In this paper a theorem about numerical relations will be established and shown to have certain consequences concerning decidability in quantification theory, as well as concerning the foundation of number theory. The theorem is that relations of natural numbers are reducible in elementary fashion to symmetric ones; i.e.:

Theorem I. For every dyadic relation R of natural numbers there is a symmetric dyadic relation H of natural numbers such that R is definable in terms of H plus just truth-functions and quantification over natural numbers.

To state the matter more fully, there is a (well-formed) formula ϕ of pure quantification theory, or first-order functional calculus, which meets these conditions:

(a) ϕ has ‘x’ and ‘y’ as sole free individual variables;

(b) ϕ contains just one predicate letter, and it is dyadic;

(c) for every dyadic relation R of natural numbers there is a symmetric dyadic relation H of natural numbers such that, when the predicate letter in ϕ is interpreted as expressing H, ϕ comes to agree in truth-value with ‘x bears R to y’ for all values of ‘x’ and ‘y’.

In Hilbert and Ackermann [2] there is a simple proof of the consistency of first order predicate logic by reducing it to propositional logic. Intuitively, the proof is based on interpreting predicate logic in a domain with only one element. Tarski [7] and Gentzen [1] have extended this method to simple type theory by starting with an individual domain consisting of a single element and then interpreting a higher type by the set of truth valued functions on the previous type.

I will use the method of Hilbert and Ackermann on Martin-Löf's type theory without universes to show that ¬Eq(A, a, b) cannot be derived without universes for any type A and any objects a and b of type A. In particular, this proves the conjecture in Martin-Löf [5] that Peano's fourth axiom (∀x ϵ N)¬ Eq(N, 0, succ(x)) cannot be proved in type theory without universes. If by consistency we mean that there is no closed term of the empty type, then the construction will also give a consistency proof by finitary methods of Martin-Löf's type theory without universes. So, without universes, the logic obtained by interpreting propositions as types is surprisingly weak. This is in sharp contrast with type theory as a computational system, since, for instance, the proof that every object of a type can be computed to normal form cannot be formalized in first order arithmetic.

Khutoretskii's Theorem states that the Rogers semilattice of any family of c.e. sets has either at most one or infinitely many elements. A lemma in the inductive step of the proof shows that no Rogers semilattice can be partitioned into a principal ideal and a principal filter. We show that such a partitioning is possible for some family of d.c.e. sets. In fact, we construct a family of c.e. sets which, when viewed as a family of d.c.e. sets, has (up to equivalence) exactly two computable Friedberg numberings μ and ν, and μ reduces to any computable numbering not equivalent to ν. The question of whether the full statement of Khutoretskii's Theorem fails for families of d.c.e. sets remains open.

The structure (D, ≤) of the Turing degrees under Turing reducibility is quite complicated. This is true even if we restrict our attention to the substructure (R, ≤) of r.e. degrees. However, the theorems which imply that these structures are complicated all involve ad hoc constructions of sets having the desired reducibility relations. The complexity disappears when we turn to degrees occurring in nature. Of the degrees in R, only 0 and 0′ seem natural. In D, only 0, 0′, 0″, …, 0ω, 0ω+1, … (and on into the transfinite) seem natural. Thus the natural degrees appear to be wellordered, with successors given by Turing jump.

If this is true, one would like to prove it. Of course the first problem is to make the concept of naturalness more precise. The following requirements seem plausible: a natural degree should be definable, its definition should relativise to an arbitrary degree, and this relativisation should preserve reducibility relations among natural degrees. Thus to each natural degree c is associated a definable fc: D → D so that fc(0) = c and ∀d(d ≤ fc(d)). Moreover, b ≤ c iff ∀d(fb(d) ≤, fc(d)). To be specific, let us take the definability of fc to mean that fc ∈ L(R).

If P is a property of degrees, we say P holds almost everywhere (a.e.) iff ∃c∀d ≥: c P(d). For f, g: D → D, let f ≤mgiff f(d) ≤ g(d) a.e. Define f′ by f′(d) = f{d)′, and let M = {f: D → D/f ∈ L(R) ∧ d ≤ f(d) a.e.}. The following conjecture is due to D. A. Martin:

Conjecture. M is prewellordered by ≤m. If f ∈ M has rank α in ≤m, then f′ has rank α + 1.

