The need of further research on the interlink between culture and institutions has been strongly advocated by economists and institutionalists alike. However, bringing together culture and institutions within an organic framework, though, is a non-trivial operation. This is due to the complexity of the synergies between cultural aspects and institutional devices. This special issue attempts to start filling this gap and to build an ad-hoc systemic platform for disseminating such a debate. To this purpose, it brings together an organic collection of contributions in well-established conceptualisations of both culture and institutions, supported by robust and consistent methodological applications. The essays presented in this work provide consistent evidence and conceptual perspectives supporting the idea that the synergies between cultural and institutional aspects are of paramount importance to understand human behaviour, individuals' choices and societies' patterns. They also improve the theoretical, empirical and methodological understanding of the role of institutions and culture in different geopolitical and socio-economic realms. By doing so, these contributions place this special issue as prelude to further research on the co-evolution of culture and institutions and on its possible implications on different societal aspects, human development and well-being.

Economic reforms and political changes often take place simultaneously. The outcomes of reforms in transitional countries depend on the sequence of these changes. Kornai developed his transition framework based on Central and Eastern Europe, and extended it to Asian nations. This article builds on Kornai's model and the institutional dialogue of economic development to construct and apply a model of transformation for Latin America. The aim is to better explain the relationship between institutional transformation and developmental outcomes over time. Our analysis utilises historical information and the views of current political leaders in Argentina. The analysis performed reflects on institutional performance, and evaluates the applicability of the proposed Latin American transition framework in practice. Based on the empirical evidence presented, we argue that economic transition is a path-dependent phenomenon, and that our model explaining the interaction of economic and political changes provides an explanation for the performance of institutional transformation in Argentina.

We argue that the effectiveness of Rwandan governments, both at implementing the 1994 genocide and inducing the current growth miracle, illustrates that the state has high capacity. Yet this capacity is not captured by conventional Weberian concepts, with their focus on taxation and formal bureaucracy. Rather, the capacity of Rwanda's state relies on its ability to leverage dense social networks which connect it to society. The origins of these networks lie in the construction of the historical state which expanded by merging with local lineages and kinship groups. Using data on the historical expansion of the Rwandan state as a proxy for the strength of state–society social networks we show they are uncorrelated with measures of Weberian state capacity. In a fieldwork exercise, we show that rule compliance today is positively correlated with our proxy, but uncorrelated with Weberian state capacity.

This paper introduces the concept of institutional resilience based on a population game. Agents in an economy are randomly matched to play a coordination game with two strategies, cooperate and defect. A breach of contract can be adjudicated in court. Agents can update their strategy, which is modelled using the replicator dynamic. In this context, cooperation is defined as the informal institution, whereas the legal system (contract law) constitutes the formal institution. Institutional resilience is defined by how the formal institution of a functioning legal system complements the informal institution of cooperation in a dynamic way. In the wake of an adverse exogenous shock, the formal institution can prevent a total breakdown of cooperation in the population.

Does democracy cause gender equality? To address this question, I use the unexpected Second Vatican Council (1962–65) as part of a shock-based identification strategy. The Second Vatican Council brought forward in time transitions to democracy that would have happened anyway and triggered transitions to democracy that would not otherwise have occurred. I use this plausibly exogenous variation in democracy to offer a causal estimate. According to my baseline specification, one standard deviation increase in democracy leads to three-fifths of a standard deviation increase in gender equality. I also peruse qualitative evidence to sketch a causal mechanism.

The ambiguous phenomenon of corruption has long been the cause of great theoretical debate in economics. By using Structural Equation Modelling, with the two types of corruption as a latent variable, this paper employs causal and indicative variables to the Latin American region to test for rent seeking and systemic corruption during 1980–2018. The findings provide evidence for two types of corruption, one generated by greed, and the other a solution to market failures. Such results support the view that corruption encompasses a complex set of social behaviours that may require a stronger definitional approach.

Although there is now a thriving subdiscipline of economics and law, so far economists working on the theory of the firm have paid relatively little attention to earlier legal doctrines. One neglected juridical school of thought is the ‘real entity’ theory developed by William Jethro Brown (1868–1930) and others. Some writers have recently suggested that this has implications for our understanding of the nature of the firm.

This paper proposes a new conceptualization of business model (BM) that rigorously exploits the important insights this notion offers and links them to related views developed in economics and business studies. We develop the foundations of a BM concept consistent with the principles of generalized Darwinism (GD) and with contributions already developed within this framework. Thus, we demonstrate the relevance of GD as a unifying framework for developing the evolutionary theory of firm and industry. We suggest analysing BM as a generative replicator hosted by the firm, which structures interactions between the members of this organization and the social entities of its industrial environment. We argue that GD allows us to clarify the nature and boundaries of the BM concept and to specify its relationships to other key evolutionary concepts, such as organizational routines.

To what extent do imposed institutions shape preferences? We consider this issue by comparing the market-versus-state attitudes of respondents from a capitalist country, Finland, and from an ex-communist group of Baltic countries, and by arguing that the period of communist rule can be viewed as an ‘experiment’ in institutional imposition. We find that, consistent with some earlier related work, citizens from ex-communist countries tend to be more supportive of state ownership than respondents from capitalist economies. However, they also favour increasing inequality and competition as the means to enhance incentives. We conclude that, in some important relevant dimensions, institutional imposition (which lasted for about 50 years) had a limited effect on preferences.

