The Mexican Revolution (1910) brought important changes to the social, political and economic spheres of Mexico. New legislation was passed to protect workers and redistribute land. The state acquired rights to petroleum, water, and subsoil minerals. For entrepreneurs this was an abrupt change from the previous regime. They had to adapt to the new policies and administrative state structure. Business lawyers aided companies in a country where the government had circumscribed the private sector's participation in the economy. Lawyers offered their clients important services, such as lobbying and aid in corporate restructuring. This article explores how in the midst of these new revolutionary regimes an important investment group used the services of business lawyer Manuel Gómez Morin to create Mexico's first holding company and to issue the first mortgage bonds in the country.

During 1870–1914, business actors were concerned about the increasing uncertainty and occasional cheating in commercial relationships. In such situations, economic actors seek to improve the information they have, so as to benefit from strong comparative advantages over their competitors. This essay analyzes the acquisition and circulation of information and the actors and rules involved between 1870 and 1914, through a comparative approach (France and Italy). It considers individual trading firms, professional associations, information intermediating agencies, and state offices. We argue that these agencies (and therefore markets and institutions) acted much less as rivals than as complements in this era. Indeed, product information is different from information on the reputation of economic actors, the latter generating further distinctions between reputation for payment, respect of deadlines, and fidelity to the terms and objects of the contract. In turn, such kinds of situated micro-information differ from general statistics on market evolution and prices. We show that most economic actors were much more interested in the former (specifics) than in the latter kinds of information. To demonstrate this point, we compare the way traders, their associations, and private and state agencies intervened in the gathering, circulation, and interpretation of economic information in two countries, Italy and France, between 1870 and 1914. We argue that their opposite outcomes were not simply the result of different “mentalities” or attitudes to risk (as exogenously given), but rather can be traced to the different institutional settings and economic segmentation of the market for information in these two countries. In fact, unlike the Italian government, French ministries refused to provide their traders with micro-information on potential overseas correspondents and product characteristics. That is to say, “attitude to risk” and “animal spirits” are not exogenous and cannot be studied outside a given historical and institutional context.

The geometric pattern of Amsterdam's canals was iconic of its nineteenth-century social order. The spider's web of canals fanned out along the Amstel river in concentric rings, its barge traffic linking the city to its hinterland, the province of Holland, and to the wider Netherlands of which it is the nominal capital. These canals divided the “Venice of the North” into ninety islands linked by more than a thousand bridges. Imposing aristocratic and merchant houses stretched along the innermost canal ring, the Golden Curve of the Gentleman's Canal. At the center of the web lay de Dam, the 200 m long market square built on the first medieval dike protecting the city from the encroaching sea. The three pillars of the Dutch state framed the market square: the Royal Palace of the Merchant King, the Dutch Reformed New Church, and in the nineteenth century, the Amsterdam stock market, the world's oldest exchange.

The half-century following the Civil War witnessed an epochal transformation in American telecommunications. In the 1870s, the telegraph network became a spawning ground for a remarkable spate of inventions that included the phonograph and the telephone, and around 1900 the telephone network became the first electrical communications medium that network providers intended to be accessible to the entire population. This transformation was a centerpiece of the still unprecedented burst of inventive activity that economic historians call the Second Industrial Revolution.

Why do the United States and France, both capitalist economies that were dominated by private railways in the 19th and early 20th centuries, have very different transport systems today? After World War II France developed 200 mph high speed trains, while railways in the United States declined to near irrelevance. This paper argues that cross-national divergence was caused by private and public actions that structured capitalmarkets and controlled planning. In the United States private financial institutions used capital markets to shape rail development. In France, by way of contrast, the state directly intervened in financial markets and controlled planning. Both systems thrived until World War I. But, then, faced with growing competition from cars, buses and trucks and burdened by excessive debt, they declined towards bankruptcy. The Great Depression became a defining moment as a Socialist-dominated government in France nationalized railways while in the United States, President Roosevelt's New Deal failed to enact policies to ensure the competitive viability of rail in relation to motorized transport. Rarely used archival sources provide much of the evidence for this argument.