The study of preservation theorems for first order logic was the focus of much research by model theorists in the 1960's. These theorems, which came to form the foundation for classical model theory, characterize first order sentences and theories that are preserved under operations such as the taking of unions or submodels (see Chang and Keisler [5] for a discussion of preservation theorems for first order logic). In current model theoretic research, logics richer than first order logic and applications of logic to other parts of mathematics have assumed the central position. In the former area, preservation theorems are not so important; in the latter, especially in applications to algebra, many of the techniques developed for proving these theorems have been useful.

In this paper I prove several preservation theorems for first order logic which I discovered while investigating the asymptotic growth of classes of finite combinatorial structures. The significance of these theorems lies in their applications to problems in finite combinatorics. Since the applications require combinatorial and analytical techniques that are not pertinent to logical questions discussed here, I shall present them in another paper [7].

We define a first-order extension LK(CP) of the cutting planes proof system CP as the first-order sequent calculus LK whose atomic formulas are CP-inequalities ∑i ai · xi ≥ b (xi's variables, ai's and b constants). We prove an interpolation theorem for LK(CP) yielding as a corollary a conditional lower bound for LK(CP)-proofs. For a subsystem R(CP) of LK(CP), essentially resolution working with clauses formed by CP-inequalities, we prove a monotone interpolation theorem obtaining thus an unconditional lower bound (depending on the maximum size of coefficients in proofs and on the maximum number of CP-inequalities in clauses). We also give an interpolation theorem for polynomial calculus working with sparse polynomials.

The proof relies on a universal interpolation theorem for semantic derivations [16, Theorem 5.1].

LK(CP) can be viewed as a two-sorted first-order theory of Z considered itself as a discretely ordered Z-module. One sort of variables are module elements, another sort are scalars. The quantification is allowed only over the former sort. We shall give a construction of a theory LK(M) for any discretely ordered module M (e.g., LK(Z) extends LK(CP)). The interpolation theorem generalizes to these theories obtained from discretely ordered Z-modules. We shall also discuss a connection to quantifier elimination for such theories.

We formulate a communication complexity problem whose (suitable) solution would allow to improve the monotone interpolation theorem and the lower bound for R(CP).

Presburger arithmetic is the first-order theory of the natural numbers with addition (but no multiplication). We characterize sets that can be defined by a Presburger formula as exactly the sets whose characteristic functions can be represented by rational generating functions; a geometric characterization of such sets is also given. In addition, if p = (p1, . . . , pn) are a subset of the free variables in a Presburger formula, we can define a counting function g(p) to be the number of solutions to the formula, for a given p. We show that every counting function obtained in this way may be represented as, equivalently, either a piecewise quasi-polynomial or a rational generating function. Finally, we translate known computational complexity results into this setting and discuss open directions.

A general strategy for proving completeness theorems for quantified modal logics is provided. Starting from free quantified modal logic K. with or without identity, extensions obtained either by adding the principle of universal instantiation or the converse of the Barcan formula or the Barcan formula are considered and proved complete in a uniform way. Completeness theorems are also shown for systems with the extended Barcan rule as well as for some quantified extensions of the modal logic B. The incompleteness of Q°.B + BF is also proved.

There have been numerous results showing that a measurable cardinal κ can carry exactly α normal measures in a model of GCH. where α is a cardinal at most κ++. Starting with just one measurable cardinal, we have [9] (for α = 1), [10] (for α = α++, the maximum possible) and [1] (for α = κ+, after collapsing κ++). In addition, under stronger large cardinal hypotheses, one can handle the remaining cases: [12] (starting with a measurable cardinal of Mitchell order α), [2] (as in [12], but where κ is the least measurable cardinal and α is less than κ, starting with a measurable of high Mitchell order) and [11] (as in [12], but where κ is the least measurable cardinal, starting with an assumption weaker than a measurable cardinal of Mitchell order 2). In this article we treat all cases by a uniform argument, starting with only one measurable cardinal and applying a cofinality-preserving forcing. The proof uses κ-Sacks forcing and the “tuning fork” technique of [8]. In addition, we explore the possibilities for the number of normal measures on a cardinal at which the GCH fails.

