Drawing upon Mikhail Bakhtin's theory of the dialogic, this essay explores the production of legal meanings about criminal responsibility in the 19th and early 20th centuries. In particular, it examines the honor-based defense of the “unwritten law” as it was articulated in relation to the formal law of provocation in the 19th century, and in the 1906 trial of Harry K. Thaw for the murder of Stanford White. Meanings about criminal responsibility emerge, I argue, from a process of discursive conflict and negotiation between the domains of legal consciousness and formal law. At trial, competing narratives of indictment and exoneration literally enact that dynamic process, so that trials may be said to be the materialization of the dialogic production of “law” in its broadest sense.

The use of paramilitary methods in civil policing tasks has become common in Western police agencies. Despite propositions that such methods should undermine the relationship between the police and the public, the effect of paramilitary policing on public trust in the police has not been empirically tested. In the present study, we examine this question in the context of protest policing, which has become a major concern for Western police agencies. Using a survey of 470 protesters who participated in “Occupy” protest events in Israel in 2012, we find that the perceived use of paramilitary methods has an independent and negative effect on trust, stronger than that of police effectiveness and the “neutrality” component of procedural justice. In-depth interviews suggest that the significance of paramilitarism may be the result of a sense of alienation and criminalization it elicits among protesters who generally perceive themselves as law-abiding citizens.

In this article, I compare the efforts to protect two transboundary watersheds that are home to some of the largest industrial areas in the world: the Great Lakes basin in North America and the Rhine river in Western Europe. Specifically, I show that the industrial discharges into the Great Lakes have been more toxic than the releases into the Rhine. This is puzzling as the laws and international agreements pertaining to the Great Lakes have been more stringent than those concerning the Rhine. I solve this puzzle in three steps. First, I show that the many voluntary investments in water protection by companies along the Rhine have outdone the considerable efforts that the U.S. laws have required of Great Lakes corporations. Thereafter, I argue that these different inclinations to invest in water protection have sprung from two alternative modes of conducting environmental politics: an adversarial one in the Great Lakes basin and a more consensual one in the Rhine valley. Last, I use an historical-institutional approach to show which institutional differences (at both the domestic and international levels) have led to the emergence of these different modes of conducting environmental politics in the two basins.

Interventions in public health crises inevitably give rise to concerns about how the balance between rights concerns and community health security might be handled. During the SARS global health crisis, different jurisdictions struggled simultaneously with similar public health challenges posed by the previously unknown and deadly disease. Yet instead of a convergence of strategies, different jurisdictions responded with measures, especially with regard to the use of quarantine, that revealed a pattern of divergence about how to strike the balance between rights concerns and health security. The origins of this article stem from the realization that Toronto's use of quarantine was far more extensive than that of either Hong Kong or Shanghai, two jurisdictions with historically weak records regarding respect for fundamental rights and civil liberties. Perspectives on the balancing of individual rights and community health security are treated here as expressions of legal consciousness. Instead of assuming a uniform legal consciousness in Toronto, Shanghai, or Hong Kong, this article presents legal consciousness as varied among groups of individuals differently situated in the crisis. The promise of this differentiated approach to legal consciousness is that it facilitates both drawing contrasts between perspectives of differently situated groups within the same city and noting commonalities between similarly situated groups in other cities. Through an examination of three distinct perspectives on rights and quarantine in each city—those of senior public health officials, frontline hospital workers, and contacts of SARS patients—the competing legal meanings and understandings about the tensions between community health security and individual rights during the SARS crisis are identified in a way that enables us to better understand the pattern of different uses of quarantine.

In 1959, Wolf, Lüke, and Hax published Scheidung und Scheidungsrecht (Divorce and Divorce Law), dealing with the effects of revision of German divorce laws in 1900 on the rates of divorce and petition for divorce. This paper is a reanalysis of Wolf, Lüke, and Hax's data with newly developed inferential statistical models, and a reappraisal in light of appropriate statistical analyses of then-conclusions and those of Max Rheinstein (1960) in his review of their work.

The focus on actuarial tables and rating systems by state regulators is insufficient to ensure that protected groups are not discriminated against by the insurance industry. The most powerful tool used to exclude unwanted groups from the insurance pool lies in the subjective underwriting guidelines companies utilize, yet the rhetoric surrounding the insurance industry shifts attention away from this area.

Existing analyses of informal control within dyadic relations neglect the nonpenal responses that characterize many such control efforts, and they give minimal attention to the interactional and interpretive processes that characterize such responses. And while dispute transformation provides a well-developed model of the development of dyadic disputes, this model is limited in prespecifying “injury” as the starting point for these processes and in neglecting informal reactions other than “claiming.” Integrating theories of informal control and dispute transformation, this article provides a case study analyzing the nature and processes of informal reactions to troubles involving college roommates, identifying three general categories of such response: managerial reactions, which involve unilateral, nonconfrontational efforts to manage the consequences or implications of the trouble or to change indirectly the troubling behavior; complaint-making reactions, where the troubled party attempts to get the other to change the disturbing behavior; and distancing and punitive reactions, which are relationally despairing responses marked by open confrontation and hostility.

