The article addresses the legality of the relocation of the United States embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in light of the duty of non-recognition and the international consensus on the two-state solution. Analysing the massive reaction of states to the United States administration’s decision, the article takes stock of the practice on the status of Jerusalem and on the Israeli-Palestinian issue more broadly. The authors conclude that the almost unanimous negative reaction of states and their commitment to the two-state solution will remain a dead letter if the solution to the crisis is left to a future bilateral agreement.

This article reassesses how members of the UN Security Council exercise influence over the Council’s decision-making process, with particular focus on the ten elected members (the E10). A common understanding of Security Council dynamics accords predominance to the five permanent members (the P5), suggesting bleak prospects for the Council as a forum that promotes the voices and representation of the 188 non-permanent members. The assumption is that real power rests with the P5, while the E10 are there to make up the numbers. By articulating a richer account of Council dynamics, this article contests the conventional wisdom that P5 centrality crowds out space for the E10 to influence Council decision-making. It also shows that opportunities for influencing Council decision-making go beyond stints of elected membership. It argues that the assumed centrality of the P5 on the Council thus needs to be qualified and re-evaluated.

This contribution focuses on the Court of Justice of the European Union (Court or CJEU) reliance on international law in cases involving economic agreements covering occupied territories. In its earlier case law, the Court adopted a formalistic approach by ignoring the broader international legal framework of the dispute in an effort to achieve conformity with international law, while at the same time avoiding being drawn into political storms. The article continues by identifying an even more worrisome trend in the Court’s latest judgments in the Front Polisario and Western Sahara Campaign UK cases. In these two cases the Court showed its willingness to stretch the international rules of treaty interpretation to a breaking point in order to avoid pronouncing on the politically sensitive question of the de facto application of the EU’s agreements with Morocco in the territory of Western Sahara. The article concludes by asserting that the Court’s line of argumentation brings another dimension to the Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit debate. The classical, binary understanding of the Court’s approach as ‘open/hostile’ to international law only provides us with a partial picture of how international law was actually used in these cases. The Court’s apparent willingness to rely on international law as a heuristic device to reinforce an outcome that radically departs from the logic and structure of international law and international legal argumentation requires a more in-depth engagement with both the content of the international law rules invoked in those judgments and with the Court’s use of such rules.

The Okavango River Basin is a transboundary basin which serves as an important source of water resources for three riparian Southern African states, namely Angola, Botswana, and Namibia. If not properly managed, the Okavango River Basin is a potential source of conflict amongst the three countries. In order to reduce the likelihood of disputes among riparian states, the Governments of Angola, Botswana, and Namibia have signed and ratified an agreement establishing the institutional framework for the management of the shared water resources. This article discusses the legal aspects of the institutional arrangements in the Okavango River Basin. It highlights the importance of river basin organizations in the effective management of transboundary watercourses. This article concludes that the institutional arrangements between the riparian states with access to the Okavango River provide the framework for resolving possible disputes peacefully. Further, it concludes that these institutional arrangements promote co-operation over the management of the shared water resources.

Non-permanent members’ strategies to augment their influence in the United Nations Security Council usually seek parity of status with the permanent members. A more radical and transformative strategy would seek to change the Council itself. Working methods reform holds more potential in this respect than composition reform. At present, however, working methods reform is oriented to increasing non-permanent members’ status and focuses on redistributing administrative roles like sub-committee chairing and penholding. The price non-permanent members pay for their offices, however, is bureaucratic drudgery, which both keeps them from pursuing their own political priorities, and socializes them into the permanent members’ rhythms of work. Using Hannah Arendt’s concepts of work, labour, and natality, this contribution analyses strategies for influence in the Security Council, and offers a negative reading of Arendt’s ideas to suggest that non-permanent members should present a more obstructive counterforce in the Council, by cultivating their difference.

Litigation has presented itself as a serious means to vindicate normative commitments about climate change by forcing governments to review their policy priorities. Today, the use of such litigation is not limited to the domestic arena. International law now provides the new principal avenue for such litigation. Two litigation strategies stand out: obligations strategy and rights strategy. Obligations strategy consists of bestowing an erga omnes character to existing obligations regarding the protection of the global environment, thereby providing standing for a non-injured party before international courts. Rights strategy, on the other hand, significantly increases in practice. It consists in the invocation, before national and international courts, of remedies for environmental damages through the legal categories of human rights law.

