Social Democratic Parties Across Europe Face adjustment problems. Given the electoral decline of almost every social democratic party, it is tempting for social scientists to pronounce such political parties as either in decay or even a thing of the past. There is little doubt that social democratic parties are searching for new concepts, ideas and policies. At the heart of the attempt to regain the political initiative is the debate over how to react not only to the challenges from the new social movements but also to the re-invigorated attack by liberals and conservatives on central social democratic policies: the welfare state and socioeconomicequality.

Dominant party systems are defined by a lack of party alternation at the national level; however, dominant party systems do not inherently preclude electoral competition at the macro level, the micro level, or both. Nonetheless, little systematic work has documented the competitiveness of elections under a dominant party system. This article describes the nature of competition under one of sub-Saharan Africa's most enduring dominant party systems, Botswana. By examining electoral outcomes at the constituency level, this article demonstrates that elections in Botswana produce significant levels of competition, especially when compared to other sub-Saharan countries. Furthermore, electoral competitiveness appears unrelated to the party system at large: namely, competitiveness is no less or greater under dominant party systems than under multiparty systems.

Given the academic and media salience of democracy and its measurement, in this contribution we take a closer look at the various existing datasets. For this purpose, in the first two sections we look at democratic conceptualization and measurement, and then focus on the most used datasets on democracy and assess them against the conceptual criteria illustrated in the first section. The third section focuses on the notion of quality of democracy and how it has advanced the understanding of contemporary democracies. The subsequent section illustrates changes in democratic scoring in European countries over the past 15 years. Our results show that democracy has not become more robust in European countries: on the contrary, several countries witnessed significant democratic deterioration. Furthermore, we show that – with the exception of Polity – the indexes analysed are highly correlated and therefore could be equally useful for an ongoing analysis of European democracies.

This article proposes a novel theoretical framework to account for the combined effects of regime type and patterns of executive authority on legislative party unity. We argue that broad presidential legislative powers favour coordination between the president and legislative parties under pure presidentialism, whereas under semi-presidentialism, strong presidents increase the potential for intra-executive conflict, submitting parties to cross-cutting pressures. We expect higher levels of legislative authority to increase party unity under presidentialism but decrease under semi-presidentialism. Moreover, when presidents are endowed with limited legislative authority, semi-presidentialism produces higher levels of party unity than presidentialism, but for sufficiently high levels of legislative authority there should be no difference across regime types. Our analyses of 1,586 pooled observations for 72 democracies from all regions of the world using the V-Dem measure of party cohesion demonstrate that presidential legislative authority, in combination with regime type, is indeed a key predictor of party unity.

PARTIES ARE THE LINK BETWEEN EXISTING POLITICAL STRUCtures and the rocesses which lead to new political institutions. No wonder, therefore, that parties play an important role at the centre of many revolutionary theories. Nevertheless the theory of parties is not as decisive to Marx's social and political theory as one might imagine. Some introductions to Marx's thought do not even mention the catchwords ‘party’ or ‘parties’ though they concentrate on the sphere of his political ideas. In most books hints at a theory of parties are hidden away in remarks of marginal importance under the topics ‘praxis’ or ‘revolution’. Only those comprehensive studies which emphasize the continuity between Marxism and Leninism, because they defend the Marxist position, deal explicitly with the theory of parties. The same is true for those authors who overemphasize the continuity of Marxist thought, to a degree which almost identifies the theoretical positions of Marx, Engels and Lenin, for the purposes of anti-Marxist polemi.

Factionalism is an important element in parties' internal life, affecting their policies, strategies, electoral performance and even survival. Yet little is known about how parties manage factionalism. This study examines how radical left parties (RLPs) manage factionalism, drawing on a comparative case study of four RLPs – the Spanish Podemos and United Left (IU), and the Portuguese Left Bloc (BE) and Communist Party (PCP) – from 2010 to 2019. Drawing on original data collection, we find that parties adopt both formal and informal mechanisms to address factionalism. However, their approaches differ significantly. We identify two main approaches towards factionalism: a permissive approach, which allows internal pluralism, in the BE and IU; and a prohibitionist approach, which actively fights factionalism, in Podemos and the PCP, with competitive prohibitionism in the former and pre-emptive prohibitionism in the latter. These approaches strongly correlate with parties' origins and political orientation, but neither fully prevents intra-party conflict or splintering.

