We examine the reverse mathematics and computability theory of a form of Ramsey's theorem in which the linear n-tuples of a binary tree are colored.

The concepts “classical valuation” and “supervaluation” were introduced by van Fraassen around 1966, to provide a semantic analysis of the then extant axiomatic systems of free logic. Consider an atomic sentence

and a “partial” model which fails to interpret c. Then (1) has no truth value in , nor does

While the valuelessness of (1) was found intuitively acceptable, that of (2) was not. Indeed, (2) and all other tautologies are theorems of free logic.

Van Fraassen found a way to accommodate both intuitions. He interprets the unproblematic atomic sentences as usual, while “interpreting” those like (1) by simply assigning them a truth-value in arbitrary fashion. Then a truth-value for every sentence can be defined in the usual way; the result van Fraassen calls a “classical valuation” of the language. The arbitrary element in any given classical valuation is then eliminated by passage to the “supervaluation” over , which agrees with the classical valuations where they agree among themselves, and otherwise is undefined. In the supervaluation over , (1) is valueless but (2) true (since true on all classical valuations), as was required.

There is a slight, but crucial oversimplification in the preceding account. Evaluation of the sentence

requires prior evaluation of the open formula

But here mere assignment of truth-value is not enough; a whole set must be arbitrarily assigned as extension. The quantification over classical valuations involved in passage to the supervaluation thus involves an implicit quantification over subsets of the domain of : supervaluations are second order.

In classical logic a collection of sets of statements (or equivalently, a property of sets of statements) is called a consistency property if it meets certain simple closure conditions (a definition is given in §2). The simplest example of a consistency property is the collection of all consistent sets in some formal system for classical logic. The Model Existence Theorem then says that any member of a consistency property is satisfiable in a countable domain. From this theorem many basic results of classical logic follow rather simply: completeness theorems, the compactness theorem, the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem, and the Craig interpolation lemma among others. The central position of the theorem in classical logic is obvious. For the infinitary logic the Model Existence Theorem is even more basic as the compactness theorem is not available; [8] is largely based on it.

In this paper we define appropriate notions of consistency properties for the first-order modal logics S4, T and K (without the Barcan formula) and for intuitionistic logic. Indeed we define two versions for intuitionistic logic, one deriving from the work of Gentzen, one from Beth; both have their uses. Model Existence Theorems are proved, from which the usual known basic results follow. We remark that Craig interpolation lemmas have been proved model theoretically for these logics by Gabbay ([5], [6]) using ultraproducts. The existence of both ultra-product and consistency property proofs of the same result is a common phenomena in classical and infinitary logic. We also present extremely simple tableau proof systems for S4, T, K and intuitionistic logics, systems whose completeness is an easy consequence of the Model Existence Theorems.

We consider first-order logic only. A theory S will be called locally interpretable in a theory T if every theorem of S is interpretable in T. If S is locally interpretable in T and T is consistent then S is consistent. Most known relative consistency proofs can be viewed as local interpretations. The classic examples are the cartesian interpretation of the elementary theorems of Euclidean n-dimensional geometry into the first-order theory of real closed fields, the interpretation of the arithmetic of integers (rational numbers) into the arithmetic of positive integers, the interpretation of ZF + (V = L) into ZF, the interpretation of analysis into ZFC, relative consistency proofs by forcing, etc. Those interpretations are global. Under fairly general conditions local interpretability implies global interpretability; see Remarks (7), (8), and (9) below.

We define the type (interpretability type) of a theory S to be the class of all theories T such that S is locally interpretable in T and vice versa. There happen to be such types and they are partially ordered by the relation of local interpretability. This partial ordering is of lattice type and has the following form:

The lattice is distributive and complete and satisfies the infinite distributivity law of Brouwerian lattices:

We do not know if the dual law

is true. We will show that the lattice is algebraic and that its compact elements form a sublattice and are precisely the types of finitely axiomatizable theories, and several other facts.

We consider extensions of Peano arithmetic suitable for doing some of nonstandard analysis, in which there is a predicate N(x) for an elementary initial segment, along with axiom schemes approximating ω1-saturation. We prove that such systems have the same proof-theoretic strength as their natural analogues in second order arithmetic. We close by presenting an even stronger extension of Peano arithmetic, which is equivalent to ZF for arithmetic statements.

