During the 1960s and early 1970s, the collapse of civilian democracies in several of Latin America's most socioeconomically developed nations and the rise of highly institutionalized, repressive regimes raised serious questions about the nature of political development and political decay in that region. Neither advanced social indicators (Argentina, Chile, Uruguay), nor an extensive, modern-industrial economic sector (Argentina, Brazil), nor a sustained period of representative government (Chile, Uruguay) seemed to be guarantees of continued civilian-democratic rule. Indeed, scholars such as Guillermo O'Donnell have suggested that the nature of economic growth and industrialization in Latin America—most notably in the “Southern Cone”— had resulted in increased class conflict, intense political strains, and the rise of bureaucratic-authoritarian (B-A) regimes.

In recent years Latin America has become the principal source of narcotic drugs on the illicit United States market. Five of the nine countries granted top-priority status in State Department narcopolitics are located in Latin America. Mexico, having earlier supplied 80% of the heroin used by American addicts, is currently the source of approximately 40% of the drug. Coca grown primarily in Bolivia and Peru, shipped through Ecuador, and processed into cocaine in Colombia monopolizes the world market. In the wake of Mexico's highly successful herbicide campaign, Colombian marijuana has come to dominate the American pot scene. And again in response to U.S. demand, Colombia has become the world's foremost manufacturer of illicit methaqualone.

Peru, in the period 1976-1979, along with half a dozen or so other countries occupied the center stage in the discussion of developing countries, which fact serious difficulties in meeting their external debt service and which face equally if not more serious problems of internal adjustment—especially little if any economic growth—as they try to raise themselves out of their financial crises. The countries which might be on such a problem list1 each have their own specific problems. All of them, in one way or another, have had a major fiscal problem which has absorbed the bulk of domestic credit into the public sector and created strong pressures to borrow abroad. Of course, the individual causes of the public sector problem vary. In several countries, especially those which export copper, adverse export prices since 1974 have contributed significantly to development problems. The "list" of countries will no doubt change and quite probably expand in the next year or two, especially if there is an almost inevitable recession in the United States.

In spite of the reestablishment of civilian democracy in Ecuador and Peru, military government continues to be the norm in Latin America. In recent years, many scholars have examined the rise of military regimes in the region in order to gain a better understanding of the dynamics of civil-military relations. Few analysts, however, have studied civil-military relations in the handful of nations where civilian government has persisted. The purpose of this analysis is, therefore, to contribute to a broader understanding of Latin American military behavior by attempting to explain the Colombian armed forces’ atypical obedience to civilian authority.

In Nicaragua in July 1979, the Sandinista popular revolutionary movement finally succeeded in overthrowing the dictatorship of the Somoza family, which had been placed in power and then supported for many years by the U.S. government. Analysis of the revolution, even in conservative U.S. government sources (LeoGrande, 1979; Montgomery, 1980), has noted the greed and corruption of the Somoza dynasty and the poverty, illiteracy, and poor health of Nicaragua's masses. More liberal sources (Koeppel and Harvey, 1980; Burbach and Draimin, 1980) comment favorably on the democratic and social justice orientation of the new revolutionary government. Coverage of the revolution, however, has barely mentioned the east coast, an isolated, ethnically complex, and fascinating part of the country.

The Antarctic Treaty was signed by twelve countries in 1959. This group, together with those countries having territorial claims prior to signing the treaty—Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom—would try with great difficulty to reconcile the opposing interests of (1) countries that for decades had been actively defending their claims of sovereignty over sectors of Antarctica; (2) superpowers that, while not asserting any claims of their own—although certainly reserving the right to do so in the future—did not accept those of other countries; and (3) a number of countries that had been invited to participate in the treaty because they had been active in Antarctica during the International Geophysical Year.

Analyses of military roles in Latin America during the two decades following World War II often assumed the military were both isolated or apart from politics, and hence amenable to civilian control. The resurgence of militarism since the early Sixties has been reflected in scholarly works reassessing these assumptions. Whereas the pioneers in this field, such as Lieuwen (1964) and Needier (1969), are clearly civilianist—reflecting a democratic and distinctly liberal bias in their values—students of Latin American militarism in the late Sixties and Seventies have increasingly, if tacitly, assumed the unviability of civilian hegemony and tended to downplay the democratic normative issue. Terms such as militarism, democracy, and civilian supremacy have been virtually eclipsed from analyses of military intervention (Johnson, 1964; Einaudi, 1969; Ropp, 1970; Stepan, 1971; Rankin, 1974; Needier, 1975; Fitch, 1979).

