Let κB be the least cardinal for which the Baire category theorem fails for the real line R. Thus κB is the least κ such that the real line can be covered by κ many nowhere dense sets. It is shown that κB cannot have countable cofinality. On the other hand it is consistent that the corresponding cardinal for 2ω1 be ℵω. Similar questions are considered for the ideal of measure zero sets, other ω1, saturated ideals, and the ideal of zero-dimensional subsets of Rω1.

The problem of finding an infinite set of natural numbers which contains no subsets of higher (Turing) degree was first posed by W. Miller [3] and was brought to our attention by C. G. Jockusch, Jr., who proved that such a set, if it existed, could not be hyperarithmetic.2 In this paper we construct an infinite set which is not recursive in any of its coinfinite subsets, and thus contains no subset of higher degree. Our original proof made use of the result (attributed to Ehrenfeucht) that every subset of 2ω which is open (in the standard topology) is “Ramsey”.

We deal with several pcf problems: we characterize another version of exponentiation: maximal number of k-branches in a tree with λ nodes, deal with existence of independent sets in stable theories, possible cardinalities of ultraproducts and the depth of ultraproducts of Boolean Algebras. Also we give cardinal invariants for each λ with a pcf restriction and investigate further TD{f). The sections can be read independently, although there are some minor dependencies.

It is shown that the nonrecursive predecessors of a 1-generic degree < 0′ are all 1-generic. As a corollary, it is shown that the 1-generic degrees are not densely ordered.

If a formal theory T is able to reason about its own syntax, then the diagonalizable algebra of T is defined as its Lindenbaum sentence algebra endowed with a unary operator □ which sends a sentence φ to the sentence □φ asserting the provability of φ in T. We prove that the first order theories of diagonalizable algebras of a wide class of theories are undecidable and establish some related results.

It is often asserted in the literature that any theorem which can be proved using nonstandard analysis can also be proved without it. The purpose of this paper is to show that this assertion is wrong, and in fact there are theorems which can be proved with nonstandard analysis but cannot be proved without it. There is currently a great deal of confusion among mathematicians because the above assertion can be interpreted in two different ways. First, there is the following correct statement: any theorem which can be proved using nonstandard analysis can be proved in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with choice, ZFC, and thus is acceptable by contemporary standards as a theorem in mathematics. Second, there is the erroneous conclusion drawn by skeptics: any theorem which can be proved using nonstandard analysis can be proved without it, and thus there is no need for nonstandard analysis.

The reason for this confusion is that the set of principles which are accepted by current mathematics, namely ZFC, is much stronger than the set of principles which are actually used in mathematical practice. It has been observed (see [F] and [S]) that almost all results in classical mathematics use methods available in second order arithmetic with appropriate comprehension and choice axiom schemes.

We give here an elementary proof of a recent result of Girard [4] comparing the rates of growth of the two principal (and extreme) examples of a spectrum of “majorization hierarchies”—i.e. hierarchies of increasing number-theoretic functions, indexed by (systems of notations for) initial segments I of the countable ordinals so that if α < β ∈ I then the βth function dominates the αth one at all but finitely-many positive integers x.

Hardy [5] was perhaps the first to make use of a majorization hierarchy—the Hα's below—in “exhibiting” a set of reals with cardinality ℵ1. More recently such hierarchies have played important roles in mathematical logic because they provide natural classifications of recursive functions according to their computational complexity. (All the functions considered here are “honest” in the sense that the size of their values gives a measure of the number of steps needed to compute them.)

The hierarchies we are concerned with fall into three main classes depending on their mode of generation at successor stages, the other crucial parameter being the initial choice of a particular (standard) fundamental sequence λ0 < λ1 < λ2 < … to each limit ordinal λ under consideration which, by a suitable diagonalization, will then determine the generation at stage λ.

Our later comparisons will require the use of a “large” initial segment I of proof-theoretic ordinals, extending as far as the “Howard ordinal”. However we will postpone a precise description of these ordinals and their associated fundamental sequences until later.

We shall be concerned in this paper with properties of relations. For simplicity we shall consider only two relations, a binary relation R and a ternary relation S, but the generalization to the case of any number of any relations presents no difficulty. We shall denote by A0 the field of the relations R and S and assume that A0 is infinite (not inductive).

The properties to be dealt with are expressible in a symbolic language L whose principal features will be sketched below.

