EC intellectual property law has now reached a significant level of harmonization, and the Community can take pride in its achievements in this respect. The need to report a wealth of new matters leaves little space for introduction. However, two issues may be highlighted here briefly. The first is that in May 2004 ten new Member States will join the EU. Although enlargement offers immense opportunities, it also presents a considerable practical challenge. The second is the Commission's plan for a directive to harmonize procedure and remedies for intellectual property infringement throughout the EU.1 It seeks to go further than the ground rules on enforcement already laid down by TRIPs, and to lay down specific procedural codes for intellectual property infringement of all types—not merely piracy and counterfeiting. This enthusiasm for intervention in the procedural aspects of national law has raised serious concerns in some quarters.

On 25 April 2012, after years of negotiations delayed by halts and setbacks, the Food Assistance Convention was adopted—the latest in a series of agreements that since 1967 have regulated the international provision of food aid. Great expectations have been placed on the adoption of the Convention. In particular it was hoped that the Convention would answer the call for a new system of food aid governance, introduce more effective mechanisms to address world's food insecurity and, ultimately, improve and modernize the rules applicable to food aid. This article provides the first critical commentary of the Convention's text, assesses the strengths and weaknesses of its provisions and considers whether and how the Convention has modified the architecture of international food aid regulation. The article also indicates where amendments to the rules might be needed to make the international regulation of food aid more effective. The article concludes that the Convention is, on balance, a positive instrument that could improve governance and adequacy of food assistance. The Convention is also important for the international human rights discourse on how States can fulfil their obligation to assist countries in need in that it offers guidance on how to meet such obligation in the specific context of the right to food. States should therefore be urged to sign and ratify it.

Globalization redefines the relationship between law and space, resulting in the emergence of transnational administrative law in a globalizing legal space. I aim to shed light on transnational administrative law by examining how administrative law relates to the process of European integration. I argue that the idea of administrative legitimation is at the core of this relationship. In the European Union, transnational administration grounds its legitimacy on the fulfilment of administrative law requirements. However, given that in the European Union, administrative legitimation is rooted in Europe's constitutional transformation, I caution against the projection of Europe's experience onto global governance.

While many Australians continue to see their roots in Western Europe, in matters concerning human rights and immigration control, Australia's culture and attitudes over time have become more closely aligned with those of States in its immediate geographical region. The trend finds obvious expression in the convergence of laws and policies governing the treatment of asylum seekers. This article uses as a case study various efforts made to establish regional frameworks for the management of irregular (forced) migration. The author argues that Australia's reversion to deflection and offshore processing as deterrent measures resonates with the discourse in two States that have been closely associated with the new ‘arrangements’: Malaysia and Indonesia. Australia's policies make express reference to laws and State behaviour in the region through what has been labelled the ‘no advantage’ principle governing Australia's treatment of asylum seekers presenting as unauthorized maritime arrivals (UMAs). The central idea is that these asylum seekers should gain no material advantage by reaching Australia in comparison with the situation they would face if their claims were processed in States of first refuge. If the comparators are the refugee-receiving States around Australia, the policy has to play out in the degradation of terms and conditions faced by UMAs in Australia. In the area of human rights and refugee policy, the author argues that Australia should be doing more to distinguish itself as a leader rather than follow the (generally poor) practices of its neighbours.

International sanctions have grown in use significantly since they were deployed in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.1 In the decade since the Kuwait crisis, economic and other measures not involving the use of force have been deployed by the international community against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro),2 Libya3 Rwanda4 Haiti5 Liberia,6 Somalia,7 Sudan,8 Sierra Leone,9 Angola,10 Eritrea and Ethiopia11 and, most recently, Afghanistan.12 International sanctions today derive—principally13—from a single source: the Security Council acting on the powers delegated to it by Member States under Article 41 of the UN Charter. However, while the sanctions contemplated by Article 41 have proved to be of continuing relevance in an increasingly interdependent world, the circumstances which enhance the potency of economic sanctions as a means of responding to an international crisis also increase the risk of loss by innocent States. The increased willingness of the Security Council to use its binding authority to impose economic sanctions has raised important questions both as to the cost of economic sanctions to implementing States, and the limits on the Council's powers.

