A major constitutional reform has occurred in France. On 1 March 2010, by virtue of the Constitutional Act of 10 December 20091 (itself pursuant to the constitutional reform of 23 July 2008)2 a new form of constitutional review came into force,3 with the blessing of the Conseil constitutionnel (the Constitutional council).4 The changes are considerable: the role of the Conseil constitutionnel has undergone a revolution which will have implications for ordinary courts as well as for citizens' rights. Arguably, the reform transforms the Conseil constitutionnel—so far a council with limited powers of review—into a true Constitutional court, and as discussed below, opens up constitutional issues in ordinary litigation, enhancing the protection of citizens' human rights. Owing to the reform, ‘Constitutional rights and liberties guaranteed by the Constitution’ can now be invoked against legislation in the course of litigation. This is a true revolution in France because, up until now, no individual was allowed to invoke the jurisdiction of the Conseil constitutionnel,5 nor were they authorized to invoke a constitutional principle in litigation, as this would have been asking ordinary judges to assess a piece of legislation against the Constitution, a task which exclusively belongs to the Conseil constitutionnel.6 Constitutional rights and liberties will now (as is further discussed below) play a key part in ordinary litigation.

Recent years have witnessed significant developments in international human rights law relating to domestic violence. No longer viewed as a matter ‘essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the State’, domestic violence now frequently commands the attention of international human rights bodies. The obligations imposed on States include positive obligations of due diligence to prevent, investigate and to punish domestic violence, whenever and wherever it occurs.1 Judicial dialogue across the borders of human rights and refugee law has also expanded access to asylum for women fleeing domestic violence, bringing with it a gradual recognition of the positive obligations that international law now imposes on States. However, as recent cases such as Jessica Gonzalez v the United States2 and Opuz v Turkey3 reveal, significant gaps remain between the rhetoric of human rights law and the reality of everyday enforcement and implementation on the ground. These gaps are most keenly felt by refugee women. While State practice suggests greater gender inclusivity and sensitivity in the practice of refugee law, women fleeing domestic violence continue to face obstacles in making their claims heard.

It is generally considered that an international organization (‘IO’) has an international legal personality which is distinct from that of its Member States, as a result of which the IO itself, rather than the Member States, is to be held responsible for the IO's internationally wrongful acts.1 It appears to be an accepted principle that Member States cannot generally be held liable for the acts of IOs by virtue of their membership of an IO alone. This view can be found in a 1996 resolution of the Institut de Droit International, which provides that ‘there is no general rule of international law whereby States members are, due solely to their membership, liable, concurrently or subsidiarily, for the obligations of an international organization of which they are members.’2 This is echoed in the International Law Commission's (‘ILC’) Commentary to article 62 of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (‘ILC DARIO’): ‘It is clear that … membership does not as such entail for member States international responsibility when the organization commits an internationally wrongful act’.3 The ILC holds the view that only in the case of an intervening act by a Member State that influences the commission of a wrongful act by the IO (aid and assistance, direction and control, coercion, avoidance of compliance, acceptance) could the Member State be held responsible.4

Governments intervene in the energy sector using a variety of measures to pursue a range of objectives, from security of supply and energy efficiency to environmental protection. Recent concerns about the impact of fossil fuels on climate change have resulted in the increasing promotion of biofuels as an alternative to oil. While worries exist with regard to the environmental impact of biofuel production in ecologically sensitive areas, it has been argued that with an effective regulatory framework to promote sustainable production, biofuels could provide a mechanism to provide energy security in an environmentally positive way.1 The interest of the European Union (EU) in the promotion of biofuels production is a relatively recent phenomenon and it is now the world's largest producer of biodiesel and the fourth largest producer of bioethanol. At its most basic level, the promotion of biofuels as an alternative to fossil fuels is part of a wider EU effort to support the use of renewable energy. The promotion of renewable energy is traceable to a number of goals, a central one of which is ensuring security of energy supply.2 Other policy goals supported by the promotion of renewable energies include reducing greenhouse gas emissions associated with climate change, decreasing dependence upon imported oil, the promotion of technological development as well as regional and rural development and employment.3

