The Inexact and Separate Science of Economics (ISSE) (Hausman, 1992) represents the most ambitious attempt to provide a systematic account of economic methodology since the first edition of Blaug's The Methodology of Economics (1980). As such, it has been the subject of extensive critical commentary (for example, Blaug, 1992b; Backhouse, 1995; Miller, 1996; Hahn, 1996; Mäki, 1996). For all the attention it has received, however, some important aspects of the book's thesis have not been developed properly. Two important ones are (1) what might be called, following the terminology used in the experimental economics literature, the ‘framing effect’ of Hausman's definition of economics, and (2) the significance of Hausman's claim that economists are committed to developing economics as a ‘separate’ science. To understand these points it is important to make explicit the position from which Hausman approaches the philosophy of science.

This note provides an introduction to the accompanying article by Allan Gibbard that was originally written for the 1968–69 Harvard graduate seminar conducted by Kenneth Arrow, John Rawls and Amartya Sen.

What role, if any, should the government perform in a society? Two very different answers to this question have been provided by John Rawls and Robert Nozick. For Rawls, the government plays an important role in ensuring that the principles of justice are realized in the workings of society. For Nozick (1974), the role of government is limited to that of providing protection. The debate over these two views has led to the questioning of the entire liberal doctrine, a questioning that has taken place not only within intellectual circles, but also within the society at large.

The term ‘communitarianism’ is often identified with ‘altruism’: an individual is taken to be communitarian-minded if he or she is concerned with the well-being of others, and not only with his or her own well-being. While communitarianism may embrace altruism, it is most appositely viewed as having a broader connotation. Consider, for example, the puzzle of voting behaviour, discussed by Amitai Etzioni (1988) and many others (including, very recently, Aldrich (1997)). Casting one's vote entails a cost, albeit usually a small one: however, if there are large numbers voting, then one's own vote has a negligible effect on the outcome. An altruist might therefore rationally refrain from voting (just as an entirely self-interested individual would), since he incurs a cost, and neither he nor anybody else receives a benefit. And yet, millions of people the world over regularly vote in elections. Other examples could also be given.

‘Group-oriented’ behaviour has been the focus of a number of recent studies. C. Clague (1993), for example, examines the roles of guilt and shame in discouraging tax evasion, and informally discusses how social influences may affect the strength of these sentiments. R. Naylor and M. Cripps (1993) examine the influence of social custom on individuals' propensity to join trade unions, while P. Nelson (1994) argues that in choosing which party to vote for people assign some weight to the preferences of persons they associate with.

In their article, Geoffrey Brennan and Loren Lomasky (1985, p. 199) present an alternative to market theories of voting behavior. Contrary to market theories which view the voter as acting to maximize the expected self-interest, the alternative view sees voting as fundamentally an act of self-expression: “Voting, like speech, is an expressive activity providing an outlet for one's moral sentiments. We suggest that it is the expressive return to a vote that frequently determines the behavior of individuals in large-number electorates.”

The social discount rate – the rate at which future benefit flows from government investment are discounted to present value – has been a frequent subject of technical debate among professional economists. From a broader perspective, however, the selection of an appropriate rate enjoins consideration of questions that define the very contours of our public philosophy. It carries implicit assumptions about the nature of citizenship, the relation between public and private spheres, and, most singularly, the status of a political society as it is located in time. A key determinant of intertemporal economic allocation, the social discount rate provides a unique registry of a polity's historical consciousness and perceptions of its intergenerational obligations. Yet the highly technical nature of the debate over the discount rate has proven inhospitable to scholars otherwise inclined to investigate its ethical dimensions. Some, notably A. K. Sen, have begun to address these philosophical issues, though much territory remains to be explored.

Scholars disagree about the plausibility of preference purification. Some see it as a familiar phenomenon. Others denounce it as conceptually incoherent, postulating that it relies on the psychologically implausible assumption of an inner rational agent. I argue that different notions of rationality can be leveraged to advance the debate: procedural rationality and structural rationality. I explicate how structural rationality, in contrast to procedural rationality, allows us to offer an account of the guiding idea behind preference purification that avoids inner rational agents. Afterward, I address two pressing challenges against preference purification that emerge under the structural rationality account.