Questions about the constructive or effective character of particular arguments arise in several areas of classical mathematics, such as in the theory of recursive functions and in numerical analysis. Some philosophers have advocated Lewis's S4 as the proper logic in which to formalize such epistemic notions. (The fundamental work on this is Hintikka [4].) Recently there have been studies of mathematical theories formalized with S4 as the underlying logic so that these epistemic notions can be expressed. (See Shapiro [7], Myhill [5], and Goodman [2]. The motivation for this work is discussed in Goodman [3].) The present paper is a contribution to the study of the simplest of these theories, namely first-order arithmetic as formalized in S4. Following Shapiro, we call this theory epistemic arithmetic (EA). More specifically, we show that EA is a conservative extension of Hey ting's arithmetic HA (ordinary first-order intuitionistic arithmetic). The question of whether EA is conservative over HA was raised but left open in Shapiro [7].

The idea of our proof is as follows. We interpret EA in an infinitary propositional S4, pretty much as Tait, for example, interprets classical arithmetic in his infinitary classical propositional calculus in [8]. We then prove a cut-elimination theorem for this infinitary propositional S4. A suitable version of the cut-elimination theorem can be formalized in HA. For cut-free infinitary proofs, there is a reflection principle provable in HA. That is, we can prove in HA that if there is a cut-free proof of the interpretation of a sentence ϕ then ϕ is true. Combining these results shows that if the interpretation of ϕ is provable in EA, then ϕ is provable in HA.

Assuming ω supercompact cardinals we force to obtain a model where the tree property holds both at אω+1, and at אn for all 2 ≤ n < ω. A model with the former was obtained by Magidor–Shelah from a large cardinal assumption above a huge cardinal, and recently by Sinapova from ω supercompact cardinals. A model with the latter was obtained by Cummings–Foreman from ω supercompact cardinals. Our model, where the two hold simultaneously, is another step toward the goal of obtaining the tree property on increasingly large intervals of successor cardinals.

1. The purpose of this paper is to show that, if the axioms of a system G of set theory are consistent, then it is impossible to prove from them the following weak form of the axiom of choice: (H1) For every denumerable set x of disjoint two-element sets, there is a set y, called a choice set for x, which contains exactly one element in common with each element of x. Among the axioms of the system G, we take, with minor modifications, Axioms A, B, C of Gödel [6]. Clearly, the independence of H1 implies that of all stronger propositions, including the general axiom of choice and the generalized continuum hypothesis.

The proof depends upon ideas of Fraenkel and Mostowski, and proceeds in the following manner. Let a be a denumerable set of objects Δ0, Δ1, Δ2, …, the exact nature of which will be specified later. Let μj = {Δ2j, Δ2j+1} for each j, c = {μ0, μ1, μ2, …}, and b = [the sum set of a]. By transfinite induction, construct the class Vc which is the closure of b under the power-set operation. For each j, it is possible to define a 1–1 mapping of Vc onto itself with the following properties. The mapping preserves the ε-relation, or, more precisely, .

The following is part of a series of papers on theories for (iterated) admissible sets (cf. [10], [11], [12], [14], [15]). Although these theories are weak subsystems of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, they allow one to formalize and prove a fair amount of definability theory and generalized recursion theory. Using this machinery it is in general not very hard to establish the connections between theories for admissible sets and (for example) systems of second order arithmetic. A proof-theoretic analysis of theories for admissible sets therefore provides quite a uniform and powerful framework for the proof-theoretic treatment of many systems of set theory, second order arithmetic and constructive mathematics (see [12] and [15]). The strongest result in this direction so far is the pair of proof-theoretic equivalences

where T0 is Feferman's system for explicit mathematics of [5] and [6], (-CA) + (BI) is the usual system of second order arithmetic with the axiom of -comprehension and bar induction and KPi is Kripke-Platek set theory with ∈-induction

for arbitrary formulas and the additional axiom

.

The least standard model of KPi is L(i0) where i0 is the first recursively inaccessible ordinal.

In this paper we are mainly interested in the theory KPi0 which results from KPi by severely restricting the principles of induction. Basically, complete induction on the natural numbers

is allowed only for ∆0-formulas, and (IND∈) is omitted completely.

The present work was inspired by Mostowski's paper [3] in which he considers classes of sequences of real numbers, and associated sets of primitive recursive real numbers. The present treatment will differ from that of [3] in that we consider the real numbers in (0, ∞), instead of just those in (0, 1), but this will make little difference. In §1 we develop a general theory, and in §2 we show the relation of this theory to the results contained in [3], and to those of other authors.

