This article argues that the harrowing consequences of official corruption for African societies elevate corruption to the level of a breach of the social and economic rights recognized in international human rights law. Yet, unlike in the case of violation of civil and political rights, the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states seems to provide a convenient excuse for the inaction of the international community in the face of egregious violation of social and economic rights. This inaction, the article argues, is part of the reason why corrupt public officials in Africa perpetrate graft and openly accumulate illicit gains at home and abroad without fear of punishment. The article, therefore, suggests two things: elevation of corruption to the status of a crime in positive international law, and expansion of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court to include official corruption and looting of public funds.

Amid the proliferation of international judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, worries about the possible fragmentation of international law are increasing. Such fears, however, may be misplaced. A close examination of the jurisprudence of nine international judicial bodies, looking specifically for instances of explicit reference to one another's decisions, shows the practice to be widespread, of variable frequency and covering both procedural and substantive issues. Taken in conjunction with other scholarship about the similar treatment of important doctrines across all (or most) bodies, this study suggests that unity, not fragmentation, may emerge from the proliferation of international courts and tribunals.

The growing sense of urgency regarding various global environmental problems has prompted calls for global legislative processes that could produce binding outcomes. However, as law-making gravitates into international forums, questions are raised regarding the legitimacy of international environmental governance. Much law-making today occurs under multilateral environmental agreements (‘MEAs’), such as the Climate Change Convention and its Kyoto Protocol. The article examines the role of Conferences of the Parties (‘COPs’) in MEA-based law-making. It juxtaposes the standard conception of international law-making and an alternative account, which sees law-making not simply as crystallized in formal consent procedures but as continuous interactional processes. The interactional account can help build the foundations for legitimate international environmental governance, and can provide important guidance to law-makers, even as they, even as they continue to operate within a formal, consent-based framework.

This essay traces the relationship between activists and academics involved in the campaign for “women's rights as human rights” as a case study of the relationship between different classes of what I call “knowledge professionals” self-consciously acting in a transnational domain. The puzzle that animates this essay is the following: how was it that at the very moment at which a critique of “rights” and a reimagination of rights as “rights talk” proved to be such fertile ground for academic scholarship did the same “rights” prove to be an equally fertile ground for activist networking and lobbying activities? The paper answers this question with respect to the work of self-reflexivity in creating a “virtual sociality of rights.”

One year ago in this Journal Carty offered a reassessment of Schmitt's writings on international law, in an attempt to present them as a still valuable theoretical tool in a contemporary critical discourse on (neo)liberalism. Carty's proceedings, thought provoking as they may be, is unconvincing, because Schmitt's views on international law are indissolubly tied up with Nazi ideology and political purposes. Paradoxically a transfer in our time of Schmitt's Großraum concept provides a less critical argument against neoliberalism than at the best a dubious bolster to it.

Despite repeated attempts to eliminate statelessness and to provide for the protection of stateless persons, international law has not been able to provide an adequate response to these problems. In the Middle East the problem has continued to grow as social and political change pushes people into becoming stateless and fails to provide those who are stateless with adequate protection. The treaties that have attempted to prevent this practice have failed. At the same time the lex specialis aimed at protecting people from the consequences of statelessness have also failed. The result has been a lacuna in the protection of stateless persons. This article suggests that a step towards filling this gap might be made by applying general international human rights law to protect stateless persons.

Gunnar Lagergren has performed many notable functions in the course of the twentieth century, most of which resulted in significant contributions to international law and, in particular, to the settlement of international disputes. As an arbitrator, he handled a number of important cases, including that between India and Pakistan concerning the Rann of Kutch and the Taba boundary arbitration between Egypt and Israel. He served with distinction on a number of important tribunals, including the European Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg and the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal at The Hague, where he was its first President.

Together with the Security Council and the General Assembly, the International Court of Justice is one of the most important guarantors of peace, security and co-operation among states. The role of the ICJ in the enforcement of its decisions has received little attention in the existing literature. Although international courts, regional courts and national courts do not physically enforce their decisions, they have various levels of enforcement mechanism procedures. Nevertheless, it has been widely and mistakenly believed that it is not the business of the ICJ to enforce its decisions, but rather this is the business of other political bodies of the United Nations. It is argued in this paper that this proposition is not accurate and, instead, the ICJ has at its disposal various enforcement procedures and is, moreover, under statutory obligations to participate actively in policing and enforcing its decisions.

This article discusses whether it is permissible to cumulatively convict a superior under both Articles 7(1) and 7(3) of the ICTY Statute. After introducing the various modes of command responsibility under each provision, the discussion is premised on the double jeopardy/non bis in idem concerns underlying the case law of the Tribunal, and that of the ICTR, in relation to cumulative convictions for substantive offences. The article first presents arguments supporting the proposition that superiors should not be held cumulatively responsible under the aforementioned provisions. It then presents arguments to the contrary, including considerations in relation to the impact on sentencing. In this light, the article critically appraises the case law of both Tribunals.

The application by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for a revision of the 1996 ICJ Judgment in the Bosnia case is the latest initiative involving the Court in the Balkan crisis. Whilst the application raises interesting questions, they reflect rather upon the indeterminate nature of the Court's original Judgment than upon their own merit. It is doubtful whether the Court would regard the change in circumstances such as to justify revising its Judgment. The most perplexing issue concerns the motivation behind the application. Given the potential effect of the proceedings on other cases involving the FRY before the Court, the application may allow the Court to dispose of all such cases in one single decision, which may have certain attractions for the Court if it is to remain politically disengaged.

