This paper examines the changes taking place in Australian industrial relations. It takes as its starting point the policy objective of improving workplace productivity and examines the impact of reforms on this objective using Lewin’s framework for the analysis of change and a mining operation as a case study. The paper suggests that the reforms are only facilitative and this exposes a reliance on management for the achievement of the policy objective. The dominance of managerial perspective changes the fundamental nature of the industrial relations system and raises several important policy considerations, in particular issues relating to the recognition of trade unions.

In the light of the financial consequences of longevity, the potential for widening living standards as the population ages, and the perception of an increased burden by the working age population, recent policy changes in New Zealand appear far from ideal. For nearly twenty years, the retirement system has comprised just a universal state pension, called New Zealand Superannuation, and voluntary unsubsidised private saving. The decision in the late 1980s to promote tax neutrality for saving was critical to attaining a cost-effective, adequate, equitable and sustainable retirement income for all in an uncertain future. Nevertheless, a level playing field was only partially achieved and by the early 2000s, large imbalances in the economy were apparent. Strident calls to promote saving gradually undermined the accord around tax neutrality for retirement saving leading in 2007 to the re-introduction of tax incentives for certain types of saving, and other types of state intervention in private provision. This paper examines how the twenty year experiment with tax neutrality is coming to an end and the implications this has for the support of an aging population experiencing increased longevity.

Using an administrative dataset from the Ontario Ministry of Labour, we investigate three hypotheses about employment standards violations among franchised businesses: (1) franchisees have a higher probability of violating employment standards than other businesses, (2) franchisees have a higher probability of monetary/wage-related ES violations than other businesses, and (3) franchisees have a lower probability of repaying monetary/wage-related violations than other businesses. The results of our statistical models suggest that overall, franchisees are indeed more likely to violate ES, have a higher probability of monetary/wage-related violations, and are less likely to repay such violations. However, the results vary substantially by industry. While franchisees had only marginally higher probabilities of an ES violation in two of the seven industry-groups examined, five of the seven industries showed substantially higher probabilities of a monetary violation. The results also show that franchisees in three industry groups (retail, accommodation and food services, and education, public administration, healthcare and social services) are particularly prone to monetary violations.

When viewed against its ostensibly successful management of the global economic crisis between 2008 and 2013, growing electoral disenchantment with the Australian Labor Party government during that time defied standard explanations and calls for further analysis. A major reason for the party’s electoral loss in 2013 was arguably popular disappointment with its eschewal of social democratic principles. Notwithstanding some progressive measures initiated between 2008 and 2013, successive Australian Labor Party governments were constrained by neoliberal strictures, even when they chose to implement progressive policies. Whatever other reasons exist for its decline in popularity between 2007 and 2013, the Australian Labor Party’s unwillingness or inability to mark out a clear alternative to neoliberalism was fundamental. In making this case, this article uses the conceptual framework of ‘depoliticisation’, defined as the displacement of policy decisions from the sphere of democratic accountability and public debate, making them matters for regulation by technocratic experts operating according to supposed edicts of the market.

A great deal of the research into the determinants of labour market outcomes has focussed on the role of human capital and the structure of the labour market. Relatively little attention has been paid to the role of social capital. This paper investigates the extent to which an individual’s social capital relates to their labour market outcomes. The relationships between social capital and labour force status and social capital and job search method are explored using data collected from a national random sample of Australians. Both a network and typology approach to measuring social capital are used.

In the United States, as in other advanced industrial countries, worker participation in management has taken on increasing importance, placing pressures on employers and unions to change how they deal with employees/members, and with each other. This paper examines two of the most impressive cases in the U.S.: the partnerships between General Motors (G.M.) and the United Autoworkers union (U.A.W.) at Saturn and between BellSouth and the Communication Workers union (C.W.A.). We outline the evolution and the basic features of these innovations, as well as highlighting certain ongoing problems. These problems, we argue, confront the parties to employment relations in the U.S. more generally, reflecting profound ambivalence about such experiments, and their continued isolation as ‘islands of excellence’. As such, these cases both illustrate the vast potential for labor-management partnerships as well as the dampening effect of the employment relations context in the U.S.

Are people receiving unemployment-related income support more likely to exit from income support if they live in a stronger labour market? This paper examines this question using data from the Australian Department of Family and Community Services Longitudinal Data Set (LDS). We find that, controlling for other observed characteristics, living in an area with a one percentage point lower unemployment rate is associated with a 5 per cent increase in the probability of exit. This implies a 9 per cent decrease in the mean duration of benefit receipt. This should be considered an upper bound for the impact of regional labour market characteristics as it partly reflects the fact that people with low skill levels can only afford to live in high unemployment regions. To control for unobserved characteristics (such as skill levels) that are constant over time we look at changes in income support among people who move location. This suggests a much lower, but still significant, impact of local labour market conditions on unemployment benefit receipt.

