The methodologies and assumptions that guide our acquisition of knowledge and interpretation of data are context and time bound. Academic disciplines, sub-disciplines, methodological approaches and research agendas are to a large degree conditioned by the ‘real world,’ and none more so than International Relations. Accordingly, it is important to consider the possible sociological foundations of different epistemologies and paradigms of International Relations. Surely there is more than one way of looking at the world, unless one is steadfastly married to a positivist universal truth. Yet it is interesting that East Asian scholarship and teaching in IR has seemingly not developed strong ‘indigenous’ regional characteristics, perhaps with the exception of Japan with its large market, long tradition, political freedom and economic affluence. In fact IR has absorbed and closely followed Western and particularly North American social science. This introduction and the articles that follow will explore the fortunes of IR scholarship and regional studies in East Asia in the context of national and regional environments. It will consider how IR is taught and researched in various national settings, and examine the interaction between IR as a social science and national/regional historical experiences, cultural and pedagogical traditions, and politico-ideological values. The underlining problematique concerns the idea of an East Asian ‘IR community’: why has this tended to be comparatively weak? How can we envision the development of a more rigorous East Asian IR community, one that is not exclusively judged according to external — and particularly North American — terms of reference and standards? It goes without saying that we are not attempting to antagonize our American friends and colleagues, but simply to stimulate a ‘sociology of science’ reflection of the discipline in the East Asian regional setting. Two questions serve as the organizing themes of this special issue. The first concerns the primary characteristics of the regional IR community. Many of the papers in this collection point to the dominance of US-originated ideas and theories. The second question arises from the first question: whether these predominant approaches help us to understand the region in a time of change.

Almost two decades after the initial victory of Thai Rak Thai, scholars still debate the forces behind Thaksin's rise to power. I revisit these debates and argue for a more explicit analysis of dynamics over time. I distinguish analytically between the founding moment of TRT's first victory and the subsequent reproduction of its dominance. I argue that TRT's financial muscle was a sufficient condition for its 2001 victory, that institutions merely contributed to the scale of its victory, and that its platform was not decisive. Once in power, however, institutions were instrumental in allowing TRT to complete its term, but more important for its long-term dominance was the rapid implementation of its campaign promises, which created a mass constituency that in turn made Thaksin-linked parties resilient at the polls despite institutional reforms designed to weaken their electoral performance.

In this paper, we study how political parties react to democratic transitions. We find that the structure of legislators’ social networks plays a critical role in shaping their political interactions during the transition period, and consequently, the post-transition party systems that emerge. We focus on the Korean case, where the incumbent authoritarian party merged with one of its pro-democracy opponents to create a powerful and enduring conservative party under democratic rule. Using a novel individual-level dataset on all legislative members during the transition, we find that the merger was facilitated by dense social networks linking members of the merged parties, which increased trust across the parties and reduced the difficulty of a merger. Conversely, we find that the paucity of ties linking pro-democracy parties hindered their long-term cooperation, despite their shared ideologies and policy goals. The study complements existing theories by providing a network-based explanation for the weakly institutionalized political party system that has characterized Korean politics since democratization.

This study examines whether a degree of autocracy and high quality of bureaucracy—two mechanisms often discussed in the context of Covid-19 responses—provide a meaningful explanation for East Asia's relative success compared to the rest of the world at the beginning of the Covid pandemic. Our multiple regression analysis for 111 countries supports our expectation, as East Asia as a region is significantly and negatively associated with confirmed Covid-19 cases and deaths compared to the rest of the world, and its interaction with the quality of bureaucracy further contributes to the negative association. In sum, this research highlights the important role of East Asia's regional characteristics in pandemic responses.

Who attempts to influence policymaking through authoritarian assemblies and why are some delegates considerably more active in doing so than others? Drawing on original data from provincial People's Political Consultative Conferences (PPCCs) in China, this study adopts a delegate-centered perspective and develops a theory of delegates’ activity in authoritarian assemblies. It argues that delegates’ activity can be explained by a combination of both cooptation theory and an understanding of delegates’ position within the authoritarian regime and hierarchy. The results highlight that core elites with more direct means of influencing policymaking will forego assemblies. Yet, peripheral elites lack other institutional channels of access to decision-makers and have to voice their demands in authoritarian legislatures. This study highlights the need for disaggregating groups of actors in authoritarian politics and offers an alternative view of cooptation particularly relevant for closed authoritarian regimes.

