of evidence. Using data from a series of survey experiments, including over 10,000 respondents we find that citizens punish incumbents who apologize, even in the case of accusations that appear the least serious in the eyes of voters. Moreover, apologies fail to generate political support compared to denials, even in cases when voters are exposed to evidence. This suggests that in most cases apologies are simply not politically viable communication strategies.

Populist radical right (PRR) parties' attacks against prevailing historical interpretations have received much public attention because they question the foundations of countries' political orders. Yet, how prominent are such attacks and what characterizes their sentiment and content? This article proposes an integrated mixed-methods approach to investigate the prominence, sentiment, and interpretations of history in PRR politicians' parliamentary speeches. Studying the case of Germany, we conducted a quantitative analysis of national parliamentary speeches (2017–2021), combined with a qualitative analysis of all speeches made by Alternative for Germany (AfD) in 2017–2018. The AfD does not use historical markers more prominently but is distinctly less negative when speaking about history compared to its general political language. The collocation and qualitative analyses reveal the nuanced ways in which the AfD affirms and disavows various mnemonic traditions, underlining the PRR's complex engagement with established norms.

What are the most challenging ethical dilemmas for politicians, and how do they handle them? The classical literature on ethical dilemmas in politics has mainly explored them as conflicts between ethical principles in high-stakes decisions. However, empirical evidence of the extent to which such dilemmas accurately reflect the experience of most politicians is scarce. Drawing on extensive in-depth interviews with Swedish parliamentarians, I show that their dilemmas stem mainly from powerlessness. Powerlessness in politics manifests itself in primarily two ways: relational powerlessness, which is driven by constraints like party and constituency loyalties, and inherent powerlessness due to formal and informal barriers like constitutional mandates and limited time and resources. This study contributes to the field of political ethics by anchoring political dilemmas in everyday democratic politics and by introducing powerlessness as a new central concept. In doing so, it supplements our understanding of ethical dilemmas in politics with insights from those confronting them.

Ideal points of MPs in the UK House of Commons (HoC) are characteristically difficult to ascertain due to tight party discipline and strategic voting by opposition members. This research note generates left/right ideal point estimates for 591 British MPs sitting in the HoC as of 22/08/2022, ascertained through their social media followership. Specifically, estimates are derived by conducting correspondence analysis (CA) on MP Twitter (X) follower networks, which are subsequently validated against an expert survey, confirming that these estimates have a high degree of between-party (R2 = 0.93) and within-party (Con: r = 0.84; Lab: r = 0.81) accuracy. The informative value of these estimates is then demonstrated by predicting candidate endorsement in the September 2022 Conservative leadership contest, confirming that an MP's ideal point was a statistically significant predictor of candidate endorsement, with Liz Truss drawing support primarily from the further right of the party.

How does the decline of traditional news outlets affect political polarization? We provide novel evidence on this question by examining the link between local newspaper exits, media consumption, and electoral behaviour in a multiparty setting. Our empirical analysis combines a unique panel of all German local newspapers between 1980 and 2009, electoral returns, and an annual media consumption survey of more than 670,000 respondents. Using a difference-in-differences design, we demonstrate that local newspaper exits increase electoral polarization. Additional analysis points to changes in media consumption as the underlying mechanism driving this result: following local news exits, consumers substitute local news with national tabloid news. Our findings extend prior results in the US context to a multiparty setting and shed new light on the causal chain running from changing local news landscapes to electoral behaviour.

Group-based identities are an important basis of political competition. Politicians consciously appeal to specific social groups, and these group-based appeals often improve the evaluation of parties and candidates. Studying place-based appeals, we advance the understanding of this strategy by distinguishing between dominant and subordinate social groups. Using two survey experiments in Germany and England, we show that group appeals improve candidate evaluation among subordinate (rural) voters. By contrast, appeals to the dominant (urban) group trigger a negative reaction. While urban citizens’ weaker local identities and lower place-based resentment partly explain this asymmetry, they mainly dislike group-based appeals because of their antagonistic nature. If the same policies are framed as benefiting urban and rural dwellers alike, candidate evaluation improves. Thus, people on the dominant side of a group divide reject a framing of politics as antagonistically structured by this divide, even if they identify with the dominant group.

Understanding which political candidates are elected for office is fundamental to democracy and political science. Whereas there is much agreement that party affiliation is one of the most important candidate characteristics to voters, evidence regarding the gender and race of the candidate is mixed. We suggest voters have lexicographic preferences, meaning they rank their preferences and focus primarily on the candidate's party affiliation. Second-order preferences such as gender and race are mostly necessary when there is a tie in first-order preferences when voters choose between two same-party candidates or have no party information. We show how conjoint experiments can be used to test for lexicographic preferences and use data from a US-representative sample and a pre-registered replication to confirm that in the United States, gender and race are second-order preferences. Lexicographic preferences provide a theoretical lens explaining some of the mixed results of gender and race in the candidate literature.