A critical observer would not deny that the practice of European Union (‘EU’) policy making in the field of criminal law in the past decade since the implementation of the Tampere Programme has been mainly repressive and prosecution-oriented.1 The idea of introducing a set of common (minimum) rules, guaranteeing the rights of defence at a EU-wide level, has not been accorded the same attention as the introduction of instruments aimed at improving the effectiveness of crime-fighting. What does this mean for the future of EU criminal policy? Will the EU succeed in the coming years in developing an area where freedom, security and justice are truly balanced? According to several authors, to date the EU has evolved in the opposite direction. As one observer put it:

Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute)1 provides that the International Criminal Court must consider ‘internationally recognized human rights’ in its interpretation and application of applicable law. This article highlights the difficulty of meaningfully interpreting this reference to ‘internationally recognized human rights’ in accordance with the ordinary rules of treaty interpretation. These interpretative difficulties lead the article to adopt a practical focus, examining the initial jurisprudence of the Court utilizing this aspect of article 21(3), concluding that although such jurisprudence reveals a number of shortcomings, the provision's tremendous potential as a tool of evolution and innovation is evident.

This article analyses the contribution made to the effective implementation of international environmental law in the EU by the ECJ invoking direct application and effect of international treaties. It considers the requirements of these doctrines in international law, distinguishing them from related doctrines in EU law. It reviews jurisprudence and literature and evaluates future potential. Implications for direct application and effect from the EU doctrine of primacy and for the principle of effective judicial protection are examined, and alternatives to full transposition, implementation and enforcement explored, including non-compliance procedures.

International commercial arbitration has long been a popular method for resolving cross-border business disputes. The opportunity for parties to choose their adjudicators and the dispute resolution procedure, the scope for privacy and the greater capacity for enforcement of awards compared to court judgments are all important reasons that parties prefer international arbitration over litigation. Reinforcing this trend in favour of international commercial arbitration has been a general consensus among national courts and legislatures that support, rather than interference, should be provided to the arbitral process. Such a philosophy is apparent, for example, in the requirements in the widely adopted New York Convention for States to recognize and enforce both foreign arbitration agreements and awards, and in international instruments such as the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, which authorize national courts to assist, rather than intervene, in the conduct of arbitrations within their borders. Moreover, international commercial arbitration has proven to be sufficiently flexible as a dispute resolution method to be used both in disputes between private parties, and between private and State entities.

Community activity in this field continues to be extensive. Intellectual property is seen as a key resource for the European Union (‘EU’), and crucial to its position in the global economy. The EU's manufacturing sector is much decreased in importance in comparison with the services sector. New information and communications technologies have transformed the economic environment. The Commission repeatedly emphasises the importance of intellectual property rights for innovation, employment, competition, and economic growth. Intellectual assets are regarded as central to success in the new ‘knowledge economy’. There are two main strands to the Commission's work with intellectual property. One is the harmonisation of the laws of Member States, in order to eliminate barriers to trade. The other is the creation of unitary systems to protect intellectual property rights throughout the Community on the basis of a single application for protection. The Commission also demonstrates particular concern regarding counterfeiting.

This article examines a number of major developments in international law and State policy regarding nuclear weapons which have occurred over the past two years.

However, in order to understand the context and significance of these developments, I must first very briefly address what has gone on previously in this area of international relations.

I have argued elsewhere that over the course of the decade ending in 2008 the original balance of principles underlying the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which comprises the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation legal regime, has been distorted, particularly by nuclear-weapon-possessing governments, led by the United States, in favor of a disproportionate prioritization of non-proliferation principles, and an unwarranted under-prioritization of peaceful use and disarmament principles.1 I also argue that this distortion of principled balance by nuclear weapon states has resulted in a number of erroneous legal interpretations of the NPT's provisions.

