THE VAGUE AND CONTRADICTORY FORMULA OF ‘DEMOCRATIC centralism’ has never been understood as a static device independent of historical circumstances. Though it has been dogmatized, despite the opposition of other non-revisionist tendencies in the international labour movement such as Rosa Luxemburg and the Worker's Opposition in Russia during the 9th Party Congress in 1920, the formula always had to be reinterpreted according to the needs of different phases of class struggle. In every phase of development, the relation between the components ‘democracy‘ and ‘centralism‘ has been defined in a different way.3 Since the 3rd Party Congress centralism was considered to be the basic organizational principle of the party, whereas democracy had to be adapted to the changing circumstances and to the political conditions of different countries. Certainly Lenin was right in arguing in his pamphlet Chto delat (1902) that, under the circumstances of tsarist autocratic rule, ‘democratism’ within the party would have been ‘an empty and dangerous game’. Also the Menshevik leaders - in spite of their controversies with Lenin - still admitted at that time that a centralized and disciplined party organization was of the highest importance. Thus Schapiro is probably right when he sees little difference between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks on the question of democratic centralism at the time of the conflict in Iskra.

‘If A Majority Of People In Northern Ireland Ever Voted To become part of a United Ireland what would you do?’ At first sight the question may seem plucked from the realms of constitutional fantasy. A united Ireland seems an unlikely prospect, at least in anything but the long term. Even proponents of unity predict a 15–20 year wait. Yet the 1998 Good Friday Agreement empowers the people of Northern Ireland to decide their own constitutional future. As a result questions on Northern Ireland's future constitutional status, and public reactions to possible changes in that status, are relevant to current political debate.

It is important to note that the principle of consent is not a new constitutional invention. It has had a long association with Northern Ireland. It is argued that the peace process and the 1998 Good Friday Agreement have refocused attention on the long-standing consent principle. While consent was part of the constitutional furniture it was often overlooked during the Troubles.

This article re-examines consent in the light of the peace process. It draws on evidence from the 1998 and 1999/2000 Northern Ireland Life and Times surveys, as well as a number of in-depth interviews with senior politicians and policy-makers involved in the peace process and the negotiations on a political settlement. First it considers the changing significance of the consent principle to Northern Ireland's constitutional status, arguing that the principle has assumed a renewed immediacy. Secondly, the article reports the findings of the two most recent Northern Ireland Life and Times surveys in relation to constitutional preferences. While public attitudes towards a unitary Ireland or continued Union within the United Kingdom have been surveyed regularly, as far as the authors are aware no previous survey has asked whether people would accept or oppose constitutional change if it was supported by a majority of Northern Ireland's citizens. In other words, no survey has gauged the level of public acceptance of the consent principle. The key question is: would unionists be prepared to come quietly if a majority of Northern Ireland's citizens voted to accept a united Ireland?

Does a rebel party’s identity change impact its political success after civil wars end? Most work on political parties examines why parties change identities but does not examine the effects of such changes. In this article I examine whether identity change (indicated by party name changes and the official renunciation of violence) affects the political success of rebel parties in terms of seat shares won in the legislature, and inclusion into the executive. Using an original data set on rebel party identity change, I conduct both Prais–Winsten and logit regression analyses and find that although name changes have little impact on political success, renunciation of violence significantly increases the likelihood of both increased seat shares and inclusion in the executive. This finding has important implications regarding the impact of identity change and the transformation of rebel groups into political parties.

Defying predictions of radical liberalization, labour market institutions in post-socialist Central and Eastern Europe are characterized by relatively protective employment legislation, sometimes combined with collective bargaining rights. However, not all protective employment regimes survived political attack by neoliberal reformers. Existing theories in comparative political economy suggest that employment regimes reflect the relative political power of producer groups. Others have suggested that in Central and Eastern Europe the content of labour market reform was determined by the coercive influence of transnational actors. Through a comparative analysis of labour market reform in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Romania and Slovakia, this article finds that trade unions played a key role in early institutional settlements over labour markets. However, in Romania and Slovakia, these institutional settlements were subsequently undermined by attacks by ideologically motivated domestic elites in episodes of disembedded politics. The article develops the concept of disembedded politics and demonstrates its importance in post-socialist institutional change.