Successive ICJ Presidents have expressed concern about the proliferation of international tribunals and substantive fragmentation of international law. This is not a new phenomenon. International law has always lacked a clear normative and institutional hierarchy. The problem is more how new institutions have used international law to further new interests, especially those not predominant in traditional law. The anxiety among ICJ judges should be seen less as a concern for abstract “coherence” than a worry about the demise of traditional principles of diplomatic law and the Court's privileged role as their foremost representative. As jurisdictional conflicts reflect divergent political priorities, it is unclear that administrative co-ordination can eliminate them. This does not, however, warrant excessive worries over fragmentation; it is an institutional expression of political pluralism internationally.

In Germany v. United States (2001), the International Court of Justice ruled that the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations confers judicially enforceable rights on foreign nationals detained for prolonged periods or sentenced to severe penalties without notice of their right to communicate with their consulates. The Court also ruled that states which fail to give timely notice cannot later invoke procedural default to bar individuals from judicial relief. However, the Court did not clearly address other issues, such as requiring individuals to show prejudice to the outcome of the trial, or denial of certain remedies for Convention violations, which may effectively foreclose relief.

Differing strategic priorities are only the beginning of the dispute over the International Criminal Court. Americans will not abandon their traditional constitution, as submission to the ICC would require. European states have already subordinated their national constitutions to a German-dominated federation. Americans do not accept international monitors in fighting against evil. Europeans are drawn to relativizing abstractions. For Germans, the ICC promises to “overcome the past,” by licensing German judges to try Americans and Israelis for war crimes. Europeans may feel obliged to fall in step with this latest German project. The US still has the moral self-confidence to resist it.

While the most important feature of the judgment given by the International Court of Justice in the LaGrand case is probably the conclusion that provisional measures indicated by the Court are binding, the decision is not without significance in the field of diplomatic protection.

This article reviews the case concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island with reference to acquisition of title to territory under international law. It traces the ICJ's use of evidence of African use and occupation to establish territorial sovereignty in a European state. The tests adopted by the Court are based on Eurocentric assumptions that only the consent of European states is necessary to adjudicate nineteenth century claims of title to territory. International law still carries forward within it the colonial notion that treaties between colonial powers in the nineteenth century extinguished pre-existing title to territory based on African use and occupation. The decision gives probative value to economic intentions of colonizing powers and geographical and scientific evidence in determining title to the disputed island while Africa use and occupation of territory is sidelined. Africa is treated as an unconscious geographical entity – a feature referred to as geographical Hegelianism in this article.

Recently, the ICJ appears to have been taking into account the protection of human life in its indication of provisional measures. This raises the question of how and to what extent the human life element influences the criteria for indicating provisional measures. After considering the meaning of ‘irreparability’ in the Court's jurisprudence, the author analyzes recent case law in the light of a link between irreparable harm and those rights of the parties that constitute the subject matter of the dispute in judicial proceedings. In conclusion, the author criticizes the Court's recent approach towards indicating provisional measures, as it raises some problems concerning jurisdiction, as well as the binding character and the nature of provisional measures.

The crime of aggression will be included within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court once agreement is reached on its definition and the conditions for exercising jurisdiction. The author discusses the ultimately unsuccessful efforts of the now concluded Preparatory Commission for the Court to complete the drafting. He suggests how the mental and material elements of the offense might be structured consistently with other offenses in the Statute of the Court. Probably the biggest intellectual hurdle is that of “conditions.” A number of states, notably the Permanent Members of the Security Council, insist that there must be a predetermination of an act of aggression by a state made by the Security Council. Others believe that the predetermination can be made by the General Assembly or the International Court of Justice. Yet others claim that all decisions must be made by the International Criminal Court. The political choice between these positions has still to be made.

The various Trial Chambers of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia have advanced potentially inconsistent definitions of the crime of persecution under Article 5 of the Tribunal's Statute. The Trial Chamber in the Krnojelac case, in attempting to reconcile these different approaches, has undertaken a comprehensive analysis both of the actus reus and mens rea elements constituting this offence. In the context of the Tribunal's jurisprudence, this article analyses these elements and briefly discusses other issues related to the crime of persecution.

On 27 June 2001, the International Court of Justice rendered its final decision in the case of LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), which deals with many complex issues of international law. Apart from the very interesting substantive legal issues relating to the regime of consular assistance and death penalty in international law, the Judgment of the Court contains significant principles and reflections as to the essence and scope of international judicial jurisdiction. In contrast to the traditional approach to this question, the Court's Judgment is concerned with practical and specific aspects of jurisdiction in action, rather than dealing with general assumptions and conceptions surrounding the problem. From this point of view, the present contribution examines the significance of LaGrand as a case in which the traditional assumptions on international judicial jurisdiction are tested and reappraised.

The United States has repeatedly failed to notify detained foreign nationals of their rights to consular notification and access under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. In capital cases, US non-compliance with this ratified Treaty has led to litigation by foreign governments and individual lawyers in domestic courts and international tribunals. While these efforts have had mixed results in individual cases, litigation by Mexico, Germany and other actors has led to increased compliance with Article 36, and a growing recognition of the significance of US treaty obligations.