We show that the DA-uniflcation problem is undecidable. That is, given two binary function symbols ⊕ and ⊗, variables and constants, it is undecidable if two terms built from these symbols can be unified provided the following DA-axioms hold:

Two terms are DA-unifiable (i.e. an equation is solvable in DA) if there exist terms to be substituted for their variables such that the resulting terms are equal in the equational theory DA.

This is the smallest currently known axiomatic subset of Hilbert's tenth problem for which an undecidability result has been obtained.

We answer a question of Just, Miller, Scheepers and Szeptycki whether certain diagonalization properties for sequences of open covers are provably closed under taking finite or countable unions.

The problem of the existence of a universal structure omitting a finite set of forbidden substructures is reducible to the corresponding problem in the category of graphs with a vertex coloring by two colors. It is not known whether this problem reduces further to the category of ordinary graphs. It is also not known whether these problems are decidable.

The paper discusses the notion of finite model truth definitions (or FM-truth definitions), introduced by M. Mostowski as a finite model analogue of Tarski's classical notion of truth definition.

We compare FM-truth definitions with Vardi's concept of the combined complexity of logics, noting an important difference: the difficulty of defining FM-truth for a logic does not depend on the syntax of , as long as it is decidable. It follows that for a natural there exist FM-truth definitions whose evaluation is much easier than the combined complexly of would suggest.

We apply the general theory to give a complexity-theoretical characterization of the logics for which the classes (prenex classes of higher order logics) define FM-truth. For any d ≥ 2, m ≥ 1 we construct a family of syntactically defined fragments of which satisfy this characterization. We also use the classes to give a refinement of known results on the complexity classes captured by .

We close with a few simple corollaries, one of which gives a sufficient condition for the existence, given a vocabulary σ, of a fixed number k such that model checking for all first order sentences over σ can be done in deterministic time nk.

In a paper of 1933 Gödel proved that every satisfiable first-order ∀2∃* sentence has a finite model. Actually he constructed a finite model in an ingenious and sophisticated way. In this paper we use a simple and straightforward probabilistic argument to establish existence of a finite model of an arbitrary satisfiable ∀2∃* sentence.

In this note I show, by means of an infinite matrix M, that the number of irreducible modalities in Lewis's system S2 is infinite. The result is of some interest in view of the fact that Parry has recently shown that there are but a finite number of modalities in the system S2 (which is the next stronger system than S2 discussed by Lewis).

I begin by introducing a function θ which is defined over the class of sets of signed integers, and which assumes sets of signed integers as values. If A is any set of signed integers, then θ(A) is the set of all signed integers whose immediate predecessors are in A; i.e., , so that n ϵ θ(A) is true if and only if n − 1 ϵ A is true.

Thus, for example, θ({−10, −1, 0, 3, 14}) = {−9, 0, 1, 4, 15}. In particular we notice that θ(V) = V and θ(Λ) = Λ, where V is the set of all signed integers, and Λ is the empty set of signed integers.

It is clear that, if A and B are sets of signed integers, then θ(A+B) = θ(A)+θ(B).

It is also easily proved that, for any set A of signed integers we have . For, if n is any signed integer, then

Illative combinatory logic consists of the theory of combinators or lambda calculus extended by extra constants (and corresponding axioms and rules) intended to capture inference. In a preceding paper, [2], we considered 4 systems of illative combinatory logic that are sound for first order intuitionistic propositional and predicate logic. The interpretation from ordinary logic into the illative systems can be done in two ways: following the propositions-as-types paradigm, in which derivations become combinators, or in a more direct way, in which derivations are not translated. Both translations are closely related in a canonical way. In the cited paper we proved completeness of the two direct translations. In the present paper we prove that also the two indirect translations are complete. These proofs are direct whereas in another version, [3], we proved completeness by showing that the two corresponding illative systems are conservative over the two systems for the direct translations. Moreover we shall prove that one of the systems is also complete for predicate calculus with higher type functions.

This paper has three parts. In this first part, we formulate and prove from V = L a new combinatorial principle, ⋄++. In the second part, we discuss the topological problem which led to the formulation of ⋄++. Finally, we use ⋄++ to construct a space solving the topological problem.