I show that any sentence of nth-order (pure or applied) arithmetic can be expressed with no loss of compositionality as a second-order sentence containing no arithmetical vocabulary, and use this result to prove a completeness theorem for applied arithmetic. More specifically. I set forth an enriched second-order language L. a sentence of L (which is true on the intended interpretation of L), and a compositionally recursive transformation Tr defined on formulas of L, and show that they have the following two properties: (a) in a universe with at least ℶn−2 objects, any formula of nth-order (pure or applied) arithmetic can be expressed as a formula of L, and (b) for any sentence of is a second-order sentence containing no arithmetical vocabulary, and

In this work we describe a new approach to the notions of relevance and paraconsistency. Unlike the works of Anderson and Belnap or da Costa (see [2], [8] and [7]) we shall mainly be guided in it by semantical intuitions. In the first two sections we introduce and investigate the algebraic structures that reflect those intuitions. The corresponding formal systems are briefly described in the third section (a more detailed treatment of these systems, including full proofs, will be given in another paper).

Our basic intuitive idea is that of “domains of discourse” or “relevance domains”. Classical logic, so we think, is valid in as much as sentences get values inside one domain; limitations on its use can be imposed only with respect to inferences in which more than one domain is involved. There are two basic binary relations over the collection of domains. One is relevance. It is reflexive and symmetric (but not necessarily transitive). Under a given interpretation two sentences are relevant to each other when their values are in relevant domains. Another basic relation between domains, no less important, is that of grading according to “degrees of reality”. The idea behind it is not new. Gentzen, for example, divided in [9] the world of mathematics into three grades, representing three “levels of reality”. The elementary theory of numbers has the highest degree or level of reality; set theory has the smallest degree and mathematical analysis occupies the intermediate level. In the theory of types, or in the accumulative von Neumann universe for set theory, we can find indication of a richer hierarchy.

We study topological constructions in the recursion theoretic framework of the lattice of recursively enumerable open subsets of a topological space X. Various constructions produce complemented recursively enumerable open sets with additional recursion theoretic properties, as well as noncomplemented open sets. In contrast to techniques in classical topology, we construct a disjoint recursively enumerable collection of basic open sets which cannot be extended to a recursively enumerable disjoint collection of basic open sets whose union is dense in X.

It is shown that there are exactly six normal DeMorgan monoids generated by the idntity element alone. The free DeMorgan monoid with no generators but the identity is characterised and shown to have exactly three thousand and eighty-eight elements. This result solves the “Ackermann constant problem” of describing the structure of sentential constants in the logic R.

In this paper we show that in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZF) sets of reals are determinate.

Before proceeding to the proof it will be helpful to consider some previous work in this area. The first major result was obtained by Gale and Stewart [3] who showed that in ZF open games are determinate. This was then successively improved by Wolfe [4] to (and so of course ) and then by Morton Davis [1] to . The results of Morton Davis further showed that countable unions of sufficiently ‘simple’ determinate sets are also determinate. At this time, however, sets did not appear sufficiently simple for this method to be applied in order to get determinacy.

The next major advance was made by D. A. Martin who showed, using indiscernibles, that with large cardinal assumptions games are equivalent to certain open games (i.e., player I (II) has a winning strategy for the game iff I (II) has a winning strategy for the open game). Thus, by the Gale–Stewart result, games are determinate. Martin's result also showed that under these large cardinal assumptions sets are sufficiently simple for the Morton Davis method to be applied to them.

Every system of signs that is defined in logical syntax may be called a formal language. It need not always be a language in the ordinary sense of the word. The rules of chess, e.g., can be expressed in the terminology of the syntax, but it would not occur to anybody to call chess a language.

A language in the ordinary sense has a meaning. That is to say that certain words in it are names of things or states or properties or relationships. In general it can be said that in any language having meaning all words subject to the rule of types are names. (Even sentences might be called names, i.e. names of facts, but we will not go so far.)

A syntax of a language L is a language with meaning, for the words of a definite type (in this paper of the type of individuals) contained in it are names of expressions of L.

If to a language we add its syntax, we get a language containing the syntax of one of its parts. If we formulate the syntax of a language L, in so far as its means allow, in the language L itself, we get a language containing a part of its syntax. We call such languages autosyntactic. It is well known that languages containing the whole of their own syntax do not exist.