Casual perusal could easily lead one to conclude that “the government” represents one of the most thoroughly researched areas in American economic history; however, there is something quite unsettling about a more careful scrutiny of its historiography. While the list of historians who have made their reputations by studying the importance of government through its impact on land policy, transportation, business, etc., etc., etc., is almost too long to enumerate, those authors who have attempted to measure the dollar value of these contributions have come to the conclusion that they must have been quite small. This paper provides no final resolution to this apparent paradox, but it does suggest at least one possible solution. It examines the spatial distribution of governmental activity and indicates that while, in total, that activity was almost always small, there were significant differences between the level of activity in different regions, and these differences may have contributed to differentials in regional growth patterns.

That the modernization of Japanese political and economic institutions during the Meiji period was spearheaded by the government and the samurai class that manned the government is a widely accepted view. One could, with little effort, assemble numerous quotations (in English or Japanese) reiterating this theme with little or no variation. Government-samurai endeavors such as pioneering in modern technology, subsidy programs (tangible and intangible), dissemination of new knowledge (to include modern business practices), and other aspects of “community-centered entrepreneurship” all support the theme. The purpose of this article is to question this well-entrenched view by submitting the findings of a close examination of the emergence of modern banking in Japan. Although this is only one aspect of the general theme, few students of Japanese economic history would deny that it has been often cited as one of the most typical examples of samurai leadership and of government initiative in the modernization of Japan. Eiichi Shibusawa, a former samurai, has invariably been linked with this development, in an attempt to stress that modern banking was a creation of the samurai class.

C P. Kindleberger once described economic history as “great fun” but not very useful for understanding what happens in the real world. W. N. Parker, on the other hand, doesn't regard it as at all amusing, but terribly important. Within that range, surely, each of us can locate his own ratio of practicality to enjoyment inherent in the pursuit of economic history. I myself was drawn to the study of economic history, even before I was aware of its existence—in fact, it was my youthful intention to invent the discipline—by two distinct motives. On the one hand, I wanted to enter (or create) a profession in which the work itself would yield intellectual pleasure. At the same time, having just lived through the longest depression in modern times and the most destructive war in history, I wanted to do something that would be useful to society. History, I knew, was interesting. Economics, I assumed, was important. I therefore resolved to give up the study of engineering, which had occupied me briefly before the war, and to create the new discipline of economic history. I was mildly surprised to discover upon enrolling in the Yale Studies for Returning Servicemen that the discipline did, indeed, already exist, and was, furthermore, ably represented at Yale by none other than Harold F. Williamson.

The rapid industrialization of pre-war Japan depended upon extensive use of mechanical power. This dependence is studied quantitatively based on historical statistics of power for the years from 1890 to 1940. The introduction of engines (the change from human to mechanical power) and shifts in the kinds of engines (from water wheels to steam engines to electric motors) are clarified by industry group. The impact of these changes on technological progress in manufacturing is revealed.

I take it as a truism that for at least the past half century the relations between government and private enterprise in Europe have irregularly evolved in such a manner as to expand the role of government policy and action. Leaving aside the European countries which now have Communist governments and almost wholly socialized economies, this trend has been, in only small part, a matter of conscious or ideological development. Primarily, it has been the consequence of piecemeal adaptation of societies to the specific pressures and problems with which they have been confronted, latterly the problems of world depression, of war, and now of postwar adjustment.

Systematic demographic analysis of early America has been neglected until quite recently. As the interest in and need for demographic data on pre-1800 America have increased during the last five years, efforts have been made to remedy this situation.The most recent studies are utilizing such new techniques as family reconstitution to avoid the problems created by the lack of reliable census data and vital statistics. But these techniques yield results very slowly, and in any case their results are subject to methodological limitations that make it necessary to check them against larger aggregates. For these reasons we need to reexamine the usefulness and accuracy of earlier studies on colonial population that were based on aggregate data. Unfortunately, this latter task has not been adequately carried out during the recent burst of activity among demographers of early America.

