A Royal Decree of 25 April 1947 entrusted the internationally well known Professor E.M. Meijers with the task of drafting a new civil code.2 Meijers started by submitting some 50 questions to the Dutch Parliament, 18 of which went right to the heart of the issue of how to deal with unjust enrichment:

‘Should a general provision be incorporated to the effect that a person who without sufficient legal ground is enriched at the expense of another must compensate the other for his loss to the maximum of his enrichment, or should the code be limited to the enumeration of a number of specific instances in which this action can be brought?’

No judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter: ‘the Court’) has ever given rise to such commotion in the Netherlands as has the judgment of 23 October 1985 in the Benthem case. In this respect it even exceeded the judgment of 24 October 1979 against the Netherlands in the Winterwerp case, and the judgment of 13 June 1979 against Belgium in the Marckx case, both of which also had very far-reaching consequences for Dutch legislation and legal practice.

Women all over the world have experienced discrimination and victimisation. However, the level of suffering women in Africa experience far exceeds imaginable proportions. Trapped between the unholy matrimony of poverty and harsh economic conditions, dictatorial regimes, religious beliefs, and cultural and traditional practices, women in Africa have been subjected to some of the worst forms of gender-based violence, abuse, victimisation, prejudice and oppression. Yet, women are at the same time the symbol of love and so central to the maintenance of African ways of life. The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights was criticised for its failure to maintain a proper balance between women's rights and African tradition. This article argues that the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (African Women's Protocol) adopted by the African Union on 11 July 2003 to beef up the protection of women's rights on the continent is amenable to a similar criticism. While it deals with many important issues affecting African women, it fails to articulate a clear or consistent African approach to women's rights. As a result, it is difficult to reconcile the Protocol with the existing body of jurisprudence in the regional human rights system as developed under the African Charter and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.

To-date, the proliferation and unrestricted transfers of small arms and light weapons (SALW) pose a threat to peace and security, particularly in conflict torn regions and countries. As part of collective responses to this problem, the Security Council intensified Chapter VII arms embargoes in the aftermath of the Cold War. These bans are arguably seen by many as the only legal restrictions on the trade in SALW under international law. However, due to a lack of appropriate monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, the bans are often violated by states and non-state actors. In response to this the Council has taken a range of steps, including establishing and empowering sanctions' committees, monitoring panels and groups of experts, to oversee compliance and conduct investigations on alleged violations. This article inquires into three areas of interest: first, the link between the small arms challenge and international peace and security and the powers and responsibilities of the Security Council to respond to this challenge; secondly, the nature, scope and major problems of the embargoes; and finally, the features of recent developments in the application of the bans. It is submitted that whilst the inherent problems of these bans, most crucially the lack of political commitment of states to comply with the measures and respond to violations remain to be persistent contemporary challenges, the newly introduced monitoring mechanisms are positive attributes to the effectiveness of the embargoes.

Non-retroactivity of treaties is well-established in international law. Provisions of a treaty do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took place, or any situation which ceased to exist before the treaty enters into force for that party. This principle precludes the possibility of litigation arising out of situations or facts dating from a period when a State could not have foreseen that the circumstances might give rise to legal proceedings.

The prolific growth of international intercourse and concomitant litigation in recent years has greatly increased the need for liberal and efficient procedures of international co-operation in civil litigation. The country in which the litigation is pending must make efficacious and flexible provision for the performance of necessary acts abroad, while the country in which the acts are to be performed should do whatever possible to eliminate unreasonable obstacles and to provide proper co-operation. Unfortunately, however, the procedures in many countries fail to meet these reasonable requirements.

The Middle East has experienced more peacekeeping activity, both in volume and variety, than any other region in the world. At the present time the United Nations Interim Force in the Lebanon (UNIFIL) is active in southern Lebanon, the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) is maintaining its vigil on the Golan Heights, the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) are stationed in the Sinai, and Observers of the UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) are serving in various sectors of the Middle East.

Since 1995, Ethiopia has embarked upon a new federal system. Very little has been written about the process in general and about the manner in which the issues concerning the division of powers between the federal government and the states in Ethiopia are adjudicated The federal Constitution has several peculiar features. One of these relates to the institution empowered to interpret and adjudicate constitutional issues. Unless there is a tribunal that enforces the supremacy clause of the Constitution and that demarcates the proper sphere of the powers of the federal and state governments, chaos would result from jurisdictional conflicts. This power, by virtue of the federal Constitution belongs to the second chamber, otherwise known as the House of Federation. This article begins with a brief introduction of the federal system and proceeds to discuss the role, jurisdiction and procedure of the House of Federation (HOF) in the adjudication and interpretation of constitutional issues from a comparative perspective. It explains why vesting this power on the HOF, and not on the judiciary, was a policy choice.

