This study examines the relative importance of local institutions and external finance on small business investment. Utilising the institutional theory, we argue that local institutions and external finance have heterogeneous effects on firm investment. More importantly, they may interact and moderate each other. Analysing a set of 1.3 million observations of small businesses operating in Vietnam (2006–2016) obtained from the Annual Enterprise Survey data from the Vietnam Statistics Office, we find that local institutional settings and external finance are important determinants of firm investment. Moreover, local institutions are able to moderate the effects of external finance on firm investment. As such, this study asserts that conventional models cannot discern whether institutions or external finance are more important to firm investment. Rather, the relative importance of institutions and external finance should be investigated from the perspective of their interaction.

The paper aims at complementing Searle's social ontology with an epistemology capable of illustrating institution formation. To this purpose, I discuss Searle's conception of constitutive rules and show that it requires the specifications of normative powers and purposes identifying status functions to be taken as given. However, such specifications arise from underlying normative commitments that may be various and possibly conflicting. Hence, in order to account for the formation of institutions, it is necessary to understand how status function declarations may emerge from alternative normative commitments. I make the hypothesis of “interactive intentionality,” as an interactive and deliberative mode of practical reasoning, to describe the processes of convergence on definite constitutive rules. These processes show how interactive intentionality may frame both commitment and enforcement, thus providing some insights to make rule-based and equilibrium-based accounts of institutions epistemologically commensurable.

The informal institutional structure embraces the social norms and moral values of a particular society and together with the formal institutional frame, they compose the social environment. Social norms and values, congealed into customary rules of behaviour, provide a stable and enduring context to economic life that acts positively or negatively on economic activity. Despite their methodological and theoretical differences, Mill and Marshall have both suggested that individual economic decisions are fully embedded in their social environment. Thus, in order to explain the economic phenomena, from simple transaction processes to long term development, they adopted a broader perspective by including the social frame inside which economic choices are made, divulging the role of custom, yet in a quite distinctive way.

The last two chapters of Frank H. Knight's Risk, Uncertainty and Profit are seldom cited and frequently ignored. But in those chapters, Knight moves from entrepreneurial judgment and organizational strategies to meet the dilemmas uncertainty presents in a firm to the wider question of how uncertainty affects the social organization of economic activity. Ignoring the concluding chapters of Knight's book means we miss an important part of his early career thoughts on the tradeoffs between free enterprise and the social organization of economic activity. The purpose of the paper is to lay out the perspective on social economic organization that he took in the final two chapters of his first major work against the context of his other contemporary writings.

The literature lacks consensus on the role of currency regimes in explaining external competitiveness. Countries not only differ in terms of currency regimes, but can also have different institutional arrangements, namely trade agreements and inflation targeting (IT) frameworks in addition to the overall quality of governance. Hence, using the real effective exchange rate and by covering 35 developing countries over the period 1975–2014, we investigate the role of currency regimes in explaining the degree of misalignment while considering institutional factors. First, we find that intermediate regimes limit the currency misalignment with greater financial openness (FO). Second, non-reciprocal preferential trade agreements improve price competitiveness, whereas free trade and reciprocal ones can only be beneficial with a higher degree of FO. Third, misalignments in fixed regimes decline in the presence of stronger institutions or in countries with an IT type of monetary policy framework. The above results remain robust to alternative specifications.

The background conditions for the emergence of the rule of law are important but underdeveloped. This paper discusses current theories of the origin of the rule of law, arguing that they are useful but incomplete. In addition to those theories, the Jewish and Christian concept of all human beings as God's image bearers is an important contributor to the rule of law in Western civilization. The formulation of universal human equality is not, however, a sufficient condition for the emergence of the rule of law. The concept has taken centuries of articulation in different institutions and social settings. It only reached full fruition when it was joined with an understanding of appropriate legal and political systems as expressed by political theorists such as Locke, Montesquieu, and Madison.

This paper explores the interaction of informal constraints on human behaviour by examining the evolution of English football jerseys. The jersey provides an excellent setting to demonstrate how informal constraints emerge from formal rules and shape human behaviour. Customs, approved norms and habits are all observed in this setting. The commercialisation of football in recent decades has resulted in these informal constraints, in many cases dating back over a century, co-existing with branding, goodwill and identity effects. Combined, these motivate clubs to maintain the status quo. As a result, club colours have remained remarkably resilient within a frequently changing landscape.

