THE EVENTS OF 1989 IN EASTERN EUROPE HAVE BEEN INTERPRETED in diverse and often contradictory ways: from the end of history to its rebirth, as both negotiated revolutions and popular uprisings. In many countries a fundamental repositioning of opposition and dissident forces was observed — changing from groups of anti-system activists quite outside the political establishment into major statesmen and national leaders involving, in some cases, rapid transformation into the occupants of major or even prime ministerial roles. Similarly, the former monopolistic ruling parties often found themselves quickly relegated to the margins of political life as oppositions of dubious legitimacy and minuscule political influence. Yet these roles were also subject to rapid reversal and further repositioning in a number of countries. The major difference now was that former governments became formally constituted oppositions rather than political pariahs or enemies of the people. That was a measure of the significance of the change that had been effected.

FOUR YEARS AGO THIS JOURNAL INITIATED AN OCCASIONAL series on the development of political science in different countries. To date four articles have appeared covering West Germany, Japan, France and the United States of America. Reading them together one is struck as much by the similarities as by the differences between the four countries. The main distinction of a comparative kind to be made, of course, is the fact of the sheer size and corresponding influence of American political science in relation to that of any other country or indeed all other countries taken together. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that commentaries on the contemporary character of American political science are almost exclusively concerned with its own methodological and professional considerations, while analogous exercises on the recent development of the discipline in other countries invariably dwell at length on how each has responded to the paradigmatic changes that have been pioneered from time to time in the USA; and as often as not they will admit of a hint of apology either for not embracing the new American modes fully enough, or, if positively disinclined so to do, for not developing a sufficiently considered critique of their shortcomings, or, again, for not themselves innovating alternative approaches and techniques of similar import and magnitude.

MANY COMMENTATORS HAVE DESCRIBED AND ANALYSED POLITICAL opositions in both democratic and authoritarian political systems. Scholars like Dahl, Lipset and Rokkan, Ionescu and Madariaga and Linz have advanced abroad taxonomies of oppositions. All seem to suffer from the difficulty in application to the specific political situation. Whether it be Dahl's categories of hegemony, polyarchy , near hegemony and near polyarchy ; Lipset and Rokkan's cleavages between church and state, landed estate and entrepreneur, employers and workers, and central and regional; or Ionescu and Madariaga's models which are based on the reasons an opposition is banned in a particular system, all have proved inadequate in describing the Portuguese opposition under Marcello Caetano. Even Linz's models of semi-opposition, alegal, and illegal opposition have failed to describe an opposition which is a combination of a semi-opposition and an alegal oposition. The object of this paper is to add information to the body of literature on oppositions within authoritarian systems and to provide a qualification to the Linz models, the semi-oppositionalegal opposition.

‘Je pense donc je vote’: the confident assertion of the european Parliament's promotional campaign in France to encourage voters to participate in the 1999 European elections struck a spectacularly false note. The citizens not only of France, but of Europe as a whole, reacted with striking indifference to the prospect of the fifth direct elections to the world's only transnational parliament. In the elections held on 10-13 June, turnout fell in all but three of the fifteen member states, averaging less than half of the eligible electorate for the first time since 1979. Except in the two countries holding general elections on the same day – Belgium and Luxembourg – media coverage of the contest was distinctly muted. Even in those countries, the European component was secondary. Across the European Union, there was little sense of key choices being defined, let alone settled, by the election, whether on a national or continental scale. If political elites were engaged in trials of strength which they were unable to avoid, there was scant evidence of campaigning on the ground. In David Butler's memorable phrase, the European elections of 1999, as before, resembled ‘tactical exercises without troops’: army generals were active at the centre, conducting a theoretical, phoney war of interest largely to themselves.

IT IS NOW COMMON (AND QUITE CORRECT) TO PRAISE ANTONIO Gramsci as the first Marxist theorist to understand that the revolution in Western Europe must deviate sharply from the strategic path taken by the Bolsheviks in Russia. With characteristic disdain for old and rigid formulae, he pointed to the crucial differences between advanced capitalist countries and the Russian Empire of 1917, and he attempted in his prison notebooks (Quaderni) to develop criteria of orientation and action appropriate to modern circumstances. What he offered was a new What is to be done? for the developed West, a fundamental reassessment and revision of the accepted Marxist approach to revolution. The nature of this enterprise has prompted many – critics and admirers alike – to lay emphasis on the tie between Gramsci and Togliatti-ism. Gramsci put forward ideas, it is claimed, whose logic is manifest in the ‘Italian (read “constitutional”, “parliamentary”, “democratic”, “pacific”) road to socialism’. It is now casually assumed in many circles that he was the ideological progenitor of what has come to be known as Eurocommunism, the increasingly influential body of doctrines that purports to marry liberalism and Marxism. In the following pages, this assumption, and other related ones, will be closely examined and evaluated.