Racial and ethnic minorities are underrepresented in most Western democracies. This article investigates one potential root cause behind this pattern: minority and majority citizens might expect to feel discriminated against if they enter politics. Using data from three large-scale surveys, we find that minorities in both the United States and Sweden are less likely to expect to feel welcome than the majority population. These discrepancies in expected discrimination persist, even after controlling for other factors. Moreover, expected discrimination is not without political consequences: those who expect to feel less welcome are less likely to indicate an interest in running for political office. Finally, these results do not differ for politically engaged citizens who constitute a more realistic pool of potential candidates. We conclude by discussing what expectations of discrimination can tell us about the fairness of the political system and how these attitudes shape political ambition among minorities.

Does nationalism increase beliefs in conspiracy theories that frame minorities as subversives? From China to Russia to India, analysts and public commentators increasingly assume that nationalism fuels belief in false or unverified information. Yet existing scholarly work has neither theoretically nor empirically examined this link. Using a survey experiment conducted among 2,373 individuals and 6 focus groups with 6–8 participants each, for a total of 50 individuals, we study the impact of nationalist sentiment on belief in conspiracy theories related to ethnic minority groups in Pakistan. We find that nationalist primes – even those intended to emphasize the integration of diverse groups into one superordinate national identity – increase belief in statements about domestic minorities collaborating with hostile foreign powers. Subgroup analysis and focus groups suggest that nationalism potentially increases the likelihood that one views rights-seeking minorities as undermining the pursuit of national status.

How governments raise tax revenue is at the core of domestic political conflict. Public opinion towards taxation is measured generally and qualitatively by many surveys, but previous research has not closely linked public preferences to the budget problem faced by governments regarding how best to raise or cut a marginal quantity of revenue. We present results from a novel tax preference experiment in which UK respondents are given choices over different tax ‘levers’ that are expected to raise or cut equal revenue. We find that while different tax levers vary substantially in their popularity, there is a ‘hidden consensus’ regarding different tax levers across income levels and partisanship of the respondents.

Globalization creates winners and losers, and recent research emphasizes that large corporations are among the biggest beneficiaries of trade while smaller firms may be harmed. How do these redistributive effects impact trade attitudes? Because a growing share of Americans hold highly unfavourable views of big corporations, we argue that the belief that large firms win from trade will provoke hostility towards trade and globalization. To test this theory, we show experimentally that informing people that large corporations benefit from trade makes them markedly more hostile towards trade compared to a treatment emphasizing that firms in exporting industries benefit. Using subgroup and mediation analysis, we find that anti-corporate sentiment drives this effect, particularly concern about corporations’ power in society. Our findings illustrate how distributive consequences and attitudes towards the winners and losers from policy change interact to shape public opinion on economic policy.

Democracies generate norms prescribing what behaviours and preferences are deemed acceptable. But what keeps these political norms in place? We expect that they are enforced by observers who disapprove of norm-breaching behaviour and are willing to apply sanctions that make it socially costly. We test this expectation with a survey in Spain, where respondents were shown pictures of individuals with different political views. We focus on norms against radical-right preferences, one of the most established political norms. In line with our expectations, individuals disapprove of radical-right preferences more than other political preferences. This makes them more likely to socially sanction those preferences, which they do mainly in indirect ways that do not force interaction with the person breaching the norm. We provide evidence on the individual-level predictors of norm enforcement. Our findings highlight the micro-level mechanisms by which social influence affects the behaviour of democratic citizens.

Does an MP's localness affect their behaviour towards constituents? Existing research has shown biases in MPs' responsiveness to citizens based on citizens' sociodemographic and political traits and voters’ tendency to prefer ‘local’ MPs. Yet, we know little about whether MPs' localness affects their responsiveness to constituents. MPs' localness may influence their behaviour for strategic reasons and/or because of homophily. To explore this relationship, we conducted a field experiment in the United Kingdom where we asked legislators about their policy priorities regarding the COVID-19 pandemic. We found that local MPs do not differentiate in their responsiveness to constituents. However, non-local MPs are motivated by party affiliation and gender in their responsiveness to constituents, with ethnicity and class playing insignificant roles. Non-local MPs respond more to co-partisans than non-partisans and women non-local MPs are more responsive to women constituents. This experiment underscores the impact of (non-)localness on MPs' interactions with constituents.

Wealth provides self-insurance against financial risk, reducing risk aversion. We apply this insurance mechanism to electoral behaviour, arguing that a voter who desires a change to the status quo and who is wealthy is more likely to vote for change than a voter who lacks the same self-insurance. We apply this argument to the case of Brexit in the UK, which has been widely characterized as a vote by the ‘economically left-behind’. Our results show that individuals who lacked wealth are less likely to support leaving the EU, explaining why so many Brexit voters were wealthy, in terms of their property wealth. We corroborate our theory using two panel surveys, accounting for unobserved individual-level heterogeneity, and by using a survey experiment. The findings have implications for the potential broader role of wealth-as-insurance in electoral behaviour and for understanding the Brexit case.