In this article we establish the undecidability of representability and of finite representability as algebras of binary relations in a wide range of signatures. In particular, representability and finite representability are undecidable for Boolean monoids and lattice ordered monoids, while representability is undecidable for Jónsson's relation algebra. We also establish a number of undecidability results for representability as algebras of injective functions.

Martin's axiom is equivalent to the statement that the universe is absolute under ccc forcing extensions for Σ1 sentences with a subset of κ, , as a parameter.

Consider any interpreted theory Θ, formulated in the notation of quantification theory (or lower predicate calculus) with interpreted predicate letters. It will be proved that Θ is translatable into a theory, likewise formulated in the notation of quantification theory, in which there is only one predicate letter, and it a dyadic one.

Let us assume a fragment of set theory, adequate to assure the existence, for all x and y without regard to logical type, of the set {x, y) whose members are x and y, and to assure the distinctness of x from {x, y} and {{x}}. ({x} is explained as {x, x}.) Let us construe the ordered pair x; y in Kuratowski's fashion, viz. as {{x}, {x, y}}, and then construe x;y;z as x;(y;z), and x;y;z;w as x;(y;z;w), and so on. Let us refer to w, w;w, w;w;w, etc. as 1w, 2w, 3w, etc.

Suppose the predicates of Θ are ‘F1’, ‘F2’, …, finite or infinite in number, and respectively d1-adic, d2-adic, …. Now let Θ′ be a theory whose notation consists of that of quantification theory with just the single dyadic predicate ‘F’, interpreted thus:

The universe of Θ′ is to comprise all objects of the universe of Θ and, in addition, {x, y) for every x and y in the universe of Θ′. (Of course the universe of Θ may happen already to comprise all this.)

Now I shall show how the familiar notations ‘x = y’, ‘x = {y, z}’, etc., and ultimately the desired ‘’, ‘’, etc. themselves can all be defined within Θ′.

When dealing with axiomatic theories from a recursion-theoretic point of view, the notion of r.e. preordering naturally arises. We agree that an r.e. preorder is a pair = 〈P, ≤P〉 such that P is an r.e. subset of the set of natural numbers (denoted by ω), ≤P is a preordering on P and the set {〈;x, y〉: x ≤Py} is r.e.. Indeed, if is an axiomatic theory, the provable implication of yields a preordering on the class of (Gödel numbers of) formulas of .

Of course, if ≤P is a preordering on P, then it yields an equivalence relation ~P on P, by simply letting x ~Py iff x ≤Py and y ≤Px. Hence, in the case of P = ω, any preordering yields an equivalence relation on ω and consequently a numeration in the sense of [4]. It is also clear that any equivalence relation on ω (hence any numeration) can be regarded as a preordering on ω. In view of this connection, we sometimes apply to the theory of preorders some of the concepts from the theory of numerations (see also Eršov [6]).

Our main concern will be in applications of these concepts to logic, in particular as regards sufficiently strong axiomatic theories (essentially the ones in which recursive functions are representable). From this point of view it seems to be of some interest to study some remarkable prelattices and Boolean prealgebras which arise from such theories. It turns out that these structures enjoy some rather surprising lattice-theoretic and universal recursion-theoretic properties.

After making our main definitions in §1, we examine universal recursion-theoretic properties of some r.e. prelattices in §2.

The aim of the paper is to prove the completeness theorem for biprobability models. This also solves Keisler's Problem 5.4 (see [4]).

Let be a countable admissible set and ω ∈ . The logic is similar to the standard probability logic . The only difference is that two types of probability quantifiers and are allowed.

A biprobability model is a structure (, μ1, μ2) where is a classical structure without operations and μ1, μ2 are two types of probability measures such that μ1 is absolutely continuous with respect to μ2, i.e. μ1 ≪ μ2.

The quantifiers are interpreted in the natural way, i.e.

for i = 1, 2. (The measure is the restriction of the completion of to the σ-algebra generated by the measurable rectangles and the diagonal sets

Axioms and rules of inference are those of , as listed in [2] with the axiom B4 from [4], with the remark that both P1 and P2 can play the role of P, together with the following axioms:

Axioms of continuity.