This article sheds light on the potential and limits of these litigation strategies in international law. The argument builds on the specific evolution in the legal architecture of international obligations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The current structure of the UNFCCC now makes it substantially impossible to bring a claim against individual states regarding their specific measures against climate change. The article, by referring to the history of drafting which produced the specific structure, questions the ability of these litigation strategies to remedy the lack of international consensus and to accommodate the technical intricacy of how to turn normative commitments into actual action for climate change.

Access to and distribution of natural resources have been since immemorable time at the root of violent conflict. Over the last few decades, international institutions, legal scholars and civil society started to pay attention to the dangerous liaison between resource commodities and wars. Current debates emphasize how, through sanctions, global regulatory initiatives, and legal accountability, the governance of natural resources in conflict and post-conflict countries has improved, although international law should play a greater role to support the transition to a durable peace. The aim of this article is to illuminate the biases and limitations of dominant accounts by exploring the influence of the resource curse thesis, and its hidden propositions, upon legal developments. Using the Sierra Leonean and Liberian Truth Commissions as a case study, it shows how legal practices and discourses have contributed to a narrow understanding of resource-driven wars as started by voracious rebel groups or caused by weak/authoritarian/corrupt governments. What is obscured by the current focus on greed and ineffective resource governance? What responsibilities and forms of violence are displaced? Engaging with these questions allows us to see the dynamics through which structural injustices and distributive concerns are marginalized in existing responses to these conflicts, how the status quo is perpetuated, and the more subtle ways in which external interventions in the political economy of the Global South take place.

The article discusses the complicated situation of post-German cultural property held within Poland’s borders after the Second World War. On 2 August 1945, ‘the Big Three’ decided a new layout of power within Europe. They reached an agreement that Silesia, Pomerania, the Free City of Danzig (Gdańsk), and part of East Prussia (Regained Territories) along with all the property which had been left on site, should be a part of Poland. One of the post-war priorities of the Polish Government was to regulate the legal status of post-German cultural property left within these newly-delineated borders. Although the Second World War ended in 1945, there was still a threat that the majority of post-German property could be devastated, destroyed, or even looted. There are some documented cases where such cultural property was seized inter alia by the Red Army and then transported to Russia. Since 1945, Russian museums have exhibited many of these pieces of art. This article addresses the question concerning the legal status of post-German cultural property in light of public international law. Furthermore, the article responds to the question, whether Poland is entitled to restitution of post-German cultural property looted from the Regained Territories.

This article analyses the decision-making process of the UN Security Council when it adopts outcome documents, such as resolutions, Presidential statements and press statements. It is commonly assumed that because of their veto power and permanency China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States have greater influence than their elected counterparts in shaping those outcomes. In recent years, that control has been strengthened by the penholdership system. Under this practice, one or more members, usually France, the United States or the United Kingdom (P3), take leadership over a situation on the agenda of the Council. When ‘holding the pen’ a member often decides what action the Council should take, then drafts an outcome document that it negotiates with other permanent members before sharing the text with elected members. This article explores the development of this practice and its impact on the respect for the rule of law in the Security Council’s decision-making process. It argues that, while concentrating power in the hands of the P3, hence diminishing transparency and the opportunity for all members to participate in the decision-making of the Council, at the same time the penholdership system also provides an avenue to strengthen elected members’ influence in ways that promote respect for the international rule of law.

In 2001, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) seminally found self-amnesty laws on serious human rights violations to be null and void. However, later national reactions showed that this supranational control has faced challenges. Such supranational judicial authority has been exercised where amnesty laws and other exemption measures blocked judicial cases, democratic referendums upheld legislation, and peace-making processes existed.

This article seeks to determine whether the traditionally interventionist jurisprudence of the IACtHR on amnesty laws/exemption measures has been legitimate under global constitutionalism standards. The standards considered are: human rights, namely, rights of victims of mass atrocities; consistency or coherence of this jurisprudence with international, regional and national practices; and democratic legitimacy and/or accountability considerations.

