Brewing in the United Kingdom in the years following 1950 saw a shift from a production to a retailing orientation. As part of this shift, the role of the area manager started to move from production and sales discipline to retail development. This article explores the job of the area manager during the period, seeking to demonstrate the weakness in recent accounts that suggest that area managers serve only as an “information relay” between senior managers and unit managers. Although the evidence is limited, because of problems with the survival of records, it suggests a more complex picture, which has implications for area managers in retail and service industries more generally.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, many U.S. business leaders resolved to go “beyond compliance” with environmental regulations. Manufacturers sought to become more eco-efficient by reducing how much waste they produced per unit of output. Some companies developed greener products. However, the new commitment to sustainability only went so far: Few executives fundamentally rethought their business models. What drove the rise of corporate concern about sustainability, and why did those drivers fall short? The incentives to become greener were partial. They affected some companies more than others, and they only rewarded efforts to reduce some environmental impacts. By analyzing the limits of corporate interest in sustainability in the late 1980s and early 1990s, this article offers fresh insight into the challenge of greening the economy.

The British trustee savings banks that operated throughout the nineteenth century were designed expressly for working-class use, and solely to promote long-term saving. Despite the substantial numbers and national spread of these banks, there have been few studies of their use by savers. Their neglect as a data source is puzzling, given the extent of the surviving depositor records that provide long-run empirical data that includes savers’ identity, marital status, and occupation, as well as account balances and transactions. Our preliminary work on four banks (Limehouse, Newcastle, South Shields, and Bury) shows results of significant interest in understanding working-class financial behavior, including a substantial number of accounts opened and maintained by working-class married women, accounts opened and run by minors from earnings, and varied patterns of account usage.

Executive education programs offered by business schools became a global phenomenon for developing top managers in the 1960s. These programs were established in more than 40 countries in Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America in less than two decades. This article explores the phenomenon in three different Latin American contexts: Central America, Peru, and Colombia. In all these cases, initiatives led to successful executive programs, which contributed to the growth of business schools that gradually achieved high international reputation. By studying the way that various U.S. actors interacted differently with local actors in the three cases, the article contributes to three discussions within business history: the history of Americanization, management education, and the alternative business history of emerging markets.

This article examines the formation of China's state enterprise system, using the case of the Dadukou Iron and Steel Works (DISW). I argue that the basic institutional arrangement of the DISW, and by extension other state-owned enterprises, consisted of a bureaucratic governance structure, distinctive management and incentive mechanisms, and the provision of social services and welfare. This arrangement took shape during the Sino-Japanese War, with the sustained systemic crisis and the nature and character of the institutional endowments leading to the formation of China's state enterprise system. In considering implications for understanding institutional change, I suggest that crisis shapes radical institutional change and that both path dependence and path independence characterize such change.

Rather than appearing full-blown in the 1970s, flexible production techniques were developed gradually in the Japanese automobile industry. After World War II, drawing on indigenous expertise derived from the cotton textile and aircraft industries, pioneering automakers Nissan and Toyota adapted Western-style automation technology, particularly transfer machines, to local conditions. In addition to building flexibility into as many aspects of this inherently inflexible technology as possible, manufacturers also worked to adapt labor and supplier relations to the needs of the new technology within the constraints of the local environment.

In this paper I discuss a dramatic financial collapse and scandal in Denmark in the interwar period. I analyze the asset price bubble from 1914 to 1920 and the subsequent failure in 1922 of Scandinavia's largest bank, the Danish Landmandsbanken, as well as the downfall of its CEO Emil Glückstadt. I discuss the sense-making process, first during the bubble and then following Landmandsbanken's collapse and Glückstadt's fall from power in 1922, and finally until the introduction of a new bank act in 1930. I further argue that such crises and scandals force contemporaries to make sense of the dramatic fall from the top of society of these icons and of their role in the collapse of their banks. I view the sense-making process as centered on the construction of narratives that explain the crisis and enable or constrain institutional response to the crisis. To conclude, I argue that the process of sense-making in the case of Landmandsbanken can be generalized as the way in which society enforces norms and values in cases of dramatic financial crisis and scandal.