A large and increasing share of economic activity in modern rich economies can be shown to lie outside what mainstream neoclassical economics itself says it can be applied to: according to neoclassical economics, such activities are unsuited to markets. Since World War II rich economies have de-industrialised, shifted to services. Since the 1970s neoclassical economics has come to dominate policy advice. This worldview justifies state interventions when there is remediable market failure, but it ignores irremediable market failure, where its theory says that markets cannot work efficiently (such as where there is joint production or own consumption). Servicisation, this article argues, has increased and is increasing the extent to which neoclassical economics is, in its own terms, ‘knowably ignorant’. This is because, where service provision is subject to irremediable market failure, neoclassical economics, in its own terms, is inapplicable. The GDP [Gross Domestic Product] share of sub-sectors serving diverse human needs, such as aged care and education, is large and rising. Such sub-sectors are dominated by joint production, manifest as diverse outputs (complex and inter-related changes in the welfare of their diverse clients). Setting aside questions of the wider ‘scientific’ validity of neoclassical theory, the article focuses on its assertion that markets cannot generate economically efficient outcomes in such activities. Arguing that the constrained optimisation of its conceptual world cannot happen in the case of joint production and own consumption of service outputs, neoclassical theory reports itself as unable to determine optimal resource allocation, and so by implication cannot fulfil its role as the foundational basis of state economic policy. Yet the literature shows that the coverage of this theoretical result is not publicised – it is ‘knowable’ but not widely known. The article concludes that, as neoclassical economics is foundational to contemporary state policy, both GDP data and neoclassical theory show that it, and markets, are knowably and increasingly inapplicable. Therefore, mainstream policy thinking continues to face an increasing ‘state of ignorance’, and the cognitive foundations of state policy are correspondingly weak.

Imagine a country that is inward looking and rarely notices the world beyond its own borders. Imagine a country with double-digit inflation and unemployment and a poor record of economic growth. Workers and their bosses are at each other’s throats, the country leads the world for working days lost due to industrial disputes and productivity (and how to improve it) is rarely talked about. Industry shelters behind prohibitive tariff walls (thinking only of the domestic market), the exchange rate is fixed every morning by officials of the central bank and the Treasury and international trade is an afterthought. Shop hours are regulated, domestic monopolies run most industries, and foreign entrants (in areas such as banking) are prohibited. Tax is high (and therefore evaded and avoided); expenditure untargeted and budgets in deficit. There are few foreign tourists, or many foreign students on university campuses. There are few restaurants around and licensing laws are restrictive. This country is at the bottom of the global premiership table in terms of economic performance despite its bountiful wealth.

In Australia and many other advanced economies, housing is playing a central role in accentuating and perpetuating inequality. This paper, drawing on primary and secondary data, discusses the various ways in which housing tenure in Australia contributes to wealth and income inequality. It argues that a neoliberal housing policy framework and accompanying financialisation of housing have facilitated a dramatic increase in house prices, the neglect of social housing, and a deepening wealth and income divide based on housing tenure. With respect to wealth, the key divide is between outright homeowners versus low-income private renters and low-income households in mortgage stress. The wealth of outright homeowners has grown substantially in recent decades and many have been able to acquire a holiday home and/or investment properties, thereby intensifying the wealth divide. Approximately a third of Australian households are now locked out of home ownership for an extended period or even lifelong. Housing tenure status also has an impact on the disposable income of households. For example, low-income outright homeowners are invariably in a far better position with respect to disposable income than their counterparts who have large mortgages or are private renters.

Australian industrial relations was a curious beast for much of the twentieth century. For many it was the institutional equivalent of a marsupial — native to the Australian environment. It developed in the economic and social circumstances of the nineteenth century. Indeed the development and elaboration of the arbitral model of Australian industrial relations was one of the major social experiments of a vibrant, young and successful Australia.

The problem of long-term unemployment has, at last, taken centre stage in the policy debate with the publication of the Green Paper Restoring Full Employment. While economic growth will reduce the general level of unemployment, to return the long-term unemployed to work will require increased training and reduction of labour costs. More recently the concept of a ‘training wage’ whereby employers would be allowed to pay below the current award wage to previously long-term unemployed has received some support. The Green Paper did not give much attention to training wages, preferring instead to focus on wage subsidies. In this paper the case for wage adjustments is discussed and evaluated.

The Australian economy has increasingly come under the influence of international factors. This has placed greater pressures on Australian businesses to be more competitive. This requires changes in both management and union practices, and changes in the institutional arrangements in which industrial relations are conducted. The paper argues the case for the general movement to enterprise bargaining. This will necessitate a major overhauling of bargaining structures and of trade union and employer association structures and practices. The award restructuring brought about by National Wage Case decisions provides but a preliminary step in the movement to an enterprise focus which will be critical to internationally competitive industries.