Victim rights have underlain the IACtHR’s jurisprudence on amnesty laws and similar measures. Importantly, developments on victim rights are not exclusive to the IACtHR as case law of other supranational human rights bodies evidences. Among human rights courts and bodies, the IACtHR has exercised the highest level of control over amnesty laws/exemption measures, even nullifying national legislation. However, the IACtHR’s case law shares common principles with UN/regional jurisprudential developments and domestic practices in terms of inadmissibility of amnesties and other exemption measures in cases of serious abuses. Unlike the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the IACtHR has not deferred to sovereign state appreciation (conventionality control doctrine). Nevertheless, the IACtHR has arguably begun to move towards more ‘moderated’ approaches. This is advisable under democratic legitimacy considerations.

Judges of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) are prominent jurists of high merit. However, little is known about certain extra-legal factors of the candidates that guide states in their selection and appointment process. This article focuses on examining extra-legal factors that matter for states in the selection process. Such extra-legal factors demonstrate that elections of candidates to the Court constitute another aspect of a broader political struggle to define the meaning of international law. The article situates the discussion on the selection process in the broader context of the discussion on biases in international law to suggest that the election of candidates to the Court becomes both an instrument and a procedure for controlling the discourse. The characteristics of the judges thus matter as a proxy to control the production and direction of such discourse. This article then explores the ways in which some states have greater strategic advantage in the selection and election processes that enables them to control the discourse to define the meaning of international law effectively.

This article re-examines the theories of recognition and non-recognition in the context of the evolving framework of the European Union (EU)’s trade and investment relations with Taiwan from legal and international relations perspectives. Notwithstanding its one-China policy, the EU has developed a pragmatic approach to engaging Taiwan under bilateral consultations and World Trade Organization negotiations that have built the foundation for the bilateral investment agreement (BIA). The article argues that since the 1980s, the EU has accorded diverse forms of recognition to Taiwan and the BIA will buttress the process. To substantiate the contention, the article systemically explores the political and trade policies of European states and EU institutions in line with their strategies toward cross-strait relations.

By deciphering the new momentum that has galvanized the European Commission’s strategy towards the EU-Taiwan BIA, the research sheds light on the implications of European Parliament resolutions and the EU’s investment talks with China. The structure and impact of the BIA are also analysed in light of EU investment protection agreements with Singapore and Vietnam. Hence, the findings contribute to the interdisciplinary study of international law and international relations and enhance the understanding of the EU’s Asia-Pacific trade and investment agreements.

While the cholera outbreak in Haiti still claims victims every month, it is also the backdrop of one of the biggest legal battles the UN has been engaged in – one for the recognition of harm caused and for reparations for victims of cholera. Having used its immunity to disengage from the issue, the UN finally changed its stance in December 2016 and apologized for the organization’s role in the cholera outbreak. This article analyses the role of the elected members of the Security Council – alongside other key stakeholders – in contributing to the UN’s change of policy. Based on privileged access to a number of actors in this politico-legal fight, this article argues that elected members of the Security Council have played a crucial role in pushing the UN to ‘do the right thing’. This article, along with other contributions to this special issue, sheds a different light on the practices inside the Security Council, demonstrating that elected members are far from being powerless, as most of the literature on the subject tends to assume. They can successfully play a significant role inside the organization when the right conditions permit them to play this role.

The civilian-combatant frame persists as the main legal lens through which lawyers organize the relationships of conflict zone actors. As a result, little attention has been paid in international legal scholarship to different gradations of ‘civilianness’ and the ways in which some civilians might compete to distinguish themselves from each other. Drawing attention to international humanitarian actors – particularly those working for NGOs – this article explores the micro-strategies these actors engage in to negotiate their relative status in war. Original qualitative empirical findings from South Sudan illuminate the way in which humanitarians struggle over distinction with individuals working for the UN peacekeeping mission, UNMISS. As is shown, humanitarian actors are doing away with a static civilian-combatant binary in their daily practice. A more fluid logic informs both their self-conceptualization and their interactions with others who share the operational space. Humanitarian actors envision civilianness as a contingent concept, and they operate according to a continuum along which everything is a matter of degree and subtle gradation. As civilianness is detached from the civilian, any given actor might acquire or shed civilian-like, or combatant-like, characteristics at any moment. The distinction practices that humanitarian actors enact can be understood as a bid for legibility, so that they might be rendered intelligible in international law and in the eyes of other actors as a special kind of civilian – the ‘civilian plus’.

