The basic rule of the common law is that damages in civil actions are awarded as compensation for injury and not as punishment for wrongdoing. The object is reparation; and the applicable principle is restitutio in integrum. Thus, the ultimate aim of the award is to restore the plaintiff, as far as money can do, to the position he would have been if the wrong had not been committed. In tort actions where the plaintiff's injury can be measured by some material loss, this principle will apply without much difficulty; however, in cases where the damages are “at large”—in that it involves a substantial subjective element, the viability of the principle of restitutio in integrum becomes doubtful. Moreover, the award of damages may sometimes look to the punishment of the defendant, instead of compensating the plaintiff; such damages are called “exemplary” damages.

Impeachment proceedings are a rarity in the African context. This is not surprising given the history of executive dictatorships, all-powerful one-party states and a subservient media. With the dramatic change in the constitutional landscape of the 1990s, attention should be focused on the adequacy of the presidential removal provisions in African constitutions. This article therefore undertakes a critical review of the relevant provisions in anglophonic African states. It argues that they are unsatisfactory in several respects and calls for them to be thoroughly revised.

An excellent documentation of the twentieth century history of the Sharī'a in Sudan is contained within the Judicial Circulars which have been issued from the office of the Grand Qadi from 1902–1979. During the colonial period and in the post-independence period the Circulars provided a unique means for modifying the adapting Sharī'a law in the Sudan, drawing on opinions of the Hanafī and Mālikī schools of juristic interpretation.

These Circulars and Memoranda are, in fact, basic to an understanding of the practice and application of the Sharī'a law in the Sudan. It is with these Circulars that I began my study of Sharī'a law and it is because of their importance that they were translated for my own work and in the hope that they may shortly be offered to students of the law of the Sudan who lack proficiency in the Arabic language.

At the beginning of the 1980s the North–South dialogue seems to have lost much of its momentum. The prevalent feeling is characterised by frustration about the dialogue's practical achievements, by growing cynicism as to its possibilities and by little hope in regard to new initiatives. The reasons for this view are manifold: the failure of major international conferences, the set-back in the negotiations on new international instruments, the standstill at the global level because of the hesitation of some countries, in particular the United States, which is reconsidering its development policy, and the deterioration of the social and economic situation in most developing countries. Given the growing economic difficulties in many industrialised states, the international climate for the necessary restructuring of the international economic order seems to have gradually worsened. This situation led the Brandt Commission to include in its report a proposal for a North–South summit conference of a limited number of heads of states or governments so as to create a new political impetus. This proposal materialised in the summit conference at Cancun, Mexico, convened by the Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky and the Mexican President Lopes Portillo. One of the hoped-for results of the Cancun summit was to reach consensus on the opening of a “global round of negotiations”, which would provide the framework for a comprehensive effort within the United Nations towards a New International Economic Order (N.I.E.O.).

This is partly a comment on Professor David's views as expressed in “A Civil Code for Ethiopia: Considerations on the Codification of the Civil Law in African Countries”, in the Tulane Law Review of February 1963. Such comment will develop this writer's views as set forth in the Journal of Ethiopian Studies, No. 1 (1963) s.v. “A New Legislative Approach to Custom: the ‘Repeals’ Provision of the Ethiopian Civil Code of 1960”.

In most modern legal systems the prosecution of offences is conducted by government-employed or appointed officials on behalf of the State. Nevertheless it is generally recognised that private individuals also have an important, if somewhat diminished, role to play in this process. Recent legislation introduced into one of the 21 states of Nigeria has however partially abolished the right of private prosecution except in relation to the offence of perjury. This and the additional controversy surrounding one man's attempts to prosecute two government security agents for the murder of his friend has generated a surge of interest in a topic which has for the most part been largely ignored.

This article traces from an historical perspective the role of the private prosecutor in Nigerian traditional society and under its present legal system. An attempt is then made to examine the powers, obligations and importance of the private prosecutor in Nigeria today, and to identify and suggest the checks and balances that are needed to preserve the right of the citizen to seek judicial redress by private prosecution when otherwise justice would be denied.

Recent constitutional developments in South Africa and political statements by President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe have brought to the fore the issue of social tolerance of homosexual conduct. It is a sensitive issue, and is approached in this article from a legal anthropological angle. A distinction is drawn between situational same-sex activity and a gay lifestyle. Although both constitute homosexual conduct, situational same-sex activity need not imply a gay lifestyle, or even a homosexual orientation.

The right to vote in Nigeria has a rather chequered history. Universal adult suffrage became a reality in Nigeria in the 1979 elections when women in the North were allowed for the first time to participate in elections. Originally the right to vote was thought of as a direct consequence of property interests rather than adhering to the person as a political right. It was only gradually that the vote was altered from a property and income right to a political right.

