It is proved (Theorem 1) that if 0# exists, then any constructible forcing property which over L adds no reals, over V collapses an uncountable L-cardinal to cardinality ω. This improves a theorem of Foreman, Magidor, and Shelah. Also, a method for approximating this phenomenon generically is found (Theorem 2). The strategy is first to reduce the problem of ‘disabling’ forcing properties to that of specializing certain trees in a weak sense.

Research in AI has recently begun to address the problems of nondeductive reasoning, i.e., the problems that arise when, on the basis of approximate or incomplete evidence, we form well-reasoned but possibly false judgments. Attempts to stimulate such reasoning fall into two main categories: the numerical approach is based on probabilities and the nonnumerical one tries to reconstruct nondeductive reasoning as a special type of deductive process. In this paper, we are concerned with the latter usually known as nonmonotonic deduction, because the set of theorems does not increase monotonically with the set of axioms.

It is generally acknowledged that nonmonotonic (n.m.) formalisms (e.g., [C], [MC1], [MC2] [MD], [MD-D], [Rl], [R2], [S]) are plagued by a number of difficulties. A key issue concerns the fact that most systems do not produce an axiomatizable set of validities. Thus, the chief objective of this paper is to develop an alternative approach in which the set of n.m. inferences, which somehow qualify as being deductively sound, is r.e.

The basic idea here is to reproduce the situation in First Order Logic where the metalogical concept of deduction translates into the logical notion of material implication. Since n.m. deductions are no longer truth preserving, our way to deal with a change in the metaconcept is to extend the standard logic apparatus so that it can reflect the new metaconcept. In other words, the intent is to study a concept of nonmonotonic implication that goes hand in hand with a notion of n.m. deduction. And in our case, it is convenient that the former be characterized within the more tractable context of monotonic logic.

In this paper we study transitive group actions.:G × X → X, definable in an ω-stable theory, where G is a connected group and X a set of Morley rank 2, with respect to sharp transitivity on qα. Here q is the generic type of X (X is of degree 1 by Proposition (1)), for ordinals α > 0, qα is the αth power of q, i.e. (aβ)β < α, ⊨ qα iff (aβ)β < α is an independent sequence (in the sense of forking) of realizations of q, and G is defined to be sharply transitive on qα iff for all (aβ)β < α, (bβ)β < α ⊨ qα there is one and only one g ∈ G with g.aβ = bβ for all β < α. The question studied here is: For which powers α of q are there group actions subject to the above conditions with G sharply transitive on qα?

In §1 we will see that for group actions satisfying the above conditions, G can be sharply transitive only on finite powers of q. Moreover, if G is sharply transitive on qn for some n ≥ 2, then the action of the stabilizer Ga on a certain subset Y of X satisfies the conditions above with Ga being sharply transitive on qm−1, where q′ is the generic type of Y (Proposition (8)). Thus, there would be a complete answer to the question if one could find some n < ω such that there is no group action as above with G sharply transitive on qn, but for n – 1 there is. In this paper we prove that such n exists and that it is either 5 or 6. More precisely, in §2 we prove that there is no group action satisfying the above conditions with G sharply transitive on q6. This is the main result of this paper. It is not known to the author whether the same also holds for q5 instead of q6. However, it does not hold for q4, as is seen in §3. There we give an example provided from projective geometry, for a group action satisfying the above conditions with G sharply transitive on q4; for G we choose PGL(3, K) and for X the projective plane over K, where K is some algebraically closed field.

Conjecture (1) of [Ma83] is confirmed here by the following result: if 3 ≤ α < ω, then there is a finite relation algebra of dimension α, which is not a relation algebra of dimension α + 1. A logical consequence of this theorem is that for every finite α ≥ 3 there is a formula of the form S ⊆ T (asserting that one binary relation is included in another), which is provable with α + 1 variables, but not provable with only α variables (using a special sequent calculus designed for deducing properties of binary relations).

The canonicity and compactness of the KM system are problems historically important in the development of our understanding of intensional logic (as explained in Goldblatt's paper, The McKinsey axiom is not canonical). The problems, however, were unsolved for years in modal logic. In the beginning of 1990, Goldblatt showed that KM is not canonical in The McKinsey axiom is not canonical. The remaining task is to solve the problem of the compactness of KM. In this paper we present a proof showing that the KM system is not compact.

