Even when a forum has completed the task of identifying, in any given case, the lex causae, there remains a possibility of further choice of law complexities as regards delimitation of the applicable law. The extent of leeway which a Scottish or English forum enjoys when purporting to apply the lex causae, in the question of whether that court should refer to,1 and apply, the whole corpus of the lex causae,2 is ultimately a matter for the forum's discretion, the exercise whereof admittedly few opportunities are afforded.

This paper outlines recent developments in regional cooperation within the Gulf of Guinea region leading to the recent establishment of the Gulf of Guinea Commission. The huge interest generated among the major oil-producing multinational corporations, the newer independent producers and the participating States in the Gulf of Guinea necessitates a critical assessment of the Treaty Establishing the Gulf of Guinea Commission. This paper adopts a comparative analysis with pre-existing regional and institutional bodies having similar aims and objectives. The aim is to ascertain whether and to what extent the emergent regime can facilitate a sustainable and responsive regime for the anticipated explosion of exploitative activities in this resource-rich and strategic littoral zone. This paper, thus, places the existing regime in the context of international best practices for multinationals and governments involved in oil and gas exploration and production. The author identifies certain imperatives for the consideration of both the corporate and sovereign interests in the world's newest resource Eldorado.

Council Regulation 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of Judgments in Civil Commercial Matters1 replaced the 1968 Brussels Convention on 1 March 2002 for Member States of the European union Except Denmark.2 This has given the European Community exclusive competence in matters relating to jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments. As a result individual Member States can no longer freely ratify conventions which, in relation to specific matters, govern jurisdiction or the recognition or enforcement of judgments.3 This is reflected in the deletion of ‘or will be’ from the text of Article 71(1) of the Regulation,4 a phrase which previously found in the equivalent provision in the Brussels Convention.5

A. The area of freedom, security and justice and the role of the Court of Justice

One of the subjects which has aroused particular interest in the study of the ‘area of freedom, security and justice’ introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam as an objective of the European Union (EU) inherent in the principle of the free movement of persons (see the preamble to, and Article 2, the Treaty on EU) is the role of the European Court of Justice (Court). The interest is both theoretical and practical, because one of the main issues is the Court's jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings and thus relations between national and Community courts and the protection of the interests of individuals before national courts wherever there is a conflict between national and Community law and thus a question of interpretation of Community law arises in national proceedings. The Treaty of Nice, which came into force on 1 February 2003, altered the jurisdiction and organisation of the Community judicature and therefore affected the ‘area of freedom, security and justice’.1

The last time this column appeared1 there was considerable discussion about the proposals being considered at the then ongoing intergovernmental conference (IGC). Not surprisingly the proposals of the UK government in its Memorandum on the Court of Justice were not adopted in the Treaty of Amsterdam. No institutional changes have been made in relation to the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance. So the approval of their Rules of Procedure is still subject to the approval of the Council and their terms of office are still six years but can be renewed.

In its decision in the Arrest Warrant case,2 the International Court of Justice studiedly refused to address systematically the legality and ambit of a purported exercise in absentia of universal criminal jurisdiction by one State over a government minister of another State. This, coupled with the dicta of certain judges with reservations as to the scope of universal jurisdiction3 and the (at best) lukewarm support for such jurisdiction displayed by certain other judges,4 might be taken as a discouragement to States to engage in similar exercises of jurisdiction. However, the contemporary trend in many developed States in favour of taking measures of extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction to apprehend and punish the alleged perpetrators of serious international law crimes, coupled with the entry into force of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, indicates that more such attempts are quite likely to be made. Within a year of its decision in the Arrest Warrant case, the ICJ again found itself the forum for a similar dispute. On 9 December 2002 the Republic of the Congo (‘the Congo’) filed an Application instituting proceedings against France5 in circumstances notably resembling those that had prompted the Democratic Republic of the Congo (‘the DRC’) to act against Belgium. Again, the Applicant was an African State protesting against an alleged abuse of universal jurisdiction and failure to respect immunities on the part of its European former colonial ruler. Despite the prima facie similarity between the two cases, however, the chances that the eventual decision in the Certain Criminal Proceedings case will go beyond the Arrest Warrant case to elucidate the doctrine of universal jurisdiction are very slight. This note is confined to considering the circumstances behind the Congolese Application and Request for the Indication of a Provisional Measure, and the Court's response thereto in its Order of 17 June 2003.