A range of private and public institutions emerged in the United States in the years before and after the Great Depression to help farmers confront the inherent uncertainty of agricultural production and marketing. This included a government-owned and operated insurance enterprise offering “all-risk” coverage to American farmers beginning in 1938. Crop insurance, initially developed as a social insurance program, was beset by pervasive problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. As managers and policy makers responded to those problems from the 1940s on, they reshaped federal crop insurance in ways that increasingly made the scheme a lever of financialization, a means of disciplining individual farmers to think of farming in abstract terms of risk management. Crop insurance became intertwined with important changes in the economic context of agriculture by the 1960s, including the emergence of the “technological treadmill,” permanently embedding financialized risk management into the political economy of American agriculture.

This is the story of two women with differing visions about business who have largely been forgotten. Miriam Beard, the maverick daughter of Progressive reformers Charles and Mary Beard, wrote the first international cultural history of the businessman in 1938. Henrietta M. Larson was Harvard Business School's first lady, the first female faculty member and the first woman to be tenured there. The two women never met or interacted. Yet their lives and histories were entangled when one woman, Henrietta, wrote a critical review about the contributions of the other. This article uses their untold story to trace the contentious process of professionalization that sidelined one maverick outsider and kept a maven insider on the margins of a fledgling discipline she had helped to create. Its significance is to make gender central to the reintegration of business and culture and of women's roles in the historiography of business.

In the early modern Atlantic world, trade brought communities and commodities closer together and, as a result, many merchants became linked in expansive networks of exchange. The unstable nature of long-distance trade meant that these networks were continually being transformed. The Liverpool–New York trade network, in particular, underwent many changes between 1763 and 1833. The article aims to demonstrate how the use of network visualizations over three distinct phases (1760–1790, 1790–1815, and 1815–1833) can elucidate these changes and provide a different approach for studying the development of this trading community. These visualizations will serve to illustrate the extent to which this network was dynamic and further our understanding of how merchant networks sustained longevity and coped with risks in the ever-changing Atlantic world.

Business historians have hitherto paid only scant attention to the Soviet experience. This article is an attempt to summarize the knowledge we have gained in the two decades following the collapse of the Soviet economy, and draws on published research, document volumes, and previously unexplored archival sources. In the conclusion, I make the case that the Soviet experience can provide relevant comparative examples for the field of business history.

As business historians embrace the narrative turn, they would do well to consider the opportunities provided by oral history. For-profit corporate storytellers offer one approach. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) of Canada’s call to action no. 92, however, offers a better one. This article explores the potential impact on business historians of the TRC, using the Petroleum Industry Oral History Project as an example.

Cinemagoing in the Netherlands during the 1930s appears to have been much less intense than in the English-speaking world. To support this assertion we examine film attendance and diffusion in the Dutch market by recourse to a new large dataset, and contrast it with observations drawn from recent research on the Anglo-Saxon countries (United States, United Kingdom, and Australia). In setting down the economic principles behind the organisation of the film industry that best describe the Anglo-Saxon model, we show how the Dutch experience differed in scale, but not in type. To investigate the reasons for this, we examine the idea that film consumption in the Netherlands was constrained through the operation of informal institutional pressures. In particular, we investigate the influence that the vertical stratification of Dutch society into distinct religious and ideological strands may have had on the filmgoing appetites of the Dutch people. A further investigation looks at the combination of exhibitors and distributors into a single industry cartel and its impact upon prices and cinema building. The paper concludes that a complex mixture of cultural, economic, institutional, and social factors were at play, causing the Dutch people to be an outlier as far as film provision and consumption was concerned.

Welfare capitalism, the management ethos adopted by American business leaders in the early twentieth century, emphasizes the role of business rather than trade unions or government in taking care of its workers. This article focuses on the reasons why the United States Rubber Company (USRC), one of the four largest U.S. rubber manufacturers, promoted welfare capitalism at its rubber plantations on the east coast of Sumatra and Malaya between 1910 and 1942. In addition, this study assesses the development of USRC's system of welfare in the areas of housing, profit sharing, pension plans, health care, and recreation. This article argues that USRC's intention was not to forestall unionization (the intention of U.S.-based companies in adopting welfare capitalism), as union formation in Southeast Asia during that period was very unlikely, but to overcome labor shortages and high turnover rates and to ensure labor stability. With reduced labor costs, the availability of financial resources allowed for technical innovations and R & D, which ultimately would lead to increased productivity.

