This article analyzes asset pricing behavior during the period leading up to the Crisis of 1873. Evidence is presented that equities, options, and bonds priced risks consistently, suggesting that investors were actively monitoring the risk of investing and were not caught up in an irrational, speculative mania. Implied probability density functions for stock returns suggest that option markets exhibited growing concern about substantial price declines prior to the crash. Concerns were concentrated on riskier, more leveraged firms. Deteriorating balance sheet fundamentals for the riskiest U.S. railroads set the stage for a market disruption in 1873 as information asymmetries worsened.

Labor productivity in German manufacturing lagged persistently behind the United States in the early twentieth century. Traditionally, this is attributed to dichotomous technology paths across the Atlantic. However, various industry case studies suggest rapid diffusion of U.S. technologies in Germany. We develop a novel decomposition framework based on Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to reconcile these findings. We conclude that by 1936 inefficient assimilation of modern production techniques—and not the use of different techniques—accounted for most of the U.S./German labor-productivity gap. Our findings call for a reappraisal of the drivers behind cross-country differences in manufacturing performance.

This article uses a new dataset of 330 slaving voyages to examine terms of credit issued for British American slave sales between 1755 and 1807. It shows that credit terms consistently varied between American colonies, and that slave ship captains considered these differences when electing where to land enslaved Africans. Our dataset also shows that credit terms were highly erratic, especially in the last quarter of the century, contributing to both surges and collapses in the slave trade to individual colonies, and in the trade as a whole. Four such instances are examined in detail to show that instability in credit terms played an important and hitherto unacknowledged role in the volume and direction of Britain's trans-Atlantic slave trade in the second one-half of the eighteenth century.

We approach the issue of the economic effects of democracy by examining which expectations investors held about the effect of democratization in the Kingdom of Saxony in 1896 and 1909. We do this by linking their investment behavior on the Berlin Stock Exchange to political events in Saxony. Here the electoral law was changed twice: In 1896 a very restrictive franchise was introduced, which was abolished in 1909 and replaced by a more democratic electoral law. Our study reveals that the Berlin Stock Exchange reacted to political changes and elections in Saxony. This is an important finding since historical research has claimed that the increased democratization in the German Kaiserreich measured in a larger participation of the population was not accompanied by a larger political influence of the parliaments. Furthermore we can show that for capital owners the possible negative effects seemed to outweigh possible positive effects of democratization. This is the first time that it has been possible to provide quantitative evidence for such antidemocratic sentiments.

During the nineteenth century, the U.S. birthrate fell by half. While previous economic literature has emphasized demand-side explanations for this decline, many of these arguments are confounded by changes in the supply of technologies to control fertility. I exploit the introduction of state laws governing American women's access to abortion to measure the effect of changes in the supply of fertility technologies on the number of children born. I estimate an increase in the birthrate of 4 to 15 percent when abortion is restricted. I also explore the legal characteristics and political economy of these laws.

In “The Industrial Revolution in Miniature,” I calculated that the spinning jenny was profitable to install in England in the 1780s but not in France.1 My calculations assumed that a spinner using a wheel in a domestic setting worked a total of 100 days per year and spun 100 pounds of coarse cotton (one pound per day). The jenny raised labor productivity to three pounds per day in the “most likely” scenario. I showed that it would have been cheaper to spin 100 pounds per year with a jenny than with a wheel in England, while the reverse would have been true in France. Hence, the jenny was installed in England rather than France. Ugo Gragnolati, Daniele Moschella, and Emanuele Pugliese have pointed out that this argument assumes that output was kept at 100 pounds per year, and the effect of the jenny was to reduce the spinner's work year to only 33–1/3 days per year.2 They suggest that it was more likely that the spinner would have continued to work 100 days per year and produce 300 pounds of yarn instead. In that case, they argue, it would have been profitable to install the jenny in France as well as England. Profitability would have increased in both countries under these assumptions because capital costs would have been cut by a third if three times as much output was produced from the same capital (although profitability was still much higher in England). Hence, they conclude that economic considerations do not explain the diffusion of the jenny.

The locomotive industry was one of the relatively sophisticated “high tech” sectors in which Italy, a late industrializer, was successful before 1913. Using technical data on the performance of different vintages of locomotives, we construct a new industry-level index of technical change. We also study the impact of different policy instruments (import duties, non-tariff trade barriers, and other discretionary interventions) in shaping the development of the industry. Our reassessment reveals not only the sound technological performance of Italian locomotives and successful industry growth, but also the critical role played by non-tariff barriers for the development of the industry.

This response offers a critical appraisal of the claim of Albrecht Ritschl to have found a possible resolution to what he calls the Anglo-German industrial productivity puzzle, which arose as the result of a new industrial production index produced in an earlier paper by the same author. Projection back from a widely accepted 1935/36 benchmark using the Ritschl index showed German industrial labor productivity in 1907 substantially higher than in Britain. This presented a puzzle for at least two reasons. First, other comparative information from the pre—World War I period, such as wages, seems difficult to square with much higher German labor productivity at this time. Second, a direct benchmark estimate produced by Stephen Broadberry and Carsten Burhop, using production census information for Britain and industrial survey material of similar quality for Germany, suggested broadly equal labor productivity in 1907. Broadberry and Burhop also showed that if Walther Hoffmann's industrial output index was used instead of the Ritschl index for Germany, the puzzle largely disappeared.

