This Article examines a controversial national security measure: the use of the armed forces within domestic borders. Military policing blurs the boundaries between crime and war, and tends to entail greater use of force against individuals. It has received relatively little academic attention but deserves to be better understood. No democratic state has relied on military policing for longer than India. And within India, no region has been subject to military policing for as long as the northeastern state of Manipur. I analyze how military policing in Manipur has fostered abuse by the armed forces, which in turn has prompted litigation and judicial innovation. Based on my analysis, I critique dominant theories about the state’s exceptional security powers. I advance two main claims. First, exceptional powers rarely remain exceptional; they eventually become the norm. Once deployed, these powers persist, and the license they provide seeps into broader habits of governance. Second, once normalized, exceptional powers become more vulnerable to judicial intervention. Judges become unwilling to accept the government’s argument that these powers are always and only used to fight pressing threats. These powers eventually become a routine subject of judicial review. Even once judicial review becomes routine, however, judges tend to be more willing to help victims of abuse than to punish abusers.

In his path-breaking essay that investigates the rise of judicial review in democratic Taiwan and South Korea, Tom Ginsburg presents the distinctive style of judicial review practiced by both countries in terms of “Confucian constitutionalism,” at the core of which is the practice of constitutional review as remonstrance. This Article examines whether the model of Confucian constitutionalism is still relevant in Korea, especially in light of the Constitutional Court’s recent decision to uphold the motion to impeach the president rather than merely offering remonstrance or warning. By associating the Court’s jurisprudence characterized by highly moralistic language and style of reasoning with Confucian constitutionalism, this Article presents Confucian constitutionalism as indirect constitutionalism, a mode of constitutionalism that aims to shape the polity’s constitutional identity in a way that achieves a meaningful congruence between liberal constitutional principles and the underlying public culture that defines the polity as a distinctive moral community.

Standard contract terms are “sticky”: they rarely change, even if change appears to be in the parties’ interest. Multiple theories to explain stickiness do not reach consensus on its causes. We investigate the role of stickiness in sovereign bond contracts, where it would be especially costly and therefore puzzling. In our interviews with more than a 100 officials responsible for the bond contracts of twenty-eight countries, they linked reluctance to change non-financial contract terms and the imperative of following a “market standard” for such terms. When a term could be described as standard for the government’s debt stock or borrower cohort, its content often came across as secondary. Sovereign debt managers seemed willing to forgo some of the benefits of contract terms for dealing with contingencies and revealing private information to avoid negative signals and maintain the liquidity of primary and secondary debt markets. Interviews with investors suggested a similar focus on standard form and a limited engagement with contract substance.

This Article reveals the significance of a new and growing minority group within US law schools—international students in the Juris Doctor (JD) program. While international students have received some attention in legal education scholarship, it mostly has been focused on their participation in the context of programs specially designed for this demographic (e.g. postgraduate programs like the LLM and SJD). Drawing from interview data with fifty-eight international JD students across seventeen graduating US law schools, our research reveals the rising importance of international students as actors within a more mainstream institutional context. In examining the ways these students navigate their law school environments, we find that although international status often impacts identity and participation, not all students encounter its impact similarly. Particularly, while some students use the identity to their advantage, others cannot escape negative implications, even with effort. This is consistent with other scholarship on minority students, and adds to a growing literature that uses their socialization experiences to better understand professional stratification. To unpack these different ways of “being international,” we borrow from Goffman’s theorization of stigma to suggest illustrative variations in the ways international students experience their environments. In doing so, we offer an introductory landscape to better understand this growing population and hope this enables new insights to theorize about other kinds of minority experience.

Immigration federalism scholarship has established that state and local government policies can make federally defined immigration status more or less consequential. Drawing primarily on focus groups and interviews with 184 undocumented students attending the University of California, we suggest that institutional policies work alongside state and local efforts to mediate the consequences of illegality for undocumented students. We find that the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program, state-funded financial aid policies, and university support programs all facilitate the integration of undocumented students by increasing access to higher education and enabling fuller participation. Although federal policies contribute to persistent barriers to academic engagement and professional development, we show that universities can intervene to improve educational experiences and opportunities. Ultimately, we argue that university policies are a key site for intervening in immigration policy and constructing immigrant illegality.

This Article examines Israeli military lawyers’ practice of international humanitarian law (IHL) revolving around the West Bank and Gaza. Based on interviews with legal officers serving in the army between 1967–2009 and archival materials, it interrogates these lawyers’ work—the stories that they tell about law, their legal interpretations and their interactions with military decision makers. This interrogation is set in the context of broader structural, historical, and political shifts. Anchored around lawyers’ stories about law, their narration of law’s relationship with politics, and its position in relation to violence, this account sets out to contribute to discussions on lawyers’—and by extension law’s—past and present positions in states’ military affairs.

Employment has been cited as one of the most effective protections against recidivism for formerly incarcerated people; however, job seekers with criminal records face barriers to employment after prison. They find themselves in a legal double bind where they are simultaneously compelled to obey the law (by finding “legit” work) but also legally barred from doing so. To navigate this conflictual legal positioning, job seekers with felony records develop strategies of working around the law to find employment. Through thirty qualitative interviews with people with felony records, I examine this alternative form of legal consciousness and detail the ways in which individuals navigate the legal barriers to acquiring “good” work. Ultimately, job seekers’ often extralegal strategies of law abidance blur the line between compliance with and defiance of the law.