THE COLLAPSE OF COMMUNISM HAS COINCIDED WITH A crisis of capitalism. At the very time when discredited Marxist dogmas have been abandoned and the former Communist countries are seeking to privatize their industries and replace planning with the market, the capitalist economies have again displayed their traditional weaknesses. For inequality has widened, and large numbers of people are still said to be in poverty notwithstanding the fact that expenditure on the welfare state in its various forms absorbs much the larger part of public expenditure. Increasing scepticism about the welfare state has been accompanied by a loss of faith in macro-economic policy. Not only has mass unemployment returned on a scale that would once have been thought inconceivable but it appears to be assumed, with gloomy resignation, that the number without work, even if reduced by a cyclical recovery, will remain high for an indefinite period ahead. In these respects, the rich West presents a discouraging prospect to the aspiring East.

SINCE 1976 ITALY HAS BEEN EXPERIENCING A POLITICAL STALEmate which should not be confused with the periodical difficulties of the system. What is at stake is the capacity of Italian democracy to ensure change in a peaceful manner – which I take to be one of the main functions of democracy. The political essence of the crisis lies in the Christian Democrats' (DC) growing incapacity to assure the governability of the country and in the problem of providing an alternative governmental leadership which would include the main opposition party, the Communist Party (PCI).

The resulting impasse is what explained both Moro's insistence on the need for a ‘great national solidarity’ and the PCI's strategy of the ‘historic compromise’. Convergence found political expression in the grand coalition governments which ruled Italy between 1976 and 1979, the first majority in thirty years which included the PCI.

On the analytical level, convergence in polarized systems like Italy's can be fruitfully analysed, as I have suggested elsewhere, from the viewpoint of the consociational model. I shall first briefly review the model before turning to a discussion of the prospects for cooperation after the 1979 general elections.

IN A SENSE RUSSIAN INDUSTRIALISTS WERE MUCH CLOSER TO THE vital centre of the Revolution of 1905 than any of the intelligentsia opposition; their workers, after all, were out on strike; and it was their private interests which were most directly and most seriously touched by the disturbances. Traditionally passive on political issues, Russian businessmen were catapulted into the ranks of the liberal opposition by the strike movement which rocked Russian industrial centies in 1905. The labour crisis goaded business men into examining government policy towards labour and capital; business groups then broadened their perspective and considered Russian society and the economy as a whole; finally, they injected political terms into the issues and echoed the pleas for constitutional reform and the extension of civil liberties so long championed by the libecal intelligentsia.

WHEN WESTERNERS FIND INDIANS BAFFLING AND EXASPERATING Indians have an explanation: it is because they bring an ‘either-or’ a proach to people who like to operate in terms of ‘both-and’, they see contraries and inconsistencies where Indians are aware only of complexity and compatibility. Without entering into a discussion of this as a general view, it is tempting to say that it could furnish an explanation of the curiously mixed and paradoxical character of the authoritarian regime which has been emer ing over the past eighteen months from that country's so-called ‘Emergency’. Tempting but less than convincing, for several reasons: the forms of authoritarianism in the world are already amply varied; it remains to be seen how far Mrs Gandhi's mixture is viable; above all, it is a mixture which looks and feels pretty strange to many Indians too.

NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT POLICIES IN GENERAL HAVE BEEN ESPECIALLY intensively studied from a comparative point of view in the last decade during which unemployment has again become an object of universal concern. But, at least to our knowledge, these studies have been focused more on the economic and social asects of the problems of employment/unemployment, and less on the political aspects, or what we call the politics of employment policies, i.e. how are these policies made, by what kind of institutions and especially through what kind of political processes?

Sammy Finer Contributed To so Many Areas of political science – comparative government, international relations, sociological theory, electoral studies – that it is often forgotten that his first love was public administration, the subject of his first two books, his Primer of public Administration, published in 1950 and his biography of Sir Edwin Chadwick published in 1952. In addition, Sammy published a seminal article on ‘The Individual Responsibiity of Ministers’ in the journal Public Administration in 1956.

