An energetic scholarly debate discusses possible reforms of representative democracy. Some support participatory forms of democracy, others a more elite-driven or technocratic democracy. This study contributes to the growing literature on the subject by emphasizing political sophistication as a theoretically relevant predictor of attitudes to democracy: different models of democracy make different demands regarding the political sophistication of citizens. The analysis includes two dimensions and three measures of sophistication: personal sophistication measured as political knowledge and internal efficacy, and impersonal sophistication measured as assessment of others’ political competence. Using the 2011 Finnish National Election Study, we find that perceptions of the sophistication of others have a substantial impact on preferences for political decision-making, and that politically sophisticated people support representative democracy. The analysis shows that perceptions of others’ political competence, which has been largely neglected by previous research, is a both theoretically and empirically relevant predictor of preferences for political decision-making processes.

IBN KHALDUN, LIKE EMILE DURKHEIM, IS PRIMARILY A THEORIST OF social cohesion. His central problem is - what is it that keeps men together in society? What is it that leads them to idendy with a sacid group, to accept and observe its norms, to subordinate their own individual interests to it, in some measure to accept the authority of its leaders, to think its thoughts and to internalize its aims? This is a question which sociologists, moralists and political osophers share. One of the interesting traits of Ibn Khaldun owever is the extent to which he is a sociologist rather than a moralist: modern sociologists may preach Wertfreiheit, he ractised it. Even when, as a kind of Maghrebin Machiavelli, he offers advice to princes, it is basically technical advice on points of detail, or on the wisdom of knowing things for what they are: but when it comes to the basic features of the social system, he indulges in no preaching. No advice is offered to the social cosmos as to how it should comport itself. Things are as they are. The thinker's job is to understand them, not to change them. Marx's contrary opinion would have astonished Ibn Khaldun. In this sense, Ibn Khaldun is more positivistic than Durkheim, whose thought is far more often at the service of values and of the concern with social renovation.

MUCH OF THE DEBATE ON THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN Parliament has focused on two questions: how far it will or can develop along the lines familiar from national parliamentary experience; and whether it will be able to insert itself effectively into the decision-making processes of the European Communities (EC). The evolution of the Parliament is well summarized in the paper by Hans Nord and John Taylor, as are the constitutional powers and political levereage the might contribute to an enhanced role in the future. A wealth of other studies recently published further amplify the constraints on the Parliament and the opportunities available to it for the gradual extension of its functions. Their conclusions range from the view that Parliament is so heavily circumscribed as to have little scope for effectiveness to the belief that Parliament will gradually enlarge its area of influence, until in practice it has gained a significant political role. Some commentators regard constitutional change, with a formal extension of parliamentary powers, as a necessary condition of an enhanced role, while others anticipate that constitutional change is more likely to take place only to recognise de iure an actual increase in the political authority of the Parliament.

IN SWEDEN, AS ELSEWHERE, ECONOMIC TRAUMA HAS BROUGHT the future of the welfare state onto the political agenda. The conjuncture at the end of the 1970s of a faltering economic performance together with an acute fiscal crisis has called into question the viability of welfare commitments. A widespread body of opinion sees the welfare state as a volume of expenditure which needs to be trimmed to accord with more limited economic means. Some argue more fundamentally that the welfare state, both as a fiscal burden and a set of values, contributed to the malaise of the economy and is an obstacle to its recovery. A feature of Swedish politics in the early 1980s has been the growth of electoral support for the Conservative Party which has introduced into public debate the ideas and idiom of neo-liberal political economy. The Conservatives have exploited a vein of unease extending across the political spectrum which has become concerned not only about the economic inefficiency of the welfare state, and the tax burden needed to maintain it, but also about the possibility that its institutions have limited rather than enhanced individual choices and freedoms.

THE PROVISIONAL IRA (PIRA) IS THE OFFSPRING OF THE IRISH Republican Army which played such a leading part in the war for Irish independence, 1919–21. Its leaders claim to be the true inheritors of the Irish Republican tradition of struggle against the British, determined to complete the task by expelling the British presence once and for all and thus to ‘liberate’ the whole of Ireland by reunifying north and south and establishing a PIRA socialist state.

This paper presents an argument as to why democratic states are unable to delegate authority to international organizations. Influential attempts to justify democratically such international bodies as the European Union by means of delegation are found to be untenable. At a more general level of theorization, it argues that the theory of delegation as involving the recoverability of delegated authority leaves us unable to identify democratic reforms for international organizations. As a remedy to the latter problem, the article proposes an alternative theory of democratic ‘delegation’– one that applies equally well to national and to international politics.

