As dynasties have traditionally used historical figures for their own political purposes, so too has the Chinese Communist Party used famous figures for its political purposes. Perhaps, more than any other person in the 20th century, the Party has used the prestige of China's pre-eminent modern writer Lu Xun for a wide variety of political, ideological, and factional purposes. Since his death in October 1936, his life and work have been interpreted in different periods to conform to the latest mutation in party policy. And when the Party became factionalized after the Great Leap Forward, different political factions used Lu Xun to represent their conflicting political positions.

This article examines China's most controversial soft power export – the Confucius Institute initiative – through the case study of its promotion and implementation in Ethiopia. As one of China's closest partners in Africa, Ethiopia presents a path-breaking case for examining the potential and the limitations of Confucius Institutes. In contrast to the existing literature that depicts Confucius Institutes largely as contested and limited initiatives, this article shows that Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms have thus far been relatively successful in Ethiopia. Specifically, China's fusion of practical or tangible benefits with language and cultural promotion – what I describe as “pragmatic enticement” – invokes support from key participants in this project, including university administrators, students and Chinese teachers. In the long term, however, even in the highly favourable context of Ethiopia, the sustainability of Confucius Institutes is questionable, as there are apparent gaps between the rising expectations of Ethiopian administrators and students, and the limited resources on the ground.

In recent years, the governments of China and India have initiated a strategic partnership. Talks of creating an integrated “Chindia” economic hub have been commonplace. Many studies have been undertaken from conflicting perspectives on bilateral relations at the high level, but how ordinary Chinese people view their contemporary Indian counterparts and how this provides a civic dimension to the partnership remains under-explored. In an authoritarian nation where exhibiting sentiments contrary to the party-state's policy is not encouraged and remains uncommon, the Chinese have increasingly relied upon the internet to express their views on various aspects of policy, including that towards India. Using systematic, qualitative research on the online community, this article categorizes the various opinions expressed by Chinese internet users about India, the Indians and Beijing's Indian policy; analyses the apparent huge gap between these perceptions and the official rhetoric of Beijing; and forecasts how such perceptions might influence future Sino-Indian relations.

In the fifth village elections in 2003 in Shaanxi province only 184 women were elected as village heads, a mere 0.6 per cent of the total. By the sixth elections in 2006 the number had almost doubled, and by the seventh elections in 2009 it had increased to 544. Together with the women on village Party committees, there were now 1,193 women village officials throughout the province, 4.5 per cent of the total. In contrast to leading women cadres within the formal structures of the political system, these village heads owed their positions not to nomination by upper levels of Party and government leadership but to success in fiercely competitive elections. Their success was the result of a grass-roots movement launched by a civil organization, the Shaanxi Research Association for Women and Family, to mobilize women's political participation. Their activities and trajectories had an impact on the local gender division of labour and entrenched gender attitudes that far surpassed the numbers alone. This article examines the collaboration between the Shaanxi Research Association for Women and Family and the All-China Women's Federation to mobilize women's political participation in Heyang county, Shaanxi province. It particularly focuses on the role of the Research Association in drawing on international feminist practices of women's empowerment to provide participatory based gender training courses as the key to persuading women to confront local and institutional resistance. Collaboration between the Research Association and the Women's Federation opened up access to significant resources both within and outside the system, creating new spaces for the articulation and protection of women's rights. Originating in a grass-roots movement, this collaboration can be seen as an instance of China's contemporary movement for gender equality.

China's response to the recent Syria crisis at the UN Security Council represents a crucial case in China's approach to intervention in that it breaks from China's recent practice of becoming more permissive regarding intervention. Instead, China actively worked to ensure that a firm line was drawn to separate intervention from foreign-imposed regime change. It did so by employing three diplomatic innovations: exercising multiple, successive vetoes; expanding discourse to delegitimize intervention as “regime change” by Western powers; and engaging in norm-shaping of the international community's “responsibility to protect” post-intervention. Together, these three innovations highlight China's desire to firmly separate the intervention norm from that of regime change. Using a variety of primary sources, the article also draws insights from interviews with foreign policy elites in Beijing, New York and New Delhi.

This article examines the global impact of China's post-Mao transformation as reflected in Sino-Cuban relations. China and Cuba resumed their comradeship after Castro endorsed China's crackdown of the 1989 pro-democracy movement, and since then Beijing has promoted its approach towards legitimizing the one-party regime through engaging in economic reforms and opening to the world to Havana. “China's lesson for Cuba” has been discussed by many Cubanists worldwide. However, the Chinese approach has posed a dilemma to Fidel Castro: he admires China's power but has doubts about the future of socialism in China. The article argues that Castro has so far adopted his old strategy for dealing with Soviet influence in the 1960s in his engagement with China: praising his political ally's power as the evidence of socialism's vitality for his domestic consumption, while significantly limiting the application of China's economic policies. But his more pragmatic successors, Raul Castro in particular, may adopt the Chinese approach.

