Analyses of the cultural factors supporting modernization and development have moved along a continuum from the clear-cut formulations of Parsons, Schumpeter, and Weber to the paradoxical assertions of contemporary scholars. The failure of countries like Argentina to achieve sustained development after spectacular starts has contributed to the confusion. This study examines two popular cultural explanations for such developmental problems, and finds them both wanting. Men-doza's experience suggests the need to adjust development programs to local cultural exigencies, rather than the reverse, as most analysts have argued. A four-part sequence to this effect is presented.

The most curious of the detractors of classical economics said it was the work of Scots, Jews, and subversives. The charges were meant to turn back the movement toward the free market, but there was some truth in them. Classical economics did begin in Scotland, Ricardo was Jewish, it was the policy of the Parliamentary Radicals, and it did threaten some major institutions. The paper describes how and to what effect these facts were used by men who each for his own reason did not like the market.

The contract construction industry today represents one of the most important sectors of the American economy. Total new construction in recent decades has accounted for nearly one-half of the Gross Private Domestic Investment, while non-farm residential building alone accounts for nearly one-quarter of GPDI.

The mainstream of Russian historiographical studies holds that at the turn of the century peasant economic conditions were in a state of near collapse. In one of the poorest parts of the empire three measures of that economic impoverishment were seriously in error: draft animals were incompletely inventoried, and the meanings of both land leasing and fallow reductions were misinterpreted. These methodological errors have systematically distorted prevailing discussions about the wealth and poverty of peasant farms in Voronezh. Accumulating evidence is beginning to suggest reopening the question of the severity of the Russian “agrarian crisis” on the eve of the Revolution of 1917.

Previous studies explain the extension of royal power in fifteenth-century France by the professionalization of military combat or by the commercialization of economic activity. Neither approach can account for the turnaround in Charles VII's fortunes between 1435 and 1445. Using Lösch's model of spatial competition to examine the determinants of state borders, we suggest that the key factor in the formation of the French hexagon was an innovation in artillery projectiles that increased military scale economies. A reduction in state economic intervention apparently accompanied this development rather than the increase suggested elsewhere.

The prices of commodities and wages of labor recorded in contemporaneous account books are the oldest continuous objective economic data in existence. Economic historians have not neglected this great intellectual resource. In fact, during the last hundred years a large proportion of the outstanding economic and historical talent has been lavished upon price history. Tooke, D'Avenel, and Rogers devoted more than twenty-five years each, at the most productive stage of their careers, to collecting price and wage statistics from manuscript sources and to writing an impressive total twenty-odd learned volumes. In the present century Beveridge in England, Elsas in Germany, Posthumus in the Netherlands, Pribram in Austria, Bujak in Poland, Bezanson and Cole in the United States, and a host of lesser lights on both sides of the Atlantic have uncovered new sources, combed old ones more exhaustively, and employed modern statistical technique to give us relatively complete and refined histories of prices in the leading economic areas of the Western world in modern times. If the old records of commercial transactions are not destroyed in total war, it seems safe to assume that future generations of scholars, seeking light from the past on recurrent inflation and deflation, will produce price histories that surpass all studies yet written in historical range, completeness, and scientific accuracy. In view of these achievements and prospects, social scientists should ask themselves what can be gained from a proper utilization of price history and what losses may result from its misuse.

The survivor technique is applied to a virtually complete set of plant and output data to determine the extent of scale economies in the plug, smoking, snuff, and fine-cut branches of the tobacco industry between 1897 and 1910. The data indicate that the relative cost advantage of large tobacco factories was substantial, with facilities of minimum efficient size often requiring market shares approaching 10 per cent of U. S. output. These results support one of the principal themes of The Visible Hand—that the realization of scale economies motivated the consolidation movement in American manufacturing at the turn of the century.

Kikuchi and Hayami found that irrigation investments were undertaken in East and Southeast Asia when the costs of increasing output through irrigating were lower than through bringing more land under cultivation. In Thailand, however, despite the lower costs of irrigation, the investments were postponed for several decades. The delay was due to a divergence between national security and economic development goals and to a conflict of private versus public interests. The results highlight the importance of the returns to decision makers in determining the amount and timing of public investments.