Institutions matter for postdisaster recovery. Conversely, natural disasters can also alter a society's institutions. Using the synthetic control method, this study examines the effects that Hurricane Katrina (2005) had on the formal and informal institutions in Louisiana. As measures of formal institutions, we employ two economic freedom scores corresponding to government employment (GE) (as a share of total employment at the state-level) and property tax (PT). These measures serve as proxies for the level of governmental interference into the economy and the protection of private property rights respectively. To assess the impact on informal institutions, we use state-level social capital data. We find that Hurricane Katrina had lasting impacts on Louisiana's formal institutions. In the post-Katrina period, we find that actual Louisiana had persistently higher economic freedom scores for both GE and PT than the synthetic Louisiana that did not experience the hurricane. These findings imply that the hurricane led to a reduction in both PTs and GE, which indicates a decrease in the relative size of the public sector as a share of the state's economy. On the other hand, we find no impact on our chosen measure of informal institution.

This paper highlights scholarly neglect of political legitimacy, the idea of a state's use of power in ways acceptable to its citizens. We argue that political legitimacy affects a state's ability to formulate and implement its policies, thus affecting governance. Our paper provides the first empirical evidence of the positive relationship between political legitimacy and governance. We combine novel cross-sectional data on political legitimacy and several governance indicators from 66 countries. Our results show that a one-standard-deviation increase in the legitimacy score increases the rule of law indicator by about one-third standard deviation. These results are robust across OLS, an instrumental variable method, and several other governance indicators. Moreover, our results reveal that in the presence of greater trust, political legitimacy has an enhanced impact on governance.

We explore how macro and micro networks influence the diffusion of technological innovation and cultural/social behavior. Across the historical regimes in China and Europe, dynastic lordship's macro networks afforded different advantages in technological innovation. A network particular to Europe, the Roman Church, extended deep into local parishes with ethical norms prescribing fairness to strangers, and these cultural foundations helped guilds, trade associations, merchant courts, and universities operate cooperatively far beyond kinship. In contrast, Chinese emperors relied on ancient Confucian moral codes and system-spanning Confucian-educated officialdom; but fiscal limitations compelled officials to defer to local lineage orders, resulting in an enduring cultural pattern of guanxi and a polity whose institutional problem-solving capacity falter beyond the local level. Yet the civil service system has enabled China to outperform similar lineage-dependent regimes. Probing network topologies, we find that system-spanning networks can facilitate technological diffusion, but local networks influence cultural and behavioral change.

Extracts from an important article by the American psychologist, philosopher and social scientist Donald T. Campbell are reproduced here, with an introduction underlining the importance of his argument for today. Campbell identified disciplinary boundaries as enablers of specialization but often barriers to scientific innovation and shared knowledge. But instead of unbounded interdisciplinarity, Campbell argued for focused specialisms that cross disciplinary boundaries. This argument is particularly relevant for the development of institutional research in the future.

The paper examines doctrinal and political reasons to explain why the Ancient Greek religion did not feature a distinct class of professional priests as suppliers of religious goods. Doctrinal reasons relate to worshiping a multitude of powerful anthropomorphic gods with flawed characters; absence of a founder of religion and of a scripture; lack of religious doctrine and of a code of moral behaviour and piety manifested as mass participation in rituals. These factors denied religious suppliers the opportunity to form a monopoly acting as an autonomous intermediary between humans and gods. Political reasons relate to the supremacy of the demos which watchfully guarded its decision-making powers and prevented other actors like a priestly interest group to challenge its authority.

Critiques of the meritocracy have centered on its narrow definition and biased assessment of merit, its stigmatization of the unsuccessful, and excessive competition. This paper identifies a different mechanism that could have pernicious social and political consequences. Economic mobility sorts people based on certain ‘productive’ traits, separating them into classes, and thus alters social externalities. This sorting–separation–externalities mechanism can produce between-class polarization in social outcomes (e.g. alcoholism and drug abuse) and worsen aggregate outcomes over all classes, consistent with rising ‘deaths of despair’ in the United States (Case and Deaton, 2020, Deaths of Despair and the Future of Capitalism. Princeton University Press). When traits are endogenous, transition out of a caste-based society produces an initial burst of economic mobility which dissipates over time. Thus, a dynamic meritocratic society devolves into a static class-based society. I set out an alternative model called the ‘experimental society’, which is less susceptible to these problems.