This article explores the implications for the protection of civilians and other vulnerable persons, of the requalification of a conflict downwards from international to non-international, focusing in particular on the changes in the characterization of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq from 2001 and 2003 respectively.

Determining the legal character of an armed conflict is rooted in an inherently political interpretation of black letter treaty law. It is generally agreed that when the United States and its coalition allies entered the wars in Afghanistan in 2001, and Iraq in 2003, their operations in those countries were initially subject to the laws of international armed conflict. However the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has determined that the conflict in Afghanistan became non-international with the establishment of the United States' backed government of Hamid Karzai on 19 June 2002 and that the conflict in Iraq became non-international with the establishment of the Iraqi Interim Government on 28 June 2004. The basis for this requalification is Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions read in conjunction with an interpretation of the meaning of ‘state’ (and of its power to authorize a foreign intervention in its own territory) that is inherently, and possibly inevitably, political.

Changes in the legal characterization of a war have profound implications for the protection of both non-combatants and combatants under international humanitarian law, in particular for humanitarian access; for the protection of non-nationals from deportation; for the protection of detainees; for the conduct of hostilities; and for the protection of persons transferred into the hands of local authorities. The practical consequence of a requalification of an armed conflict downwards to non-international is a marked loss of protection for persons that were protected by the Geneva Conventions in the earlier stages of the conflict.

This article addresses the question whether the European Union defaulted on the ‘strict observance’ of international law and ‘respect’ for the UN Charter, which are now express objectives of the EU following the Lisbon reform, in the course of the famous Kadi cases. With the final appeals judgment having been handed down by the Court of Justice of the European Union in July 2013, this question can now be conclusively answered in the negative. Despite the general tension these legal challenges created between EU law and international law, the EU managed, in the course of twelve years, to weave a seamless coat of compliance with international law. The article contrasts this finding with the general academic discourse on this case law, which tends to depict Kadi as a ‘sacrifice’ of compliance with international law for the benefit of fundamental rights (as well as the autonomy of the EU legal order). By retracing the entirety of this string of cases, the article demonstrates that, all rhetoric aside and for all practical purposes, the EU courts and other institutions managed to avoid any violations of international legal obligations towards the UN Security Council in this matter. The EU discontinued its own sanctions against Mr Kadi only after he had been delisted by the UN by means of a political decision, not by virtue of judicial intervention.

This article addresses R. O'Keefe's 1999 publication entitled ‘The Meaning of “Cultural Property” under the 1954 Hague Convention’. There the author made two points regarding the protection of ‘cultural objects and places of worship’ in the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 that have been commonly shared by legal scholarship and practice. First, he claimed that despite the divergences between the definitions of cultural property in the 1954 Hague Convention and the 1977 Additional Protocols, the spectrum of cultural property they covered was exactly the same. Secondly, he held that the Additional Protocols awarded a higher regime of protection to cultural property for not being subject to imperative military necessity. This article reconsiders and qualifies these statements. It argues that while both instruments tackle objects which represent each party's national heritage, their scope of application differ since the 1954 Hague Convention cannot cover places of worship that constitute the spiritual heritage of peoples per se. This, we will see, has resulted in its own different consequences in international practice. It also aruges that it is erroneous to maintain tout court that the 1954 Hague Convention offers a weaker regime of protection for cultural property. From a closer look at the relationship between the concepts of ‘military objectives’ and ‘imperative military necessity’, a distinct and more nuanced conclusion follows: the 1954 Hague Convention offers stricter guarantees against the likelihood of acts of hostility aimed at cultural property. This article continues a scholarly debate initiated by O'Keefe, casts some clarity on issues that seem to trouble the ICTY, and challenges the mainstream interpretation given to the protection of cultural property under the two Additional Protocols.