SINCE 1974, A PROCESS OF POLITICAL ‘OPENING’ HAS BEEN taking place in Brazil. But it was only after 1978, when the amnesty law was passed and exiles be an to return, that a majority of observers and academic analysts convinced them-selves that that process was real. The Brazilian regime can still be described as military-based and authoritarian, but now the so-called abertura has become meaningful enough to direct our attention to a different set of questions: why did such changes take place, contrary to most predictions, journalistic as well as academic, of the late 1960s and early 1970s? Why have elections pla ed such a decisive role in them, again contrary to most predictions? Are the fruits picked in this example of redemocratization really ripe to be enjoyed? Can the other countries subject to military-authoritarian rule in the Southern Cone equally aspire to them – that is , to orderly but yet significant steps toward an eventual demise of their authoritarian systems?

We have limited knowledge of how the insecure environment characteristic of personalist dictatorships affects the behaviour of provincial leaders. In this article, we argue that such provincial leaders face a trade-off: either they can keep a low profile but remain vulnerable to the capriciousness of the ruler (the acquiescent strategy), or they can gamble and try to build a power base of their own as a defence against the whims of the dictator (the power-accruing strategy). Next, we specify three contextual conditions, each of which makes provincial leaders more likely to choose and succeed with a power-accruing strategy, which in turn allows them to rule their province with an iron fist. Finally, empirically, we illustrate our arguments through a number of example cases and an in-depth study of a contemporary, very powerful provincial leader in a personalist authoritarian regime: Ramzan Kadyrov, leader of the Chechen Republic within Vladimir Putin's Russia.

THE END OF ONE-PARTY DOMINANCE BY THE LIBERAL Democratic Party of Japan came as abruptly as the fall of the Berlin wall four years before. It started with the debate on electoral system change, ostensibly as an attempt to curb corruption. The LDP has been plagued by a series of large-scale corruption scandals since the Recruit scandal of 1989. The latest concerned former vice-president Shin Kanemaru's alleged violation of the political money regulation law and the income tax law in 1992–93. The Prime Minister, Kiichi Miyazawa, accepting a fair degree of compromise with opposition parties, wanted to pass a bill to change the current electoral system. The LDP initially wanted to change from the system of choosing a few persons in each district by one vote to the Anglo-American type system of selecting one person in each district by one vote. The opposition wanted to change to the continental European system of proportional representation. A compromise was made by the LDP's proposal to combine the latter two systems. Then two dissenting groups emerged suddenly in the LDP. One took the exit option by forming new political parties. The other took the voice option by backing away from the Miyazawa compromise plan. Miyazawa was humiliated by his failure to have the bill enacted and a motion of no confidence was passed. He then called for a general election, which took place on 18 July 1993. The outcome did not give a majority to the LDP and subsequently a non-LDP coalition was formed to produce a non-LDP government for the first time since the foundation of the LDP in 1955

The development of the power of the European Economic Community has given rise to a reaction from those interests which are most directly affected. In order to make sure both that they are informed and that their interests are represented and defended, the various groups concerned have been led to create for themselves new structures at the level of EEC. A parallel relation has thus emerged between the official powers of EEC and the private powers affected by it. These groups, formed on the European level, naturally have neither the solidity nor the effectiveness of professional representation on the national level. Moreover, since such groups are themselves a part of the process of evolution of the political structure, they adapt themselves readily to new political circumstances. But if these European professional organs are not comparable to the national groupings, they cannot be seen as similar to the international associations. They are more numerous – three hundred and fifty to four hundred gravitate towards the European Community. Their action is both more intense and more concrete than that of the international associations, and corresponds to questions with which the community is concerned.

How do politicians in post-war societies talk about the past war? How do they discursively represent vulnerable social groups created by the conflict? Does the nature of this representation depend on the politicians’ ideology or their record of combat service? We answer these questions by pairing natural language processing tools and a large corpus of parliamentary debates with an extensive data set of biographical information including detailed records of war service for all members of parliament during two recent terms in Croatia. We demonstrate not only that veteran politicians talk about war differently from their non-veteran counterparts, but also that the sentiment of war-related political discourse is highly dependent on the speaker's exposure to combat and ideological orientation. These results improve our understanding of the representational role played by combat veterans, as well as of the link between descriptive and substantive representation of vulnerable groups in post-war societies.

This article aims to provide an understanding of the dynamics of pension politics in South Korea with a particular focus on the role of bureaucrats. In order to explain the reforms, this research will closely examine how the expertise and legitimacy of civil servants, together with their institutional positioning, have affected their power and role in the policy-making process. This article will argue that bureaucrats, particularly the welfare bureaucracy, attained their major reform goals by associating and competing with other political actors in two major reforms.

