It is often quite proper, philosophically speaking, to raise objections to a philosophical inquiry because it is seeking an answer to a question which ought not to have been raised in the first place. So in this instance, one might maintain that it is illegitimate to ask questions about the metaphysics of the Tractatus, just because the Tractatus is not the sort of book which is supposed to have a particular metaphysics. The Tractatus, we have heard said, is a book on the philosophy of language, not one on metaphysics; it is a specification of what language is, or ought to be like, and is not meant to have anything to do with the metaphysical constitution of the world.

In his lucid and perceptive essay, “Recent Work on Kant's Theoretical Philosophy”, Karl Ameriks signals Kant's distinction between appearances and things in themselves as one of the (two) “central issues” of the Critique of Pure Reason. The reason why the issue is central (and complicated) is that Kant appears to say contradictory things on the matter. At times he says (or implies) that appearances are the same as things in themselves, and at other times he says (or implies) that they are different. Some interpreters have tried to make sense of these contradictions by claiming that “although for Kant there are not two objects involved, there are still two transcendental and intelligible aspects or points of view that are called for by his doctrine of things in themselves and appearances”. However, it is not immediately clear what kind of an animal an aspect or a point of view is, what kind of operation it is to “look at” an object from such different points of view, and what kind of results this operation is supposed to give. In the present paper, I make a fresh proposal. I propose to interpret Kant's conflicting claims on the relation between things in themselves and appearances in terms of the contemporary framework of possible-world semantics.

It is obvious that teaching and research in informal logic (critical thinking, rhetoric) is a growth industry, indeed one of burgeoning proportions. Judging by skyrocketing enrolments and the avalanche of books, journals, computer aids, conferences, and workshops during the last decade, it would seem to be no passing fad but the overdue recognition of a societal need.

Quel statut donner aux calculs et surtout aux figures proposées par Henri Bergson pour expliquer le fonctionnement de la reconnaissance dans Matière et mémoire ? Ce travail suggère que ces calculs et ces figures ne sont pas que des métaphores commodes ; la réalité n'est pas dépourvue d'un certain nombre d’éléments et de grandeurs plus ou moins importantes. Il semble donc possible de supposer qu'après avoir arithmétisé les faits de conscience à l'aide de nombres spéciaux (dans l’Essai), Bergson géométrise l’être spirituel et matériel (dans Matière et mémoire).

This article defends the idea that causal relations between reasons and actions are wholly irrelevant to the explanatory efficacy of reason-explanations. The analysis of reason-explanations provided in this article shows that the so-called “problem of explanatory force” is solved, not by putative causal relations between the reasons for which agents act and their actions, but rather by the intentions that agents necessarily have when they act for a reason. Additionally, the article provides a critique of the principal source of support for the thesis that reason-explanations are causal explanations, namely, Davidson's argument in “Actions, Reasons, and Causes.” It is shown that Davidson's argument for this thesis rests crucially on two mistakes: his definition of intentional action and his ontological prejudice against intentions.

This article examines Confucius’ ideas of moral peace (an 安) and moral pleasure (le 樂) in the Analects. It argues that an and le are two correlated aspects of a self-cultivated state of being (jing-jie 境界) that is grounded on practising benevolence or human-heartedness (ren 仁) and on following the Way (dao 道). The state of an-le involves not only one's reason (i.e., knowing ren and dao) and one's will (i.e., willing ren and dao), but also one's love or ‘emotional liking’ (hào 好) with respect to the practice of ren and dao. It is a state that resembles Kant's idea of intellectual contentment but, pace Philip Ivanhoe's recent interpretation of Confucius, it is different from Aristotle's concepts of pleasure and eudaimonia.