The survival of minority governments depends on support from non-cabinet parties that strive to safeguard government stability while also fulfilling their accountability to the electorate. This article argues that non-cabinet parties' propensity to support the government depends on their desire to uphold distinctiveness when accountability is at stake. This even applies to opposition parties that are officially committed to minority government support and, as a trade-off, receive policy pay-offs. By analysing opposition party voting in 23 years of Swedish minority governments (1991–2018), the article suggests that ideologically distant support parties are more likely to oppose the government on their core issues since compromise would involve too-large concessions. These results question our understanding of support party pay-offs as a trade-off for minority government support and highlight the rationality of entering a support agreement, which gives the support party a certain degree of policy influence while also keeping a distinct party profile.

During the economic crisis, the radical left, especially in countries of the European South, continued its course from marginality to mainstream while social democracy found itself trapped in its previous strategic orientations. This article examines the two political families in a relational and comparative perspective, focusing on the interaction of social democratic and radical left parties that evolved in a series of national cases (Greece, Portugal, Spain and France) and in particular within the political and electoral cycle of 2015–17. The ideological, programmatic and strategic responses of these parties to the critical juncture of the crisis, which mark a convergence or deviation in the paths of the two ‘enemy brothers', shed light on their political and ideological mutations, transformations and/or adaptations.

Capitalism and democracy have transformed the world, but not in a harmonious way. This article provides a broad overview of the major driving forces of democracy, its relationship with ongoing socioeconomic developments and some of the countervailing factors. It points to the inherently conflictive nature of democratic procedures and decision-making, but also emphasizes the potentially universal implications of basic democratic values. Against this background, the future prospects of democracy and possible alternatives in the age of globalization are assessed. All this is based, as far as space permits, on the huge body of available theoretical and empirical literature, but also on the author’s long-term preoccupation with this topic and some of his personal views and experiences.

Understanding the role of the American state in the era of neoliberal finance requires a scale of analysis that can identify not only the domestic but also the international role of the informal empire the US established in the middle of the twentieth century for superintending capitalism on a world scale. This article demonstrates that it was not so much neoliberal ideology that broke the old system of financial regulations, as it was the latter’s increasingly dysfunctional effects as finance outgrew the New Deal incubator through the post-war decades. Through the Bretton Woods crisis and the stagflation of the 1970s, institutional reform in the financial sector became a key dimension of broader competitive capitalist strategies for innovation and expansion. While this certainly involved extensive leveraging and speculation, it met the hedging needs not only of financial institutions but also of the many corporations seeking protection from the rapidly evolving vulnerabilities associated with global trade and investment. Yet the financial volatility that inevitably resulted from those very transformations meant that the Federal Reserve’s function as lender of last resort was increasingly called upon, just as the Treasury came to define its role as that of ‘failure containment’ on a global scale. On the basis of this theoretical and historical perspective, the article analyses the causes and consequences of the 2007–8 financial crisis and the ‘old/new practice of failure containment’ that has characterized the American state’s response to it.

There is broad agreement that the most important transformation undergone by democratic politics since the second half of the twentieth century has been the diffusion of the means of mass-communication (television in particular). Teledemocracy especially has changed democratic politics in a specific way: the leaders rather than the parties now stand at the centre of the electoral and political process. This article does not aim to go over the relationship between media and politics; that has already been done. Instead, it focuses on how to deal with a situation in which media and politics overlap.

‘THE CLAIM WHICH IS BEING MADE IS THAT THE LIBERALIZATION is now becoming a generic and indeed a crucial phenomenon, as the Revolution had been; that, for good and in the main obvious reasons, it is replacing the earlier myth as a central political preoccupation or category; and that its basic assumptions are not merely more pertinent to our time, but probably also rather sounder by any criterion and at all times’. So wrote Ernest Gelher in a recent article destined in my view to initiate a vast debate.