The symbols of the language of propositional modal logic are as follows:

1. A denumerably infinite set of sentence letters, for example, {p0, P1, p2, …};

2. The Boolean connectives &, ⋁, ¬, →, ↔ and parentheses;

3. The modal operators L and M where M is defined as ¬L¬.

The formation rules of well-formed propositional modal formulae are the formation rules of formulae in classic propositional logic plus the following rule:

If A is a well-formed formula, so is LA.

A normal modal system is a set of formulae that contains all tautologies and the formula

and is closed under the following transformation rules:

Uniform substitution. If A is a theorem, so is every substitution-instance of A.

Modus ponens. If A and A → B are theorems, so is B.

Necessitation. If A is a theorem, so is LA.

Let L be a normal system. Then a set S of formulae is L-consistent if and only if for any formula B, which is the conjunction of some formulae in S, B is not included in L. A set S of formulae is maximal if and only if for every formula A, S either contains A or contains ¬A. A set S of formulae is maximal L-consistent if and only if it is both maximal and L-consistent.

We show how to extract effective bounds Φ for ⋀u1⋀v ≤ytu⋁wηG0-sentences which depend on u only (i.e. ⋀u⋀v ≤y, tu⋁w ≤η ΦuG0) from arithmetical proofs which use analytical assumptions of the form

(ϒ, δ, ρ, and τ are arbitrary finite types, η ≤ 2, G0 and F0 are quantifier-free, and s and t are closed terms). If τ ≤ 2, (*) can be weakened to

This is used to establish new conservation results about weak Konig's lemma. Applications to proofs in classical analysis, especially uniqueness proofs in approximation theory, will be given in subsequent papers.

We investigate various ways of introducing axioms for randomness in set theory. The results show that these axioms, when added to ZF, imply the failure of AC. But the axiom of extensionality plays an essential role in the derivation, and a deeper analysis may ultimately show that randomness is incompatible with extensionality.

In this paper we consider properties, related to model-completeness, of the theory of integrally closed commutative regular rings. We obtain the main theorem claiming that in a Boolean algebra B, the truth of a prenex Σn-formula whose parameters ai, partition B, can be determined by finitely many conditions built from the first entry of Tarski invariant T(ai)'s, n-characteristic D(n, ai)'s and the quantities S(ai, l) and S′(ai, l) for l < n. Then we derive two important theorems. One claims that for any Boolean algebras A and B, an embedding of A into B preserving D(n, a) for all a ϵ A is a Σn-extension. The other claims that the theory of n-separable Boolean algebras admits elimination of quantifiers in a simple definitional extension of the language of Boolean algebras. Finally we translate these results into the language of commutative regular rings.

The so-called Curry-Howard interpretation (Curry [1934], Curry and Feys [1958], Howard [1969], Tait [1965]) is known to provide a rather neat term-functional account of intuitionistic implication. Could one refine the interpretation to obtain an almost as good account of other neighbouring implications, including the so-called ‘resource’ implications (e.g. linear, relevant, etc.)?

We answer this question positively by demonstrating that just by working with side conditions on the rule of assertability conditions for the connective representing implication (‘→’) one can characterise those ‘resource’ logics. The idea stems from the realisation that whereas the elimination rule for conditionals (of which implication is a particular case) remains virtually unchanged no matter what kind of conditional one has (i.e. linear, relevant, intuitionistic, classical, etc., all have modus ponens), the corresponding introduction rule carries an element of vagueness which can be explored in the characterisation of several sorts of conditionals. The rule of →-introduction is classified as an ‘improper’ inference rule, to use a terminology from Prawitz [1965]. Now, the so-called improper rules leave room for manoeuvre as to how a particular logic can be obtained just by imposing conditions on the discharge of assumptions that would correspond to the particular logical discipline one is adopting (linear, relevant, ticket entailment, intuitionistic, classical, etc.). The side conditions can be ‘naturally’ imposed, given that a degree of ‘vagueness’ is introduced by the presentation of those improper inference rules, such as the rule of →-introduction:

which says: starting from assumption ‘A’, and arriving at ‘B’ via an unspecified number of steps, one can discharge the assumption and conclude that ‘A’ implies ‘B’.