Does female bureaucratic support for female political leaders change over time? Existing research focuses on factors that vary across countries. Little work examines how contingent events within a context impact gender-based solidarity. Drawing on collective identity theory, we argue that high-profile incidents of perceived gender-based injustice against a female president could increase female bureaucrats’ support for the leader. To explore this, we leverage a unique setting of a female president's impeachment in South Korea to assess the relationship between gender and bureaucrats’ support. Examining support for President Park before and after the impeachment, we find that her impeachment has a gendered impact on support, with female bureaucrats’ support increasing and male bureaucratic support remaining unchanged. Furthermore, mediation analysis provides suggestive evidence that the result operates through a heightened sense of injustice. Our findings suggest that support for female political leaders varies not only across countries, but also shifts within governments.

South Korea's economic takeoff in the 1960s triggered a scholarly debate over the causes behind its economic growth. Neoclassical economists and “statist” scholars focused on government policies toward the industrial sector, but as this article shows, they have neglected to consider the political economy behind the government's targeting of the agricultural and livestock sectors for export promotion. In fact, the South Korean government's support of export-led growth—aimed at the rural sector as well as industry—transformed the nation's agricultural and livestock institutions from instruments of development and export promotion into protectionist mechanisms. This article discusses how complete market liberalization would have resulted in more efficient resource allocation and reveals how political considerations affected the institutional arrangement in the South Korean countryside and the subsequent liberalization of agricultural and beef markets.

Ever since the destruction of Hiroshima in 1945, states all over the world have been faced with the issue of whether or not to acquire the ‘absolute weapon’ for themselves. The question of ‘going nuclear’ has been especially acute on the Korean peninsula, with its history of conflict, division and great power meddling. Has any one of the two Koreas, or both, ever attempted to acquire nuclear weapons? Did either of them decide to abandon that quest? If so, when and why? These are the questions that motivate this paper.

The historic June 2000 summit and subsequent exchanges between North and South Korea have added a new dimension to not only South-North Korean relations but also the situation in Northeast Asia as a whole. On one hand, the thawing South- North Korean relations has generated great optimism among those who see it as an irrefutable sign of North Korea's intention to join the rest of the world as a constructive player. At the other extreme, it is seen as a deceptive, if not desperate, act on the part of North Korea to reap economic gains and lower the guard of South Korea and its allies, principally the United States. Perhaps a more realistic assessment lies somewhere between these polar analyses.

What determines the public evaluation of South Korean president? Is it a temporal cycle of presidential tenure, the economy or political events? This paper explores these questions by examining the case of President Kim Dae Jung who enjoyed high popularity in the early phase of his tenure but experienced consistent decline of popularity after 18 months in office, much like his predecessors did. The paper argues that the high and low of public support for the president is not simply a function of the temporal cycle and that the fluctuation of public rating is strongly influenced by the public's consideration of economic matters and corruption scandals. In the case of the current South Korean president, one's performance in resuscitating the economy could not rescue a president besieged by one corruption scandal after another. Also, the improved economic conditions did not save Kim Dae Jung's public approval rate from tumbling, because reforms failed to alleviate the economic hardship felt by the lower class. All of this demonstrates that the public does separate economic and political issues and weigh them disproportionately in evaluating presidential performance.

Northeast Asia constitutes a “regional environmental security complex” wherein the actors and societies are enmeshed together in a web of positive and negative externalities with respect both to environmental problems and efforts to solve them. The three sets of environmental issues relevant to the security architecture can be summarized as follows: damage to and destruction of peaceful relations, stability and order of the state-based system of international relations caused by environmental decay and resource scarcity; threats to human security rooted in environmental decay and resource scarcity; and damage to and destruction of environmental integrity caused by instability and conflict. Environmental degradation can degrade human security by damaging the health of human populations; economic security by impacting adversely on local, national, regional and international economies; and national security by undermining stable relations among countries. Equally, though, recurring patterns of human, economic and national behavior can deplete the earth's resources and degrade the physical environment.

Almost exactly a half-century following the outbreak of the Korean War, South Korea president Kim Dae-jung made a historic visit to Pyongyang for the first-ever summit meeting between the leaders of the two Koreas in June of 2000. A decade following the collapse of communism in the rest of the world, Kim's journey would inevitably be judged in history as a potential starting point for the end of inter-Korean confrontation. Three days following direct, broad-ranging discussions with his counterpart, Kim Jong Il, Kim Dae-jung confidently returned to Seoul with an inter-Korean summit declaration promising enhanced efforts at reconciliation and inter-Korean exchange. Upon his return to Seoul, Kim Dae-jung declared that there would be “no more war” on the Korean Peninsula. The next task was to institutionalize an array of exchanges and inter-Korean interactions designed eventually to lead to national reconciliation.