Despite a growing body of literature on the advancement of autocratic tactics and toolkits in competitive authoritarian regimes (CARs), we lack sufficient knowledge on the strategies that the opposition builds against populist-authoritarian governments. Using two top autocratizing cases – Turkey and Hungary – this article singles out ‘transnationalization’ as one such novel strategy. ‘Transnationalization’ is defined as a strategy through which opposition-led subnational executives transform local and global boundaries by consciously forming a link with the liberal-democratic world in order to expand their space for manoeuvre. Conducting a qualitative content analysis of the Istanbul and Budapest mayors' international Twitter accounts and using evidence from elite interviews with officials from Istanbul and Budapest municipalities, we demonstrate the material, symbolic and political means of this strategy and the rationalist and normative motivations behind it. By discussing the what, how and why of a transnationalization strategy, we fill an important gap in the scholarship regarding opposition strategies in CARs.

‘GOVERNMENTAL INSTABILITY: ITS CAUSES AND CURE’ HAS stimulated a growth industry in political science. Conferences, projects and published and unpublished works attest to its attraction as a research topic as well as its centrality for the democratic process. The volatility of electorates ranks high among the presumed causes of instability. The inability of cabinets to maintain legislative majorities, often attributed to the fickle nature of mass publics, is said to lead to ineffective government. Lack of effectiveness, in turn, results in voter disaffection, loss of legitimacy and increased volatility.

TWENTY YEARS OF BREAKDOWNS IN PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENTS; the replacement of competitive political systems by military-bureaucratic regimes throughout Asia and Africa; civil war in Vietnam; the disintegration of Nigeria and the perpetration of genocide in that country, have inspired pessimism among most observers about the future of democratic politics in the new states. It has been suggested that political scientists now turn their attentions to the question of ‘political decay’ as well as to the question of ‘political development’ and that political leaders in the new states concentrate upon building the instruments of political control before engaging in serious economic development and social mobilization, and before permitting political competition and political participation: for, it is argued, rapid increases in economic development, social mobilization, and political participation work against the building and maintenance of strong and stable political institutions in a developing society.

While there is significant anecdotal evidence that excluded political opposition parties in repressive states adopt the form of human rights organizations, there is little systematic research into this phenomenon. What does exist tends to be descriptive rather than theoretical in nature. This paper draws from collective action and resource mobilization literatures, arguing that excluded political elites respond to repression by searching for political opportunities both domestically and internationally, and then transform their organizations into units better able to take advantage of those opportunities. The politics of external funding push these organizations towards a human rights and democratization orientation. The article evaluates this argument through an analysis of human rights movements in politically repressive, post-Communist Uzbekistan and considers the impact of this phenomenon on democratization and civil society development.

On 15 January 1966, a crisis-bound Nigerian government was overthrown by a swift military coup d'état. The Prime Minister of the Federal Republic and his powerful associate, the Federal Minister of Finance, were seized by soldiers in Lagos. Neither survived, although the death of the Prime Minister, who was not personally unpopular, may not have been premeditated. His political chief, the premier of the vast Northern Region, was killed in Kaduna, and the latter's ally, the premier of the Western Region, died violently in Ibadan. Their major opponents among Nigerian office holders, namely the President of the Republic and the premiers of the Eastern and Midwestern Regions, escaped death. The President was on leave outside the country; it is not clear whether the two surviving premiers were spared by design or mistake. In any case, the tendency in Nigerian politics with which the survivors had been identified did appear to have triumphed despite their personal losses of power.

The removal of barriers to international trade has been a powerful stimulus to economic growth in the post-war period. World trade has grown on average 2 per cent faster than GNP throughout this period. Countries which deliberately sought to make themselves competitive externally have grown much faster than countries which relied on their domestic market. By contrast, communist countries, where the system discouraged external trade, have fallen steadily behind. The consequence for most countries has been a steadily growing share of their economy which is exposed to international competition.

There are few Chapters of the Federal Republic'S History that could be written without a prominent reference to the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Since 1949 Christian Democratic chancellors have led German governments for no less than 37 years. Even when in opposition, the Christian Democrats - composed at the national level of the CDU and the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU)1 - constituted more often than not the strongest parliamentary party group (Fraktion) in the Bundestag, such as after the federal elections of 1969, 1976 and 1980. Also at state level and in the Bundesrat, which represents the individual states (L-nder) in the national decision-making process, the Christian Democrats quite often held a dominant position justifying occasional remarks of a ‘CDU/CSU bias’ within the German party system.

In The Early 1970S, Dankwart Rustow Stressed The Centrality of national identity as a background condition for democratization. A recently emerging body of literature has raised this important issue again, opening it up for further discussion. Mark Thompson, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, for example, have highlighted the centrality of the national identity question (they use the term ‘stateness’) in their recent work. Henry Bienen and Jeffrey Herbst see the emergence of a sense of national identity as a prerequisite for democratization in Africa, thus confirming Rustow's idea of sequence. Ilter Turan supports Rustow's view on the role of national identity in his analysis of the cases of Iraq and the Central Asian republics, while James Putzel uses the macro variable of the national identity question to explain why democratic politics is more difficult in Indonesia, which faces the risk of disintegration, and in the ethnically-divided Malaysia, with its weak national identity, than in the Philippines where disintegration is not an issue.