While the boundaries between child, adolescent, and adult are difficult to define, there is a consensus that children and adults are different in kind. Extreme acts of violence put pressure on that consensus. Children that kill, for many, create a kind of border problem for juvenile justice. That public opinion tends to align with the general claim that children who break the law should be given a break belies a deeper set of confusions. On what grounds should a seventeen-year-old that kills be treated more leniently than his eighteen-year-old counterpart? For the U.S. Supreme Court majority, the solution is to root its doctrine in a scientifically supported “developmental approach.” This article argues that this approach is philosophically confused. One must abandon, or significantly amend, that dominant understanding to explain how a principled concern with proportional punishment simultaneously justifies and limits the legal response to children that kill. The final pages sketch an alternative account that may be able to address the shortcomings of appeals to development. To punish children as adults, I suggest, is an attempt to reap the benefits of paternalism without bearing the accompanying political, social, and moral costs.

This Essay introduces a Review Symposium for Philip Goodman, Joshua Page, and Michelle Phelps’s Breaking the Pendulum, a book that challenges the centrality of the pendulum metaphor that scholars, journalists, and politicians have used to describe significant shifts in the overall orientation of punishment nationwide. Drawing on recent research, Goodman, Page, and Phelps lay out the case for abandoning this metaphor as well as its associated theory of penal change, offering in its place an “agonistic perspective.” Using this agonistic perspective as well as research on the topic, I suggest some reasons why the pendulum metaphor may still be a fruitful site of interrogation. Specifically, I argue that, while recognizing the caveats illustrated by Goodman, Page, and Phelps, we should take seriously the pendular pattern of US penal history told at the national level and we should not dismiss the mechanical causes of penal change in our efforts to populate theories and accounts of penal change with individual and group actors.

In Breaking the Pendulum, Goodman, Page, and Phelps (2017) advance an “agonistic” perspective that contends struggle drives penal change, and that it does so through perpetual conflict. Yet studying only manifest struggles, when an actor made their resistance to a penal status quo known, presents thorny problems in conceptualizing conflict. One such problem is that conflict among agonists advocating competing penal policies presupposes consensus between those who threaten penal order’s basic conditions. Understanding penal agonism’s corollary, penal antagonism, offers a more complete starting point from which to theorize penal history and penality.

In Breaking the Pendulum: The Long Struggle Over Criminal Justice (2017), Philip Goodman, Joshua Page, and Michelle Phelps advocate replacing the pendular notion of penal change with an agonistic approach, where contention is central. This Essay reflects on a pendulum component that has escaped theoretical or empirical scrutiny in pendular accounts of penal change: the pivot determining how freely a pendulum weight swings, and its resting equilibrium. In this parting glance at the pendulum heuristic, I relate this pivot to the agonistic perspective on punishment and—focusing on racial politics of juvenile justice—imagine an antiracist calibration of struggle over penal change.

In this Review Essay, I try to rise to one of the challenges that Goodman, Page, and Phelps pose to other scholars in their book, Breaking the Pendulum (2017). They invite us to explore whether and how well their “agonistic perspective” on penal change travels. In response, I draw on original archival and oral history research on probation history in Scotland to explore their model’s utility in the context of this particular and challenging test case. Although Scotland is often discussed as an anomaly because of a supposed consensus around an enduring commitment to penal welfarism, my analysis reveals precisely the kinds of contestation that Goodman, Page, and Phelps describe. I conclude that their agonistic perspective seems to travel well, at least to this Atlantic edge of Europe, but that scholars in other jurisdictions will need either to undertake or revisit primary research to properly test the model and further refine it.

This Essay responds to thoughtful analyses from Ashley Rubin, Johann Koehler, Geoff Ward, and Fergus McNeill on our book Breaking the Pendulum: The Long Struggle Over Criminal Justice (2017). In particular, we revisit our claim that consensus within the penal field is illusory. Drawing inspiration from our interlocutors, we argue that while recognized actors constantly struggle over the character and scope of criminal justice, they agree (at least implicitly) that certain positions are “unthinkable” and certain actors must remain outside the field. This “conflictual consensus” limits radical transformations of criminal justice. Our revised perspective encourages scholars to analyze how marginal positions and actors become part of the field, as well as the effects they produce while trying to reshape its boundaries. We conclude by sketching out how scholars have extended and revised the agonistic perspective we advance in Breaking the Pendulum and where we might turn next.

Susanna L. Blumenthal’s Law and the Modern Mind: Consciousness and Responsibility in American Legal Culture (2016) is a history of the self in nineteenth-century America. When judges considered a person’s criminal responsibility or civil capacity in court, they created a body of legal and political thought about the self, society, the economy, and American democracy. This essay uses Blumenthal’s book to explore recent work on law and the mind in Britain and North America, and argues that abstract questions about free will, the self, and the mind were part of the everyday jurisprudence of the nineteenth century. Debates about responsibility were also debates about the psychological consequences of capitalism and the borders of personhood and citizenship at a time of rapid economic, political, and social change.