THE WAY THAT THE TERM ‘POLICE STATE’ ENTERED THE ENGLISH language is curious. It is simply the transliteration of the German term Polizeistaat. In German constitutional and administrative law the Polizeistaat was one of the triad of categories used to describe the characteristics of particular states. The other two categories were the Rechtsstaat and the Justizstaat. The Polizeistaat was the creation of 18th-century Prussia. The devastation of the Thuty Years War led the Prussian leaders to conclude that only a state based upon internal discipline, rigorously controlled, and economically self-sufficient could provide a proper basis for survival. This involved breaking the feudal powers of the aristocracy, substituting for them as the principal instrument of government a civil service wholly obedient and responsive to the rulers of the state, and creating a powerful army capable of protecting the heartland of Prussia, if necessary by wars of expansion. The permanent possibility of war became the basis of stable government, and stable government, even at the price of war, was the major blessing a state could bestow on its citizens.

Co-decisions between the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament are increasingly adopted as early agreements. Recent EU studies have pinpointed how this informal turn in EU governance has altered the existing balance of power between EU actors and within EU institutions. However, the implications of accelerated EU decision-making are expected to have repercussions beyond the EU system and in other institutions impinging on the role of national parliaments. This study examines the implications of an alteration of EU political time on national parliaments’ ability to scrutinize their executives in EU affairs. A mixed method approach has been applied. This strategy combines survey data on national parliaments’ scrutiny process and response to early agreements for 26 EU countries with a case study examination of national parliaments in Denmark, the UK and Germany. The burgeoning research agenda on EU timescapes is applied. This study finds that the clocks of most national parliaments are out of time with the EU decision-mode of early agreements, which severely hampers the national parliaments’ ability to scrutinize national governments.

THE POLITICAL GAINS EXPECTED FROM HOLDING DIRECT ELECtions to the European Parliament were bound to depend on the nature and extent of mass communication. Information flows released during the campaign in the various Community countries, and how they were received by electoral audiences, would determine, for example, whether: European awareness would spread beyond the confines of cosmopolitan élites into the ranks of mass publics; the legitimacy of the Euro ean Parliament would be strengthened by enhancing its visibility, intelligibility and relevance in the eyes of European citizens; and whether the seeds of a European-level body of public opinion would begin to sprout and flourish. As Emdio Colombo once put it, ‘The elections to the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage provide an opportunity of bringing the debate on Europe into the public forum and of enlisting the active support of the man in the street for the construction of Europe.’

Although the internet is severely censored in China, negative reporting and critical deliberations of political institutions and policy issues, especially low-profile ones, have been abundant in cyberspace. Given such a mixed pattern of online information, this study explores the complexity of the effect of the internet on regime support by parsing it into direct effect and indirect effect. It argues that the internet indirectly erodes its viewers’ overall support for the authoritarian regime by decreasing their evaluation of government performance. The findings from a mediation analysis of a Beijing sample support this argument. The result of one analysis also indicates that the direct effect of internet use on regime support can be positive. Such findings about the effect of the internet in China help advance our understanding of both political and theoretical implications of the spread of the internet in authoritarian countries.

Interactions between ruling and opposition parties in India have long been sorely neglected by political analysts. This study finds clear contrasts between interactions at national and state levels in this federal system, and further, often marked variations across the 28 states – each of which has its own Westminster-style legislature. Government–opposition relations range from semi-civilized to caustic, although most cases are situated some at distance from those extremes. So, despite a recent confrontation in the Indian Parliament, there are no strong trends towards either deterioration or greater accommodation. This is a study in ambiguity.

This article demonstrates the utility of comparative historical approaches and tools for temporal analysis in comparative regional integration. Over three decades Australian and New Zealand policymakers constructed a Trans-Tasman Single Economic Market that, like the Single European Market, creates supra-national authority and removes administrative barriers to free movement of goods, services capital and people. Like the Single European Market, the Trans-Tasman Single Economic Market regulates internal movements of people liberally. In Europe, some argue, liberal regulation of people movements has led to politicization of integration. In Australia and New Zealand integration has no mass political salience. This article compares European and trans-Tasman integration to explain these divergent outcomes. It shows how differing sequences of events can explain varying levels of mass mobilization around integration in the two cases. In Europe ‘economic integration’ preceded the liberalization of people movements. Trans-Tasman integration reversed this sequence.