The boll weevil's impact on southern agriculture poses a dilemma. Micro-level evidence suggests the weevil triggered a transition out of cotton, but macro-level indicators fail to register much long-term impact. Econometric simulation of boll weevil impact—taking into account the low demand elasticity for southern cotton, differences between states in the timing and levels of infestation, and long-term supply and demand shifts independent of the weevil—shows that the two sets of evidence are not inconsistent.

Few economic historians have addressed the impact of poor health on economic productivity.1 This relationship, neglected and poorly understood, is the subject of my dissertation. Specifically, the dissertation examines the effect of a chronic debilitating disease on agricultural productivity in the American South between 1860 and 1940. As is well known, per capita gross agricultural output dropped sharply during the Civil War decade and remained low until 1910. Contrary to what one would expect, between 1870 and 1910 agricultural output was lowest in sandy soil regions and highest in regions composed mostly of clay soil. A rapid expansion of per capita agricultural output occurred after 1910. The income decline of the Civil War decade and subsequent increase of the post-1910 era were also related to soil region, with the greatest income swing occurring in sandy soil regions.

Written history abounds with colorful generalizations which can often be regarded as immovable and undying monuments to the truth. Stately, memorable, unself-conscious, their smooth surfaces and clean lines are unmarred by the asymmetry of qualification. Particularly impressive are those memorials which stand majestically on pedestals of aggregate quantitative evidence. Decomposition is then akin to deformation; iconoclasm becomes a species of philistinism. Nonetheless, although history may be considered a type of art, it is not pop art. The melancholy task of critical destruction is part of the historian's mandate.

The rapid development of the nationwide telephone network following the expiration of the Bell patents in 1894, along with expansion of private wire telegraph networks, created the “nerve center” necessary for rapid growth in the decentralized, dealer-intermediated, over-the-counter security markets. Using membership roles from the National Quotation Bureau—the predecessor of the NASDAQ—I link growth in the number of dealers to the expansion of these communication networks prior to World War I. Moreover, trading activity on the organized stock exchanges fell during this period, suggesting that these technologies provided a competitive advantage to the over-the-counter markets.

The first order of business for the new Congress under the Constitution of 1787 was raising revenue to fund the government's operation and to service the public debt. On 8 April 1789, two days after the first Congress achieved a quorum, James Madison introduced a proposal to levy duties on imported goods. This tariff proposal became one of the first pieces of legislation passed by Congress and was signed by President George Washington on 4 July 1789.The author thanks the National Science Foundation for providing partial research support.

This paper shows that the best practice of American methods for producing iron in 1890 was slightly better than the methods employed in Great Britain. It argues that the difference in technique was not of sufficient magnitude to have any bearing on Britain's “decline” as an industrial power. Profits in America are shown to be quite large, and it is hypothesized that these profits arose because the Americans did not anticipate the growth in the demand for pig iron.

I'm honored by this assignment: partly because I think after-dinner speeches are a necessary combination of regularizer and tranquilizer; also because it is a pleasure to share in our silver jubilee before silver vanishes from circulation. I wonder what the Association will do when the golden jubilee comes round. But the last two words of the title were not of my choosing, and when the program came I had to consult my dictionary. There I learned that “to evaluate” means “to ascertain the numerical value of”—which suggests I am to talk in digits. As for “reflective,” the good book says “throwing back images, light, etc., as in a mirror.” Of late years, since I gave up using a hairbrush and took to an electric razor, I haven't done much looking into mirrors; and when I do so my bifocals compel me to stand so close that the view is limited in area or to move far back and thereby get width and depth of vision.

Recent studies, when taken together, suggest that the bureaucratic elites of nineteenth-century Germany and Japan were much less successful in stimulating economic development than has been traditionally asserted. Direct government investment was neither extensive nor successful. Government-sponsored institutional change, notably in financial structures, had little if any beneficial impact. Development in both nations resulted from the gradual emergence of a commercial culture, and on world factors exogenous to government policy. The bureaucratic elites failed to adjust to changed circumstances, instead leading both nations into disastrous wars. These results call into question development strategies based on central government control.