A general perception of crisis at the end of the postwar period of growth has spawned two types of theoretical response: while a conservative theory of overload focusses on ungovernability caused by postmaterialist value change, radical analysis points to the structural contradictions of the welfare and intervention state. This article suggests that the current crisis is characterized by postmaterialist persistence and structural contradictions under the conditions of economic constraint. It examines polarization and potential mobilization of fragmented postindustrial societies in the context of neo-conservative politics, and it suggests a regime of economic dualism and/or corporatism as the most likely outcome.

Arguments for tolerance, and criticisms of it, regularly produce paradoxes and other kinds of conceptual difficulty. We seek to show that these paradoxes are unnecessary, and that they arise from misconceptions of what a theory of tolerance is required to justify. Imagined as a “virtue,” tolerance is simply confused with other concepts; understood in the framework of a theory of “rights,” the element of choice essential to the concept is wholly neglected; explaining the concept in terms of some theory of fallibilism leads to a confusion of pragmatic with cognitive standards. Moreover, such mistaken approaches often arise from an equation of tolerance with liberalism or pluralism: the authors maintain, however, that justifications of tolerance do not rest on a commitment to any political theory or ideology, but imply only a recognition of the political situation itself.

Do consumer and producer considerations influence support for future trade agreements and, if so, how? Prior research has pitted self-interest-based explanations of trade preferences against perception-based explanations, finding limited empirical support for the self-interest hypothesis. Instead of treating perceptions and self-interest as competing explanations, we construct a theoretical model with perceptions of trade as a mediating factor linking self-interest and support for prospective free trade agreements (FTAs). Using new survey data collected by the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, we examine how two distinct forms of self-interest (consumer and producer considerations) can indirectly shape attitudes toward the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). We find that the impact of respondents' income level (proxying producer considerations) and their recognition of the price-lowering effect of international trade (proxying consumer considerations) on support for the TPP are largely mediated by perceptions of trade. Together the findings suggest a middle ground between the two sides of the self-interest debate.

This article argues that Simeon's insistence on the value of explicit comparison within individual studies of public policy needs to remain central even in historical institutionalist approaches which “take time seriously” and focus on causal mechanisms—a methodological injunction sometimes seen to augur in favour of single-case and single-outcome studies. However, if Simeon's suggested approach is to reflect the major advances that have occurred since he wrote, it will require more fully and more explicitly combining the power of the comparative method with the powerful insights generated by a logic of intertemporal causal mechanisms unfolding over time.

Scholarly research suggests that Canadian election campaigns are centralized affairs, with party headquarters managing a disciplined campaign organization across 338 federal constituencies. At the same time, local realities can incentivize constituency campaigns to deviate from their parties. This article examines the extent of local campaign discipline, given these tensions between parties’ centralizing compulsions and countervailing forces that militate against party cohesion. The article relies on original data to identify and explain the extent of local campaign behaviour that defies central party preferences and directives. It draws from interviews with 87 former candidates and eight party strategists, as well as observational data gathered from 10 constituency campaigns during the 2019 federal election. The findings indicate a relatively high level of undisciplined constituency campaign behaviour during the 2015 and 2019 elections. The article contends that this behaviour stems from insubordination, innovation and incompetence within constituency campaigns.

Abstract. The United States and Canada enacted similar campaign finance reforms in the early 2000s. This article draws upon interviews with leaders of the major Canadian interest groups to explore similarities and differences in the responses of Canadian and American interest groups to reform. While groups in both countries shared an increased emphasis on mobilization and communication with members, the Canadian reforms were more effective at removing many groups from political campaigns entirely. This difference is primarily a result of differences in the two nations' party systems and the historical development of interest groups in the two countries.