While co-operatives are traditionally associated with workers, consumers, and farmers, the business model, with its emphasis on democracy and community, has also been adopted by small business owners, the self-employed, and professionals. These business co-operatives are distinct phenomenon, because they primarily consist of independent organizational entities that are not co-operatives and are generally in direct competition with one another. They are unique in that they bring together separate organizations that seek to combat market threats while adopting a philosophy based on co-operative principles. This article begins with an overview of the Australian co-operative landscape. It then defines the concept of business co-operatives and then draws upon the Visual Atlas of Australian Co-operatives History Project, which has developed a large database of Australian co-operatives over time and space, to examine the development of business co-operatives in Australia. It looks at where business co-operatives formed in the economy, the motivation underlying their formation, their average life spans, and their relationships with the broader co-operative movement. The article highlights the value of business co-operatives in introducing the values of participatory democracy and working for the common good into unanticipated markets and reinforcing the co-operative movement.

In the 1950s, part-time work gradually became an element of labor policy to activate women to participate in the labor market that could be transferred from one country to another. Support of part-time employment in the Dutch labor market, however, was initially not endorsed as a solution to the problem of low female labor force participation but was the outcome of a more complex set of deliberations, in which the moral economy of employers’ organizations conflicted with broader demands for increased productivity. The article contrasts the initial concerns of Dutch employers about increasing women’s labor force participation with the country’s later international role in advocating part-time work for married women on an international scale. The Netherlands thereby serves as a case study of how employers’ organizations instrumentalized part-time employment for their own moral economy based in the breadwinner ideology.

Conceptual metaphors, like Galambos and Amatori’s “entrepreneurial multiplier,” play a pivotal but largely unexamined role in historical interpretation. They do this by allowing historians to see one set of historical associations or relationships in terms of another, more familiar, one. I highlight this interpretive role by comparing Galambos and Amatori’s construct to Joseph Schumpeter’s “gale of creative destruction” and Arthur Cole’s “entrepreneurial stream” as metaphors that attempt to explain the relationship between entrepreneurship and historical change. I also point out the risks that taken-for-granted metaphors can have in narrowing room for interpretation, and argue that reflexivity and playfulness are essential to keeping conceptual metaphors alive as interpretive devices. I conclude by suggesting that metaphors are an intrinsic form of theorizing in historical interpretation, and illustrate my argument by briefly examining “industrial revolution” as a construct in business and economic history.

The precise nature of the relationship between the American business community and the New Deal has been a lively topic of debate in recent years. This article looks at an important figure and firm in that relationship (Thomas J. Watson of IBM) to increase our understanding of it. This article focuses chronologically on the period from the early 1930s through the mid-1950s, when New-Deal-era public policy innovations were most influential. The overall picture that emerges from this study of the U.S. business-government relationship during those years is one of business accommodation of major changes in social conditions and public policies rather than a view of business as the primary leader of change.

Management theory andtransaction cost economics provide few insights into the dynamics of multilateral negotiations. A host of factors suggest that complex transactions—especially those that involve government agencies—face a high probability of failure. Yet history records many examples of successful multiple-party transactions. Using the records of a major Australian iron ore mining venture, Hamersley Iron, this article reveals a number of the tactics that are usedto engineer an agreement when the parties concerned have conflicting objectives, different cultural affiliations, and distinctive institutional ties. The essay also exposes some of the devices that the Japanese steel industry—Hamersley’s main customer—used to secure competitive advantages in raw material procurement during the industry’s rise to international prominence.

This article is a case study of a Chinese indigenous firm in the refrigerated egg-packing industry during the interwar period. I argue that the China Egg Produce Company (CEPC) was quick to grasp Western management in terms of vertical integration and business diversification. In addition, this firm took advantage of embedded social relations and social networks to construct a strong “internal architecture.” As a result, CEPC not only rivaled some six to eight British and American enterprises, but also took the lead in persuading them to form an international cartel during the 1930s. The data presented in this case study shows the surprising vitality and adaptability of Chinese businesses and suggests that China was in the process of developing a modern business system prior to the chaotic events of the late 1940s.

In this article I examine corporative management practices in electronics firms in Boston and in Silicon Valley from the 1920s to the 1960s. Managers in several key firms developed these practices in response to political and professional ideologies and as a way to address the problems of hiring, using, and retaining a highly skilled work force. They did this independently of the welfare capitalism plans of corporations such as Eastman Kodak and before the guru theorists and work empowerment programs of the 1960s. The corporatist methods first developed in Boston and further refined in Silicon Valley later diffused to most U.S. firms in the software, computer, Internet, and biotechnology industries.