This article analyzes the everyday interpretive practices of corporations and bureaucrats that shape the meaning and force of international economic law. To understand how common practices such as public consultation submissions, corporate threat letters, and external legal assistance influence regulators' understanding of their “legally available” policy space, we study the contested introduction of a pioneering nutrition labeling regulation in Chile. The transnational food industry powerfully challenged the regulation's legality under World Trade Organization law. But Chilean health bureaucrats, in coordination with segments of the country's legally highly competent economic bureaucracy, effectively defended the legality of their proposed regulatory measure. Drawing on data from freedom-of-information requests and in-depth interviews, the article argues that the outcomes of such interpretive contests are substantially shaped by participants' knowledge of the entitlements created by international economic law and thus by the international legal expertise they have access to. This often but not always puts transnational corporations at an advantage over national regulators in the strategic interpretation of international economic law.

Merry's comprehensive review shows us how studies of plural normative orderings during the past twenty-five years have greatly enriched our understanding of the complexity of normative structures, their interdependence and the ways in which these structures are involved in human agency. At the same time her review illustrates how little conceptual progress has been made. We do not have a more acute understanding nor a refined conceptual usage of the terms law, normative order, or pluralism. In a way this is reassuring. It tells us that stimulating new research and methodological approaches can be developed without giving much thought to these conceptual problems. The best historical writings in legal pluralism in colonial societies, such as the Dutch studies on Indonesian societies, did not excessively ponder whether the local normative systems should or should not be called law. The neo-classicists of legal pluralism such as Macaulay (1963) and Moore (1973) explicitly did not present their data as legal pluralism, and when Galanter (1981) tells us about indigenous law in western societies he does not make much fuss about it.

Gays and lesbians have recently turned to the courts and the law for recognition of their families. Some of the most successful cases are those won by a gay or lesbian “second-parent” of a child whose biological or legally adoptive parent is his or her partner. The court opinions granting these second-parent adoptions have often portrayed these petitioners as similar to an idealized heterosexual family unit, albeit with two same-sex parents. In this study, 20 parents who successfully pursued a second-parent adoption were interviewed to examine their experiences with the legal system. Results indicate that these petitioners did not envision themselves as similar to heterosexual families and resisted attempts by state actors who tried to formulate them as such. The literature on legal consciousness and pragmatism is used to analyze the respondents' experiences.

This article assesses the power of judges in Russia (on courts of general jurisdiction, arbitrazh courts, and military courts) in dealing with cases in which the government or one of its officials is a party. Power, that is, the resources of judges to make binding decisions, is understood as including jurisdiction, discretion, and authority to ensure compliance. The article analyzes the dramatic growth of jurisdiction and caseload in administrative justice in post-Soviet Russia to the year 2002 and examines how the courts have performed in handling the review of actions by officials (including in the military), tax cases, electoral disputes, and the legality of normative acts (both regulations and laws of lower governments), especially in the late 1990s. High rates of success for persons bringing suits against the government suggest that judges were able by and large to adjudicate fairly and rule against the state. To a considerable degree (but not always), those decisions were implemented (more often than were constitutional and commercial decisions). Interestingly, citizens who challenged the actions of officials in court had much more success than those who brought complaints to the Procuracy. Finally, the article develops an agenda for future research that would deepen understanding of the significance of administrative justice in the Russian Federation and the power of judges.

This article examines a widely publicized corporate accountability and human rights case filed by Burmese plaintiffs and human rights litigators in 1996 under the Alien Tort Claims Act in U.S. courts, Doe v. Unocal, in conjunction with the three main theoretical approaches to analyzing how law may matter for broader social change efforts: (1) legal realism, (2) Critical Legal Studies (CLS), and (3) legal mobilization. The article discusses interactions between Doe v. Unocal and grassroots Burmese human rights activism in the San Francisco Bay Area, including intersections with corporate accountability activism. It argues that a transnationally attuned legal mobilization framework, rather than legal realist or CLS approaches, is most appropriate to analyze the political opportunities and indirect effects of Doe v. Unocal and similar litigation in the context of neoliberal globalization. Further, this article argues that human rights discourse may serve as a common vocabulary and counterhegemonic resource for activists and litigators in cases such as Doe v. Unocal, contrary to overarching critiques of such discourse that emphasize only its hegemonic potentials in global governance regimes.

This article explores the practices, discourses and dilemmas of the Israeli human rights NGOs that are working to protect and promote the human rights of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. This case can shed light on the complex process of “triangular translation” of human rights, which is distinct from other forms of human rights localization studied thus far. In this process, human rights NGOs translate international human rights norms on the one hand, and the suffering of the victims on the other, into the conceptions and legal language commonly employed by the state that violates these rights. We analyze the dialectics of change and reproduction embedded in the efforts of Israeli activists to defend Palestinian human rights while at the same time depoliticizing their work and adopting discriminatory premises and conceptions hegemonic in Israeli society. The recent and alarming legislative proposals in Israel aimed at curtailing the work of human rights NGOs reinforce the need to reconsider the role of human rights NGOs in society, including their depoliticized strategies, their use of legal language and their relations with the diminishing peace movement.