This article deals with an example of local community religion in north China, the activities of a woman spirit-medium in a small village in Hebei province. This woman is believed to represent an ancient goddess, the Silkworm Mother (Cangu nainai), to whom people turn for healing illnesses not cured by Western or Chinese medicine. This study shows that local popular religion is very much alive in contemporary China.

Per capita peasant income in China rose only 0·5 per cent per year over the two decades prior to 1978. Rural income growth was not only slow, it also lagged far behind the 1·7 per cent per year rate of the urban sector, which had started from a higher base. In December 1978 participants at the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party ratified major policy changes designed to increase peasant income substantially. These and ensuing changes have raised the profitability of agriculture and altered production and marketing patterns. Before evaluating the magnitude and sources of income growth it will be useful to outline the major policy changes.

This study provides an overview of the origin, importance and strength of the non-leading cadre system and argues that the system plays a key role in building resilience in China's bureaucracy. The non-leading cadre system is administratively and politically important because it makes the party-state bureaucracy more adaptable and fosters cohesion among the elite cadre workforce. Although the system may appear to have institutionalized redundancy, this study argues that this redundancy has the benefit of making movement between leading and non-leading cadre status possible. In other words, the non-leading cadre system provides the various levels of the party-state bureaucracy with the leverage to develop their own measures for resolving their own problems. Putting aside the deficiencies in implementation, the non-leading cadre system is likely to remain durable and will help to develop an agile and resilient personnel management system, at least in the short to medium term.

Through analysing the early 1950s Thought Reform campaign, this article suggests a new approach to studying Chinese intellectuals. I highlight the reification of this social category under Communist Party rule. The campaign universalized zhishifenzi (知识分子) as a social classification, absorbed a diversity of people into the category and established within it multiple subject positions. This reification of the Chinese intellectual, which persisted after Thought Reform, had serious impacts on central policies, local organization and individual behaviour. My analytical perspective can further the understanding of CCP rule, state–intellectual relations and the experience of so-called Chinese intellectuals.

There is a common policy bias against creating an appropriate economic environment for rural growth in many less developed countries as governments attempt to strive for rapid industrialization through various interventions in both the urban and rural sectors. As a result, signals for resource flows are distorted and incentive to raise agricultural productivity is destroyed. Such structural distortions and the low level of income mean that investment in agricultural production is often unattractive and therefore funds for that purpose are scarce. Many developing countries have, over the past 40 years, attempted to alleviate this perceived inadequacy of credits, which was seen as the only inhibiting factor to rural development, by the provision of highly subsidized and controlled finance through the creation of specialized credit institutions. However, there is an increasing recognition that this conventional approach has failed to achieve its aim and its premises are seriously challenged.

This study addresses the Chinese Second World War victims' reparations movement (CWRM) against Japan as a case of contemporary Chinese memory politics. While many studies indicate the Chinese government's use of the war memories for political purposes, ours focuses on how official discourses are translated into citizens' political participation and how the state–society interactions lead to variation in the development of the movement sectors within the case of CWRM. Drawing on textual and ethnographic data and a theoretical “dynamic statism,” we argue that the central government's ambivalent attitude towards this ideologically useful yet institutionally troublesome movement created room for local governments and the movement to pursue their own causes. Yet the local and central governments' strong interventions, either facilitation or repression, discouraged civil society's participation and led to the underdevelopment of some movement sectors. In the sectors where the local governments held an attitude of absenteeism or co-operation, the movement was able to mobilize resources from civil society and state institutions and finally developed well.

This article compares cultural governance in Taiwan and China through their respective place-making processes. It investigates how cultural polices objectify tradition and popularize cultural landscape in local places for economic development and identity politics. Contrary to what would be commonly expected, the Chinese government adopted a minimalist approach while the Taiwanese government was much more hands-on. The sociopolitical histories of the two governments and their objectives are examined to understand this difference. In addition, the reactions of the locals to cultural policies in the two places are also contrasted. Finally, the different effects of cultural governance in China and Taiwan are examined. In particular, it was found that communal relations have deteriorated in China but strengthened in Taiwan as a result.