We consider arbitrary stratified languages. We study structures which satisfy the same stratified sentences and we obtain an extension of Keisler's Isomorphism Theorem to this situation. Then we consider operations which are definable by a stratified formula and modify the ‘type’ of their argument by one; we prove that for such an operation F the sentence c = F(c) and the scheme φ(c) ↔ (F(c)), where ↔(x) varies among all the stratified formulas with no variable other than x free, imply the same stratified {c}-sentences.

This paper presents a new technique for handling modal logics with transitive frames, i.e. extensions of the modal system K4. In effect, the technique is based on the following fundamental result, to be obtained below in §3.

Given a formula φ, we can effectively construct finite frames 1, …, n which completely characterize the set of all transitive general frames refuting φ. More exactly, an arbitrary general frame refutes φ iff contains a (not necessarily generated) subframe such that (1) i, for some i ϵ {1, …, n}, is a p-morphic image of (after Fine [1985] we say is subreducible to i), (2) is cofinal in , and (3) every point in that is not in does not get into “closed domains” which are uniquely determined in i, by φ.

This purely technical result has, as it turns out, rather unexpected and profound consequences. For instance, it follows at once that if φ determines no closed domains in the frames 1, …, n associated with it, then the normal extension of K4 generated by φ has the finite model property and so is decidable. Moreover, every normal logic axiomatizable by any (even infinite) set of such formulas φ also has the finite model property. This observation would not possibly merit any special attention, were it not for the fact that the class of such logics contains almost all the standard systems within the field of K4 (at least all those mentioned by Segerberg [1971] or Bull and Segerberg [1984]), all logics containing S4.3, all subframe logics of Fine [1985], and a continuum of other logics as well.

Let be the least cardinal θ such that MAθ fails, (i.e. MA) implies that is regular. Models for regular with are easy to get (see [Ku1]). Fremlin and Miller proved that cof() > ω [Fr, 41C(d)]. The question of whether it is consistent that be singular was solved, in the affirmative, by Kunen [Ku1]. Kunen used a (θ, θ) strong gap in (ω)/Fin, whose splitting partial order is c.c.c. He showed that if cof(θ) = ω1, and P is a c.c.c. partial order of cardinality < θ that may destroy the strong gap, then there exists another c.c.c. partial order Q, which does not destroy the strong gap, and such that ⊩Q “P is not c.c.c”. One then gets Kunen's model by iterating c.c.c. partial orders of cardinality < θ, without destroying the strong (θ, θ) gap. It is unknown whether it is consistent to have ω1 < cof() < .

Clearly, there exists a c.c.c. partial order Q with ∣Q∣ = , such that (Q) = (see (1.1)). A partial order P is σ-centered iff P is the union of countably many centered subsets, where a subset A ⊆ P is centered iff p ≤ q. Clearly, a σ-centered partial order is c.c.c. Bell and Szymański proved that (σ-centered) is regular (see [Be] or [Fr, 14C], and [Fr, 21K] or [vD, 3.1(e)]). This implies that if P is a σ-centered partial order, and is singular, then (P) > . In particular, if is singular, then Q is not σ-centered and all c.c.c. partial orders of cardinality < have a Baire number (1.1) strictly greater than . It was suggested in [Ku1] to try and use Q(T) (1.2), where T is a tree with no ω1-branches, to get models with singular . It is well known that when T is such a tree, the forcing Q(T) is c.c.c. [BMR], ∣Q(T)∣ = ∣T∣, and if T is not special, then n(Q(T)) ≤ ∣T∣.

Ever since Cantor, we have known that the reals and the rationals are not isomorphic (as equality structures, i.e., sets). Logically speaking, however, they are not all that different; in first-order classical logic they are elementarily equivalent, since the theory of infinite sets is complete. The same holds for ℝ and ℚ as ordered sets; again the theory of dense linear order without end points is complete.

