The concept of disease remains hotly contested. In light of problems with existing accounts, some theorists argue that the disease concept ought to be eliminated. We answer this skeptical challenge by reframing the discussion in terms of the role that the disease concept plays in the complex network of health care institutions in which it is deployed. We argue that while prevailing accounts do not suffer from the particular defects that critics have identified, they do suffer from other deficits, and this leads us to propose a new account that satisfies the desiderata for a concept of disease in human medicine.

James developed an evolutionary objection to epiphenomenalism that is still discussed today. Epiphenomenalists have offered responses that do not grasp its full depth. I thus offer a new reading and assessment of James’s objection. Our life-essential, phenomenal pleasures and pains have three features that suggest that they were shaped by selection, according to James: they are natively patterned, those patterns are systematically linked with antecedent brain states, and the patterns are “universal” among humans. If epiphenomenalism were true, phenomenal patterns could not have been selected (because epiphenomenalism precludes phenomenal consciousness affecting reproductive success). So epiphenomenalism is likely false.

Evidence of the pervasiveness of neural reuse in the human brain has forced a revision of the standard conception of modularity in the cognitive sciences. One persistent line of argument against such revision, however, cites the evidence of cognitive dissociations. While this article takes the dissociations seriously, it contends that the traditional modular account is not the best explanation. The key to the puzzle is neural redundancy. The article offers both a philosophical analysis of the relation between reuse and redundancy as well as a plausible solution to the problem of dissociations.

According to orthodox representationalism, perceptual states have constitutive veridicality or accuracy conditions. In defense of this view, several philosophers—most notably Tyler Burge—employ a realist strategy that turns on the purported explanatory ineliminability of representational posits in perceptual science. I argue that Burge’s version of the realist strategy fails as a defense of orthodox representationalism. However, it may vindicate a different kind of representationalism.

Theorists working on information and representation are often not centrally concerned with “Shannon” information, as it is often put, but with some other, sometimes called “semantic,” kind of information. This perception is wrong. Shannon’s theory of information is the only one we need. I sketch a (Shannon) informational account of representation, for a certain important family of cases. This account, which represents a significant departure from the Dretskean philosophical mainstream, will show how a number of popular proposals about the purportedly noninformational ingredients in representation actually belong in the same coherent, purely information-theoretic picture.

According to psychological constructivism, emotions result from projecting folk emotion concepts onto felt affective episodes. While constructivists acknowledge there is a biological dimension to emotion, they deny that emotions are (or involve) affect programs. So they also deny emotions are natural kinds. However, the essential role that constructivism gives to felt experience and folk concepts leads to an account that is extensionally inadequate and functionally inaccurate. Moreover, biologically oriented proposals that reject these commitments are not similarly encumbered. Recognizing this has two implications: biological mechanisms are more central to emotion than constructivism allows, and the conclusion that emotions are not natural kinds is premature.

As for most measurement procedures in the course of their development, measures of consciousness face the problem of coordination, that is, the problem of knowing whether a measurement procedure actually measures what it is intended to measure. I focus on the case of the Perceptual Awareness Scale to illustrate how ignoring this problem leads to ambiguous interpretations of subjective reports in consciousness science. In turn, I show that empirical results based on this measurement procedure might be systematically misinterpreted.

Psychologists say a measure has construct validity when it, in fact, measures the construct it is intended to measure. Construct validity is both an important notion in psychological research methods and the source of much confusion and debate among psychologists. I argue that this confusion arises, in part, because of a failure to distinguish between construct validity, a feature of measures relative to a construct, and construct legitimacy, a feature of the construct itself. I propose a prescriptive account of construct validity on the basis of this distinction, then provide evidence for my account through two examples from research psychology.

In a world awash in statistical patterns, should we conclude that the universe’s evolution or genesis is somehow subject to chance? I draw attention to alternatives that must be acknowledged if we are to have an adequate assessment of what chance the universe might have had.

Brown and Pooley’s ‘dynamical approach’ to physical theories asserts, in opposition to the orthodox position on physical geometry, that facts about physical geometry are grounded in, or explained by, facts about dynamical fields, not the other way round. John Norton has claimed that the proponent of the dynamical approach is illicitly committed to spatiotemporal presumptions in ‘constructing’ space-time from facts about dynamical symmetries. In this article, I present an abstract, algebraic formulation of field theories and demonstrate that the proponent of the dynamical approach is not committed, in special relativity, to the illicit presumptions to which Norton refers.

The laws of nature have an internal explanatory structure. This leads to interesting questions for metaphysicians of laws. What is the nature of this explanation? Marc Lange has recently argued in favor of metalaws: higher-order laws governing other laws, of which symmetry principles may be an example. Lange argues that his view, unlike its competitors, can make sense of the explanatory power of symmetries. I agree with Lange about the explanatory structure of laws but disagree with him about the nature of this explanation. I then present a Humean view that neatly captures the explanatory power of symmetry principles.

The universality of critical phenomena is best explained by appeal to the Renormalization Group (RG). Batterman and Morrison, among others, have claimed that this explanation is irreducible. I argue that the RG account is reducible but that the higher-level explanation ought not to be eliminated. I demonstrate that the key assumption on which the explanation relies—the scale invariance of critical systems—can be explained in lower-level terms. However, we should not replace the RG explanation with a bottom-up account; rather, we should acknowledge that the explanation appeals to dependencies that may be traced down to lower levels.

Quantum physics is the foundation for chemistry, but the concept of chemical bonding is not easily reconciled with quantum mechanical models of molecular systems. The quantum theory of atoms in molecules, developed by Richard F. W. Bader and colleagues, seeks to define bonding using a topological analysis of the electron density distribution. The “bond paths” identified by the analysis are posited as indicators of a special pair-wise physical relationship between atoms. While elements of the theory remain subject to debate, I argue that the quantum theory of atoms in molecules embodies a distinctive interactive conception of bonding that is an attractive alternative to others previously discussed.

Dmitrii Mendeleev’s periodic system is known for its predictive accuracy, but talk of its completeness is rarer. This is surprising because completeness (polnost’) was a quality that Mendeleev saw as important for a systematization of the chemical elements. Here, I explain how Mendeleev’s valuing of completeness influenced the development of his periodic system. After introducing five indicators of its completeness, I zoom into one in particular: Mendeleev’s inclusion of a schematic row of oxides. I then show how it guided Mendeleev’s predictions of indium and ekaboron, which suggests that the valuing of completeness was instrumental for making predictions.