• 1) .

• 2) .

Axiom of absolute continuity:

where and Φn = {φ ∈ Φ: φ has n free variables}.

The purpose of this paper is to study a formal system PA(Q2) of first order Peano arithmetic, PA, augmented by a Ramsey quantifier Q2 which binds two free variables. The intended meaning of Q2xx′φ(x, x′) is that there exists an infinite set X of natural numbers such that φ(a, a′) holds for all a, a′ Є X such that a ≠ a′. Such an X is called a witness set for Q2xx′φ(x, x′). Our results would not be affected by the addition of further Ramsey quantifiers Q3, Q4, …, Here of course the intended meaning of Qkx1 … xkφ(x1,…xk) is that there exists an infinite set X such that φ(a1…, ak) holds for all k-element subsets {a1, … ak} of X.

Ramsey quantifiers were first introduced in a general model theoretic setting by Magidor and Malitz [13]. The system PA{Q2), or rather, a system essentially equivalent to it, was first defined and studied by Macintyre [12]. Some of Macintyre's results were obtained independently by Morgenstern [15]. The present paper is essentially self-contained, but all of our results have been directly inspired by those of Macintyre [12].

After some preliminaries in §1, we begin in §2 by giving a new completeness proof for PA(Q2). A by-product of our proof is that for every regular uncountable cardinal k, every consistent extension of PA(Q2) has a k-like model in which all classes are definable. (By a class we mean a subset of the universe of the model, every initial segment of which is finite in the sense of the model.)

In [8] S. J. Maslov gives a positive solution to the decision problem for satisfiability of formulas of the form

in any first-order predicate calculus without identity where h, k, m, n are positive integers, αi, βi are signed atomic formulas (atomic formulas or negations of atomic formulas), and ∧, ∨ are conjunction and disjunction symbols, respectively (cf. [6] for a related solvable class). In this paper we show that the decision problem is unsolvable for formulas that are like those considered by Maslov except that they have prefixes of the form ∀x∃y1 … ∃yk∀z. This settles the decision problems for all prefix classes of formulas for formulas that are in prenex conjunctive normal form in which all disjunctions are binary (have just two terms). In our concluding section we report results on decision problems for related classes of formulas including classes of formulas in languages with identity and we describe some special properties of formulas in which all disjunctions are binary including a property that implies that any proof of our result, that a class of formulas is a reduction class for satisfiability, is necessarily indirect. Our proof is based on an unsolvable combinatorial tag problem.

The generality of a derivation is an equivalence relation on the set of occurrences of variables in its premises and conclusion such that two occurrences of the same variable are in this relation if and only if they must remain occurrences of the same variable in every generalization of the derivation. The variables in question are propositional or of another type. A generalization of the derivation consists in diversifying variables without changing the rules of inference.

This paper examines in the setting of categorial proof theory the conjecture that two derivations with the same premises and conclusions stand for the same proof if and only if they have the same generality. For that purpose generality is defined within a category whose arrows are equivalence relations on finite ordinals, where composition is rather complicated. Several examples are given of deductive systems of derivations covering fragments of logic, with the associated map into the category of equivalence relations of generality.

This category is isomorphically represented in the category whose arrows are binary relations between finite ordinals, where composition is the usual simple composition of relations. This representation is related to a classical representation result of Richard Brauer.

In [2], Carlson and Simpson proved a dualized version of Ramsey's theorem obtained by coloring partitions of ω instead of subsets of ω. It was at the suggestion of Simpson that the author undertook to study the notion dual to that of a Ramsey ultrafilter. After stating the basic terminology and notation used in the paper in §1, in §2 we establish some basic properties of the lattice of all partitions of a cardinal κ. §3 is devoted to the study of families of pairwise disjoint partitions of ω. §4 is concerned with descending sequences of partitions. In §5, we give some examples of filters of partitions. Properties of such filters are discussed in §6. Co-Ramsey filters are introduced in §7, and it is shown how they can be associated with Ramsey ultrafilters. The main result of §8 is Proposition 8.1, which asserts the existence of a co-Ramsey filter under the continuum hypothesis.