One of the main catalysts for the shift towards renewable energies has been the practice of support schemes in a key number of EU member states. Some of these states have since withdrawn or revoked much of their original support, which has resulted in investment treaty arbitrations being filed against them under the Energy Charter Treaty. Arguably, a balance should be found between investors’ legitimate expectations concerning the stability of the legal framework and the host states’ right to adapt regulations to new needs. This can be achieved by clarifying and delimiting the principle of fair and equitable treatment, and by encapsulating it in a more precise set of rules. Due to its open character, this principle could otherwise become too intrusive a standard of judicial review for the exercise of sovereign power by host states. It could be diluted into a rhetorical framework inviting uncertainty and subjective judgment. While the focus of this article is on energy, the concern for legal stability equally applies to all those sectors where large upfront investments are required, which can only be recouped in the long run.

About half a million Cambodians have attended hearings or outreach activities about the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) since public hearings began in 2009. Countless more have watched the trials unfold on television, and increasingly on social media. To date, the majority of conversations around the legacy of the ECCC have come from international scholars focusing on the legal impact the trials may have. This article instead presents the often-missing views of Cambodian youth about the Tribunal. It also, more broadly, explores the ECCC’s impact on education and young people’s understanding of history. Based on research carried out with university students, this article argues that the contribution of the ECCC to education has often been overlooked and is in fact one of its most significant legacies. In Cambodia, government and non-government organizations, as well as academic institutions, have the unique opportunity to incorporate testimony, footage, and documents from the ECCC into their programmes, greatly adding to the existing repertoire of Khmer-language resources dealing with the past. The result is a more well-rounded programme of transitional justice and reconciliation than the court alone could have provided, and certainly a higher level of external resilience than would have occurred had the court been located outside of Cambodia.

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) follows its own rules regarding the responsibility of states, although the international law of state responsibility enshrined in the International Law Commission (ILC) Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA) remains, as general international law, relevant to its decisions. However, case law of the ECtHR shows that the Court is departing from certain ARSIWA principles as it adopts a broad interpretation of rights contained in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) giving rise to positive obligations.1

Exploring those trends in the state responsibility regime of the ECHR, this article argues that, by clarifying certain ARSIWA provisions, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) can play an important role by contributing to a higher degree of judicial integration on the law of state responsibility. It is desirable that the ICJ takes any upcoming opportunity to provide greater clarity on the challenges and nuances of the applicability of the law of state responsibility, in particular as it relates to positive obligations. That would contribute to a more systematic use of those rules by regional courts such as the ECtHR, and ultimately to guaranteeing a greater protection of human rights.

In a landmark effort to finally acknowledge the necessity to jointly respond to the global phenomenon of large movements of refugees and migrants, the process initiated in 2016 with the approval of the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants eventually led to the adoption of two UN Global Compacts, respectively the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) and the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR). Despite the enthusiastic support shown at first by the international community, the GCM negotiations have been more controversial and ultimately shaken by the clamorous withdrawals of several states. The main argument used by the withdrawing governments to justify the sudden refusal to adopt the GCM was based on the claim that the document − although non-binding − undermines the ‘sovereign right’ of the state. Such a claim, given the centrality that the principle of state sovereignty has acquired since the Peace of Westphalia, deserves to be further analysed from an international law perspective by resorting to the ‘sovereignty test’ developed by Schrijver. The present work, after briefly introducing the main tenets of the GCM, applies the ‘sovereignty test’ to the GCM to dissect the alleged tension between state sovereignty on the one hand and the shared approach to international migration envisaged by the pact on the other. This article’s ultimate goal is to prove that the GCM does not aim to restrain state sovereignty; rather, it strives to remind states of existing international commitments already undertaken at the regional and global level.