From an intuitionistic point of view these matters are more complicated; e.g., the theory of equality of ℚ is decidable, whereas the one of ℝ patently is not. This, in a roundabout way, shows that ℚ and ℝ are not isomorphic; of course, there is no need for such a detour, as Cantor's original proof [2] is intuitionistically correct, and Brouwer's new proof [1] is another alternative intuitionistic argument.

In view of the fact that ℚ and ℝ behave so strikingly differently with respect to first-order logic, one is easily tempted to look for elementary equivalences among the subsets of ℝ. Until quite recently most model theoretic investigations of intuitionistic theories made use of special (artificial) notions of “model”, e.g., Kripke models, sheaf models,…; but there is no prima facie reason why one should not practice model theory much the same way as traditional model theorists do. That is to say on the basis of a naive set theory, or, in our case, of naive intuitionistic mathematics.

This paper uses the method of (k, p)-isomorphisms of Fraïssé, and it is briefly shown that one half of the Fraïssé theorem holds intuitionistically.

A method is presented for constructing natural deduction-style systems for propositional relevant logics. The method consists in first translating formulas of relevant logics into ternary relations, and then defining deduction rules for a corresponding logic of ternary relations. Proof systems of that form are given for various relevant logics. A class of algebras of ternary relations is introduced that provides a relation-algebraic semantics for relevant logics.

We improve results of Marczewski, Frankiewicz, Brown, and others comparing the ω-ideals of measure zero, meager, Marczewski measure zero, and completely Ramsey null sets; in particular, we remove CH from the hypothesis of many of Brown's constructions of sets lying in some of these ideals but not in others. We improve upon work of Marczewski by constructing, without CH, a nonmeasurable Marczewski measure zero set lacking the property of Baire. We extend our analysis of ω-ideals to include the completely Ramsey null sets relative to a Ramsey ultrafilter and obtain all 32 possible examples of sets in some ideals and not others, some under the assumption of MA, but most in ZFC alone. We also improve upon the known constructions of a Marczewski measure zero set which is not Ramsey by using a set theoretic hypothesis which is weaker than those used by other authors. We give several consistency proofs: one concerning the relative sizes of the covering numbers for the meager sets and the completely Ramsey null sets; another concerning the size of non; and a third concerning the size of add. We also study those classes of perfect sets which are bases for the class of always first category sets.

The Schur-Zassenhaus Theorem is one of the fundamental theorems of finite group theory. Here is its statement:

Fact 1.1 (Schur-Zassenhaus Theorem). Let G be a finite group and let N be a normal subgroup of G. Assume that the order ∣N∣ is relatively prime to the index [G:N]. Then N has a complement in G and any two complements of N are conjugate in G.

The proof can be found in most standard books in group theory, e.g., in [S, Chapter 2, Theorem 8.10]. The original statement stipulated one of N or G/N to be solvable. Since then, the Feit-Thompson theorem [FT] has been proved and it forces either N or G/N to be solvable. (The analogous Feit-Thompson theorem for groups of finite Morley rank is a long standing open problem).

The literal translation of the Schur-Zassenhaus theorem to the finite Morley rank context would state that in a group G of finite Morley rank a normal π-Hall subgroup (if it exists at all) has a complement and all the complements are conjugate to each other. (Recall that a group H is called a π-group, where π is a set of prime numbers, if elements of H have finite orders whose prime divisors are from π. Maximal π-subgroups of a group G are called π-Hall subgroups. They exist by Zorn's lemma. Since a normal π-subgroup of G is in all the π-Hall subgroups, if a group has a normal π-Hall subgroup then this subgroup is unique.)

The second assertion of the Schur-Zassenhaus theorem about the conjugacy of complements is false in general. As a counterexample, consider the multiplicative group ℂ* of the complex number field ℂ and consider the p-Sylow for any prime p, or even the torsion part of ℂ*. Let H be this subgroup. H has a complement, but this complement is found by Zorn's Lemma (consider a maximal subgroup that intersects H trivially) and the use of Zorn's Lemma is essential. In fact, by Zorn's Lemma, any subgroup that has a trivial intersection with H can be extended to a complement of H. Since ℂ* is abelian, these complements cannot be conjugated to each other.