This comparison involves the study of two very different forms of remedy. These are the Scottish Arrestment and the English Freezing Order.2 The Freezing Order is a relatively recent common law creation which contains features unusual amongst Convention jurisdictions. The continental origins of the Arrestment over 400 years ago, and its existence in a jurisdiction based upon the Civil Law unaltered by the Code Napoleon, have given rise to a remedy which is a member of the same family as its continental equivalents but different again. Indeed as we shall see, these measures are so different that most of the possible features of remedies of their type lie in the contrast.

The period under review (January 2010 – June 2012) has been a time of consolidation (or exhaustion) for the Union generally, as the Lisbon changes are allowed to bed in. The competition sphere is no exception. There has been limited initiative, certainly nothing ambitious to come out of the Commission over the period. At the same time a new Commission took up office—three months late, and by a little-remarked constitutional sleight of hand1—in 2010, and with it came a new Commissioner for Competition (Mr Almunia) and with him a new Director-General of DG Competition (Mr Italianer—Dutch notwithstanding the name), which event sometimes, but not always, marks a reorientation of Union competition policy. Both are economists which, again, may or may not influence the direction of policy. At the same time the Union has been buffeted by a financial crisis not wholly of its own making in which the competition rules must have a significant role to play.

The WTO Appellate Body has so far authorized public appeal hearings as the exception, not the rule: it is limited to those instances in which the main parties request it. Such authorization constitutes a very positive development for the WTO dispute settlement system, for it enhances the transparency of the system at its highest stage. Indeed, the Appellate Body is becoming a leading actor in the formation of international law1 owing to the fact that it is the most active international court of the world, the relevance of the issues it deals with and the fact that it is at the apex of a dispute settlement system with permanent and exclusive jurisdiction over 153 States. Nonetheless, it is not in tune with inter-state international adjudication where the trend concerning hearings is, for good reason, geared towards openness and transparency, not privacy, as the rule.

The law and legal system of Mauritius are an unusual hybrid and a remarkable instance of comparative law in action. As a consequence of its history, as an overseas possession of France from 1715 to 1810 and as a British colony from 1814 until it achieved independence within the Commonwealth in 1968, its law and legal system reflect the legal traditions of both its former colonial rulers. In general terms, Mauritian private law is based on the French Code Civil while public law and commercial law are based on English law: an example of what has recently been labelled a “bi-systemic legal system”. The Constitution, a version of the Westminster export model, was originally monarchical. It was amended in 1991 and Mauritius became a republic within the Commonwealth in 1992.

The eventual product of the International Law Commission's (ILC) work on state immunity hasbeen in the form of a Convention. This prompts the question whether widespread ratification (or accession etc) will be necessary for clear rules of international law on state immunity to become firmlyestablished or whether a substantial codifying effect could be achieved even if the Convention does not attract a great number of parties. The latter has sometimes been said of much of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. As the law on state immunity has undergone much of its substantial development by practice of national courts (albeit that the piecemeal adoption and implementation of treaties has played some part), could this process not simply continue with the Convention providing guidance or a model? If the trend from absolute to restrictive immunity could occur by development of customary law, are there not still adequate means of consolidating customary law without the need for states actually to become parties to the treaty?

Regulatory competition in company law has been extensively debated in the last few decades, but it has rarely been discussed whether there could also be regulatory competition in partnership law. This article fills this gap. It addresses the partnership law of the US, the UK, Germany, and France, and presents empirical data on the different types of partnerships and companies established in these jurisdictions. The main focus is on the use of a limited liability partnership (LLP) outside its country of origin. It is also considered whether some regulatory competition can take place in the law of limited partnerships.