This is a study of meaning making and identity construction in child custody cases involving gay or lesbian parents. In it, I investigate the language of all such recorded decisions over the past 50 years, focusing on how judges—in interaction with the litigants before them—construct, negotiate, deny, and confirm the sexual and familial identities of the parents and would-be parents involved in these custody contests. Employing a constitutive framework and drawing on the social, scientific, and feminist literatures on sexuality, family, and law, I find that through multiple discursive processes, from self-representation to imposition to negotiation of new spaces of compromise, family law actors bring together sexual and familial statuses often treated as exclusive of each other.

Research into the effects of legal representation is rare because in many settings in which people might have lawyers, legal representation is either so common or so unusual that it cannot serve as a variable. Moreover, such research as exists is often poorly controlled or otherwise methodologically deficient. Our data set, derived from the case files of a public housing eviction board, allows us to overcome most of the difficulties that plague prior studies because it is relatively large and unusually rich in information about individual cases. We model the effects of various tenant and case characteristics on lawyer involvement as well as the effects of legal representation on case outcome. We find that lawyers tend to handle more difficult cases and that the likelihood that legal representation will aid a tenant depends on case type and changes over time. Our results, though likely to be context dependent, suggest how the effects of legal representation may be studied in other settings and the kinds of variables that may condition such effects.

The research we report here has had as its aim a study of the acquisition of political philosophy during the adolescent years. We have always known, in a rough and general way, that adolescence is marked by a rapid growth in the comprehension of political ideas. At the threshold of adolescence, at eleven or twelve, the youngster has only a dim, diffuse, and incomplete notion of the political order; by the time he has reached eighteen, he will be, more often than not, a fully formed political creature, possessing a stable and coherent understanding of political structures and functions, and in many cases, committing himself to a philosophy of government. How does this transition take place? In particular, how do learning and cognitive maturation interact to produce these sweeping changes? As a first approach to these questions, we undertook a developmental and cross-national study of adolescents. Youngsters of eleven, thirteen, fifteen, and eighteen were interviewed in three countries: the United States, England, and Germany. (German eleven-year-olds were not interviewed because of fund limitations. Hence, the cross-national analysis compares subjects thirteen through eighteen years of age.) By interviewing youngsters from pubescence to late adolescence we hoped to discern the maturation of political perspectives; by comparing youngsters in three countries with rather different political traditions we hoped to get some sense of the differential impact of social ideas.

The size of the lawyer population in the United States has increased dramatically in the last fifteen years. The rate of growth has substantially exceeded that of the general adult population. With the entry of a large number of young adults into the profession, an increasing proportion of whom are women, the age distribution of the profession has shifted downward and the representation of women among young lawyers has rapidly risen. The absolute number of lawyers working in each employment sector has increased significantly. Although the majority of lawyers continue to engage in the private practice of law, the proportion working in firm settings has grown as the proportion in solo practice has declined. Employment patterns of men and women continue to differ, with both younger and older women less likely to engage in private practice than men and more likely to be engaged in salaried employment. Moreover, even among private practitioners, differences persist as women continue to gravitate to solo practice or employment in large firms and remain under-represented in intermediate-sized firm practice.

The polygraph's widespread use in the legal setting and elsewhere should be of concern to society, but especially to psychologists and lawyers. Since lying does not produce a measurable physiological response-and hence renders “lie detection” meaningless-the plausibility of the theory of so-called lie detection tests is questioned. Empirical evidence is presented that disputes the accuracy of testing and shows the high rate of false positive misclassification (e.g., misclassifying a truthful person as deceptive). An alternative procedure is recommended. This procedure, sometimes called the Guilty Knowledge Test, has some problems associated with its use and can be used only when particular information is available. However, it can be a significantly more accurate detector of guilt than the standard lie detection test.

This article explores the relationship between legal consciousness and legal mobilization in the context of constitutional rights in Colombia. Citizens report extremely low confidence in the state and the judiciary, yet hundreds of thousands of Colombians make constitutional rights claims through the acción de tutela procedure each year. Why does profound skepticism of the ability of the judiciary to provide justice and fair treatment seem to coexist with high levels of use of the legal system? How do perspectives on rights and the legal system relate to observed mobilization of the law? Drawing on 74 interviews and an original 310-person survey, this article develops legal consciousness theory, identifying the specific beliefs that encourage or discourage individuals to turn to the courts to make claims to their rights. In the Colombian case, understandings of law and the state encourage the use of the tutela procedure, not due to the realizable promise of the state to protect rights or the majestic power of the law, but because the tutela is understood to be the only mechanism through which citizens can access their rights. In other words, citizens turn to the courts because there is no other alternative.