Alfred D. Chandler entered my professional life incrementally rather than dramatically.As a student of economic history at CambridgeUniversity in Britain in the early 1970s, I barely encountered his name. British universities had their own long traditions in business and economic history, including a strong interest in entrepreneurship and in government policies toward industry. Most British scholars were not especially enthusiastic about ideas from across the Atlantic, whether the methodological approach of the new economic history of Robert Fogel, or Chandler's organizational synthesis. Cambridge was an especially closed academic world, with a strong assumption that little that happened outside its delightful campus could be really important. It was not until 1979, when I was recruited by the Business History Unit at the London School of Economics (LSE), headed by Chandler's (then) acolyte Leslie Hannah, that I read Strategy and Structure, nearly two decades after it was published.

Is manufacturing flexibility a purely contemporary phenomenon, an outgrowth of computer-controlled technologies, volatile markets, and sophisticated consumers that did not exist in a previous age of Fordist mass production? Or did mass manufacturers in earlier periods face comparable problems of combining high productivity, low costs, rapid product innovation, and frequent adjustments to shifting demand? And if so, what technological and organizational solutions did they develop in response? Did the flexible manufacturing practices made famous by Japanese firms in the 1970s and 1980s such as just-in-time logistics, collaborative supplier relations, joint product development, quick tooling changes, and mixed-model assembly represent a sharp break with the canonical principles of Western mass production? Or were these innovations anticipated—and even to some extent inspired—by earlier experiments with manufacturing flexibility pioneered by American and European firms during the heyday of mass production itself ? Focusing on the archetypal mass production industry at the height of the Fordist era between the 1920s and the 1970s, the papers in this special issue of Enterprise & Society offer new and surprising answers to these questions.

The case study of Bresee's Department Store in Oneonta, New York, suggests that small-town department stores were not necessarily fully “modern” by the early twentieth century. This article demonstrates how modern, big-store, business methods came later and documents how earlier modes of trade, such as credit and bartering, persisted into the early twentieth century, even in non-rural, northern contexts. Preliminary findings suggest that eliminating the urban bias in much historiography by including small-town retailing practices may lead to a later periodization of American consumer society.

The article addresses the question to what extent American antitrust policy in Germany and Italy during the 1950s, was a success or not. Did these nations adopt this policy, did they adapt themselves to it, or did they completely reject it? By a detailed comparison of these two big European nations, Germany and Italy—both defeated powers of the Second World War, and both therefore strongly dependent on postwar American aid—the effects of the American antitrust policy will be analyzed. Eventually, the Germans better adapted, after initial resistance of German big business, to the American plans than the Italians, however, only in an amended and softer form. The Italian resistance—but we even use the expression prolonged rejection—to the economic reforms were much stronger. The US administration envisioned a unified free European market without cartels as early as 1943, however, it would take another fifty years before these ideas would be implemented.

This article examines the role of human resources in the business strategy of Ocean Steam Ship Company (later Ocean Transport & Trading), one of the United Kingdom’s leading shipping firms. The time under review is the 1970s, a period of rapid and disruptive change for the shipping industry and of considerable difficulties for the UK economy. As a result of uncertainty over the development of the shipping industry in general, and Ocean’s business in particular, managing staff numbers and career opportunities became key elements of the company’s overall business strategy during these years. The article also examines the changing objectives of that strategy, the means by which these objectives were pursued, and the external constraints under which these objectives had to take place. It argues that Ocean found itself privileging the requirements of running a “people business” over other strategic concerns and that external constraints prevented the firm from pursuing theoretically more appropriate strategies, such as increased use of outsourcing and extricating itself from its UK-based, human resource intensive business.

This paper traces the history of the Chinese fire insurance industry and Tai Ping Insurance, one of the most successful Chinese insurance companies in the early twentieth century. It provides a case study on the “indigenization” of fire insurance in China by retracing how a fledgling firm mastered selling a foreign financial product and managed to win market share in an ostensibly adverse environment. This paper argues that while Tai Ping benefited from the growing embrace of insurance by the Chinese public, its success was ultimately driven by the company’s economies of scale, cross-selling synergies, and tight connections to banking. This paper also explores the broader context in which fire insurance operated by examining how the indigenization of insurance in China unfolded, with Chinese insurers like Tai Ping mediating the introduction of a new financial product, the transfer of new institutions, and the diffusion of new knowledge regarding risk. More generally, the history of Tai Ping and the Chinese fire insurance industry addresses a research lacuna in the history of insurance beyond the developed markets in Western Europe and North America, which has typically focused more on the experiences of British and American multinational enterprises and less on that of native companies. By highlighting the degree of institutional convergence and divergence between the Chinese insurance industry and its global counterparts, this paper contributes to a more inclusive history of the internationalization of insurance.