Distinct diffusion curves are identified by model type and significant differences in regional motor car ownership in the interwar U.K. economy. We assess the viability of applying mass production strategies such as Ford and General Motors pursued in America. Given the demand-side constraints present in the U.K. market, the price reductions made possible by the exploitation of economies of scale were insufficient to create a mass market. Hence, the relatively low levels of ownership achieved can be seen as a rational response to the constraints perceived by firms.

New England experienced a significant economic transformation after the Revolutionary War. Despite an extensive literature on American development, little is known about the precise role of banks in this process. This article exploits a detailed dataset from Plymouth County, Massachusetts to show that the first bank during its early stage was far more selective in lending than the pre-existing personal credit market. Thus the mere introduction of a single bank did not broaden access to credit. Following the liberalization of chartering policy in the 1820s, however, freer entry and competition drove banks to extend credit to farmers and artisans.

British investment in Argentina in the period 1880–1914 amounted to some 8 percent of total British overseas investment; it exhibited long swings which were roughly similar to long swings in total British overseas investment but opposite to British domestic investment, although the bursts of lending to Argentina were particularly concentrated. These swings have attracted the attention of economists and some (notably Brinley Thomas) have pointed out that emigration from Europe to North America and American investment in construction and transportation and other series in the American economy exhibited 18–20 year swings similar to those in British overseas investment, and that these were all in opposite phase to swings in British home investment and the building cycle in Britain. They have then gone on to explain these inverse British patterns in terms of emigration and the growth rhythm of the Atlantic economy, with heavy stress being laid on North American effects. The analysis of movements of both labor and capital can then be conducted in terms of the varying intensities of the pull of opportunities at home and abroad, and the push of home conditions and prospects, and how these interacted with each other to produce these inverse patterns.

Why did the United States subsidize American multinationals' entry into countries treated as informal colonies? We study a classic case of American imperialism, the 1903 U.S. support of Panama's secession from Colombia and subsequent U.S. payment of the 1921 reparations that opened Colombia's oil fields to Standard Oil. We test Noel Maurer's (2013) empire trap hypothesis quantitatively. Archival and econometric evidence documents Colombia's threat to Standard Oil's sunk investment, which induced the multinational to build a supermajority coalition in the U.S. Senate to back a reparations treaty. Results support the empire trap hypothesis but point out important qualifications.

This paper studies the average and heterogeneous effects of railway access on parish-level population, income, and industrialization in Württemberg during the Industrial Revolution. We show that the growth-enhancing effect of the railway was much greater in parishes that were larger and more industrial at the outset. However, such early industrial parishes were rare in the relatively poor German state. This might explain why we find small average growth effects, which only increase at the end of the nineteenth century. Heterogeneity in the impact of the railway thus increased economic disparities within Württemberg and contributed to the state’s relatively sluggish growth.

Not long ago an authority on dyeing observed that “in the history of the dyeing industry indigo holds a unique place by reason of its irresistible rise to supremacy among dyestuffs and its equally rapid dethronement by the modern chemical colors. …” Among the sources of this once flourishing industry, one that has never been studied adequately is that of colonial Brazil. Commercial indigo production began there in the early 1760's, but after an impressive start the industry disappeared within less than two generations. Its beginnings occurred at a time when Portugal, like other imperial powers of that era, was seeking to diversify the agriculture of her colonies so as to make them more lucrative to the mother country. A study of the industry's brief tenure in Portugal's most important colony reveals some of the problems that confronted its planters, merchants, and royal officials as they attempted, with limited experience and inadequate supporting capital, to develop new sources of income during a period of keen international economic rivalry. The factors involved in the rise and decline of the Brazilian indigo industry can best be appreciated when it is examined as part of the global history of indigo production and trade between the late fifteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

This article uses the records of the Dow Chemical Company to analyze the role of distributors in facilitating collusion in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It compares collusion in three closely related markets: salt, bromine, and bleach. Where national distributors with well-established reputations had facilitated the entry of small producers into integrated markets, distributors could also facilitate collusion. Mass-producing entrants, like Dow, joined collusive distribution arrangements while improving their innovative production processes. In the longer run, they integrated forward to escape the output restrictions and arms-length relationship with customers imposed by collusive agreements.

