Five decades after the wave of independence of the 1960s, have all African territories been decolonized in accordance with international law? On the basis of the General Assembly and state practice, this study argues that only the continuing possession of African territories by colonial powers is contrary to the obligation to decolonize under international law. Thus, colonialism is still persisting in Africa with regard to the Glorious Islands, Mayotte, the Chagos, Ceuta and Melilla, the islands Alhucemas, Chafarinas, Leïla, and Peñon de Vélez de la Gomera. These territories belong respectively to Madagascar, the Comoros Islands, Mauritius, and Morocco. However, the obligation to decolonize under international law, which is premised on the existence of a colonial possession, does not provide any legal basis to claims directed against independent African states. Besides, the maintenance of boundaries existing upon the achievement of African countries to independence is not a case of enduring colonialism.

The long-awaited verdict of the International Court of Justice in the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide case between Croatia and Serbia brought to an end the speculations as to whether or not a finding of genocide would be reached. After lengthy considerations on the genocidal actus reus, the Court dismissed all the claims of genocide, based on the lack of genocidal intent. If this conclusion is perfectly in line with established law and case law, its wider readability and acceptability outside of the legal microcosm is perhaps doubtful. How can a judgment which recognizes that acts falling within the list of proscribed genocidal acts have been committed but which then refutes their qualification as genocidal due to a lack of specific intent be explicable to those who lost their loved ones in what they feel was an enterprise of destruction?

The International Court of Justice's (ICJ) decision in the case of Croatia v. Serbia raises fundamental questions about the nature of genocidal intent. While the Court was careful not to make a clear departure from established case law on the matter, its emphasis on elements such as ‘pattern’ and ‘scale’ – at the expense of the role of individual intent – indicates that the majority on the bench adopted an interpretation which brings the legal concept of genocide closer to an abstract event of mass atrocity than to an act capable of commission even by select individuals. That, however, is an understanding which is not only alien to the traditional interpretation adopted by international criminal tribunals, but also unjustifiable under the established law of state responsibility. This article considers various aspects in the judgment which invite critique in that regard, but also analyses the way in which the ICJ has dealt with the coexistence of intent and certain motives – a crucial aspect of the case which has already been object of some controversy.

There is a lively discussion as to whether debts incurred by despotic regimes and used to the detriment of the population are legally valid. This article gives a brief introduction to the concept of so-called odious debts and argues that a legal solution is not only desirable, but feasible. Subsequently, international human rights are identified as the missing link between the behaviour of the debtor state and the assessment of individual debts. Consequently, a human rights-based mechanism for the prevention of odious agreements is developed, based on an international convention annexed to this article. The convention provides that a state is classified as odious debts-prone if it is responsible for serious and systematic violations of human rights or international humanitarian law, or if its public sector is governed by severe and systemic corruption. Agreements concluded with an odious debts-prone state are void, unless the agreement complies with principles of responsible contracting as developed in this article. Finally, the scope of application of the convention and possible state parties are specified.

This article critically examines the concept of ethnic cleansing in light of the ruling of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Croatia v. Serbia. It suggests that the lack of overt reference to it in the Genocide Convention constitutes a significant lacuna in judicial recognition and protection of atrocities committed in both the Former Yugoslavia and more generally, which the ICJ categorically refused to address. Having examined how the ICJ attempted to conceptualize ethnic cleansing as evidence of both the actus reus of genocide (particularly in relation to Article II(c) of the Convention) and its mens rea, the article then critically assesses the Court's reasoning in its refusal to rule that a violation of the Convention had taken place in relation to deportation and forcible transfer. The article then concludes by contending that the Court simply failed to provide a much-needed and workable precedent to properly include ethnic cleansing within the legal and factual matrix of genocide.

The doctrine and case law on expropriation in international investment law is an unsettled area due to a variety of factors such as the diversity of interests between capital importing and exporting states, the divergence in legal, economic, and cultural concepts of property rights, and, more importantly, the regulatory role of the state in cross-border investment activities. Although China has been an active ‘treaty-maker’ in the universe of international investment arbitration, evidenced by its nearly 130 bilateral investment treaties (BITs), the notion of expropriation in these BITs is in a state of flux. This article scrutinizes the expropriation clauses in China's BITs, in particular, the Peru–China BIT and the Peru–China free trade agreement, by reference to the final award of Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, the first Chinese BIT arbitration case. This article attempts, in a comparative context, to understand the underlying rationale for China's evolving stance on expropriation.

This article examines the approach followed by the International Court of Justice in Croatia v. Serbia in relation to rape and sexual violence as acts of genocide under Article II of the Genocide Convention. It is argued that this decision leaves much uncertainty with respect to the elements constituting the actus reus of genocide. First, the Court has narrowed the interpretation given by the ad hoc tribunals to what constitutes ‘serious harm’ under Article II(b). Second, it has introduced an objective requirement, which is in fact unnecessary under Article II(c) of the Convention. Third, it seems that, according to the Court, in order for rape and sexual violence to be regarded as genocidal conduct within the meaning of Article II(d) of the Convention, it is necessary to prove that such conduct did in fact prevent births at least within a part of the group.

The attitude of African states towards judicial and arbitral settlement of disputes has substantially evolved since their accession to independence. The original reluctance to resort to the judicial settlement of disputes was due to a lack of trust in the system of ‘international law’ from which they were excluded prior to the UN Charter era and the rules of which were sometimes used to justify their colonization. There was also the issue of under-representation in international judicial or arbitral organs. That initial reluctance has more recently evolved into acquiescence at the universal level. Judicial institutions are also being established by the African states themselves.

The article focuses on one of the most intriguing and, at the same time, controversial issues of international criminal law: whether the state policy requirement should be considered as a constitutive element in core international crimes. Adopting a criminal policy perspective, my intention is to contribute to the ongoing discussion by offering a doctrinal and criminological corroboration of the position that answers in the affirmative. Nevertheless, I am not necessarily promoting a normative choice entailing the amendment of the definition of core international crimes, but I rather call for a policy choice of focusing on cases that presume a state policy component.

Article 31(1)(d)1 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute) presents an important opportunity to reconsider the defence of duress in cases of unlawful killing. While the case of Erdemović has done much to substantiate the existence of the defence of duress at international law it appears to have curtailed the doctrine by interpreting it with reference to a strict form of proportionality characteristic of duress as justification. On the other hand, duress as excuse requires some measure of proportionality. This article will contend that the hybrid approach of Nuremberg Military Tribunals (NMTs), defined duress and the moral choice test primarily by reference to culpa in causa, not resorting to duress, and a ‘softer’ proportionality and in doing so, provided a more flexible and workable model for duress. Article 31(1)(d) of the ICC Statute, although an interesting attempt to find the balance between duress as excuse and justification, is a missed opportunity to redefine the defence in international criminal law. An alternative test for duress, with reference to the principles that emerged from the jurisprudence of the NMTs, is required in order to find the correct balance between duress as excuse and justification.