On 27 February 2011, it was reported in the media that the United Kingdom had revoked the diplomatic immunity of Libyan leader Mu'ammar Qaddafi and his family.1 Earlier that day, the British Foreign Secretary, William Hague, told BBC1's Andrew Marr Show:

The Cancun Agreements, hailed by Patricia Espinosa, Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs and President of the Cancun Conference, as launching ‘a new era of international cooperation on climate change,’1 were concluded on 11 December 2010 to widespread acclaim. These agreements that will guide the climate negotiations for the foreseeable future represent another twist in the tale of the ongoing negotiations.

The United Kingdom (‘UK’) has indicated its intention not to opt-in to two proposals from the European Commission aimed at further developing the Common European Asylum System through the replacement of existing instruments on asylum procedures and reception conditions. The purpose of the European Union (‘EU’) amendment process is to establish rules that more closely align the legal framework for asylum in the Member States so that asylum seekers receive the same higher standard of treatment in any Member State in which they choose to make their application, and to address criticism that the Directives are incompatible with human rights obligations. The UK asserts that its asylum procedures satisfy the standards imposed by its obligations under international and European law, and does not view further harmonization of asylum matters at EU level as necessary or appropriate. Its decision not to opt-in raises issues regarding sovereignty, subsidiarity, the rule of law and European integration. This article will explore these issues, as well as provide an overview of select provisions from the proposals in light of UK asylum policy.

A new statutory right for Parliament to control the ratification of treaties for the United Kingdom has recently entered into force.1 The topic of ‘Ratification of Treaties’ may have attracted fewer headlines than some others originally proposed for inclusion in the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 (the CRaG Act),2 but reform in this area succeeded, with cross-party support, and is now in operation.3 These new statutory provisions replace the ‘Ponsonby Rule’ in the UK.

The interpretation of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter has been the elephant in the room, or more accurately the chamber of the Council, since the bitter divisions over the ‘revival argument’ and the invasion of Iraq in 2003.1 Although there has been some evidence of an increase in the specificity of UNSC resolutions in an effort to avoid the same difficulties reoccurring,2 the margin of appreciation provided to States in interpreting the mandates provided to them has recently come into focus again.

Since the outset of the financial crisis, the EU financial markets regime1 has been undergoing a period of turbulence which contrasts sharply with the period of relative stability which it briefly enjoyed over 2005–2007 and post-FSAP (Financial Services Action Plan2). The FSAP reforms had been adopted. The Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) had emerged as an influential actor, driving some degree of supervisory coordination and co-operation and constructing a significant soft law ‘rule-book.’ And the 2007 Lamfalussy Review suggested broad political, institutional and stakeholder satisfaction with the Lamfalussy process. There was little enthusiasm for grand adventures in institutional design, albeit that supervision, an institutionally-driven concern, was presciently if belatedly emerging as a concern of the EU institutions. The Review's main concern, however, was with strengthening the pragmatic, if somewhat haphazard, network-based, ‘supervisory convergence’ model as the means for supervising the integrating EU financial market. With respect to regulation, reflecting the wider international zeitgeist pre-crisis,3 ‘Better Regulation’ and the need for a ‘regulatory pause’ were the watchwords of a Commission which, once the massive FSAP regime was safely in place, espoused the benefits of self-regulation and highlighted the risks of intervention without impact assessment, extensive consultation and evidence of market failure.4 This was most apparent with respect to credit rating agencies,5 debt market transparency,6 hedge funds,7 and clearing and settlement.8 Institutionally, a relatively sophisticated law-making apparatus, in the form of the Lamfalussy structures, a plethora of advisory bodies and stakeholder bodies (notably FIN-NET which represents the consumer and SME interest), had been established.