IT IS NO EXCEPTION TO THE CONTINGENCY OF HUMAN THINGS that events can occur as expected: this happens so as to lull US for the next surprise. ‘A good election for poll takers’, said one headline, of Reagan's lopsided victory. His 18-percentage point margin was exactly predicted by Gallup and roughly approximated by others in a ten to 25 point range of misses. Once again it was confirmed that science can give mathematical expression to our expectations in politics. But the expected result was also a welcome sign that the American polity was healthy enough to reelect a president in whom few - and those more his supporters than his opponents - could have been disappointed. A people's ability to express gratitude to its leaders is more than a measure of political stability: it is one end of political stability and when exercised is the most ennobling act of popular sovereignty.

The article provides an overview of gay identity politics today. It begins with an introduction to the historical trajectory of the post-1945 period, and then turns to the challenges posed by queer politics and theory to gay identity politics. The related issue of the globalization of being gay is then considered, in terms of the universalizing of identity politics. Finally, the ramifications for gay identity politics of the political and legal recognition of same-sex relationships are discussed, leading to the obvious final question: whether being gay will continue to have a political logic in the years ahead.

THE PROCESS WHICH CHARACTERIZED THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE Jewish community in Palestine was a process of the formation of a non-sovereign political centre which progressively increased its authority through the exercise of control over the mobilization and distribution of resources. The bearer of this process was a power conscious elite – oriented on the formation of an institutionalized national centre. The mobilization of resources outside of the system enabled this centre to allocate more resources than it had to extract from its periphery. Thus, a dynamic equilibrium was created in which progressively increasing demands were balanced by an increased mobilization of resources. The operation of the system was dependent upon a division of functions between an evolving coalitionary national centre and various particularistic sub-centres. The lack of sovereignty paradoxically contributed to the development of ‘rules of the game’ which made the resolution of conflicts possible within a quasi-parliamentary framework.

THE RESULT OF THE DANISH PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION OF 11 MARCH 1998 could hardly have been closer. It came down to 89 voters in the Faroes: had this number voted for the local centre-right party, rather than the centre-left one, both of the islands' two seats in the Danish Folketing (parliament) would have gone to supporters of the opposition, thus tipping the parliamentary balance. However, because the sister party of the Danish Social Democrats won one of those seats, the incumbent prime minister, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, managed to confound the predictions of the opinion polls and stay in power, continuing his Social Democrats' coalition with the Social Liberal Party. It remained a minority government; but this is the norm in Denmark's fragmented multi-party system. Moreover, with the presumed support of the parties to the left of the Social Democrats, and with other parties also professing their keenness to cooperate, the chances of a stable government enduring through the rest of the four-year parliamentary term looked bright.

IN MY GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION/LEONARD SCHAPIRO lecture in 1993 I attempted an incomplete analysis of international economic relations after the end of the cold war, in particular the unexpected tensions and difficulties. The end of superpower confrontation had not only removed one incentive for Western countries to settle their economic disputes. It had also lowered the priority given to security issues, where national governments were in control, and had exposed their dwindling ability to take economic decisions, because of the extent of the interdependence which was the price paid for their prosperity. I could not think of a single area of domestic policy immune from international influence. Professor Susan Strange has developed a more trenchant analysis of this trend in her Government and Opposition/Leonard Schapiro lecture this year.

In focusing on the relationships between asylum recognition rates and the different institutional arrangements through which European states share or preserve their sovereignty, this article seeks to show how sovereignty-sharing affects the right to political asylum in practice. After a qualitative overview of variations in sovereignty-sharing forms, the article presents the results from a multiple regression analysis of the relationship between legal and institutional frames of asylum decision-making in 17 West European countries (EU-15, Norway and Switzerland) and the asylum recognition rates in these countries. The article ends with a brief assessment of the significance of the results for a potential policy change in the European Union.