POLITICS WAS A CONCERN OF MINE SINCE I WAS SIX YEARS OLD. It did not start in the library. It began a decade before 1930 in the campaign meetings of my mother who was one of the first women Members of Parliament in the Czechoslovak Republic, for the Social Democratic Party in a Sudeten German workingclass constituency. By 1930 I was 18 years old and an active member of the youth organization of that party. In that year I saw Nazi parades in Berlin, prior to the Nazis’ first big success in the German elections of that year. Soon there were Nazi meetings – later thinly disguised as Henlein party meetings – in the Sudetenland and in Prague where I became a student at the German University and where my family and I belonged to the German minority. Problems of the labour movement, depression, unemployment, nationalism and Fascism were real events unrolling before my eyes.

Legislative responses to social changes signify how representative democracy works. Yet research is still needed to find out whether and how representatives in new democratic countries address the constituents’ interests and demands. We revisit the 18th National Assembly in Korea (2008–12) to examine legislative activities surrounding the issue of economic inequality. To understand how lawmakers in the new democracy like Korea respond to the demands of redistributive policies, we turn to representatives’ co-sponsorship behaviour. We find that Korean lawmakers do respond to constituents’ preferences. More specifically, Korean lawmakers representing conservative districts tend to care less about economic inequality than other representatives while controlling their partisanship. This study fleshes out the link between the represented and the representatives in a new democracy where party discipline at the expense of constituency connection has long dominated legislative politics.

Recently, scholars have shown a growing interest in radical left parties (RLPs). In terms of electoral success, the rise of the KPÖ Graz, the Communist Party in Austria’s second biggest city, represents perhaps the most counterintuitive case in Western Europe. Adding to previous studies, the rise of the KPÖ Graz contradicts many of the claims made and patterns found about the conditions for the electoral success of RLPs. While the national KPÖ was voted out of parliament in 1959, the Graz branch has been a member of local government since 1998. Since then, the party has managed to gain 20 per cent of the vote in three out of four elections. In 2017, the KPÖ defended its place as the second largest party in local legislature and stayed ahead of the radical right FPÖ, on the rise at the national level. In stark contrast to the Communists’ current strength, however, they did not gain even 2 per cent of the vote in 1983. This analysis shows how the party has managed to ‘own’ the issue of housing and to exploit local political opportunities in order to be electorally successful. The findings point to the importance of agency and the subnational level for RLPs, and highlight more general questions in the study of this party family.

The article starts from a critique of the widespread assumption that intergovernmentalism is not only the more practical but also the more democratic way of handling the current European crises – and particularly the euro crisis – to argue for the need to rethink the working and the definition of democracy in the current heightened interconnectedness of political organization. It suggests that perceiving European citizens as being separated into distinct state communities stands in the way of a full appreciation of the externalities, hence of the reciprocal responsibilities, that they owe each other and turns apparently democratic decisions into potential acts of domination, as theorized by both Pettit (1997) and Bohman (2006). It suggests that we should embrace a more encompassing and dialogical notion of democracy which translates Pallasmaa’s (2012) notion of hapticity from the field of physical architecture to that of institutional architecture. It concludes by suggesting that there are already institutional architectures in the EU which lend themselves to a haptic declension, for example the European Semester.

Hamas, the most influential Islamist party in the occupied Palestinian territories, replaced its strategy of electoral boycott in 1996 with participation in 2006 – a change that is not explained in the literature. Assisted by theories of party change, the article seeks to fill this gap. The article demonstrates that the move from boycott to participation can largely be attributed to a change of dominant coalition. In line with the theoretical assumptions, environmental challenges and shocks altered the power–balance within Hamas, robbing the coalition dominating at the time of the boycott of its power and allowing a new faction to obtain dominance. This new dominant faction saw political participation as a legitimate avenue to pursue Hamas's cause, and its rise to power secured the change of strategy and participation in the 2006 elections.