This article evaluates Derek Bickerton's 2009 theory of language evolution. Bickerton argues that language was the result of a need to recruit individuals to help in the scavenging of carcasses of megafauna. The signals used for recruitment at the earliest stage of language evolution were iconic and could be used to refer to objects outside the sensory range of the receiver(s). Bickerton's scenario is an example of what is described in game theory as a stag hunt. We can, by recasting Bickerton's scenario as a stag hunt, identify criteria that any account of the transition to language must satisfy. There are several hurdles we would need to jump over to demonstrate that Bickerton's model is valid. First, not much is known about early hominin scavenging. While the available evidence is compatible with Bickerton's scenario, it is compatible with other scenarios as well. Second, Bickerton argues that, at the initial stage of language evolution, signals were grounded in salient aspects of the environment. The empirical support for natural salience as a determinant of the communication systems used at the earliest stages of language evolution is mixed at best; communication systems can arise spontaneously in the absence of natural salience. Third, maintaining communication systems is nontrivial because of the incentive to deceive.

The Oxford Handbook of Compounding surveys a variety of theoretical and descriptive issues, presenting overviews of compounding in a number of frameworks and sketches of compounding in a number of languages. Much of the book deals with Germanic noun–noun compounding. I take up some of the theoretical questions raised surrounding such constructions, in particular, the notion of attributive modification in noun-headed compounds. I focus on two issues. The first is the semantic relation between the head noun and its nominal modifier. Several authors repeat the argument that there is a small(-ish) fixed number of general semantic relations in noun–noun compounds (‘Lees's solution’), but I argue that the correct way to look at such compounds is what I call ‘Downing's solution’, in which we assume that the relation is specified pragmatically, and hence could be any relation at all. The second issue is the way that adjectives modify nouns inside compounds. Although there are languages in which compounded adjectives modify just as they do in phrases (Chukchee, Arleplog Swedish), in general the adjective has a classifier role and not that of a compositional attributive modifier. Thus, even if an English (or German) adjective–noun compound looks compositional, it isn't.