This article focuses on the approaches of international criminal judges to using external precedent, distinguishing between the appraisal-based and flexible approaches. On the one hand, the appraisal-based approach refers to uses of external judicial decisions which are preceded by an express legal appraisal. On the other hand, the flexible approach denotes a less stringent use of such decisions. It finds that, in a number of cases, international criminal judges have adopted a flexible approach to decisions and have assimilated them within the legal framework of the referring court or tribunal without the necessary adjustment. This may have important implications for the principle of legality and the fairness of the proceedings. The paper indicates that the adoption of either the appraisal-based or flexible approaches to external judicial decisions is not necessarily linked to the specific legal backgrounds of the judges involved, and different judges hailing from varying legal backgrounds have shifted between these approaches in different cases. This suggests that there is need for greater rigour in the judicial methodology for using external judicial decisions and, in particular, the importance of the appraisal-based approach to using such decisions, to ensure their the congruence with the legal framework of the referring court or tribunal.

The aim of this article is to show that the concept of perpetration by means as it appears in Article 25 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) accurately reflects liability for crimes committed by high-level perpetrators who exercise control over the actions of the lower-level (fully responsible) perpetrators. Finding the proper mode of liability in these cases is crucial to the International Criminal Court's (ICC) mission of ending impunity for serious international crimes. While international criminal law may be unlikely to deter criminals, especially heads of state and other powerful leaders, it can provide some sense of justice for the victims by convicting and punishing those responsible for their suffering. As such, the functions of international criminal law are to a large extent expressive and retributive. At the same time, it is important to keep the focus of international criminal law on individual responsibility of the perpetrators. It is, therefore, crucial to find proper labels that reflect culpability well. I hope to make a contribution to this search in what follows.

This article is divided into five sections. First, I provide a background to the move, recently articulated by the ICC, from the concept of joint criminal enterprise (JCE) to that of indirect perpetration (and indirect co-perpetration) (section 2). Second, I analyse the original presentation of this idea by the German jurist Claus Roxin (section 3). Third, I examine the application of this concept by the German courts, particularly in the 1994 trial of three high level GDR officials held liable as indirect perpetrators for the killings (carried out by the border guards) of refugees at the East/West German border (section 4). Then I present a recent (Winter 2011) proposal by Jens Ohlin to abandon both JCE and indirect perpetration in favour of another mode of collective liability based on joint intentions (section 5). Finally, I defend the concept of indirect perpetration against Ohlin's criticisms, arguing that it offers a more accurate way to label the conduct of high-level perpetrators who carry out crimes by means of direct perpetrators who are themselves liable (section 6).

In international criminal tribunal discourse, appeals to history and legitimacy are omnipresent. This article addresses the widespread practice of combining these appeals into one narrative. It analyses how international prosecutors engage with justifying the legitimacy of trials through the invocation of a tribunal's own history. The scrutiny of such ‘auto-histories’ as a specific form of history-telling illuminates an overlooked dimension of trials as fora for writing history. The opening statement is a perfect opportunity for constructing and communicating auto-histories. A comparative study of opening statements at the International Military Tribunal, the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the International Criminal Court reveals a recurrent, self-justifying narrative where both rootedness in history and a break with the past are key to singing the tribunal into existence as a crucial mechanism in the transition from chaos to peace. The connections between auto-histories at different tribunals show how legal practitioners discursively contribute to constructing the international criminal law's identity by relying on both origins and future.

Since the end of the Cold War, societies from the former Soviet Union and others throughout Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia, and Latin America have overthrown dictators and other authoritative rulers in the hope of allowing democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. In some cases, the change has been violent and drawn out, while in other cases the change has been quick and (more or less) non-violent. Regardless of whether the change has been violent or not, a crucial question during and after transition is: In what ways should post-authoritarian and/or post-conflict societies deal with their ‘evil’ past in order to ‘enable the state itself to [once again] function as a moral agent’? This question constitutes the very core of what is known as ‘transitional justice’ (TJ).

This doctoral thesis, now published as a monograph, provides a thorough analysis of one of the most crucial concepts of the modern law of armed conflicts (LOAC), namely military objectives. The concept is crucial because the targeting of such objectives is directly linked to the principle of distinction, which in turn is a cardinal tenet of LOAC. It requires that the belligerents must always make the distinction between civilian objects and persons on the one hand, and military objectives (persons and objects) on the other, and attack only the latter to the exclusion of the former (Article 48 of the Additional Protocol I of 1977 (AP I)). Thus, the concept of military objectives is cast amidst the protection of civilians during the conduct of hostilities (whereas Geneva Convention IV of 1949 concerns their protection outside the context of combat action). It stands to reason that this protection is an essential part of the modern law of armed conflicts. Moreover, it is only superficially surprising that AP I was the first treaty to generally define military objectives. In the nineteenth century, the civilian hardly appeared in the LOAC. It was at that time simply taken for granted that civilians were outside the reach of military action; they would not participate in it and concomitantly would be spared from attacks. The social environment of the past was such that military action and civilian presence were reasonably distinct: the battlefield was the pitch for military action, other areas were bluntly aloof from such action. The twentieth century completely changed these parameters. Air power allowed a belligerent to wreak heavy havoc into all the lands of the adverse party. Industrialization and modernization of the army made civilian objectives relevant from a military standpoint, in particular industrial plants. Finally, the difference between civilians and military personnel was blurred, since civilians participated in a variety of forms to military operations (guerilla warfare is but one of the most emblematic forms of such participation). All these factors, among others, explain that the majority of victims in modern armed conflicts are civilians, not rarely up to a proportion of 90 per cent.1 The question of military objectives remains also highly relevant when viewed from another perspective. It is a concept often applied in modern military campaigns, where air power is of the essence. However, it gives rise to uncertainties at least on two accounts. First, the definition is open-ended and contextual; it must be operationalized in single cases and this gives rise to legal uncertainty. Indeed, Article 52, § 2, AP I, the cardinal provision in this regard, provides only for criteria which have to be applied by the belligerent to single sets of facts in order to determine if an object is a military objective. Second, there are marked differences of interpretation between the US and the continental European conceptions of military objectives, especially in certain areas of targeting such as ‘economic targets’ (i.e. targets chosen for their economic value to the war-sustaining effort). Notwithstanding the relevance of the concept of military objectives, there is hardly a wealth of monographic treatment of the subject matter. Indeed, no monograph in the English language was directly and exclusively devoted to that notion before the present publication. This new monograph is thus more than welcome.