This article analyses the difficulties surrounding justiciability of the right to health care in Nigeria and the implications for access issues. It argues that claims denying justiciability on the grounds of the absence of a legal foundation and / or paucity of resources are misplaced. This reasoning derives from an interrogation of the rationale for and the consequences of the designation of what ought to be the right to health care as a Directive Principle, kleptocracy as an impediment to actualizing the right to health care, and the impact of the domestication of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. Projecting into the future, the article analyses the challenges that would confront courts in Nigeria grappling with the normative content of the right to health care, arguing that the difficulties are not insurmountable and that, given the seemingly intractable nature of the issues, the courts should adopt a proactive interpretive approach.

A growing number of states have modified constitutionally determined presidential term limits or adopted a flexible interpretation of relevant constitutional provisions to allow incumbent leaders additional terms in the highest office. This article investigates African Union (AU) responses to attempts to overturn or weaken term limits on executive power, one of the most tenacious constitutional trends in Africa. Inspired by the AU's well-established discourse on “unconstitutional changes of government” under the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, the article frames the manipulation of presidential term limits as “undemocratic changes of the constitution”. From this perspective it argues for a more active role for the AU in monitoring and enforcing constitutionalism and respect for democratic standards by member states when they amend their constitution. It concludes with a tentative set of principles to guide processes of constitutional change in Africa.

Over the past decade, the African Union has put in place a normative framework to promote constitutional rule and, in particular, orderly constitutional transfers of power in its member states. Its Peace and Security Council opposes unconstitutional changes of government, including through the use of sanctions. The PSC systematically advocates a return to constitutional order, in particular through free and fair elections, as a remedy for unconstitutional changes of government. However, while opposing unconstitutional means of obtaining or transferring power, the AU has been generally supportive of the use of power-sharing agreements as an instrument of negotiated conflict settlement. Most power-sharing agreements do not accord with the prevailing constitutional order. This dual policy, of opposing certain types of unconstitutional change of government while advocating power-sharing agreements, poses an obvious challenge for the consistency of AU policy.

Consider these apparently simple facts: in 1968, the Government of Botswana introduced its Tribal Land Act, which promulgated new institutional and tenurial arrangements for the rural communities; in the period thereafter land regulations in Barolong, a small chiefdom in the south-eastern corner of the country, underwent dramatic changes. Most obvious among these were a rapid rise in the value of cultivable acreages, a marked shift in the ideology of property rights, and an intense politicisation of the processes surrounding the distribution and negotiation of arable holdings. Given the historical coincidence of these events, it might seem perfectly reasonable to infer a causal link between them. And, indeed, the direct attribution of rural transformations of this kind to the effects of state intervention is common enough in analyses of “social change” and “development”. But, tempting as this mode of explanation might be, it leads inexorably to oversimplification. Worse still, it is often predicated upon the patently false assumption that the temporal conjunction of such decontextualised events may alone represent a sufficient condition for hypothesising causal connections between them.

KANGAVE, JALIA, Improving tax administration: a case study of the Uganda Revenue authority, Journal of African Law, 49, 2 (2005): 145–176

The prevalence of poverty in developing countries demands that these countries should improvise internal revenue generating projects to supplement, or better still, ultimately significantly reduce dependence on foreign funding. This way self-sustaining economies will be built. One such internal revenue-generating mechanism, and perhaps the most commonly used, is taxation. This paper makes a case for tax administration as a tool of increasing the contribution of tax revenue to Gross Domestic Product, and consequently, a means of reducing the gap between the rich and the poor. The goal of this paper is to propose ways in which the Uganda Revenue Authority (the URA) can improve its tax administration. To achieve this objective, the paper begins with a detailed discussion of the URA's structure and the procedures it follows in collecting taxes. It then highlights the problems that may arise from such structure and procedures, before making proposals on how the URA can reform its organizational structure and processes to maximize its potential in revenue collection capabilities.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) suffered two notable setbacks in Africa in 2010: the African Union's (AU) renewed call for members not to cooperate in executing ICC arrest warrants for Sudanese President al-Bashir; and the president's first visits to the territory of ICC states parties since warrants were issued in 2009 and 2010. Factors surrounding these developments suggest they do not represent the predominant view or approach to the court in Africa, where there is considerable backing for the ICC among African government officials and civil society. African ICC states parties and civil society should enhance initiatives to demonstrate the support that exists for the court, and to ensure that attacks on it are understood as limited efforts that emanate more from criticisms of the UN Security Council than of the court. Developments in 2011 reinforce these assessments.

One of the crucial theoretical problems confronting human rights is the perception of its historical derivation related to the universal or relative character of the rights declared. Limited views on the origin of the concept are widespread and easily exploited to stymie die quest for human rights. Cultural-monopolist derivations of its origin have fed relativist but apologist arguments in developing countries. A cultural-universalist conception is not only possible but preferable. A contrary position would both contradict and deter the cause of human rights. To arrogate the concept to some groups, cultures and civilizations to die exclusion of others would be deleterious to the momentum toward universal consensus on human rights in at least two major ways. It would harden or ossify divisive tendencies and provide ammunition for apologist justification of violations.