France has been well characterized by Raymond Aron, following de Tocqueville, as Immuable et changeante. Nowhere does variability (across space) combine more strongly with stability (in time) than in the economy of rural France in the nineteenth century. Judging again by titles, we must give higher marks to the author of The Eternal Order of the Fields than to the man who argued that Capitalism and Agriculture were growing ever closer, to the advantage of the former.

When examining the various aspects of Soviet society, and looking back at its antecedents in pre-revolutionary Russia, a certain continuity in institutions and economic policies emerges. This is in particular true in the area of banking and credit. The Soviet banking system, as it evolved after the October revolution, and, more specifically, after the credit reforms of 1930–1932, is unique in many respects. Surely, there are examples in non-socialist countries of banking institutions which combine central banking and commercial banking. In many cases, central banks of the less developed countries have assumed a leading role in implementing development programs and in creating the required financial institutions, instruments, and markets. In some leading industrial countries, such as France and Italy, as well as in a number of the newer countries, large commercial banks are owned by the government. The uniqueness of the Soviet banking system lies in the complete integration of monetary processes within the system of central planning, the credit monopoly of the State Bank of the Soviet Union (Gosbank) and its broad control powers over the performance of the entire state-owned segment of the economy.

The invention of the airplane by Wilbur and Orville Wright in 1903 marked the beginning of an industry which has grown to be the largest single manufacturing employer in the United States. Once the airplane was invented, there was wide-spread expectation that producing aircraft would be a very profitable business.

This article examines the economic costs to the British nation of the Seven Years War. Drawing upon manuscript records and secondary studies, the author analyzes in detail the diversion of resources to the Navy and the effect of increased debts on the economy. Finding that the burden was great but the impact apparently slight, the author suggests that the English may have drawn substantially upon extra-national sources of capital, labor and materials.

British investment in Argentina in the period 1880–1914 amounted to some 8 percent of total British overseas investment; it exhibited long swings which were roughly similar to long swings in total British overseas investment but opposite to British domestic investment, although the bursts of lending to Argentina were particularly concentrated. These swings have attracted the attention of economists and some (notably Brinley Thomas) have pointed out that emigration from Europe to North America and American investment in construction and transportation and other series in the American economy exhibited 18–20 year swings similar to those in British overseas investment, and that these were all in opposite phase to swings in British home investment and the building cycle in Britain. They have then gone on to explain these inverse British patterns in terms of emigration and the growth rhythm of the Atlantic economy, with heavy stress being laid on North American effects. The analysis of movements of both labor and capital can then be conducted in terms of the varying intensities of the pull of opportunities at home and abroad, and the push of home conditions and prospects, and how these interacted with each other to produce these inverse patterns.

Economic historians have traced the origin of the uniform property tax in the United States to the insertion of uniformity clauses into state constitutions in the Northwest and to efforts to tax commercial wealth. This article shows that the tax was created by legislation in the Northeast and that the first constitutional clauses were adopted in the South to protect slaveholders. It is time for historians of the U.S. political economy to abandon the dated paradigms of the “progressive history” tradition.

Turnpike trusts were private organizations that financed road improvements by levying tolls and issuing mortgage debt. They were established by Acts of Parliament throughout the seventeenth, eighteenth, and early nineteenth centuries. The acts transferred authority from parishes to a body of trustees, composed of local landowners and merchants. Parishes financed road improvements with local property taxes; but they could not levy tolls. This article uses a new data set to show that turnpike trusts increased road expenditure, rather than replacing existing or forthcoming parish expenditure. It also illustrates how institutional changes contributed to the process of economic development in England.

That the modernization of Japanese political and economic institutions during the Meiji period was spearheaded by the government and the samurai class that manned the government is a widely accepted view. One could, with little effort, assemble numerous quotations (in English or Japanese) reiterating this theme with little or no variation. Government-samurai endeavors such as pioneering in modern technology, subsidy programs (tangible and intangible), dissemination of new knowledge (to include modern business practices), and other aspects of “community-centered entrepreneurship” all support the theme. The purpose of this article is to question this well-entrenched view by submitting the findings of a close examination of the emergence of modern banking in Japan. Although this is only one aspect of the general theme, few students of Japanese economic history would deny that it has been often cited as one of the most typical examples of samurai leadership and of government initiative in the modernization of Japan. Eiichi Shibusawa, a former samurai, has invariably been linked with this development, in an attempt to stress that modern banking was a creation of the samurai class.

The rapid industrialization of pre-war Japan depended upon extensive use of mechanical power. This dependence is studied quantitatively based on historical statistics of power for the years from 1890 to 1940. The introduction of engines (the change from human to mechanical power) and shifts in the kinds of engines (from water wheels to steam engines to electric motors) are clarified by industry group. The impact of these changes on technological progress in manufacturing is revealed.

This article examines the forces that appear to have driven long-term trends in American urban inequality. The changing structure of consumer goods' prices is shown to have played a significant—but not dominant—role in every phase of increasing and decreasing nominal inequality from 1820 to 1929. The revealed symmetry in movement between the urban price and income structure suggests that a successful macro-distribution model must explain both historical phenomena. Finally, the article concludes that technological imbalance was a crucial element in shaping peacetime patterns of income distribution.