Developments in industrial organization contributed to the lack of diversification in Britain's older industrial areas during the interwar period. The large-scale firm had not yet developed in appropriate industries to the point where large numbers of branch plants could be sent to the depressed areas (as they were after World War II), even if interwar macroeconomic policy had been more expansionary. At the industry level, barriers to new entrants and restrictive practices were high in the 1930s, precisely the period when the need for structural change in the depressed areas was most apparent.

Toward the end of the eighteenth century Spanish America had about 400,000 slaves, which made 3 percent of the population. Before this time the importance of slavery had been greater, having received a large stimulus because of the sharp demographic decline of the natives following the Conquest. The arrival of Africans meant that in 1650 the proportion of slaves to total population was from 5 to 10 percent.

The relation of theoretical economics to empirical historical analysis has been one of the central problems of economic historians ever since the recognition of economic history as a separate discipline. Recent studies in logic and philosophy, by constructing new frames of meaning for both theory and history, have opened up several avenues for a fresh approach to this and other problems of importance to the historian and the economist.

Although New England's unit banking system was declining in profitability during the late nineteenth century, the existing competitive environment prevented large institutions from outperforming their smaller rivals. As a result, there was little change in the structure of the banking system during this period. At the turn of the century, however, a wave of mergers radically transformed the banking sectors of Boston and Providence. Although the greater profitability of the mergers indicates they were a better fit to the economic environment than their smaller predecessors, their creation was only made possible by a special combination of historical circumstances.

The mainsprings of the entrepreneur's activity are his expectations of profit. Being aspirations, these are rarely expressed, but they are founded on objective facts—upon the experience of profits actually earned. Until the days of the limited company or corporation, actual profits were close secrets. Few records survive of the profits of individual enterprises before the nineteenth century, and little is known of general levels of profits and profit expectations. This paper attempts to throw some light on the subject by an exploration of some financial records of the English shipping industry in the decades around 1700. The records are of special interest because the assets of this industry were expensive and long-lived units; it was natural to relate earnings to an annual rate of return on the capital invested in those units. The industry was, moreover, a large and rapidly growing one.

We explore the effects of human capital on workers during the latter nineteenth century by examining the U.S. Navy. Naval officers belonged either to a regular or an engineer corps and had tasks assigned for their specialized training. We compile education and career data for officers from Naval Academy and navy registers for the years 1858 to 1907. Wage premia for “engineer-skilled” officers deteriorated over their careers; more traditionally skilled officers enjoyed higher gains in earnings and more frequent promotions. This compelled those with engineering skills to leave the service early, hindering the navy's capacity to further technologically develop.

The analysis summarized below was made in an attempt to study long-term changes in the level and composition of national income in the United States. For reasons that will become dear, this attempt had to be limited to measures for years since 1870; but before this decision was reached, I had to scrutinize and reject the current and rather widely used estimates for the years prior to 1870. The notes below summarize the results of this scrutiny and may be of interest to other workers in the field.

This article investigates the feminization of poverty prior to 1960 by focusing on three factors that contributed to the increase in the propensity to form female-headed households and to the poverty rate among such households. Compared with 1939, households headed by prime-age women in 1959 included fewer adults, thereby reducing earnings potential. The earnings level at which such women formed independent households was lower relative to the poverty line; and although higher earnings allowed more women to form independent households, the increase was not large enough to lift some of these households out of poverty.

Theories of the demographic transition often center on the rising price of children. A model of fertility derived from household production in the antebellum United States contains both own children and slaves as inputs. Changes in slaveholdings beget changes in the marginal product of the slaveowners’ own children and, hence, their price. I use panel data on slaveowning households between 1850 and 1870 to measure the slaveowners’ own fertility responses to exogenous changes in slaveholdings. Results indicate a strong, negative correlation between own child prices and fertility.

Between 1933 and 1973 the federal government funded the construction of over 1 million units of low-rent housing. Using county-level data, I find that communities with high densities of public housing had lower median family income, lower median property values, lower population density, and a higher percentage of families with low income in 1970. However, I find no negative effects of public housing in 1950 or 1960, implying that long-run negative effects only became apparent in the 1960s. The effects found in 1970 are partially due to a decline in human capital.

This article investigates the impact of “learning-by-producing” on inventive activity. From 1870 to 1910, in both emerging (electrical equipment and supplies) and maturing (shoes and textiles) industries, the geographic association between invention and production was rather weak. Regional shifts in production did not lead to corresponding increases in invention. The location of inventive activity tended to mirror that of individuals with advanced technical skills appropriate to each industry. Consequently, scholars may have overemphasized the importance of learning-by-producing in accounting for geographic differences in inventive activity, and underestimated the significance of technical skills amongst the population.

If the Town of Birmingham or Sheffield etc. have reason to apprehend that Manufactories are set up from time to time in any foreign Countries, thro' the means or by the assistance of English workmen from hence, who not finding the advantages such as they expected etc. may be desirous of returning—and if any set of Traders chuse to enter into an agreement to encourage the return of such men by promising them Employment the same as before and to contribute to the expence of their Journey home in such Terms as they shall Judge best, the King's Minister at the respective Courts shall have orders to make it a particular object to enquire about such Manufactories and Men, to make them acquainted of such an Agreement, and to give them every Assistance and Encouragement possible for their Return…. Lord Dartmouth to Matthew Boulton, n.d., Assay Office Library, Birmingham

This article analyzes how Japan financed its World War II occupation of Southeast Asia, the market-purchased transfer of resources to Japan, and the monetary and inflation consequences of Japanese policies. Occupation was financed principally by printing large quantities of money. While some Southeast Asian countries had high inflation, hyperinflation hardly occurred because of a sustained transactions demand for money and because of Japan's strong enforcement of monetary monopoly. Highly specialized Southeast Asian economies and loss of Japanese merchant shipping limited resource extraction.

Andrew J. Seltzer raises an interesting question: How large was the net effect of southern political institutions on congressional support for the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)? Although Seltzer claims to use my econometric results to show that those institutions had little effect, his interpretation of my results depends entirely on two assumptions that I did not make and that he does not justify. The first assumption is that two variables—the Turnout-Manufacturing Correlation and Turnout—somehow “defined the southern political system.” The second is that southern political institutions caused higher values of Turnout-Manufacturing Correlation. Seltzer's assumptions are theoretically baseless and empirically indefensible, and they lead him to the wrong conclusion. I will explain why.

A reconsideration of regional economic development during the antebellum period is underway. Emphasis thus far has tended to center on economic aggregates, on one region (the South) or on a single sector (agriculture). While the results of this work have altered our understanding of the antebellum South's relative economic position—or at least have sharpened the debate on the issues—comprehension of the role and position of the period's industrial sector remains faulty, largely because it has been derived from indirect evidence.

This article explores the determinants of wealth for seventeenth-century Englishmen living in three very different environments—Worcestershire, East London, and Tidewater, Virginia. Wealth differences among these regions can be described in terms of the particular mix of occupational status groups, age groups, and literates each possessed. When all of these variables are accounted for, region becomes an insignificant determinant of wealth. Occupational status, predictably, had the primary influence on wealth, but the system, through provisions for age and education, also made definite allowances for the ability to use and consume resources efficiently.