In that article, written in the aftermath of the Crichel Down controversy, Sammy refuted what he called the ‘folklore’ that surrounded the principle of individual responsibility, showing that there was no convention of resignation for administrative fault, and that, in any case, resignation was an ineffective remedy for departmental mismanagement.

The institutional process is essentially an outcome and a reflection of political action. It is therefore understandable that political institutions have always interested not only political thinkers and politicians, but also those nations and groups which are struggling to set up, reorganize or abolish any given political institutions.

Their importance lies, too, in the fact that they reflect fundamental political aspirations and relationships. They are more or less the true image of a political system and of the structure of a society at a given epoch. But when seen in a more general perspective, institutions are merely the framework of power, The complexity of and problems inherent in society, its permanent need for further material, cultural and political development have led to an expansion of the institutional structure of political society. This expansion is brought about by political organizations, especially by political parties, as well as by other organizations, such as trade unions, citizens’ associations, pressure groups, etc.

THE CURRENT CRISIS IN RUSSIAN SOCIETY HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT of all manner of scholarly investigations, essays and editorials. But the clear economic reverses, distinctly felt by all, have caused analysis to focus almost exclusively on this aspect of the crisis. A more constructive approach to the problem might be to examine it as a process, as an objective result of all aspects of the country's development and contemporary civilization as a whole.

This approach presupposes that the rejection of socialism in Russia and Eastern Europe, the major reforms in China and Vietnam, and the dead-end situation in Cuba are not chance, but form a pattern. In each case, the crisis is a function of the transition from one social system to another. This transitional crisis is all-encompassing; its economic component is no more important than the political, social, ethical, cultural, or that of daily life. A transitional crisis is the harbinger of a Time of Troubles when all of society — not just isolated elements — is thrown into turmoil.

Michael Oakeshott was one of this country's and one of this century's leading writers on politics, contributing both a series of incisive commentaries and a number of profoundly original essays to our understanding. Chiefly through his writings on Hobbes — many of which were collected in Hobbes on Civil Association (1975) — and through his two major sets of essays on original themes — published as Rationalism in Politics (1962) and On Human Conduc (1975) — Oakeshott secure1 established himself in the pantheon of great political theorists.2

This article examines how the Finnish Social Democratic Party has adapted to European integration. The analysis illustrates that the Social Democrats have successfully argued to their electorate that the objectives of integration are compatible with core social democratic values. Considering that Finland was hit by a severe recession in the early 1990s, discourse about economic integration and monetary stability facilitating the economic growth that is essential for job creation and the survival of domestic welfare state policies sounded appealing to SDP voters. Determined party leadership, support from trade unions and the lack of a credible threat from the other leftist parties have also contributed to the relatively smooth adaptation to Europe. However, recent internal debates about the direction of party ideology and poor electoral performances – notably in the European Parliament elections – indicate that not all sections within the party are in favour of the current ideological choices.

How do cabinet reshuffles affect the parliamentary opposition's use of no-confidence motions in the government? Opposition parties employ no-confidence motions as electoral signals to highlight government incompetence and to position themselves as a government in waiting. We argue that cabinet reshuffles – which prime ministers use to respond to policy failures, scandals, poor ministerial performance and disloyalty – present an opportunity for the opposition to deploy no-confidence motions to this end. The incentives to deploy this strategy, however, are contingent on the nature of the party system and are greatest where party-system concentration positions a single opposition party as the alternative to the government and sole beneficiary of a no-confidence vote. We test this expectation using a multilevel modelling approach applied to data on reshuffles in 316 governments and 16 parliamentary democracies, and find support for our expectation: cabinet reshuffles raise the probability of no-confidence motions conditional on party-system concentration.

THE REFERENDUM PROVED THAT THE BRITISH PEOPLE DID NOT WANT to leave the Community. But neither the government's presentation of its case nor the people's response to the campaign indicated any demand for changes in the Community, other than a loosening of some of its rules and a strengthening of the intergovernmental aspect at the expense of the supranational. Yet M Ortoli called the referendum result a ‘point of departure’ for the Community; the French are interested in resuming progress towards monetary union; the Germans are talking of more political integration; and on the continent there are high hopes of ‘European progress’ following the Tindemans report on European Union. Are we, then, heading for another great clash between static British and dynamic continentals?