The immediate future of economic history is here. As I look over the program of our sessions, it seems plain that all of us are bound to be thinking about the nature of that future. Our president will speak on this subject with an authority that the rest of us cannot command. But it is up to each of us, however humble, to make such a contribution as the means at our disposal permit. Creative discussion always helps men to edge a little closer toward the truth. Let us hope there will be much of it during the next two days. Professor Innis has asked me to open the formal part of this session by some brief remarks on the relation of economic history to American civilization. I thank him for his confidence, but wish that he had placed the task in more competent hands. The subject I have selected is a vast and complicated one, and all I can hope to offer are a few rough and general suggestions. What I have to say is intended to provoke discussion.

The American tradition emphasizes the importance of sea power, especially the great age of sea power which began with Columbus and led first to the expansion of Spain and Portugal and then to the empire building of England, Holland, and France, and the development of North America. In America itself we are also familiar with the epic march across the continent to the Pacific, and the way in which the expanding frontier shaped, or at least strongly influenced, our society and our institutions, as expounded by Turner. Even our continental history, however, was initiated by the crossing of the Atlantic; and from then on even our period of most active continental expansion was never free of the influences and effects of sea power, sea-borne commerce, the investment of European capital, and acceleration of population growth by the immigration of Europeans.

The relative stagnation of British industry during what has been called the climacteric of the 1890's did not extend to shipbuilding, though that industry, producing capital goods and depending on a substantial foreign market, shared many of the characteristics of the industries most affected by foreign competition. The purpose of this article is to discuss the comparative success of British shipbuilding. In the first two sections, the conditions of shipbuilding in Britain and in the countries that rivaled her are briefly described, and in the remainder of the paper the factors influencing comparative costs are examined.

Until the 1790s marine insurance in the United States was organized by brokers and underwritten by private individuals. Beginning in 1792, however, the private underwriters had to compete with newly formed marine insurance corporations. Each organizational form had advantages and disadvantages. This article uses archival data from a private underwriter and a corporation to study how the competition between these different organizational forms was affected by a powerful exogenous shock which substantially increased the risks to American merchant shipping in the late 1790s: the “Quasi-War” between the United States and France.

Amuch neglected topic in the economic history of Uganda is the contribution of fiscal policy to the inequality of income. While generalizations have been made about the heavy burden of taxation on Uganda's Africans and the bias in the distribution of government expenditure, no systematic analysis of these issues has been undertaken. It is my objective to rectify this shortcoming, and to provide estimates of the incidence of taxation on different races and sectors of the economy at different periods. This study should be of parallel interest to my earlier article, demonstrating the extent of inequality in Uganda, since it shows that the government's tax policy had a major effect on the distribution of income in the country. The present paper focuses particularly on the farmers, who have always been at the bottom of the distribution ladder, and attempts to answer the following questions. 1.) What were the major sources of tax revenue in Uganda, and what proportion of the revenue was derived from the farmers? 2.) What was the farmers' rate of taxation compared to that of other sections of the population? 3.) How was expenditure out of government revenue distributed?

Although its role has been overlooked by monetary historians, a two-cent tax on bank checks effective from June 1932 through December 1934 appears to have been an important contributing factor to that period's severe monetary contraction. According to the estimates in this article, the currency–demand deposit ratio was about 15 percent higher, and the M1 money stock about 12 percent smaller, ceteris paribus, than each would have been without the tax. The contractionary consequences had in fact been anticipated by many legislators who were, nevertheless, unable to prevent the measure from being included in the Revenue Act of 1932.

In 1942 the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve agreed to keep the interest rate on long-term government bonds below a ceiling of 2.5 percent. Assuming rational expectations, the ceiling on long-term interest rates can be viewed as a government commitment to low long-run inflation. The Fed also agreed to buy and sell short-term government bonds at a below-market rate of 3/8 percent. This policy did not result in long-run inflation because it was narrowly confined to 3-month Treasury bills.