I provide indestructibility results for large cardinals consistent with V = L, such as weakly compact, indescribable and strongly unfoldable cardinals. The Main Theorem shows that any strongly unfoldable cardinal κ can be made indestructible by <κ-closed, κ-proper forcing. This class of posets includes for instance all <κ-closed posets that are either κ−-c.c. or <κ-strategically closed as well as finite iterations of such posets. Since strongly unfoldable cardinals strengthen both indescribable and weakly compact cardinals, the Main Theorem therefore makes these two large cardinal notions similarly indestructible. Finally. I apply the Main Theorem to obtain a class forcing extension preserving all strongly unfoldable cardinals in which every strongly unfoldable cardinal κ is indestructible by <κ-closed, κ-proper forcing.

The system of formal logic to be presented in this paper has the following main properties:

(1). The Mengenlehre paradoxes do not arise in it.

(2). It seems to be free from other contradictions.

(3). It does not resort to a theory of types.

(4). It uses negation and material implication and does not weaken the principle of excluded middle.

(5). It contains no analogue to the Curry W operator; consequently, given a propositional function ϕ, a propositional function Ψ cannot always be found such that, for all x, ϕ(x, x) and Ψ(x) are equivalent propositions.

(6). It employs a universal quantifier, G, such that (x)f(x), (x)f(x, x), (x)f(x, x, x), …, would be respectively expressed thus, G(f, f), G(f, f, f), G(f, f, f, f), ….

(7). It employs Schönfinkel's functional notation, so that f(x1, x2, …, xn) will be written as (( … ((fx1)x2) …)xn) and abbreviated to (fx1x2… xn) and, when no ambiguity results, to fx1x2…xn.

(8). A theory of integers and real numbers cannot, apparently, be deduced from it.

(9). A form of the axiom of choice is provable in it.

In this paper we introduce a system S5U, formed by adding to the modal system S5 a new connective U, Up being read “probably”. A few theorems are derived in S5U, and the system is provided with a decision procedure. Several decidable extensions of S5U are discussed, and probability logic is related to plurality quantification.

For every κ ∈ ω, there is an infinite set Aκ ⊆ ω and a d(κ) ∈ ω such that for all Q0, Q1, ⊆ Aκ where ∣Q0∣ = ∣ Q1∣, or d(κ) < ∣Q0∣, Q1∣ < ℵ0, the structures ‹ω, +, Q0› and ‹ω, +, Q1› are indistinguishable by first-order sentences of quantifier depth κ whose atomic formulas are of the form u = v, u + v = w, and Q(u), where u, v, and w are variables.

Let M be an O-minimal structure. We use our understanding, acquired in [KPS], of the structure of definable sets of n-tuples in M, to study definable (in M) equivalence relations on Mn. In particular, we show that if E is an A-definable equivalence relation on Mn (A ⊂ M) then E has only finitely many classes with nonempty interior in Mn, each such class being moreover also A-definable. As a consequence, we are able to give some conditions under which an O-minimal theory T eliminates imaginaries (in the sense of Poizat [P]).

If L is a first order language and M an L-structure, then by a definable set in M, we mean something of the form X ⊂ Mn, n ≥ 1, where X = {(a1…,an) ∈ Mn: M ⊨ϕ(ā)} for some formula ∈ L(M). (Here L(M) means L together with names for the elements of M.) If the parameters from come from a subset A of M, we say that X is A-definable.

M is said to be O-minimal if M = (M, <,…), where < is a dense linear order with no first or last element, and every definable set X ⊂ M is a finite union of points, and intervals (a, b) (where a, b ∈ M ∪ {± ∞}). (This notion is as in [PS] except here we demand the underlying order be dense.) The complete theory T is said to be O-minimal if every model of T is O-minimal. (Note that in [KPS] it is proved that if M is O-minimal, then T = Th(M) is O-minimal.) In the remainder of this section and in §2, M will denote a fixed but arbitrary O-minimal structure. A,B,C,… will denote subsets of M.

For any ordinal Λ, we can define a polymodal logic GLPΛ, with a modality [ξ] for each ξ < Λ. These represent provability predicates of increasing strength. Although GLPΛ has no Kripke models, Ignatiev showed that indeed one can construct a Kripke model of the variable-free fragment with natural number modalities, denoted . Later, Icard defined a topological model for which is very closely related to Ignatiev's.

In this paper we show how to extend these constructions for arbitrary Λ. More generally, for each Θ, Λ we build a Kripke model and a topological model , and show that is sound for both of these structures, as well as complete, provided Θ is large enough.