During the regime of Mao Zedong (1949–76), a number of Western scholars described Chinas modern history as moving from one orthodoxy, the Confucianism of the Qing dynasty, to the Marxism–Leninism– Maoism of the Peoples Republic. The cultural and intellectual pluralism of the intervening years of die early decades of the 20th century, the May Fourth movement, and even the more limited pluralism during the weak Leninist state and watered–down Confucianism of the Kuomintang Republic (1928–49) looked like an interregnum between two orthodoxies.1 When Deng Xiaoping came to power in 1978 and established a milder form of authoritarianism than that of his predecessor, a number of Western scholars revised their views of 20th–century Chinese history. As Deng carried out economically pragmatic policies and relaxed controls over the intellectual community as well as over peoples personal lives and geographic regions, they pointed out that the 1949 divide of the Chinese Communist revolution was not as sharp and as singular a break in modern Chinese history as it had been presented. Rather, it should be seen as part of the ongoing effort to build a strong Chinese state and modern economy, inspired by nationalist pride, going on since the end of the Qing dynasty in 1911.

This article uses an “urban landscapes” perspective to examine the urban sculpture scene and its production system in Shanghai. It reviews both the national urban sculpture discourse and urban sculpture planning practices since 1949, and then focuses on Shanghai specifically. It examines three major stakeholders in urban sculpture development and their interactions. The main argument is that Shanghai's urban sculpture scene has evolved due to the proliferation of aesthetic and symbolic sculptures as opposed to traditional monuments; however, urban entrepreneurialism and globalization have been shaped by the continuity of the Chinese ideological framework, which has transformed urban sculptures from explicit into veiled political didacticism under the guise of caring for the people.

The activities and functions of youth organisations are important factors in the life of most, if not all, political movements of the twentieth century. This is true of totalitarian, as well as of more liberally conceived political movements; however, special attention and emphasis has been given to youth organisations in Fascist and Communist societies, where the young people have been forced, pressured, or cajoled into such organisations from an early age and subjected to powerful influences designed to make them faithful and reliable tools or willing helpers of the ruling group or party. Nazi Germany's Hitler Jugend, Fascist Italy's Ballilla, and Soviet Russia's Komsomol are the best known examples of the totalitarian variety of youth organisation. In non-totalitarian societies the young are also given the opportunity to join such groups as the Young Conservatives in the U.K., Young Republicans and Democrats in the U.S., Junior Chambers of Commerce, YMCA, YWCA, Boy Scouts and the like. The difference between youth organisations in the two types of societies, from the Western viewpoint, is that our youth organisations are primarily created for the sake of the young people, who join them voluntarily for the sense of participation and outlet for their energies and talents which such organisations can provide, whereas the totalitarian youth organisations are created for purposes pursued by the ruling political group in those societies, to mould the thinking of youngsters along the desired lines, and to establish an apparatus for control both of the young members and of their relatives and friends. From the Communist viewpoint however, Western youth organisations are politically unsophisticated picnic and camping clubs, which insufficiently prepare young people for the responsibilities facing them in later years and fail to provide them with the ideals for a “correct” political outlook.

A number of recent publications have given detailed accounts of the gulag system in the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), filling an important gap in the available literature. Comprehensive descriptions of the huge prison and labour camp network, which has administered the lives of 20 to 30 million convicts since 1949, are generally based either on the analysis of official documents, in particular notices and regulations,1 or on information gathered from former prisoners.2 The brutal treatment of political prisoners in the regimes penal institutions, the gradual destruc– tion of human beings in labour camps, and the widespread use of torture and physical violence in thought reform are some of the most disturbing aspects of a gulag system that have been vividly evoked in many autobiographies.3 Beyond these general descriptions, however, virtually f nothing is known about the number of camps, the scope of labour reform or even the daily lives of common prisoners. The major difficulty encountered in research on the gulag system is the lack of more substantial empirical evidence, as internal documents formulated by prison administrations, public security bureaus or other security departments are f difficult to find. Indeed, anyone found guilty of leaking special classified documents will be convicted of a counter–revolutionary crime.

Introduction Since the late 1970s, when the current programmes seeking to modernize China's defence establishment began, issues of military doctrine, strategy and operations have remained at the forefront of China's quest for a defence capacity capable of being ranked among the world's great powers. As the Chinese leadership contemplated defence modernization, they could not but recognize the Janus-like quality of their armed forces. One face looked back on the people's war traditions that served them so well and for so long, while the other faced the complexities of conventional and strategic nuclear warfare and deterrence in the latter part of the 20th century.

This paper attempts to assess just how much and in what ways behaviour has changed between the generation that experienced the Son-fan, Wu-fan Campaign in 1951–52 and the generation that pitched itself into the Cultural Revolution of 1966–69. We focus in the first instance on the confluence of the San-fan with a thought reform movement in the schools in 1951–52, in which students “drew a clear line of demarcation between self and family,” often denouncing their parents, and in which a youth vanguard forced their teachers as well to criticize themselves. Impressionistic comparisons between that campaign and the Cultural Revolution of the ways in which adoles-cents tried to establish continuity between patterns of behaviour learned in childhood and adult social-political roles may reveal differences in the direction and nature of their rebelliousness and may reflect changes in family relationships and in socialization patterns.