One of the most important problems in the study of economic development is the role of technological change in the growth process. My dissertation is an analysis of some of the major variables which influenced the timing of the invention, adoption, and diffusion of the compound marine steam engine. The problem was divided into three parts: (1) all those variables pertaining directly to the invention of the engine, and the very first effects on the cost structure of the steamship industry; (2) the role of the compound marine steam engine in the growth of the German merchant fleet, 1872–1887, with special emphasis on the diffusion of the invention and its productivity effects; and (3) the effect of the compound steam engine on the sailing ship component of the German merchant fleet.

In this article I develop a taxonomy of financial practices based on whether financial activity is intended to fund new capital investment or to create new financial structures to accommodate planned changes in the structure of an industry's existing capital stock. The taxonomy is then applied to the financial development of the U.S. sugar-refining industry between 1875 and 1905. The taxonomy provides an explanation of the rise of the large, widely held industrial corporation in the United States that is more consistent with the historical record than are the conventional “financial strain” or “asset liquidation” hypotheses.

In an earlier issue of this Journal, M. E. Sushka criticized the methodology of such “revisionists” as Peter Temin in their evaluation of the impact of the Bank War on the Jacksonian economy. Sushka characterizes the work of the revisionists as the “use of descriptive statistical tools in an attempt to analyze developments empirically.” Sushka, on the other hand, applies “modern econometric techniques” to “an economic framework drawn from contemporary monetary and macroeconomic theory.”

From the 1830s on Syria and Palestine exported monetary metal to pay for an import surplus. Nevertheless, there is evidence of a concomitant inflationary process. The apparent contradiction is resolved by a theoretical argument and by reference to the dual nature of the Ottoman monetary system. Government-induced inflation in terms of the domestic (token and paper) money reinforced the rising price of full-bodied coins, caused by the adverse balance of trade.

The daily, weekly, and seasonal rhythms of production in the Montgolfier paper mill, one of the largest in eighteenth-century France, are examined here. Based on the comments of pioneer manufacturers, historians have been led to believe that early industrial work was irregular and unpredictable. The Montgolfiers as well complained of undependable workers. Yet their own output registers reveal a pattern of regular productivity unaided by advanced machinery or steam power.

This paper shows that the Glorious Revolution of 1688 broadened access to Parliament for families needing rights to sell land in so-called estate bills. Bills were on average 14–27 percentage points more likely to be for gentry families and not aristocratic families in legislative sessions after the Revolution compared to sessions before. Regression and archival evidence suggest that parliamentary certainty was primarily responsible for improved access by altering families’ entry calculus and brokers’ recruitment of new business. More broadly, the paper provides insight into the ways in which political institutions affect access to and the provision of property rights.

Fiscal regimes have become progressively more centralized and though the trend extends over nearly a millennium, the process accelerated in the early nineteenth century. The growth of central government budgets as a fraction of the economy and relative to local and regional budgets is well known. Many believe that the process has been driven by changes in citizens' demand for social services and therefore have associated it with democratization and with crises such as World War I and the Great Depression. In this paper we take a different tack and consider the evolution of fiscal institutions and changes in the preferences of the central executive. Our reconsideration is prompted by the observation that from and institutional standpoint fiscal centralization long preceded the massive expansion of the welfare state in the twentieth century.