The establishment in the Gold Coast of commercial agriculture based on a permanent cultivation of the soil, the development of the mining and timber industries in the last two decades of the nineteenth century and the concession boom that these events carried in their train, created favourable conditions for capitalist development for which the private ownership of the means of production is a prerequisite. However, at that time the basic means of production in the Gold Coast, i.e. the land, was generally held in common and was not privately owned.

Colonialism, however, had the effect of establishing two systems of production in the country. The capitalist sector which became dominant was created at commercial and urban centres. The traditional communal system based on what, for want of a better term, one could call subsistence agriculture, remained at the periphery in the countryside. The dominant capitalist sector produced in its own image a class of property owners consisting of European, national and rural capitalists. Attempts by the latter to acquire lands to be privately owned gave rise to problems of insecurity of title. A machinery for land registration was thought to be the most adequate means of solving the problem.

In 1959 I had just completed my Diploma in International Law at Cambridge under the supervision of Eli Lauterpacht, who was assisting me in finding a post in the international law field. One day; he said that he had been approached by the School of Oriental and African Studies to find a Research Officer in “African Law”—would I be interested? I asked him what on earth “African Law” was. He wasn't sure, but suggested that I go and discuss things with a Dr. Allott at SOAS.

Tony Allott was full of enthusiasm about a new comprehensive research scheme, the Restatement of African Law Project (RALP), set up at SOAS with substantial financial assistance from the Nuffield Foundation. The object was to facilitate, undertake and assist in the recording of customary laws in Commonwealth African countries in a systematic legal fashion (the choice of the term “restatement” having been influenced by the restatements of American common law). Tony said that two Research Officers had just been appointed: W. C. (Bill) Ekow Daniels of Ghana would deal with West Africa; Bill McClain (an American) would deal with Central/Southern Africa and, if I took the job, East Africa would be assigned to me.

I told Tony that this sounded all very exciting, but I knew nothing about Africa or African law, let alone customary law. How could I begin to restate something of which I knew nothing? Tony was not deterred.

This article examines the extent to which the decision to establish the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights was motivated by the desire of African states to safeguard their own interests at the expense of effectively protecting human rights in Africa. Using an examination of the drafting history of the Banjul Charter and the establishment of the African Commission as a background, this article explores the potential implications for the future of human rights protection on the continent as a result of the creation of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights and its proposed merger with the African Court of Justice.

The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights was adopted unanimously in June, 1981, by the Organisation of African Unity (O.A.U.). Although it is not yet in force its adoption represents an important landmark in the protection and promotion of human rights on the African continent. The O.A.U. has in the past been sharply criticized for its apparent indifference to the suppression of human rights in a number of independent African States. Although the founding Charter of the O.A.U. of 1961 makes reference to the issue of human rights in Article II l (e) and also mentions in general terms the need to promote the welfare and well-being of the African people, its primary concern has been with the eradication of colonialism and apartheid on the African continent. In this context it is clearly committed to the achievement of human rights and self-determination of the peoples of South Africa and Namibia. However, other breaches of human rights on a widespread scale, such as the massacre of thousands of the Bahutu tribe of Burundi in 1973, was neither discussed nor condemned by the O.A.U. Similarly, the mass murders and other atrocities during the former regime of Idi Amin (Uganda 1971–79) and subsequently and also those which took place during the regime of Jean-Bedel Bokassa, (Central African Republic 1966–79) and Marcias

Since the British established the first statutory native courts in Nigeria, attempts have been made to reserve for such courts original civil jurisdiction in customary law matters which were considered to be within the peculiar knowledge of traditional authorities, who, consistently with the indirect rule system, normally manned the tribunals. The first legislative measure reserving original civil jurisdiction for the statutory native courts was the Protectorate Courts Ordinance, 1933 which established a High Court for that part of the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria known as the Protectorate, and provided that the High Court was not to exercise original jurisdiction in cases raising any issue as to title to, or interest in, land and which were subject to the jurisdiction of a native court, except where the Governor in Council directed otherwise or where the case was transferred from a native court under the provisions of the Native Courts Ordinance, 1933. Thus matters involving land tenure with respect to which native courts had jurisdiction were regarded as. customary law matters which could best be dealt with by traditional courts or courts having a traditional setting.

Writing about any constitution is tricky business and that of Zambia is no exception. Four constitutions in 32 years hardly represents a settled state of affairs, and an end, or even a stopping place of long duration, does not appear in sight. This is, however, an interesting, even exciting period in Zambia’s brief constitutional history. The subject cries out for an examination of where the country has been, where it is, and where, at least in the opinion of these observers, it ought to be heading.

