The law of England has been introduced into colonial territories to a varying extent and by various means3; as a consequence, whether adopted en bloc or piecemeal or borrowed by way of Indian law, the English law forms the major part of the law applicable in each territory, and is often the residual law which is called on in default of an express rule. But this reception of the law of England immediately raises a problem of some magnitude; to what extent, if at all, are the decisions of courts in England to be followed by colonial courts? It is somewhat surprising that, at this late hour, the problem should not apparently have been considered by legal writers, except in a useful article by Dr. T. O. Elias4.

Most countries of the world have at one time or another been confronted with questions of what principles or rules should guide the courts in readjusting the property rights of spouses at the dissolution of their marriage. Virtually all civilised countries have accepted marriage as an equal partnership of two legally equal individuals to which each one of them contributes in one way or another. Most policy makers agree that the partners contribute to the marriage through their division of labour and that these contributions although not equal in absolute terms are nonetheless of equal relative value to the welfare of the family.

This recognition of the equal worth and equal importance of the two spouses to a marriage relationship has had profound effects on the matrimonial property regimes of numerous countries which have had to tackle the problem of the construction of a fair and equitable legal formula for the reallocation of matrimonial property rights at the dissolution of marriage. The fundamental problem has been whether a fair and equitable system is achieved by means of fixed rules of apportionment or through flexible discretionary judicial powers exercisable at the discretion of courts, in the light of the individual circumstances of each case.

It is assumed in this article that there is an urgent need to establish in African states adequate facilities for legal education, and that such education should be of the highest possible standard and adaptable for the special needs of the new African countries. Hitherto much of the law in which an African student was instructed was that which was received from and is applied by the European colonial powers. He was not instructed in customary law or the special legislation of his country. Today the special legislation of a new African state has become increasingly important especially in the fields of co-operatives, trade unionism, agriculture, industry, public administration and social relations. Thus the lawyer of any African state whose only equipment is the received law, which in reality will remain a basis for the understanding of the new legislation, becomes ill-equipped for either private practice or the public service.

Malaŵi has two sets of courts which run completely parallel to each other. One set forms the Judicial Branch of the Government and consists of magistrates’ courts (which have original civil and criminal jurisdiction only), the High Court (which has unlimited original and appellate civil and criminal jurisdiction) and the Supreme Court of Appeal (which has original criminal jurisdiction for contempt of court but otherwise has appellate civil and criminal jurisdiction). The Supreme Court of Appeal is a final appellate court in this set of courts. These courts are here called Received Courts because they apply the received (English) common law as the basic law.

The other set of courts is a section of the Ministry of Justice (which is part of the Executive Branch of the Government). The set consists of Traditional Courts of Grades A and B, the Traditional Appeal Courts (which hear and determine appeals from Traditional Courts of Grades A and B), District Traditional Courts, Regional Traditional Courts and the National Traditional Appeal Court (which hears and determines appeals from Traditional Appeal Courts, District Traditional Courts and Regional Traditional Courts). The civil and criminal jurisdiction of Traditional Courts is set out in the warrant establishing the Court and is supplemented from time to time by published ministerial orders under the authority of the Traditional Courts Act (the 1962 Act). The National Traditional Appeal Court is a final appellate court in this set of courts.

The law of compulsory acquisition of land in Nigeria is rooted in the country's constitution. It is enshrined that every Nigerian has the right to own private property and that such property shall not be acquired compulsorily, except in the manner and for the purposes prescribed by a law that requires both the payment of prompt compensation and compliance with the rule of law on access to court. In 2012, the Supreme Court of Nigeria delivered three decisions on the compulsory acquisition of land or the revocation of occupancy rights; Alhaji Tsoho Dan Amale v Sokoto Local Government and Others; Goldmark Nigeria Limited and Others v Ibafon Company Limited and Others; and Ohochukwu v Attorney General of Rivers State and Others. These three cases laid down principles on the subject which are worthy of exposition.

This article considers the protection of, and assistance for, internally displaced children (IDCs) in Africa. Internal displacement has become one of Africa's most pressing human rights challenges. Over the last decade, millions of persons have been internally displaced on the continent by conflict, disaster and other causes. Children are one of the most affected categories of persons, given the implications of displacement for them. Article 23(4) of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child incorporates specific protection for IDCs. This article examines the protection of IDCs in the context of this regional framework. It argues that, while article 23(4) requires that both refugee children and IDCs should be accorded the same protection from a rights-based perspective, it also requires that the protection of IDCs should be construed with reference to the Kampala Convention, which is the most recent applicable regional regime governing internal displacement.

Over the last several decades, states have demonstrated significant political commitment towards advancing protection and assistance for internally displaced persons. A notable form in which this commitment has been reflected is in the emergence of normative standards, with the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (UNGP) as the guiding text. The fact that the UNGP framework has found expression in the landscape on internal displacement is evidenced at various levels of governance. Within the African context, the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention) draws on pertinent normative frameworks, with the UNGP as the leading framework. While this point is often made in general terms, this article focuses on the extent to which the norm on internal displacement has diffused and expanded within the African context.

This article re-assesses the means available for the effective enforcement of human rights in Tanzania based on the valid assumption that the proclamation of human rights in legal instruments, be they at the domestic or international level, is meaningless without the entrenchment of effective enforcement procedures. Particular attention is directed towards the re-examination of the capacity and ability of the courts to meet the challenges posed by human rights and political discourses in their ongoing transformation. The issue is whether they can be said to be adequately providing effective avenues for the promotion, protection and enforcement of human rights.

The Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, completed in 1994, has fundamentally transformed the legal landscape of the world trading system, making the WTO arguably the most powerful international economic institution in the world. Yet, the systemic problems that have dogged the WTO since its establishment in 1995 have their roots in the nature of this transformation and its implications for developing countries, especially African states. Developing countries, hitherto excluded from GATT rules, became subject to expanded WTO legal rules and disciplines on a range of new areas, including services, intellectual property rights and investment measures. The possibility of deepening and widening the rule-base of the trade regime is also likely with the Doha agenda, which includes possible negotiations on new rules dealing with investment, competition policy, trade facilitation, and transparency in government procurement.

Clearly, the increasing legalization and internationalization of trade rules have implications for weak states. International legalization involves sophisticated bargaining where power relations play a significant role. The purpose of this article is to explore, in the context of some of the theories of international law and political economy, how the preferences and interests of African countries are reflected in international rule making that involves both weak and powerful states. The article traces the institutional and legal evolution of the world trading system and how African countries have been affected by these developments. The new Doha agenda is examined with a view to establishing whether it holds out any real hope of redressing the imbalances in the system. Finally, suggestions are made as to how global trade rules can be fair, and therefore made to work for poor states.

African countries, in particular Kenya, have recognized the role of science and technology in long-term economic adaptation and development. Consequently, they have turned to national planning with emphasis on science and technology. In this respect, the goals of national planning are geared towards enhancing the transfer and acquisition of foreign technology and the promotion of local inventive capacity. In Kenya, the importance of these goals is reflected in the enactment of a new patent law embodied in the Industrial Property Act of 1989.