The rise of large business corporations in the late 19th century compelled many American observers to admit that the nature of the corporation had yet to be understood. Published in this context, Ernst Freund's little-known The Legal Nature of Corporations (1897) was an original attempt to come to terms with a new legal and economic reality. But it can also be described, to paraphrase Oliver Wendell Holmes, as the earliest example of the rational study of corporate law. The paper shows that Freund had the intuitions of an institutional economist, and engaged in what today would be called comparative institutional analysis. Remarkably, his argument that the corporate form secures property against insider defection and against outsiders anticipated recent work on entity shielding and capital lock-in, and can be read as an early contribution to what today would be called the theory of the firm.

This relatively unknown and seldom cited text by the great American institutional economist John R. Commons if of interest not merely because of the issues mentioned in its title. It also illuminates Commons's analysis of custom, law, and the state. This introduction gives some biographical details and discusses some of the important features of this essay.

Ha-Joon Chang, in his article ‘Institutions and Economic Development: Theory, Policy, and History’, provides a description and critique of the mainstream view of institutions and development. It applies well to Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s. However, the effort to introduce these Anglo-American institutional structures (Global Standard Institutions; GSIs) in the 1980s and 1990s resulted in uneven and unstable economic performance, not development. As a result, the relationship among institutions, development and economic policy in Latin America today has generally moved far beyond this ‘mainstream’. The institutions to insure macro stability have generally been preserved, and some countries do follow GSI prescriptions. However in most countries, especially in South America, the effort to find the right mix of institutions for development has moved far beyond this mainstream. The result has been innovative initiatives to address more fundamental development issues such as inequality, property rights and international economic institutions. This process is likely to continue, facilitated by the currently robust democratic political systems that grew out of the earlier turmoil.

The use of height data to measure living standards is now a well-established method in economics, and a number of core findings in the literature are widely agreed upon. There are still some populations, places, and times, however, for which anthropometric evidence remains thin. This paper introduces a new dataset from the Tennessee State Prison to track the heights of comparable black and white males born between 1820 and 1906. Shorter statures were associated with close proximity to the Mississippi River, and the largest share of the white–black stature gap was associated with nativity. Black and white statures declined throughout the 19th century, and farmers were taller than non-farmers.

This paper investigates the views on competition theory and policy of the American institutional economists during the first half of the 20th century. These perspectives contrasted with those of contemporary neoclassical and later mainstream economic approaches. We identify three distinct dimensions to an institutionalist perspective on competition. First, institutionalist approaches focused on describing industry details, so as to bring theory into closer contact with reality. Second, institutionalists emphasized that while competition was sometimes beneficial, it could also be disruptive. Third, institutionalists had a broad view of the objectives of competition policy that extended beyond effects on consumer welfare. Consequently, institutionalists advocated for a wide range of policies to enhance competition, including industrial self-regulation, broad stakeholder representation within corporations, and direct governmental regulations. Their experimental attitude implied that policy would always be evolving, and antitrust enforcement might be only one stage in the development toward a regime of industrial regulation.

Oliver Williamson's contributions to the theory of the firm were of course seminal. Yet, they were not originally formulated to address the central question in strategic management: Why do some firms persistently outperform others in financial terms? We suggest that when Williamson did address this question, his efforts were not compelling. We also suggest, however, that with suitable adjustments, the key mechanisms in Williamson's theory can indeed usefully address this question.

In his rich contribution, Arruñada (2017) debates what institutions are needed to enforce complex ‘sequential’ transactions embedded in interdependent private contracts, and more specifically discusses the conditions of their efficiency when it comes to transferring property. Beyond acknowledging the importance of this issue and the very stimulating and often counterintuitive ideas developed in the paper, this short note challenges some of the positions adopted by Arruñada, particularly regarding the relevance of ‘The problem of social cost’ (Coase, 1960) for dealing with this issue. It also raises questions about the institutional, hybrid arrangement advocated as the solution for dealing with sequential transactions.

After Thorstein Veblen, Wesley Mitchell, and John R. Commons, Walton H. Hamilton (1881–1958) was one of the leading figures in American institutional economics in the interwar period (Rutherford, 2000, 2001, 2003). Indeed, Hamilton (1916: 863 n.) originally coined the very term ‘institutional economics’. He announced its existence and defined its essential outlook at the annual meeting of the American Economic Association in December 1918 (Hamilton, 1919). Institutional economics then emerged in America as a broad movement, attracting support from a large number of leading economists. Significantly, ‘Hamilton should be credited with having played the role of chief promoter’ (Dorfman, 1974: 28).

Policy lessons are often drawn from the emergence in Europe of ‘inclusive’ institutions, which are held to have displaced ‘extractive’ institutions and fostered economic growth. This article analyzes the concept of inclusiveness using evidence on a historical institution that has been widely viewed as inclusive – the guild. It finds that we must differentiate between three types of inclusiveness: community, corporative, and societal. Community inclusiveness refers to the share of individuals involved in an institution's operations, corporative inclusiveness the share of political representation enjoyed by the institution itself, and societal inclusiveness the extent to which the institution enables full economic and political participation by everyone in society. We must also distinguish between general inclusiveness, which takes into account general-equilibrium effects, and partial inclusiveness, which assumes away such effects. Inclusiveness and extractiveness are not opposites in theory, and guilds show why certain types of inclusive institution are likely to behave in extractive ways. Finally, guilds alert us to trade-offs between inclusive economic institutions, inclusive political institutions, and inclusive growth. History does not imply abandoning the concept of inclusiveness, but rather thinking about it carefully.

Recent writings by Richard Posner in this Journal and elsewhere appear to mark a departure from the Chicago price theory tradition with which Posner long has been associated. This paper picks up on one facet of this: the similarity of Posner's views of the corporation, and of executive compensation in particular, to the perspective laid out by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means in The Modern Corporation and Private Property – a perspective that has for decades been harshly rejected by the Chicago school.