Families of Borel equivalence relations and quasiorders that are cofinal with respect to the Borel reducibility ordering. ≤B, are constructed. There is an analytic ideal on ω generating a complete analytic equivalence relation and any Borel equivalence relation reduces to one generated by a Borel ideal. Several Borel equivalence relations, among them Lipschitz isomorphism of compact metric spaces, are shown to be Kσ complete.

We study satisfiability and infinite-state model checking in ICPDL, which extends Propositional Dynamic Logic (PDL) with intersection and converse operators on programs. The two main results of this paper are that (i) satisfiability is in 2ΕΧΡΤΙΜΕ, thus 2ΕΧΡΤΙΜΕ-complete by an existing lower bound, and (ii) infinite-state model checking of basic process algebras and pushdown systems is also 2ΕΧΡΤΙΜΕ-complete. Both upper bounds are obtained by polynomial time computable reductions to ω-regular tree satisfiability in ICPDL, a reasoning problem that we introduce specifically for this purpose. This problem is then reduced to the emptiness problem for alternating two-way automata on infinite trees. Our approach to (i) also provides a shorter and more elegant proof of Danecki's difficult result that satisfiability in IPDL is in 2ΕΧΡΤΙΜΕ. We prove the lower bound(s) for infinite-state model checking using an encoding of alternating Turing machines.

On sait, depuis les travaux de Zil'ber et de Cherlin, que le degré de Morley de la théorie T d'un groupe G totalement transcendant est l'indice du plus petit sous-groupe définissable d'indice fini de G. Il est clair qu'il lui est supérieur, et l'inégalité inverse peut s'obtenir de la manière suivante: on fait agir G sur les types de S1(G) de rang de Morley maximum en associant à p, type de x au-dessus de G, le type ap de ax au-dessus de G; on montre alors que cette action est définissable, que le fait que ap = q équivaut au fait que a satisfasse une certaine formule à paramètres dans G, ce qui est bien facile si on n'oublie pas que dans une théorie stable tous les types sont définissables; on montre ensuite que cette action est transitive, que si p et q sont de rang de Morley maximum il existe a dans G tel que ap = q, et la méthode la plus rapide, mais qui est aussi la plus sophistiquée, est d'utiliser l'argument de symétrie de la déviation employé dans la preuve de la Proposition 1 de présent article; on conclut alors puisque le degré de Morley, qui est par définition le nombre de types de rang de Morley maximum, ést egal à l'indice du stabilisateur de p, qui est définissable.

Ce comportement des types de rang de Morely maximum se retrouve sans peine, si G est seulement superstable, dans celui des types de “plus petit rang continu” (encore appellé “degré de Shelah”) maximum. Pour trouver ce qui leur correspond dans le cas où G est seulement stable, il faut être un peu plus soigneux, et considérer les types p de S1(G), où G aura éventuellement été remplacé par une extension élémentaire suffisament saturée, tels que pour tout a de G ap ne dévie pas sur ∅: on montre qu'ils existent, et qu'ils sont tous conjugués par action de G; le fait que ap = q s'exprimera cette fois par une infinité de formules et non plus par une seule.

We show that if ℱ is any “well-behaved” subset of the Borel functions and we assume the Axiom of Determinacy then the hierarchy of degrees on (ωω) induced by ℱ turns out to look like the Wadge hierarchy (which is the special case where ℱ is the set of continuous functions).

It is relatively consistent with ZFC that every countable FUfin space of weight ℵ1 is metrizable. This provides a partial answer to a question of G. Gruenhage and P. Szeptycki [GS1].

The motives for seeking economy in the basis of a system are much the same as the motives for constructing the system itself. A given idea A need be left as primitive in a system only so long as we have discovered between A and the other primitives no relationship intimate enough to permit defining A in terms of them; hence the more the set of primitives can be reduced without becoming inadequate, the more comprehensively will the system exhibit the network of interrelationships that comprise its subject-matter. Of course we are often concerned less with an explicit effort to reduce our basis than with particular problems as to how to define certain ideas from others. But such special problems of derivation, such problems of rendering certain ideas eliminable in favor of others, are merely instances of the general problem of economy. Thus it is quite wrong to think of the search for economy as a sort of game, inspired by an abnormal love of superficial neatness. Some economies may be relatively unimportant, but the inevitable result of regarding all economy as trivial would be a willingness to accept all ideas as primitive at the outset, making a system both unnecessary and impossible.