How do right-wing-populist incumbents navigate rhetorical strategic choices when they seek to manage external crises? Relevant literature has paid increasing attention to the role of ‘crisis’ in boosting the electoral success of right-wing populist candidates. We know a lot less about the rhetorical strategies used by right-wing populist incumbents seeking re-election. We draw on literatures on populism, crisis management and political rhetoric to conceptualize the rhetorical strategic choices of right-wing populist incumbents in times of crisis. We propose a framework for the choice of rhetorical strategy available to right-wing populist incumbents and illustrate it with a qualitative content analysis of Trump's tweets and White House press briefings during the first months of the COVID-19 pandemic. We find limited rhetorical adaptation to crisis and high degrees of continuity with previous rhetoric grounded in right-wing populism. This challenges prevalent assumptions regarding the likelihood of incumbent rhetorical flexibility in the face of crisis.

Although the clichéd status of the phrase ‘the party’s over’ makes it almost redundant, the esteem in which parties are held has never been lower. One facet of party decline is the renewed interest in independents. Previously confined to transition states and non-democracies, they have begun to make some political headway in more established states. This is a worrying development for both political parties and those who profess their normative value. This article examines the source of the re-emergent independent presence via a case study of Ireland, a party democracy where they have had the greatest impact. Using constituency-level data, the influences of political, cultural and institutional factors are examined. It is found that independents are a product of both a small political system and declining party attachment. They are a protest option for those not drawn to ideological anti-establishment parties, while there is mixed evidence concerning the influence of a centre–periphery socioeconomic divide.

This article analyses the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on Brazil's populist radical right (PRR), as well as the responses of PRR actors to the pandemic, during the period from March 2020 to October 2021. Despite high death rates and declining popularity in the final months of that period, the Brazilian president consistently maintained a denialist narrative that incorporated key aspects of populist ideology. Based on the analysis of opinion surveys, documents, online messages and secondary sources, we argue that explaining this denialism requires understanding Brazil's radical-right populism as more than an ideology: it is a social movement. The impacts of the pandemic on Bolsonaro's PRR government and its responses can only be understood by simultaneously analysing the top-down actions of the leader and the bottom-up role of bolsonarismo – that is, the broad coalition of actors who actively support the radical-right project. The case of bolsonarismo suggests that literature on populism in general would profit from taking right-wing movements more seriously as co-producers of populist rhetoric and practices.

ELECTIONINS THE FEDERAL STATES (Länder) OF WEST GERMANY are frequently interpreted as indicators of national political opinion in much the same way as by-elections in Britain are examined for pointers to trends in the fortunes of the major political parties. Similar factors seem to operate in both cases: a general swing against the party in office; a tendency to see these elections as confidence votes with consequent effects on the morale of the government and opposition parties; and the use of them to register a protest vote since voters are free of the responsibility of having to choose a national government. National ministers intervene in both countries to speak on behalf of local candidates in order to enhance their parties’ chances, while the mass media usually view these elections in national terms, for interest tends to focus more on the impact of the elections on national politics than on any serious estimation of the actual part played by national issues during the course of the election campaigns.

DESPITE ITS WIDE INFLUENCE, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF KARL POPPER has received, until recently, remarkably little systematic attention from academic political theorists. Hailed by Isaiah Berlin as the most formidable of Marxism's living critics and reviled by Marxists as a prominent luminary of that White Emigration whose pernicious influence is mainly responsible for the ideological rejuvenation of a moribund reactionary culture, canonized as a prophet of freedom and enterprise and lumped together with such despised conservatives as Oakeshott, Namier and Butterfield as one of those who want only ‘to keep that dear old T-model on the road by dint of a little piecemeal engineering’, Popper incontestably has been a storm centre of several major ideological controversies. Equally, Popper's dissident reinterpretations of the thought of Plato and Hegel, like his defence of value-freedom and methodological individualism in the social sciences, have generated massive and subtly ramified literatures, while the form of critical rationalism which has been developed by some of his disciples has been seen, both by its proponents and by its enemies, as the foremost contribution to the contemporary struggle against irrationalism.

Among Arguments Advanced In Favour Of Direct Democracy, legitimacy pleas loom large. If the rules governing people can only be legitimate when those rules arise from and represent the will of all, then it is commonly argued that people should have the right to vote not just for representatives but on substantive issues of public policy as well. To claim otherwise is regarded as anti-democratic: for example, Bogdanor writes that ‘in the final analysis, the arguments against referendums are arguments against democracy’, while Saward asks, ‘What better way to maximize responsiveness of rulers to the ruled than by fostering a system in which the ruled themselves make the decisions?’