In [3] Friedberg showed that every Turing degree ≥ 0′ is the jump of some degree. Using the relativized version of this theorem it can be shown by finite induction that if a ≥ 0(n)0(n) then there is a b such that b(n) = a (our notation is defined in §1). It is natural to ask whether these results can be extended into the transfinite. Is it true for example, that whenever a ≥ 0(ω) there is a b such that = b(ω)= a? In §2 we use forcing to prove this result. (The usefulness of forcing in answering questions involving the jump operation on degrees of unsolvability has been previously demonstrated in Selman [5] where, for example, forcing was used to construct degrees a and b such that a(ω) = b(ω) = a ∪ b = 0(ω).) In §3 we generalize the methods of §2 to show that if α is a recursive ordinal and a ≥ 0(α) then there is a bsuch that b(α) = a, i.e. the Friedberg result can be extended to all recursive ordinal levels.

Thomason [6] used a forcing argument to show: If (the Kleene set of notations for the recursive ordinals) then there is a B such that (the set of notations for ordinals recursive in B). In §4 we show this result holds when hyperarithmetic reducibility is replaced by Turing reducibility: If then there is a B such that .

In [60] N. Belnap presented an 8-element matrix for the relevant logic R with the following property: if in an implication A → B the formulas A and B do not have a common variable then there exists a valuation v such that v (A → B) does not belong to the set of designated elements of this matrix. A 6-element matrix of this kind can be found in: R. Routley, R.K. Meyer, V. Plumwood and R.T. Brady [82], Below we prove that the logics generated by these two matrices are the only maximal extensions of the relevant logic R which have the relevance property: if A → B is provable in such a logic then A and B have a common propositional variable.

In a nonstandard universe, the κ-saturation property states that any family of fewer than κ internal sets with the finite intersection property has a nonempty intersection. An ordered field F is said to have the λ-Bolzano-Weierstrass property iff F has cofinality λ and every bounded λ-sequence in F has a convergent λ-subsequence. We show that if κ < λ are uncountable regular cardinals and βα < λ whenever α < κ and β < λ then there is a κ-saturated nonstandard universe in which the hyperreal numbers have the λ-Bolzano-Weierstrass property. The result also applies to certain fragments of set theory and second order arithmetic.

This paper compares the strength of two sorts of sentences of PA (classical first-order arithmetic with induction): reflection principles and sentences that may be called iterated consistency assertions.

Let Bew(x) be the standard provability predicate for PA, and for any sentence S of PA, let ⌈S⌉ be the numeral for the Gödel number of S. The reflection principle for S is the sentence Bew(⌈S⌉) → S, and a reflection principle is simply the reflection principle for some sentence. Nothing false (in the standard model for PA) is provable in PA, and therefore every reflection principle is true. Löb's theorem asserts that S is provable (in PA) if the reflection principle for S is provable.

We shall suppose that the 0-ary propositional connectives ⊤ and ⊥ are taken as primitives in the formulation of PA. We define the iterated consistency assertions Conm by: Con0 = ⊤; Conm−1 = − Bew(⌈ − Conm⌉). Con1 may be taken to be the sentence of PA that expresses the consistency of PA; Conn−1, the sentence that expresses the consistency of PA ⋃ {Conn}.

Our starting point is the observation that Con1 is equivalent (in PA) to the reflection principle for ⊥. (The second incompleteness theorem thus follows in a well-known way from Löb's theorem: if PA is consistent, then ⊥ is not provable, the reflection principle for ⊥ is not provable, and the consistency of PA is not provable either.)

A meadow is a commutative ring with an inverse operator satisfying 0−1 = 0. We determine the initial algebra of the meadows of characteristic 0 and prove a normal form theorem for it. As an immediate consequence we obtain the decidability of the closed term problem for meadows and the computability of their initial object.

In this paper we investigate the first order metatheory of the classical propositional logic. In the first section we prove that the first order metatheory of the classical propositional logic is undecidable. Thus as a mathematical object even the simplest of logics is, from a logical standpoint, quite complex. In fact it is of the same complexity as true first order number theory.

This result answers negatively a question of J. F. A. K. van Benthem (see [van Benthem and Doets 1983]) as to whether the interpolation theorem in some sense completes the metatheory of the calculus. Let us begin by motivating the question that we answer. In [van Benthem and Doets 1983] it is claimed that a folklore prejudice has it that interpolation was the final elementary property of first order logic to be discovered. Even though other properties of the propositional calculus have been discovered since Craig's orginal paper [Craig 1957] (see for example [Reznikoff 1965]) there is a lot of evidence for the fundamental nature of the property. In abstract model theory for example one finds that very few logics have the interpolation property. There are two well-known open problems in this area. These are

1. Is there a logic satisfying the full compactness theorem as well as the interpolation theorem that is not equivalent to first order logic even for finite models?

2. Is there a logic stronger than L(Q), the logic with the quantifierthere exist uncountably many, that is countably compact and has the interpolation property?