Résumé. Au début des années 2000, les États-Unis et le Canada ont promulgué des lois similaires visant la réforme du financement des campagnes électorales. Cet article est basé sur des entretiens avec les chefs des principaux groupes d'intérêt canadiens. Il étudie les ressemblances et les différences entre leurs réponses à ces réformes et celles des groupes d'intérêt américains. Même si les groupes des deux pays ont tous insisté sur la communication et la mobilisation de leurs membres, les réformes canadiennes ont mieux réussi à éliminer entièrement plusieurs groupes des campagnes électorales. Cette différence s'explique surtout par la structure différente des deux systèmes de partis politiques et par l'évolution historique des groupes d'intérêt dans ces deux pays.

There has been a recent tendency, with deep historical roots in structural-functionalism and elite analyses, to insulate the state from class formations and struggles. Reacting against classical Marxist and neo-Marxist attempts to locate certain features of state policy in the class struggles of capitalist formations, there has been a reversion to “explaining” state policy solely by the “internal dynamics” of state administration and the motives and intentions of their incumbents. Leslie Pal's critique of my work in his article is yet another attempt in this tradition. After critiquing my “narrow” use of “relative autonomy” and “rigid” reliance on “class struggle” to account for the introduction of the Employment and Social Insurance Act of 1935 and the Unemployment Insurance Act of 1940, he offers an alternative classless “model” which relies heavily on actuarial ideology and federal-provincial relations in the dynamics of internal state administration. In light of his use of my work as a point of departure, I will make only a few salient points. My comments are divided into two parts: theoretical assumptions and the class nature of actuarial ideology.

Canada is beginning to slowly embrace an ethic of Indigenous-settler biculturalism. One model of change is afforded by the development of biculturalism in Aotearoa/New Zealand, where recent Indigenous Māori mobilization has created a unique model in the Western settler world. This article explores what Canada might learn from the Kiwi experience, focusing on the key identity marker Pākehā, an internalized and contingent settler identity, using Indigenous vocabulary and reliant on a relationship with Indigenous peoples. This article gauges Pākehā’s utility in promoting biculturalism, noting both its progressive qualities and problems in its deployment, including continued inequality, political alienation, and structural discrimination. While Canada has no Pākehā analogue, terms such as “settler” are being operationalized to develop a larger agenda for reconciliation along the lines recommended by the Truth and Reconcilliation Commission. However, such terms function best when channelled towards achieving positive concrete goals, rather than acting as rhetorical screens for continued inaction.

Abstract. This paper examines contemporary debates in Maori politics by responding to the argument of the former leader of the opposition National party, Don Brash, that Maori public policy is most properly based on “need” alone because indigenous status offers no “rights” beyond those of common national citizenship. The paper's alternative argument is that the politics of indigeneity and associated theories of self-determination provide a way of avoiding a general belief that addressing need is all that is required to include Maori fairly in the national polity. It is argued that Maori ought to enjoy rights of indigeneity as the basis of an inclusive, cohesive and fair society.

Résumé. Cette étude examine certains débats dans le domaine de la politique maorie en répondant aux propos de l'ancien chef du parti National, Don Brash, selon qui la politique publique maorie se baserait le plus aptement sur la notion du seul ‘besoin’, le statut de peuple indigène ne conférant aucun ‘droit’ au-delà de ceux qu'accorde la citoyennenté nationale régulière. Nous proposons par contre que la politique de l'indigénéité et les théories de l'auto-détermination qui y sont associées constituent un moyen de parer à une croyance généralisée qu'il suffirait de suppléer au besoin pour inclure avec justice les Maoris dans la politique nationale. Nous démontrerons que dans une société inclusive, cohésive et juste, les Maoris devraient jouir des droits accordés par l'indigénéité.