The internationalization of business is the subject of an extensive theoretical literature as well as a growing number of historical studies. Historians have paid relatively little attention to the development of multinationals in the service sector, and studies about international publishing are especially scarce. This article discusses the early internationalization of two Dutch publishing firms, Kluwer (nowWolters Kluwer) and Elsevier (now Reed Elsevier) and confronts these case histories with the evolutionary theory of internationalization. The Dutch cases underline the important role of experience, knowledge and learning as well as of the national context in which companies develop. They also show that these factors allow for very different trajectories of internationalization within the same branch of business and the same country.

This article examines the Polaroid Corporation’s “experiment” in South Africa during the 1970s, which began after African American workers pressured the company to pull its operations out of South Africa in protest of the white minority government’s apartheid policies. It argues that Polaroid’s initiatives, little studied until now, led other American companies to question their presence in South Africa and inspired both student divestment movements at Harvard and other colleges and universities and the efforts of Leon Sullivan, whose 1977 “Sullivan Principles” urged American companies to treat their workers in South Africa as they would treat their counterparts in the United States in an effort to battle racism and apartheid. Despite Polaroid’s efforts, engagement with South Africa and apartheid proved futile, which initiated a larger movement to completely disengage from South Africa.

Although the automobile industry has served as the backbone of much business history scholarship, business historians have paid little attention to this industry’s actions concerning the complex of environmental issues that took hold in the 1960s. Volvo represents a captivating case study to gain insight into why the automobile industry’s growth has been difficult to align with the shift toward environmental sustainability. Although Volvo pioneered the exhaust emission control technology on the U.S. market in the 1970s and gained an international reputation for high environmental and safety standards in the decades that followed, the company was unable to seriously address climate change in the 1990s. This article identifies several key factors impacting the automobile industry’s passive response to environmental challenges—for instance, weak and asymmetric emission control regulations on international markets, consumer preferences for larger cars (SUVs) in the 1990s, and a lack of systematic regulatory pressure to shift from fossil fuels and the internal combustion engine. In the case of Volvo, world leadership in safety standards, rather than low carbon emissions, constituted the company’s competitive advantage as climate change emerged as one of the most critical environmental issues in the 1990s.

Business historians have treated the emergence of large, modern, vertically integrated meatpacking firms in the second half of the nineteenth century as the economically rational and inevitable product of the industry's search for ways to maximize profits through technological innovation, vertical integration, and the achievement of economies of scale and scope. This is only part of the story, however. Society's efforts to force the industry to abate its environmental pollution through government regulation and private lawsuits also stimulated and shaped these processes of modernization.

The question of the role of the state in the creation of competitive clusters and innovation systems has drawn increased attention in recent years. Drawing on Mariana Mazzucato’s concept of “the entrepreneurial state,” this article investigates the role of the public sector in the development of the Danish robotics cluster, a world-leading cluster for production of industrial robots that has developed after the closing of Maersk’s shipyard in the city of Odense. In what ways did public programs and actors contribute to the development of this cluster? In what ways did public programs facilitate entrepreneurs, and when did they function as agents or perhaps even risk-takers? To answer these questions, this article tracks three layers of public agency: the local, the national, and the European. This article concludes that there were crucial initiatives at all three levels and that these initiatives were not coordinated, but nevertheless connected by a certain zeitgeist—the idea of public institutions taking responsibility for the competitiveness of private companies, an idea that blossomed in the period of high globalization from the late 1980s to the 2000s. In other words, what united the efforts of the public sector was not any master plan but an underlying thought collective that made the workings of “the entrepreneurial state” flexible and fit for the unpredictable nature of innovation. Thus, this article argues that industrial policy did not wither away in the age of neoliberalism but changed its form in an increasing complexity of state-market relations.