The jurisdiction of State High Courts in Nigeria is to be found in section 236(1) of the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The section provides:

“236(1). Subject to the provisions of this constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by law, the High Court of a State shall have unlimited jurisdiction to hear and determine any civil proceedings in which the existence or extent of a legal right, power, duty, liability, privilege, interest, obligation or claim is in issue or to hear and determine any criminal proceedings involving or relating ot any penalty, forfeiture, punishment or other liability in respect of an offence committed by any person.”

The laws of Cape Verde are unusual in that the islands were uninhabited prior to the arrival of the Portuguese and their legal system. The extent to which Capeverdean law is and is likely to be influenced by Portuguese law is considered. The article concludes that whilst some original legal solutions have been developed in Cape Verde, its limited legal resources and the continuing close ties with Portugal will remain but this should be seen as a strength rather than a weakness of the legal system.

“We have to be realistic and hard-headed about this problem of refugees. We have in particular, to recognise that it is not getting smaller.”

Julius K. Nyerere

Applicable statutes give Nigerian courts discretion to achieve fairness in marital property readjustment. Ironically, the courts’ approach has often been to adjudicate on the basis of formal title, resulting in a general failure to make any readjustments. This article offers two alternative explanations for this judicial behaviour: absence of a specific statutory marriage-centred definition of matrimonial property; and the courts’ failure to appreciate the implicit matrimonial property regime revealed by a perspicacious interpretation of the statutes. These factors lead the courts to exercise a title-finding jurisdiction instead of an adjustive one. This conservative approach results in the courts exercising an exclusionary prescription of property. These flaws ignore the socio-cultural underpinnings and environment of marriage that support patriarchy in Africa and generally “disable” women in relation to property rights. Sample court cases support this thesis and underscore the need for a statutory definition of matrimonial property, with marriage as its denominator.

Food is essential for human survival. When the right quantity and quality is taken, it ensures growth and an adequate supply of nutrition to the body, which results in basic effectiveness in all spheres of life. Genetically modified crops have the potential to alleviate hunger and provide more food, especially in developing countries that have high levels of hunger, malnutrition and poverty. Although the debates on genetically modified crops generally focus on intellectual property, other issues include health and environmental concerns. This article examines these issues with the aim of providing holistic knowledge of the subject matter, which is important for stakeholders, particularly in developing countries, in deciding to protect plant variety rights. The article concludes that it is essential for developing countries to consider food security issues in fulfilling their obligations under the TRIPS Agreement.

I do not wish to trouble you with the details of the system of courts in the Sudan, which is extremely complicated, but it is necessary to sketch the bare outlines. For some time it has been true to say that the Sudan has an “integrated” system in that the Local Courts form part of the judicial hierarchy and come under the supervision of the judiciary rather than the executive. But it would be misleading to call the system “unified”, as the judiciary is split into two quite separate hierarchies: the Sharia Division of which the Grand Kadi is the head, and the Civil Division over which I have the honour to preside. Within the Civil Division there are three main types of courts: “Civil Courts” as established under the Civil Justice Ordinance, Native Courts set up under the Native Courts Ordinance in the six Northern Provinces, and Chiefs Courts set up by the Chiefs’ Courts Ordinance in the three Southern Provinces.

In the Internet ruling the Authority did not come to the assistance of the monopoly. It is submitted that the vested interests of the ISPs outweighed any protection that Telkom could claim and it suited the Authority then to have reference to constitutional rights and universal sendee policies to justify its ruling. The Authority's perception of the market-place may have influenced the decision. In the call back ruling, however, the Authority came to the assistance of the monopoly. This ruling was based in part on a desire to protect Telkom's revenue. But it seems because the call back operators were not afforded an opportunity to present a case to protect their interests, the Authority assumed Telkom's interests to be more important. This notwithstanding, in both rulings the Authority opted for a value-laden rather than a technologically informed decision. While this may be commendable in terms of achieving the overall goals of the sector, it does lead to inconsistency. As I have alluded to above, this can perhaps be overcome if the Authority develops a coherent policy framework for decision making, i.e. the White Paper and the Telecommunications Act afford the Authority a number of policy beacons by which they may be guided and it is inappropriate to follow one (the Telkom monopoly) at the expense of others.

Africa quite suddenly came within the focus of the world's political microscope in the last decade or so. Having thus come into view, it has aroused the interests not only of political scientists but also of lawyers all over the world to an extent almost unprecedented in world history. The colonial powers which had ruled most of Africa in modern times had themselves had centuries of political autonomy behind them. Within the past two decades these colonial powers have had, mainly voluntarily but in some cases as a result of revolt by the governed, to transfer political power to most of their erstwhile dependent peoples.