Abstract. Effectively managing the Canada–US border has emerged as a major security challenge post-9/11. Burden-sharing theories suggest that the United States would take the lead on border security due to its hegemonic role in ensuring North American security, while smaller nations such as Canada enjoy a free ride. We refute the free-rider hypothesis and propose an approach which accounts for the differentiated concerns held by contiguous states. By dedicating sizeable resources to the issue of border security and by appealing to advantageous negotiation strategies, Ottawa has leveraged its position as a secondary state vis-à-vis the United States. Efforts employed by the province of Quebec have bolstered Canada's relative influence in this issue area. We argue that Quebec and Ottawa perceived and acted on complementary interests which empowered the Canadian government to respond more forcefully to US-driven border security measures after 9/11. We conclude with alternative models to border security management, as well the practical implications of our argument.

Résumé. Un des défis majeurs depuis le 11 septembre 2001 concerne la gestion de la frontière entre le Canada et les États-Unis. Les théories sur le partage du fardeau supposent que les États-Unis sont l'acteur dominant dans l'élaboration des politiques frontalières, assurant la sécurité du continent nord-américain. En contrepartie, les états secondaires, comme le Canada, se voient souvent attribuer le rôle du passager clandestin dans ces interactions. Cet article porte sur le partage du fardeau entre le Canada et les États-Unis en ce qui a trait à la sécurité frontalière. Nous réfutons l'hypothèse du passager clandestin en proposant une approche qui prend compte des préoccupations distinctes des deux états voisins. En investissant d'importantes ressources pour la gestion de la frontière et en appliquant des stratégies de négociations avantageuses, Ottawa a su surmonter son statut de puissance moyenne face aux États-Unis. Le Québec a contribué au renforcement de la position canadienne en agissant de concert avec Ottawa, puisque les deux paliers poursuivaient des intérêts complémentaires. Le résultat de cette coopération est une riposte cohérente et soutenue démontrée par le gouvernement canadien face aux mesures de sécurité initiées par les États-Unis après le 11 septembre. Enfin, nous discutons également des implications pratiques de notre argument en comparant les différents modèles dans la litérature portant sur la gestion de la sécurité frontalière.

The ideological weakness of modern liberalism has long been recognized as one of the more striking features of contemporary politics. Although constitutional democracy has on the whole proved rather more successful than totalitarian government in satisfying the ordinary needs of men, its achievements have generally failed to arouse a great deal of enthusiasm. In comparison with the aggressive self-confidence of communists and fascists, the attitude of contemporary liberals is notoriously defensive and pessimistic. What are the causes underlying this curious failure of liberal morale? To what extent can it be attributed to deficiencies in the theoretical structure of modern liberalism? These questions must be of interest to anyone who is concerned with the problems of contemporary political thought.

When substantial accomplishments fail to evoke enthusiasm, it is reasonable to suppose that those accomplishments are being measured against standards which in some way or other are alien to their nature. A good deal of the weakness of modern liberalism arises out of the fact that it insists on judging the achievements of constitutional democracy, an essentially pluralist system, in terms of standards which are still largely absolutist in character. Liberal government depends in practice on the existence of a multi-myth, multi-group society. Policy is determined not, as in totalitarian countries, by imposing the will of a homogeneous ruling group upon the rest of the community, but by a process of parliamentary negotiation between the supporters of widely varying points of view. In a society of this sort, the coercive functions of government are necessarily limited by the claims of rival individuals and groups.

Because Canada has a labour force composed of more than one language stock, it is of interest to ask what social organization has developed to take account of this pluralism in her work world. Such an interest may take two main forms. First, with respect to a language variable, differences in occupational opportunities may be seen as the sole problem of Canadian Indians and Eskimos, of French Canadians, or of New Canadians. Second, we may wish to find out how our different language groups achieve interdependence in actual work situations and with what consequences for society as a whole. It is the second approach which will be adopted here; in a sense it includes the first, since the problem of any group stems in large part from the ways in which groups act on each other. The groups to which I shall limit my discussion will be the English and the French Canadians, but my remarks will undoubtedly apply, at least in part, to groups who speak other languages.

The view taken in this paper is that in our society, because English is the sole language which has currency in all aspects of social activity, people of different mother tongues have unequal opportunities for work. In a plural society, two consequences follow from the dominance of one language: a limited utilization of the potential skills of those who do not know the dominant language perfectly and a disengagement of the other mother tongues from important aspects of social reality.