Osama Bin Laden was killed on 2 May 2011 in the course of an operation by US special forces (Navy Seals) in Abbottabad, Pakistan.1 The US forces were flown by helicopter from neighbouring Afghanistan. The death of Bin Laden renewed questions about the legality of such operations during armed conflicts and during peacetime.2 The potentially applicable law includes international humanitarian law, international human rights law, jus ad bellum and the domestic law of the US and Pakistan.3

The judgment of 3 December 2009 in Commission v Germany touches upon the issue of improper implementation by a Member State (Germany) of the EU regulatory framework in the electronic communications sector.1 In this sense, the judgment in question belongs to the relatively large group of rulings in which the European Court of Justice (ECJ) categorizes the legislative actions (or inactions) of Member States in the field of electronic communications as infringing the Union secondary legislation.2 Undoubtedly, however, Commission v Germany constitutes a judgment that is of paramount importance within the above-mentioned group of rulings and deserves a particularly close attention. Being confronted here with the German rules that generally exempted the so-called new (emerging) markets in the sector concerned from ex ante regulation, the Court had an opportunity to express its views on such key regulatory issues as:

1. 1) the position of encouraging efficient investment in infrastructure, and promoting innovation within the hierarchy of objectives that the EU regulation in electronic communications sector aims to achieve;

2. 2) the scope of discretionary powers of national regulatory authorities (NRAs) in defining the markets susceptible to ex ante regulation, and in regulating those markets, including the markets having a new or emerging character;

3. 3) the role of national legislators in regulating electronic communications markets, and particularly the relationships between national legislators and NRAs in the field of regulation of the markets in question.

The definition and scope of indigenous peoples' human rights are usually contentious in the context of Africa.2 While in recent years indigenous peoples' human rights have expanded immensely internationally, in Africa indigenous peoples' rights are still perceived to be in their infancy.3 At the United Nations, the group of African States delayed the process that finally led to the adoption of the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007 (UNDRIP).4 At a national level, most of the States in Africa are still reluctant to recognize the specific rights of indigenous peoples.5 Until recently, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (the Commission), the leading human rights institution for the continent,6 had kept a low profile on the issue and had ‘not always interpreted indigenous peoples’ rights favourably'.7 From this perspective Commission regarding the communication submitted by the indigenous Endorois community against Kenya casts new light on the rights of indigenous peoples in Africa.8 The decision, which has already been hailed as a ‘landmark,’9 touches on several crucial issues regarding the development of indigenous peoples' human rights in Africa. This groundbreaking decision did not materialize unexpectedly but is part of a wider evolution of the Commission regarding indigenous peoples' human rights in Africa. It echoes the work of the Commission's own Working Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations/Communities (Working Group) which was established in 2001 with the mandate to focus specifically on the promotion and protection of the rights of indigenous peoples in Africa.10 The mandate of the Working Group is to examine the concept of indigenous communities in Africa, as well as to analyse their rights under the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Charter).11 In 2003 the Commission adopted the report of the Working Group which proposes several avenues for the recognition and promotion of indigenous rights in Africa.12 The adoption of an Advisory Opinion by the Commission to support the adoption of UNDRIP marked another step toward the affirmation of indigenous peoples' rights in Africa.13 The Advisory Opinion not only participated in unlocking the reluctance of the group of African States to adopt the UNDRIP, but also reflected developments taking place at the international level on the rights of indigenous peoples as well as their connection to the continent. Remarkably, in recent years, the Commission has started to refer to indigenous peoples' rights in its examination of States' periodic reports.14 All these factors and the recent decision of the Commission in the Endorois case indicate the emergence of a consistent jurisprudence on indigenous peoples' rights in Africa.

On 28 October 2010, the Standing Committee of the Eleventh National People's Congress adopted China's first statute on the Conflict of Laws: the ‘Act on the Application of Laws over Foreign-related Civil Relationships’ (‘Conflicts Act’).1 The adoption was an historic event in Chinese legislative history, as it indicates China has modernised its conflict-of-law rules after many years of unremitting efforts made by legislators and scholars. More importantly, it means that ‘a socialist legal system with Chinese characteristics’ has been successfully established, and allows China to claim to have a systematic legal system.2