The pattern of Latin American regional cooperation has changed greatly during the past five years. New organizations, such as SELA (Latin American Economic System) and OLADE (Latin American Energy Organization), have been formed, while other groups, such as CACM (Central American Common Market), have become moribund. These changes in regional organizations are primarily the result of changes occurring in the developmental orientations and governmental capabilities of the member governments. In this study, two quite different organizations, the Andean Pact and the Amazon Pact, are examined to shed light on the dynamics of contemporary Latin American international relations and to explore new theoretical approaches in the study of regional cooperation schemes.

Economic development—defined by growth of GNP per capita—among the poor countries of the world during the last 25 years has been higher than in almost any other period in mankind's history. Although this growth might have not been as high as that expected by some policy makers, the 1950-1975 period shows an overall improvement over the recent past. In spite of this apparent surge in growth, many policy makers and social scientists have shown disappointment and dismay at some characteristics of the recent increases in GNP (Morawetz, 1977).

The concepts of “political assassination” and “terrorism” are fraught with definitional problems. For purposes of this study, the former will be defined simply as “murder for political motives.” It is one of a series of acts that collectively are intended to produce a psychological state of fear and uncertainty within the general population, i.e., “terrorism,” in an effort to direct political activity through intimidation.

Assassination is usually thought of as a terroristic act associated with opposition political groups. This article examines its use as a mechanism of control by government and private groups who perceive a threat to their privileged position in society.

Intellectuals have always played a role in the political development of their societies. Their role, however, has fluctuated with changes in time and place, and in the 20th century the intellectual's function in society seems ambiguous both to the intellectual himself and to those who have studied him. In spite of this ambiguity, there is a consensus in recent literature that the ability of intellectuals to influence elite groups and the government itself is on the increase (Ladd and Lipset, 1976: 309). The reasons for this increased influence are several, and although there is recognition of the expanding importance of men of knowledge, there are few serious examinations of this group and its role (Marsal and Arent, 1970: 466; Marsal, 1966: 36; Friedmann, 1960: 540-541).

The British experience with federations is not a happy one. Attempts to combine its smaller and poorer colonies into some form of larger political and economic union as part of its decolonization process are generally reckoned to have failed. Almost without exception, the individual colonies decided to go it alone, to seek independence on their own, that is.

The former West Indian colonies are a case in point. Notwithstanding several attempts to bring them closer together, they have shown a remarkable tenacity to retain their individual existence and identity. The 1958 Federation, the most ambitious attempt to weld them into a nation, ended in failure after only three years and much internal wrangling. The larger islands of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago went on to become independent on their own. A further attempt to amalgamate the remaining units, the so-called "Little Eight" into a Federation of the Eastern Caribbean also failed, after which Barbados sought independence on its own.

In 1880, the famous Chilean politician and historian, Benjamin Vicuña Mackenna, wrote:

The early relations of Latin America and Japan, representing a distinct chapter in the discovery of East Asia by the West, are attributable to the initial thrust of West European expansion beginning in the late fifteenth century, led by Portugal and Spain. Magellan claimed the Philippines for Spain in 1521, and following the conquest of Mexico, and later Peru, Spain sought to establish a trans-Pacific route for communication and commerce. The conquest of the Philippines, carried on from 1565 to 1571 under the leadership of Miguel López de Legaspi, foreshadowed the beginning of the Manila-Acapulco trade, which was subsequently carried on until 1815. In 1606 there were 3,000 Japanese colonists in Manila, and 15,000 in Dilao, which included Manila. Some Japanese, as well as Chinese, served as crew members on the Spanish galleons, and it is probable that these Japanese were the first in recorded history to reach the Americas (Ishii, 1937: 88; Bradley, 1942: 11; Meskill et al., 1971: 74-86; Schurz, 1939: 99-128).

A growing realization on the part of scholars and the general public has been the increasing interdependence of the world. Technology and communications have narrowed distance and time between diverse cultures, resulting in increased contact, if not increased cultural harmony.

The immigration of millions of persons to new homes has heightened this interdependence. In the Western Hemisphere not only the United States but also Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile received substantial numbers of immigrants.

Brazil, alone, was the recipient of more than 5 million immigrants. The majority of the immigrants, apart from those of the Iberian Peninsula, came from Germany, Italy, and Japan. Chronologically, the Germans arrived first, the Italians second, and the Japanese third. Numerically, Italy has contributed 1.5 million, Germany 300,000, and Japan 170,000 to date.