The Election For Japan'S House Of Councillors Took Place On 29 July 2001. The result was a resounding victory for the major governing party, the Liberal Democratic Party, with its majority regained after the failure in the previous election in 1998. The election was very interesting in two senses. First, the deepening difficulty of the economy did not prevent the LDP from making a comeback of sorts. Normally, the Japanese voters, like most others, reward the governing party when the economy goes well. Secondly, its newly chosen maverick President, Junichiro Koizumi, successfully adopted a rhetoric of ‘Reform with Pain’ for the ostensible reason of escaping Japan's dilemma: the impossibility of allowing many business firms and banks to go bankrupt without thereby aggravating economic problems and antagonizing the electorate; its inability to drastically reduce the large number of public corporations with large registered deficits; and its inability to drastically reduce huge accumulated deficits. He came, he saw and he won. ‘How?’ is the question that the rest of this article attempts to answer.

ONE APPROACH TO STUDYING THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE People's Republic of China (PRC) has been to conclude that they are really a sham, designed to conceal the absence of citizen rights, and therefore presumably of little benefit as documents for study. Constitutions, however, are forms of political expression, and are perhaps best approached as reflections of changes in policy orientation. Their purposes include the formal institutionalization of past changes, the expression of immediate political priorities and laying the foundations for reorientations in basic policy.

THAT THERE IS ROOM FOR DOUBT TODAY ABOUT WHAT LIES ahead for the Communities nobody will deny. The Community has been in trouble for at least five years, and despite the succession of summits the trouble has not been fully disposed of. The enlargement negotiations are the demonstration - or one more demonstration - of the difficulty the Community is having in coming to terms with itself. And, worse, a further process of what I might call ‘institutional drift’ is making its operation yet more intergovernmental.

I should like first to review the position as it now stands and how it is likely to develop in the short term. I will then go on to try to establish what can be done to rectify, or even reverse, the present trends. For unless they do change in the months ahead the prospects for progress in the longer term will be in jeopardy.

EXTRAPARLIAMENTARY OPPOSTION MADE ITS APPEARANCE IN THE midst of the political upheavals of 1968 both as part of a wider phenomenon of social and political life and as the result of a specific combination of factors in certain countries, especially France and the United States. In the wider sense, it resulted from the age-old problem: are established political structures willing (or indeed able) to answer the needs of the larger socio-political communities for whose welfare they have been made responsible? The problems of the technological age—popular participation in governmental processes, the coming of age of the post-war ‘baby boom’ generation, the quality of life in the consumer society, and, perhaps most significantly, the increasing bureaucratization of administration and politics on both sides of the iron curtain—served to stoke the furnaces of scepticism and open rejection of accepted answers. As the year progressed, the collective leadership of the Soviet Union continued to pull back from the de-Stalinization of the Krushchev era, American leaders were assassinated and racial strife continued, hopes for a Middle East settlement faded, and the Vietnam war exploded in the Tet offensive. The atmosphere of hopeful progress which had permeated the early 1960s was shattered for good, and a widespread mood of frustration came to predominate.

THE SHOCK INDUCED IN SWEDEN BY OLOF PALME'S assassination was not translated into any dramatic political consequences. In the absence of any identifiable culprit or motive Swedes could do little more than speculate inconclusively whether responsibility might lie in a vendetta against Palme pursued by some foreign agency or, less likely but more insidious, in some unsuspected pathology within their own society. The assassination served no obvious political purpose. It could only be registered, therefore, as signifying that Sweden, no less than countries with a tradition of political violence, was subject to the ‘sleep of reason’. In a mood of sad resignation the country sought to resume normal politics.

Many of the violent conflicts of the post-Cold War period have involved peoples who have historically been victims of interstate politics. Compromise is highly problematic in contexts of this kind, given that sovereign powers tend to attach the label ‘terrorism’ to acts of resistance and the resistance tends to claim an experience of injustice. Given a situation where compromise is seen by actors on both sides to be impossible, how would anything other than a ‘rotten compromise’ be possible? The article develops a framework called the Warden's Dilemma which is then put to use in the empirical exploration of two historical cases: the hunger strikes in Northern Ireland in 1980–81 and the martyrdom of Polish Solidarity's priest, Jerzy Popieluszko, a few years later.

Memories of wrongdoings are often viewed as an obstacle to reconciliation in divided societies. Is it due to the past or the present politics of the past? To examine the dilemma of essentialism versus presentism, this article investigates the impact of transitional justice on memories of wrongdoing. It theorizes that using different transitional justice strategies to deal with the same wrongdoing shapes memories in different ways. The theory is tested via vignette-based surveys in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, which adopted distinct lustration laws. The results show that wrongdoing is viewed through lustration laws, reflecting present power constellations, not history.