The ancient Greek city-states were slave societies, but the institutions of slavery differed across them. The slaves of democratic Athens were foreigners bought as chattels labouring in agriculture, craftsmanship, banking, mining, and domestic services and were often given some limited freedoms and extra pay. On the contrary, the helots, the slaves of oligarchic Sparta, were indigenous of the lands they cultivated for their masters and were treated harshly. The study offers an economic explanation of the different slavery systems. Modelling the slaveholder as a profit maximiser, it attributes the different systems to differences in the probabilities of the slaves running away or revolting, the dependence of output on effort-intensive or care-intensive production technology, which depends on the fertility of the soil and affects whether the slave is treated kindly instead of harshly, and the cost of guarding slaves under different regimes.

Ronald Coase detested ‘blackboard economics’ and as a result was often criticized for being ‘against theory’. Coase has also been criticized for being overly descriptive in his institutional analysis. Here, I claim that Coase was both theoretical and interested in hypothesis testing. In order to do Coasean analysis, however, it is necessary to analyse a subject matter at the deep transaction level, given the definition of transaction costs. The rich level of detail required may give the impression of an absence of theory or testing. Here, I provide a number of real farm examples and contrast them with blackboard farm economics to make this point.

Daron Acemoglu, James Robinson and others are explaining divergent economic histories with qualitative measures of institutional quality – including Acemoglu and Robinson's popular inclusive/extractive dichotomy. While quantitative studies have sort to confirm these links using econometric proxies, few empirical accounts have shown how these proxies, or indeed the institutions they seek to represent actually influenced economic growth. This study helps fill that gap by testing whether evidence in Zambia's post-colonial history supports a proposed econometric link between its institutional quality and its slow economic growth. Support for this link is found in foreign investors’ interpretation of declining institutional constraint on Zambia's President as the potential for increased policy volatility, and as such an economic inducement to delay critical investment to Zambia's capital constrained economy. These findings add weight to the institutional argument in general, as well as present one concrete example in history of a mechanism through which institutional quality affected economic growth.

This paper highlights a link between measures for precolonial institutions and ethnic fractionalisation in postcolonial countries. A conceptual explanation is provided for why countries that were more politically centralised in precolonial times should be less ethnically fractionalised in current times. This result is confirmed for a sample of postcolonial countries in Africa, Asia and the Pacific. This is followed by a comparative case study in the South Pacific countries of Papua New Guinea, Tonga and Samoa. It is hoped that these results will lead to further empirical work focused at delving deeper into the link between these two measures to better understand what they are actually measuring, and why both are so closely related to economic development.

This is a response to the criticism by Rod O'Donnell of the account of Keynes’ notion of a general theory in the book How Economics Forgot History (Hodgson, 2001). Several points of full agreement are noted, including the fact that Keynes’ work contains much discussion of historically specific institutions, including the financial and market institutions of modern capitalism. But it is argued here that even copious discussion of historically specific institutions is insufficient to indicate an adequate understanding or conceptual appreciation of historical periodisation or evolution, as developed in various ways by Karl Marx, the German historical school and the original American institutionalists. Keynes’ General Theory is best understood as a theory of modern capitalism. But Keynes did not have sufficient acquaintance with these historically oriented schools of thought to even define the concept of capitalism, or to make that specific historical association clear.

Williamson's legacy will be permanently, and deservedly, linked with the theory of the firm. As important, however, is his contribution to our understanding of contracting. My aim here is to describe Williamson's conception of contracting, how it differs from other approaches to contracting, and some implications of that approach for contract design and enforcement. I argue that Williamson's ‘process orientation’ – in which the main dimension along which contracts vary is the extent to which contract adjustments are effected through court ordering versus private ordering – provides alternative interpretations of some conventional contract terms but also sheds light on some otherwise puzzling contractual phenomena.

Scholars argue that the New Institutional Economics (NIE) has not yet provided causal explanations on how long institutions persist or why and how they suffer dramatic changes. Others state that evidence is still inconclusive to define a theoretical justification on how changes and development occur. This article focuses on the institutions of the electricity sector in Brazil, aiming to heighten the body of empirical research in NIE and produce satisfactory explanations that motivate theory refinement. Based on a qualitative approach, we find that the drivers of the first institutional change in Brazil's electricity sector were related to market protection and domestic industrial support. For the second institutional change, economic recession (country at state of bankruptcy, debt crisis, and high inflation rates) and reliability of utility services were the driving factors. We hope this study systematizes historical facts and helps create grounds for our understanding of institutional evolution and economic growth.