We use standard set theoretic conventions and notation. Let κ be a cardinal. We set κ* = κ − {0}. For every ordinal α ≤ κ, (κ)α denotes the set of those sequences X(ν), ν < α, of pairwise disjoint nonempty subsets of κ such that ⋃ν<αX(ν) = κ, and ⋂X(ν) < ⋂X(ν′) whenever ν < ν′. We also let (κ)≤α = ⋃β≤α(κ)β and (κ)<α = ⋃β<α(κ)β. Given X ∈ (κ)α, we put xν = ⋂X(ν) for every ν < α, and we denote by Ax the set of all xν, 0 < ν < α.

An interpolation theorem holds for many standard modal logics, but first order S5 is a prominent example of a logic for which it fails. In this paper it is shown that a first order S5 interpolation theorem can be proved provided the logic is extended to contain propositional quantifiers. A proper statement of the result involves some subtleties, but this is the essence of it.

This paper is devoted to the general question, which assertions φ have the property,

if φ is provable classically, then φ is

(*) provable constructively.

More generally, we consider the question, what is the “constructive content” of a given classical proof? Our aim is to formulate rules in a form applicable to mathematical practice. Often a mathematician has the feeling that there will be no difficulty constructivizing a certain proof, only a number of routine details; although it can be quite laborious to set them all out. We believe that most such situations will come quite easily under the scope of the rules given here; the metamathematical machinery will then take care of the details.

This basic idea is not new; it has been discussed by Gödel and by Kreisel. Kreisel's investigations [Kr] were based on Herbrand's theorem; in unpublished memoranda he has also used Gödel's methods on some examples. These methods of Gödel (the double-negation and Dialectica interpretations) lie at the root of our work here. Previous work, however, has been limited to traditional formal systems of number theory and analysis. It is only recently that formal systems adequate to formalize constructive mathematics as a whole have been developed. Thus, for the first time we are in a position to formulate logical theorems which are easily applicable to mathematical practice. It is this program which we here carry out.

Now that the work has been placed in some historical context, let us return to the main question: which φ have the property (*)? Upon first considering the problem, one might guess that any φ which makes no existential assertions (including disjunctions) should have the property (*).

The main result of this paper is the following transfer theorem: If T is an elementary theory which has a κ-like model where κ is hyperinaccessible of type ω, then T has a λ-like model for each λ > card(T). Helling [3] obtained the same conclusion under the stronger hypothesis that κ is weakly compact. Fuhrken conjectured in [1] that the same conclusion would result if κ were merely inaccessible. (He also showed there the connection with a problem about generalized quantifiers.) Thus, our theorem lies properly between Helling's theorem and Fuhrken's conjecture. In [9] it is shown that this theorem is actually the best possible. This theorem and the other results of this paper were announced by the authors in [10].

In §1 we prove as Theorem 1 a slightly stronger form of the above theorem. This theorem is generalized in §2 to Theorem 2 which concerns theories which permit the omitting of types. The methods used in §§1 and 2 are also applicable to problems regarding Hanf numbers as well as to two-cardinal problems.

It is shown in ZF that if δ < δ+ < Ω are such that δ and δ+ are either both weakly compact or singular cardinals and Ω is large enough for putting the core model apparatus into action then there is an inner model with a Woodin cardinal.

In this paper, we propose a weak regularity principle which is similar to both weak König's lemma and Ramsey's theorem. We begin by studying the computational strength of this principle in the context of reverse mathematics. We then analyze different ways of generalizing this principle.

In spite of the analogies between ℚp and which became evident through the work of Ax and Kochen, an adaptation of the complete recursive axiom system given by them for ℚp, to the case of does not render a complete axiom system. We show the independence of elementary properties which express the action of additive polynomials as maps on . We formulate an elementary property expressing this action and show that it holds for all maximal valued fields. We also derive an example of a rather simple immediate valued function field over a henselian defectless ground field which is not a henselian rational function field. This example is of special interest in connection with the open problem of local uniformization in positive characteristic.