Résumé. La mobilisation de différents courants du néo-institutionnalisme permet de comprendre la destinée politique et sociale des institutions étatiques en Afrique. Les institutionnalismes historique et du choix rationnel, placés sous les auspices de l'institutionnalisme sociologique rendent possible le dépassement des institutions formelles et des constitutions rigides au profit des normes et valeurs parallèles influençant effectivement le comportement des acteurs. C'est la “ paraconstitution ” tant ces normes et valeurs ont une centralité réelle dans le vécu socio-politique. En tant qu'elle est une donnée constante, la “ paraconstitution ” est une importante catégorie d'analyse des processus de démocratisation en Afrique.

Abstract. The mobilization of different currents of neo-institutionalism is helpful in understanding the social and political destiny of power institutions in Africa. When placed under the umbrella of sociological institutionalism, others institutionalisms such as rational choice institutionalism and historical institutionalism can go beyond formal institutions and rigid constitutions. The notion of “paraconstitution” is suggested hereby in a generic perspective for the understanding of concrete or parallel norms and values that effectively shape the behaviour of political actors. Sociological institutionalism permits the apprehension of dynamic interactions between political practises and culture in Africa without falling into the trap of culturalism.

This study tests explanations of the choice of policy instruments. The comparative analysis of the Canadian and United States energy policies for the period 1973-1996 concludes that the choice of a policy instrument is a function of (1) whether the degree of constraint involved is consistent with the ideological predisposition of the party in power, (2) whether the agency needed to implement the instrument already exists, thus reducing costs, (3) whether a policy transfer from other jurisdictions is possible or whether policy harmonization is required, and (4) whether the target groups affected by the use of the instrument are likely to oppose its use.

In 1946, after visiting Russia, Harold Innis remarked that the time had come to broaden the range of political economy by studying, first, the struggle for social supremacy between states, churches and commerce; and, second, the related competition between languages, religions, cultures and communications media. This, I argue, is what Innis accomplished. His early studies of Canadian economic history transcended conventional economics and laid the groundwork for a later political theory of communications. It expressly took up the 1946 challenge to address competing monopolies of knowledge and power, hence manipulating the space and time-binding properties of communications media. Innis' work reflected a materialist model of communications, a social ecology, a soft determinism or philosophic naturalism and it linked knowledge, freedom and power. Finally, I conclude, these insights permitted Innis to transcend bias and to search for a balanced culture.

Résumé. Cet article a pour objectif de présenter les racines intellectuelles de la politique étrangère canadienne promue par David Bercuson et Barry Cooper, deux membres de ce que d'aucunes appellent « l'école de Calgary », et à qui on attribue une certaine influence sur la pensée du gouvernement Harper. L'article montre que bien que leurs prescriptions puissent se résumer à première vue à un désir de rapprochement avec les États-Unis, leur politique étrangère repose sur des fondements plus complexes, qui combinent leur propre lecture de l'histoire canadienne et des intentions ayant présidé à la Confédération, une certaine conception des relations internationales, ainsi qu'une réflexion philosophique et anthropologique sur la violence, le tout ayant été fortement influencé par la conscience politique particulière de l'Ouest canadien.

Abstract. This article explores the intellectual roots of Canada's foreign policy as conceived and promoted by David Bercuson and Barry Cooper, two prominent members of the “Calgary School” and public intellectuals credited with influencing the Harper government's view of the world. While their notion of Canada's foreign policy can be simply boiled down to their belief that Canada should align with the foreign policy of the United States, it is, in fact, more complex. Bercuson and Cooper's vision of Canada's foreign policy blends in a distinct way their own understanding of Canadian history and the original intent behind Canadian Confederation; their particular conception of international relations; philosophical and anthropological reflections on violence; and their typically Western Canadian political consciousness.