Conventional poverty and inequality measures, based only on comparisons of financial resources, may underestimate gender differences in living standards. The value of time spent in household work by oneself and partner, and the value of leisure are key elements that need to be considered in measures of living standards. This article develops a method for measuring wellbeing at the level of the individual, rather than the household. Following the tradition of Australian models of ‘full income’, the final measure of wellbeing includes the value of time in leisure and unpaid work along with individual income, the benefits accruing from the social wage and the welfare gains from the ownership and use of assets. The article then compares the conventional income distribution and the ‘full income’ distribution to identify population subgroups disadvantaged on each of these measures. The results show that gender inequalities in living standards may be underestimated by conventional income measures, and that inequalities in personal income and time use contribute most substantially to gender inequality in the full income distribution.

Much more is learned in the workplace than efficient skills. We have rather few concepts with which to theorise the ‘counter-cultural’ nature of much workplace learning. In leading off four articles that address this gap, this introduction dips into Australian labour history to open a discussion aimed at making visible some of the other learning that occurs at work. It asks why most workplace learning researchers have not acknowledged or extended such learning, and suggests that changing working conditions within universities may change this.

This study addresses the effectiveness of the fiscal stimulus package announced by the Turkish government in 2009 in terms of its particular gendered outcomes, with a special emphasis on employment policies. Through an analysis of the package’s components and the policies of the Public Employment Agency of Turkey (Iskur), this article demonstrates the public sector’s reluctance to take a leading role in generating employment and the insufficiency of its efforts in addressing the stated goal of increasing women’s employment. Active and passive employment policies in Turkey are instead shown to be accommodating the country’s gender-segregated labour markets and discrimination against women.

There has been much debate about the role of carbon prices in reducing greenhouse gas emissions in Australia. However there has been far less attention paid to the evaluation of complementary and other non-price policies designed to accompany the carbon price. The purpose of this article is to develop a framework for considering the case for, and effectiveness of, the wide range of existing and proposed complementary policies that are designed to accompany the carbon price in the effort to reduce Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions. The article concludes that an effective evaluation of complementary policies should include identifying the market failure the policy is aimed at correcting. The complementary policy should work in conjunction with, not opposition to, other polices aimed at reducing emissions. It should be complementary with the policies of other levels of government and it should also consider issues of efficiency, equity, accountability and adaptability.

Although workplace death is known to have profound social and psychological effects on families, the economic consequences have not been explored. This pioneering study investigated families’ financial situations following fatal workplace injuries. An online survey explored the impact of post-death financial change on 142 participants from Australia, Canada, the USA, and the UK using a scale from the economic strain model. Half of the participants experienced financial loss, and the proportion struggling financially increased from 24% to 62% after the death. Workers’ compensation claims were made by 74% of participants, but they reported problems with delays, levels of entitlement, and satisfaction with the scheme. Other key sources of assistance were family and friends or support groups and services. Participants who were older, next-of-kin, and partner/spouses were significantly more likely to experience financial loss as were those whose deceased relative worked 51+ hours per week, possibly because the deceased was self-employed or worked significant overtime not covered by compensation settlements. Those experiencing financial loss sought short- and long-term financial help, accessed social security, re-entered the workforce, acquired mental disorders, and experienced declines in physical health, at significantly higher rates than participants without financial loss, and their children developed mental health problems significantly more often. Findings highlight the detrimental, and potentially intergenerational, effects of financial loss on the health and wellbeing of families bereaved by traumatic workplace deaths. Policy issues flowing from the results are discussed, including how this informs wider debates on refashioning regulatory protection.

This article examines Chinese immigrant engineers’ navigation in the highly flexible information technology (IT) industry in the United States and their strategies of utilizing the high-velocity labour market to their advantage. Flexible employment has grown both in prevalence and prominence in the study of the American IT industry. What flexibility theorists fail to attend to, however, is the ethnicised demission of the high-velocity labour market in the IT sector. To address this vacancy, the researcher conducted a 13-month ethnography at a leading internet-services firm in the United States and 66 additional interviews with engineers from eight leading tech companies. The ethnographic work showed that inequality that emerged within the tech firms (e.g. ‘bamboo ceilings’) disadvantaged Chinese engineers’ career development. The ‘bamboo ceiling’ stimulated Chinese immigrants to use the high-velocity labour market to normalize their job-hopping practices, in order to circumvent their career disadvantage. To facilitate their job-hopping, Chinese engineers developed university-based networks. This study concludes that, with help of their university network, Chinese immigrants became the most mobile group in the US tech industry, which further preserved the industry’s flexibility.