The direct selling industry has a long history, with roots snaking back to the nineteenth-century “Yankee peddlers” who roamed the countryside selling tools, teas, and liniments door-to-door. Its reputation has suffered from the prevalence of misleading and illegal schemes such as pyramids, which generate income by paying money or other compensation solely for the act of recruiting, charge high entrance fees, and sell products of questionable value. Nonetheless, some advocates note that direct sales work, which often involves family and flexible working hours, has provided an excellent alternative to the traditional bureaucratic employment relationship that has historically been less receptive to women.

Unlike other Western European companies operating in Iran between the first and second world wars, the Danish construction firm Kampsax pursued a forestalling strategy in dealing with the political imperative of Reza Shah. The British Bank of the Middle East and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, by contrast, pursued an absorption strategy. That is, they actively tried to “Iranize” their operations by appointing native Iranians to important managerial positions. Kampsax, however, made no attempt at “Iranization,” depending entirely on contractual relations with local builders and labor forces. This no doubt contributed to the firm's exposure as a totally foreign enterprise and lessened their chances of gaining favor with the Shah's advisors, who pursued an overtly nationalistic set of policies. The history of Kampsax in Iran therefore offers a useful case to use the concept of the political risks in relation to multinationals working in dictatorial settings. This paper undertakes such a study and concludes that the absorption strategy that was already being pursued by British firms offers a better way of managing such risks.

Unlike several of my colleagues whose retrospective essays are included in this special section, I did not have a personal relationship with Alfred DuPont Chandler, though during the 1980s he did invite me to present a discussion of my first book Proprietary Capitalism at his Harvard business history seminar. I also met Dr. Chandler frequently at Business History Conference meetings, where I found him ever-gracious, indifferent to criticism, and supportive of diverse projects whether allied with or tangential to his own. Thus here I offer some reflections on our discipline and its current situation, taking Chandler's publications as a point of departure.

The internationalization of business is the subject of an extensive theoretical literature as well as a growing number of historical studies. Historians have paid relatively little attention to the development of multinationals in the service sector, and studies about international publishing are especially scarce. This article discusses the early internationalization of two Dutch publishing firms, Kluwer (nowWolters Kluwer) and Elsevier (now Reed Elsevier) and confronts these case histories with the evolutionary theory of internationalization. The Dutch cases underline the important role of experience, knowledge and learning as well as of the national context in which companies develop. They also show that these factors allow for very different trajectories of internationalization within the same branch of business and the same country.

In the 1960s and 1970s, the largest U.S. chemical firm, E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company, established an international presence in synthetic fibers by building plants to make nylon, polyester, and acrylic in Latin America and Europe. DuPont managers also looked to the Middle East, specifically to Iran, which was fast industrializing under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. The Shah's pro-Western stance and his country's rich oil fields made Iran appealing to a petrochemical giant like DuPont, which used petroleum feed stocks to make fibers and other products. In the 1970s, DuPont partnered with the Behshahr Industrial Group, a conglomerate run by the Ledjavardi clan, one of Iran's leading families, to build a high-tech fiber facility that would help modernize the Iranian textile industry. The story of this short-lived joint venture, a victim of the Islamic Revolution, demonstrates the challenges to multinationals operating in imperial Iran, and shows how the daily experience of dealing with cultural differences often masked larger political and economic troubles.

One could make a career of throwing darts at the work of Alfred Chandler. I don't mean just criticizing him. You could take the pages of Chandler's books, paste them up on a wall, and start throwing. Almost everywhere a point struck would be a little gem of business history to draw your interest.

Historians have often looked to industrial capitalism to further our understanding of “time consciousness.” This article explores time consciousness through the experience of a railroad in pre-Civil War South Carolina. Examining the South Carolina Railroad allows us to examine how time consciousness operated in a region not associated with industrial capitalism, and also see how multiple times could function simultaneously. While clocks were important to railroad operations, companies also had to address an array of non-clock times. Moreover, companies were never fully in control of their own time, but were in constant conflict and negotiation with various groups in the community. While industrialization and factory labor remain important ways to understand time consciousness, looking beyond the factory walls can help historians make better use of the analytical power of time.

This paper examines the marketing activities of Nestlé in the Ottoman Empire between 1870 and 1927. Nestlé began with the same strategy it had developed in Western markets for the Ottoman market. But the Ottoman political, social, and cultural context differed considerably from Europe. The article explores how Nestl´e responded to this complex marketing environment with increasing local differentiation. It goes on to demonstrate that as well as its variegated approaches to the ethnically, religiously, and culturally heterogeneous urban consumer, Nestlé's success derived from its ability to connect with different strata of society. I argue that the Ottoman Empire, and especially its capital Istanbul, were strategically essential to Nestl´e's development of its adaptive global marketing strategy.

This article discusses the business strategies formulated by Egyptian marketers as they established their enterprises to meet new multinational corporations' (MNCs') demand for marketing—research, promotion, and advertising services. This transition occurred during a period of economic liberalization, known locally as the infitah (open-door era), and rapid economic growth, resulting from the regional oil-boom of the early 1970s. Local entrepreneurship and competition for accounts would create a new, “glocal” business environment in Egypt, which concurrently mediated MNCs adaptation to local economic conditions and “Egyptianized” imported goods.

The case study of Bresee's Department Store in Oneonta, New York, suggests that small-town department stores were not necessarily fully “modern” by the early twentieth century. This article demonstrates how modern, big-store, business methods came later and documents how earlier modes of trade, such as credit and bartering, persisted into the early twentieth century, even in non-rural, northern contexts. Preliminary findings suggest that eliminating the urban bias in much historiography by including small-town retailing practices may lead to a later periodization of American consumer society.