Courts are frequently confronted with complaints about unequal treatment of various sorts, varying from legislative acts limiting the rights of inheritance of illegitimate children, to unequal taxation criteria for property taxes. The need to assess different cases of unequal treatment against the equality principle places before the courts a difficult task. The equality principle demands that the courts examine the reasonableness and justifiability of each specific case of unequal treatment, however different the subject. In doing so, the courts need to respect both the discretion or freedom of the party that is responsible for the difference in treatment, and the interests of the person or group that is disadvantaged by it. In order to enable the courts to take account of all interests at stake in any relevant equal treatment case, some variation in the intensity of review is indispensable. In some cases, it is appropriate to exercise restraint in assessing the justification for an inequality in treatment, while other cases call for the strictest scrutiny. In this contribution, the various factors that are relevant to the determination of the appropriate level of review are identified on the basis of a comparative study of the case law of the European Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights and the US Supreme Court. In addition, a standard is offered to balance intensity-determining factors pointing in different directions.

The decisions rendered by the House of Lords in ex parte Pinochet have not only held the attention of the general public, but also have been broadly considered in academic writing. Most of the public international lawyers1y’ comments concentrate on analysing the judgments, which is absolutely necessary as, owing to the particularities of procedure, twelve Law Lords – thus twelve distinguished lawyers of a court held in highest regard throughout the world – have given lengthy opinions on very intricate questions of international and domestic law. Consequently, the present article intends to refrain as far as possible from further comment and critique on what was decided by the House of Lords. Instead, it will undertake a closer look at the aftermath of the Pinochet decision. The main question is whether the decisions in ex parte Pinochet have resulted in a change in the relevant public international law rules concerning heads of state immunity. The ‘classic’ content of these rules shall be provided, together with the uncertainties and inconsistencies which existed well before ex parte Pinochet, and the new trends and developments that are calling them into question (infra section 3). The whole analysis is based on the assumption that the issues touched upon in the House of Lords' decisions are at the heart of the fundamental changes which international legal scholarship is currently undergoing, particularly since the 1990s. We are thus not only facing a possible change of legal rules, but must also reflect on the potential modification of basic concepts in the areas of statehood, sources of law and the position of the individual (infra section 4).

The privatization of essential services such as water and electricity has raised a number of questions with respect to the role of the state and how these services should be regulated. An obligation to regulate from the perspective of human rights law may clash with the right to regulate within certain limits under international investment law. The importance of these services for society requires the adoption of positive protection measures that guarantee their quality and universal accessibility. At the same time, the rights of investors under bilateral investment treaties need to be respected. However, under international law it is not self-evident that human rights concerns will trump the legal obligations flowing from bilateral investment treaties. A way to reconcile these potentially competing legal obligations is required under international law, and may lead to the development of what may be called ‘international public service law’.

Today, Machiavelli's words have lost none of their accuracy. Population transfer still serves as an effective means to secure the fruits of conquest or aggression to the detriment of the civilian population. With nationalist sentiments rising alarmingly, population transfer is bound to be one of the issues figuring high on the international agenda in the decade to come.

On 17 July 1998, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (hereinafter: the ICC Statute) was adopted. There is no doubt about the significance of the legislation of the ICC Statute to international criminal law. The discussion at the United Nations (UN) on the idea of an international court for criminal proceedings started soon after the establishment of the UN, in the legislation of the Genocide Convention and other works, but encountered a deadlock in the 1950s. Considering how difficult it was to reach an agreement on this issue, it is astonishing to see that the ICC Statute became substantive law a half-century after the adoption of the Genocide Convention. This phenomenon demonstrates the evolution in the environment and consciousness of the international community through time.

1. The structure of the United Nations system was established at San Francisco in 1945 and laid down in Chapters IX and X of the UN Charter. Articles 57, 58 and 63 provide the legal basis for co-ordination in the UN system. According to Art. 57 the various specialized agencies “shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations”. Art. 58 states that the UN shall make recommendations for the co-ordination of the policies and activities of the specialized agencies. Art. 63 assigns the primary co-ordination responsibility to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).

A high point was reached in the CSCE process with the adoption of the extensive Concluding Document of the third follow-up meeting in Vienna of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) on 19 January 1989. This document, which is the result of more than two years of negotiation, is remarkable for two reasons. First, the 35 participating countries – all the European States with the exception of Albania, together with Canada and the United States – have never before achieved so much agreement on so many formerly disputed matters relating primarily to human rights as they did in Vienna. In addition, a significant advance was recorded in Vienna on the matter of supervising the performance of the obligations accepted by the CSCE States: the supervisory mechanism of the human dimension of the CSCE signifies at the same time a significant strengthening of the institutional structure of the CSCE process. It is my intention in this article to examine to what extent the Helsinki process, in particular its institutional features, has undergone a change in character as a consequence of the results achieved at the follow-up meeting. At the same time, I shall look at a number of institutional changes and adaptations that I consider to be desirable.