Rubin and Pearl offered approaches to causal effect estimation and Lewis and Pearl offered theories of counterfactual conditionals. Arguments offered by Pearl and his collaborators support a weak form of equivalence such that notation from the rival theory can be re-purposed to express Pearl’s theory in a way that is equivalent to Pearl’s theory expressed in its native notation. Nonetheless, the many fundamental differences between the theories rule out any stronger form of equivalence. A renewed emphasis on comparative research can help to guide applications, further develop each theory, and better understand their relative strengths and weaknesses.

This paper proposes a novel measure of civic norm compliance. We combine the literature on norm compliance from institutional economics and social philosophy. Institutional economics draws on survey data to measure civic norms, whereas social philosophy offers a theoretical framework that proves fruitful when used to operationalize civic norms. This paper shows that significantly different results emerge when the operationalization of civic norms in institutional economics draws on the theoretical framework that social philosophy offers. Furthermore, this study is relevant for social philosophy too, as it shows the potential of survey data as a test-bed for philosophical theories of norm compliance.

Why should ‘better than’ be transitive? The leading answer in ethics is that values do not change with context. But this cannot be the entire source of transitivity, I argue, since transitivity can fail even if values never change, so long as they are complex, with multiple dimensions combined non-additively. I conclude by exploring a new hypothesis: that all alleged cases of nontransitive betterness, such as Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion, can and should be modelled as the result of complexity, not context-relativity.

This paper argues that Isaac Levi's account of preference reversals is only a limited success. Levi succeeds in showing that an agent acting in accord with his theory may exhibit reversals. Nevertheless, the specific account that Levi presents in order to accommodate the behavior of experimental subjects appears to be disconfirmed by available evidence.

The original position together with the veil of ignorance have served as one of the main methodological devices to justify principles of distributive justice. Most approaches to this topic have primarily focused on the single person decision-theoretic aspect of the original position. This paper, in contrast, will directly model the basic structure and the economic agents therein to project the economic consequences and social outcomes generated either by utilitarianism or Rawls’s two principles of justice. It will be shown that when the differences in people’s productive abilities are sufficiently great, utilitarianism dominates Rawls’s two principles of justice by providing a higher level of overall well-being to every member of society. Whenever this is the case, the parties can rely on the Principle of Dominance (which is a direct implication of instrumental rationality) to choose utilitarianism over Rawls’s two principles of justice. Furthermore, when this is so, utilitarianism is free from one of its most fundamental criticisms that it ‘does not take seriously the distinction between persons’ (Rawls 1971 [1999]: 24).

Motivation, agency, and public policy: of knights and knaves, pawns and queens, by Julian Le Grand, Oxford University Press, 2003, 230 pages.

Julian Le Grand offers an account of public policy that arranges views along two axes: a motivational axis, along which individuals can be knights or knaves, and an agency axis, along which they can be pawns or queens. Knaves are concerned to further their self-interest, understood broadly in terms of whatever people may care about. Following Hume, Le Grand calls such characters “knaves,” but this has no automatic connotations with illegal activities. Knights, on the other hand, are motivated to help others for no private reward, even to the detriment of their interests. Pawns, like the pieces on the chess board, are passive victims of circumstances, unable to make responsible choices. Queens do make such choices: they are empowered agents responsible for their fates.

Group judgements are often – implicitly or explicitly – influenced by their members’ individual expertise. However, given that expertise is seldom recognized fully and that some distortions may occur (bias, correlation, etc.), it is not clear that differential weighting is an epistemically advantageous strategy with respect to straight averaging. Our paper characterizes a wide set of conditions under which differential weighting outperforms straight averaging and embeds the results into the multidisciplinary group decision-making literature.

G.A. Cohen has criticized the capability approach for focusing on individuals’ freedom – their capability to control their lives – and ignoring benefits achieved passively. He argues that this view of well-being is excessively ‘athletic’. However, if the capability approach is employed to guide egalitarian public policy, capabilities are the appropriate goal of just distributive policies, not just components of individual well-being. When understood as a policy-guide, I argue that the capability approach's focus on ‘athletic’ individual freedom and control is justified: in the public domain, it is important not just that individuals receive benefits, but that they participate in their achievement.