This article investigates the relationship between levels of party institutionalization and individual-level partisan mobilization. Levels of party institutionalization have been linked to macro-level outcomes such as party system stability, but little is known about the micro-level underpinnings of such patterns. This article investigates one set of mechanisms through which party institutionalization might affect electoral outcomes. Specifically, we ask how routinization and value infusion – two central dimensions of party institutionalization – shape partisans’ political mobilization. We investigate these relationships by matching data on individual-level behaviour (taken from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) 2014 wave) with data on party attributes commonly associated with levels of institutionalization (taken from the Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project – DALP). We find that while value infusion encourages relatively greater participation from non-member supporters, party routinization depresses non-member participation but may mobilize otherwise inactive members. These findings suggest that to understand the effects of party institutionalization on a macro-level phenomenon such as electoral volatility, it may be necessary to study how parties institutionalize, rather than just asking how much they institutionalize.

Even if the non-unitary nature of parties has come back into the party politics agenda, many of its features are still largely understudied. Specifically, an encompassing explanation of individual faction membership and of the role of party fusions in fostering faction membership is still missing. By performing a diachronic analysis, this article proposes a new approach to study the determinants of faction membership, highlighting the fundamental role of ideological, policy- and career-related factors. Moreover, the article uses as an explanatory factor a key element that has hitherto never been taken into account in intra-party analyses: psychological social identity, a variable that strongly conditions party members’ behaviour in situations where parties are merging. The analysis also shows the crucial role of party fusion in shaping individual faction membership determinants, highlighting that the effect of these determinants varies considerably the more time has elapsed since the party’s merger.

The Classical Model for Broadcasting Structures in Europe is one based on national autarchy and linguistic exclusivity. The model derives from the introduction of radio broadcasting in the 1920s. As always in the field of communications, developments art supply-led rather than demand-led. Thus the early radio manufacturers established local radio stations to demonstrate their new equipment at a time when governments had not formulated any policies to deal with the new phenomenon.

Global market integration is widely perceived as presenting a major challenge to the sustainability of many national economic regulatory systems. There is far less agreement, however, about precisely how these pressures feed into the politics of reform and reshape national public policy. This article will seek to cast light on this relationship by identifying four influential ‘models of linkage’ between global pressures and regulatory change. It will then comparatively assess their capacity to elucidate the progress of shareholder protection reform in Germany and Italy. While no single model proves fully satisfactory, it will be argued that the weaknesses of two of them can be largely overcome through a process of refinement and integration.

NOWHERE IN HIS WORK DOES ÉLIE HALÉVY SHOW THAT HE felt any particular preference for those whom man hold to be his predecessors or masters. He refers at Length to Montesquieu at the beginning of his third volume on England in 1815, but indirectly, through his English interpreters, especially Blackstone. Blackstone interpreted the British constitution in the light of the interpretation which Montesquieu gave it in l'Esprit des Lois. In so doing he yielded to the force of French logic and falsified the analysis of reality. As French logic is unable to understand the British procedure, and imposed upon the English a stylized representation of their own practice, this paradoxical exercise was greatly to the taste of Halévy, an historian who always enjoyed the paradoxes of history, and who understood so well the native genius of both peoples.

THE BUSINESS OF LIVING IS INESCAPABLY HAZARDOUS, EVEN IN THE advanced industrial societies, for all that life within them has now become less nasty, brutish and short. In fact, the very process of technological innovation which has made possible the unprecedented affluence of these societies has also led to quite new dangers. In consequence, securing a reasonable balance between the advantages and disadvantages of innovation has now become an important government objective, and a vital one in the case of any technical development whose potentially dysfunctional effects would be catastrophic. It is with the political issues bearing upon the maintenance of this balance that this article is mainly concerned. Its scope is restricted for reasons of logic as well as of convenience to the specifically physical man-made hazards of industrial societies, and the unique psychological problems which these societies are often said to present are therefore not considered.

TRIADS ARE IN FASHION. IN POLITICS AND MARKETS, Charles Lindblom distinguishes between three kinds of social relationships — the exchange relations characteristic of markets; the authority relations characteristic of states; and what he calls ‘preceptoral’ relations, the relations of teachers to pupils, of advertisers to consumers, of indoctrinators to the indoctrinated. In the epilogue to The Liberal Theory of Justice, Brian Barry proposes a different, but in some respects complementary, triad. There are, he suggests, three ‘models’ of social collaboration.

THE POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL MAP OF EUROPE CHANGED dramatically during 1989 and 1990. Recent developments have totally demolished the old rules and beliefs that have guided relations between nations. Although some scholars have even argued about the final victory of liberalism, contemporary international relations are nevertheless far from unproblematic. The internal development of former European socialist societies is not yet complete and the North-South conflict seems to be intensifying. Relations between small and big nations still often threaten stability in the contemporary world.