We are happy to undertake this brief assessment in the context of recognition of the career of Professor J.S. Read. This able, patient, effective, and thoughtful scholar has been a mentor to generations of African lawyers, including Zambians. To both of us Jim Read has been a warm and generous friend, from time to time a wise counsellor who has contributed much to our own efforts.

Four interrelated reforms in the private law of Ghana were promulgated by the ruling Provisional National Defence Council (P.N.D.C.) on 14 June, 1985: the Intestate Succession Law, 1985 (P.N.D.C.L. Ill); the Customary Marriage and Divorce (Registration) Law, 1985 (P.N.D.C.L. 112); the Administration of Estates (Amendment) Law, 1985 (P.N.D.C.L. 113); and the Head of Family (Accountability) Law, 1985 (P.N.D.C.L. 114). The Intestate Succession Law radically changes the law of inheritance, and constitutes the most extensive legislative reform ever made in the private law of Ghana. The Administration of Estates (Amendment) Law is a minor consequential enactment. The other two Laws are directed primarily to other issues, but bear on the Intestate Succession Law in minor aspects which will be mentioned later.

This comment does not seek to provide a detailed textual analysis of the Law, but merely to consider its provenance and general significance in the development of Ghanaian property law.

John Whittow in a recent book observes that droughts, unlike an earthquake, a tsunami or an avalanche do not suddenly appear in a dramatic fashion hitting the newspaper headlines of an unsuspecting world. Drought, he says, is slow and insidious, a creeping death which gradually paralyses entire nations and changes the course of history.

That is how it seems Ghana was taken unawares by the recent prolonged droughts that have been affecting the country since the early part of 1982. Until then, people in Ghana had taken for granted constant water supplies, uninterrupted supply of electricity and other energy resources, principally from the Volta hydroelectric dam—the largest man-made lake in the world—feeling secure in the mistaken belief that drought comes only to the geographically arid or semi-arid parts of the world.

It is usually assumed that there is sufficient legislation to regulate the Nigerian business community and combat corporate irresponsibility and that the challenge lies in lackadaisical enforcement by regulators. This article queries this assumption and analyses the corporate social responsibility (CSR) regulatory landscape in corporate Nigeria. It depicts a bleak picture of weak regulation, faulty legal transplantation of foreign principles, a lackadaisical attitude to enforcement, double operational standards from multinational enterprises, and incoherence and policy disparity between CSR regulatory provisions in primary legislation on the one hand and their subsidiary laws on the other. It argues that the challenge lies in faulty and disjointed legislation grossly undermined by fallacious legal transplantation. The article concludes by offering an agenda for the harmonization of the disjointed CSR framework in highlighted primary and subsidiary legislation, in line with best international standards.

This article discusses the challenges affecting the achievement of financial inclusion for the poor and low-income earners in South Africa. The concept of financial inclusion could be defined as the provision of affordable financial products and services to all members of the society by the government and/or other relevant role-players such as financial services providers. This article identifies unemployment, poverty, financial illiteracy, over-indebtedness, high bank fees, mistrust of the banking system, lack of relevant national identity documentation and poor legislative framework for financial inclusion as some of the challenges affecting the full attainment of financial inclusion for the poor and low-income earners in South Africa. Given these flaws, the article highlights the need for the government, financial institutions and other relevant stakeholders to adopt legislative and other measures as an antidote to financial exclusion and poverty challenges affecting the poor and low-income earners in South Africa.

The problem of diversity of laws remains a major, if indirect, obstacle to African economic development which has not been the subject of any concerted consideration or attention by African states. It is now generally recognized that diversity of laws is an impediment to international commercial activity. Diversity of laws also negatively affects commercial transactions between African merchants and foreign (non-African) contractors. Furthermore, diversity of international commercial laws among African countries is likely to impede the achievement of the objectives of the economic integration schemes.

The activities of oil multinational corporations (MNCs) in Nigeria, especially in the oil and gas sector, have come under focus in recent years. The BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in the USA highlighted the negative or unintended consequences of the activities of MNCs. Also, oil MNCs in Nigeria have been at the centre of scandals about poor labour standards, environmental degradation and human rights violations amongst others. Furthermore, the extant state-oriented or command and control regulatory regime has been ineffective. Thus, self-regulation by oil MNCs has risen to help counter these negative consequences. This article contends that the self-regulatory regime is ineffective and advocates for reforms to remedy it.

The history of illegal farming activities in certain forest reserves in the Western Region of Ghana demonstrates the magnitude of the problems facing conservationists, administrators and forestry personnel i n developing countries. The objective of this article is to explore briefly some of those problems and to reflect on the value of a human rights approach to environmental protection in the light of events in Western Ghana. First, the article presents evidence of the scale of illegal farming i n some forest reserves in the Western Region, before discussing the various initiatives taken since the 1960s to reserve and protect forest land in this Region. The administrative, legal and political obstacles to their success are highlighted as is the role played by competing interest groups. The implications of this analysis for the concept of environmental rights is then briefly discussed and alternative proposals for tackling this problem suggested.