A common method of obtaining the classical modal logics, for example the Feys system T, the Lewis systems, the Brouwerian system etc., is to build on a basis for the propositional calculus by adjoining a new symbol L, specifying new axioms involving L and the symbols in the basis for PC, and imposing one or more additional transformation rules. In the jargon of algebraic logic, which is the point of view we shall adopt, the “necessity” symbol L may be interpreted as an operator on the Boolean algebra of propositions of PC. For example, the Lewis system S4 may be regarded as a Boolean algebra ℒ together with an operator L on ℒ having the properties: (1)Lp ≤ p for all p in ℒ, (2)L1 = 1, (3) L(p → q) ≤ Lp → Lq for all p, q in ℒ, and (4) Lp = L(Lp) for all p in ℒ. Here, of course, → denotes the material implication connective: p→q = p′ ∨ q. It is easy to verify that property (3) may be replaced by either (3′) L(p ∧ q) = Lp ∧ Lq for all p, q in ℒ, or by (3″) L(p → q) ∧ Lp ≤ Lq for all p, q in ℒ. In particular, it follows from (1) through (4) above that L is a decreasing, idempotent and isotone operator on ℒ. Such mappings are often called interior operators.

In a previous paper [5], we considered the problem of introducing an implication connective into a quantum logic. This is greatly complicated by the fact that the quantal propositions band together to form an orthocomplemented lattice which is only “locally” distributive. Such lattices are called orthomodular. For definitions and further discussion, the reader is referred to that paper. In it, we argued that the Sasaki implication connective ⊃ defined by p ⊃ q = p′ ∨ (p ∧ q) is a natural generalization of material implication when the lattice of propositions is ortho-modular. Indeed, if unrestricted distributivity were permitted, p ⊃ q would reduce to the classical material implication p → q. For this reason, we choose ⊃ to play the role of material implication in an orthomodular lattice. Further properties of ⊃ are enumerated in Example 2.2(1) and Corollary 2.4 below.

We define a quasi-order on Borel functions from a zero-dimensional Polish space into another that both refines the order induced by the Baire hierarchy of functions and generalises the embeddability order on Borel sets. We study the properties of this quasi-order on continuous functions, and we prove that the closed subsets of a zero-dimensional Polish space are well-quasi-ordered by bi-continuous embeddability.

We investigate various strong notions of rigidity for Souslin trees, separating them under ⟡ into a hierarchy. Applying our methods to the automorphism tower problem in group theory, we show under ⟡ that there is a group whose automorphism tower is highly malleable by forcing.

Following the book Algebraic Set Theory from André Joyal and Ieke Moerdijk [8], we give a characterization of the initial ZF-algebra, for Heyting pretoposes equipped with a class of small maps. Then, an application is considered (the effective topos) to show how to recover an already known model (McCarty [9]).

An individual-concept, hereinafter “individuation”, is a function from possible worlds to individuals. Constant individuations I will call “subsistents” (the notion will presently be generalized). A “substance”, after Thomason [35], is a subsistent whose value exists for the world at hand. In the systems of quantified modal logic developed over the past twenty years, the tendency has been to restrict the range of quantifiers to substances (often represented technically by the simple individuals that would be the values of the constant individuations), while allowing constant terms (particularly descriptions) to express arbitrary individuations. One result is to invalidate unrestricted universal instantiation (and existential generalization), rather as in free logic. Such systems approximate some features of ordinary usage rather nicely, e.g. the behavior of quantifiers and definite descriptions in tensed discourse. Stalnaker and Thomason's Q3r [34], based on the latter's Q3 [35], [36], is exemplary of this approach.

The suggestion has repeatedly been considered to quantify over individuations in general (Kanger [14], Kaplan [17], Hughes and Cresswell [12, p. 196], Thomason [35, p. 136], Pollock [30]).

The main purpose of this note is to present new semi-model-theoretic proofs of some axiomatization results. Principally, we prove the result of [van Dalen and Statman] on the axiomatization of the equality fragment of the intuitionistic theory of apartness by ω-fold stability axioms. Further examples are also discussed.

The intuitionistic theories of equality and apartness are given by the following nonlogical axioms:

EQ .

AP .

In AP, one can define a notion of equality by means of the abbreviation:

.

The corresponding interpretation of E Q in AP is not faithful — since equality is a negation, we have stability of equality:

.

The equality fragment of AP is axiomatized by a suitable generalization of the stability of equality. To state it, one first defines a sequence of partial apartness relations:

.

A simple induction shows, for all n,

whence

.