The Northern Ireland Peace Agreement1 was concluded following multi-party negotiations on Good Friday, 10 April 1998. It received 71 per cent approval in Northern Ireland and 95 per cent approval in the Republic of Ireland in the subsequent referenda held on Friday 22 May, the day after Ascension. To some, it must have seemed that the timing was singularly appropriate following 30 years of “The Troubles”, which were perceived as being between a “Catholic minority” and a “Protestant majority”. While there are some minority groups identified by their religious affiliation that do require rights relating only to their religion, such as the right to worship in community,2 to practise and profess their religion,3 to legal recognition as a church,4 to hold property5 and to determine its own membership,6 some minority groups identified by their religious affiliation are properly national or ethnic minorities–religion is merely one factor which distinguishes them from the other groups, including the majority, in the population. One example of the latter situation is to be seen in (Northern) Ireland where there is, in fact, untypically, a double minority: the Catholic-nationalist community is a minority in Northern Ireland, but the Protestant-unionist population is a minority in the island of Ireland as a whole.7 The territory of Northern Ireland is geographically separate from the rest of the United Kingdom. The recent peace agreement addresses a whole range of issues for Northern Ireland, but included are, on the one hand, rights for the populations based on their religious affiliation, their culture and their language and, on the other, rights with respect to their political participation up to the point of external self-determination. It is a holistic approach. Like any good minority rights agreement,8 it deals with both standards and their implementation and, like any good minority rights agreement, it is not a minority rights agreement but, rather, a peace settlement.

This article argues that although most Caribbean States have in the last 60 years ascended to statehood, colonialism continues to exist in new and variable forms. It relies upon the concept of ‘coloniality’ as advanced by Schneiderman to contend that the international investment law regime, whose history and evolution is rooted in colonialism, relentlessly pursues the economic interests of foreign investors and capital-exporting countries. It draws important connections between historic colonialism and the contemporary regime for the protection of foreign direct investment by situating the Caribbean's experience in the light of the rationales, tropes and methods arising in the past which endure in investment law's domains, as advanced by Schneiderman in his new book, Investment Law's Alibis, namely (a) profitability and privilege; (b) a discourse of improvement; (c) distrust of local self-rule; and (d) construction of legal enclaves. It is argued that each of these features of colonial rule, from a Caribbean perspective, is inscribed in the discourse and practices of the international investment law regime.

The eventual product of the International Law Commission's (ILC) work on state immunity hasbeen in the form of a Convention. This prompts the question whether widespread ratification (or accession etc) will be necessary for clear rules of international law on state immunity to become firmlyestablished or whether a substantial codifying effect could be achieved even if the Convention does not attract a great number of parties. The latter has sometimes been said of much of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. As the law on state immunity has undergone much of its substantial development by practice of national courts (albeit that the piecemeal adoption and implementation of treaties has played some part), could this process not simply continue with the Convention providing guidance or a model? If the trend from absolute to restrictive immunity could occur by development of customary law, are there not still adequate means of consolidating customary law without the need for states actually to become parties to the treaty?

Regulatory competition in company law has been extensively debated in the last few decades, but it has rarely been discussed whether there could also be regulatory competition in partnership law. This article fills this gap. It addresses the partnership law of the US, the UK, Germany, and France, and presents empirical data on the different types of partnerships and companies established in these jurisdictions. The main focus is on the use of a limited liability partnership (LLP) outside its country of origin. It is also considered whether some regulatory competition can take place in the law of limited partnerships.

To allow Court orders to be disobeyed would be to tread the road towards anarchy. If the orders of the Court can be treated with disrespect, the whole administration of justice is brought into scorn. Daily, thousands of Canadians resort to our Courts for relief against the wrongful acts of others. If the remedies that Courts grant to correct those wrongs can be ignored, then there will be nothing left but for each person to take the law into his own hands. Loss of respect for the Courts will quickly result in the destruction of our society. [O'Leary J, in Canada Metal Co. Ltd v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (1975) 48 DLR 3d 641, 669 (High Court of Ontario)]

Even when a forum has completed the task of identifying, in any given case, the lex causae, there remains a possibility of further choice of law complexities as regards delimitation of the applicable law. The extent of leeway which a Scottish or English forum enjoys when purporting to apply the lex causae, in the question of whether that court should refer to,1 and apply, the whole corpus of the lex causae,2 is ultimately a matter for the forum's discretion, the exercise whereof admittedly few opportunities are afforded.

This article addresses the issues attending common law collegiate courts' engagements with allegations of bias within their own ranks. It will be argued that, in such cases, it would be inappropriate to involve the collegiate panel or any member thereof in the decision, since such involvement inevitably encounters difficulties. The common law's dilemmas require drastic solutions, but the common law arguably is ill-equipped to implement the required change. The answer, it will be argued, is legislation.

The WTO Appellate Body has so far authorized public appeal hearings as the exception, not the rule: it is limited to those instances in which the main parties request it. Such authorization constitutes a very positive development for the WTO dispute settlement system, for it enhances the transparency of the system at its highest stage. Indeed, the Appellate Body is becoming a leading actor in the formation of international law1 owing to the fact that it is the most active international court of the world, the relevance of the issues it deals with and the fact that it is at the apex of a dispute settlement system with permanent and exclusive jurisdiction over 153 States. Nonetheless, it is not in tune with inter-state international adjudication where the trend concerning hearings is, for good reason, geared towards openness and transparency, not privacy, as the rule.